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3 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates the reasons of the failure for resettlement programmes in 
preventing the impoverishment of people displaced by development projects. It is also 
concerned with the contribution that economics can make to the improvement of 
resettlement theory and practice, in particular through political economy and choice 
experiment methodologies. The investigation is carried out through a case study of the 
Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh, which will lead to the submersion of 177 villages and 
the displacement of 200,000 people. The research originates from the acknowledgement 
that the failure of resettlement programmes is determined at, and reflected through, the 
theoretical, methodological and practical levels. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the existing literature on 
displacement and resettlement and identifies where failures are located at theoretical and 
methodological levels. The unsatisfactory use of economics in dealing with the problem of 
resettlement is pinpointed as a major cause of theoretical and methodological deficiencies. 
In order to tackle these, alternative approaches from within the discipline are suggested. 
These include the use of choice experiments to consult the affected population directly 
about their resettlement. Also emphasised is the potential contribution of political economy 
to the theoretical understanding of resettlement, and a framework based on the notion of 
adverse incorporation is developed. 
The second part clarifies the methodology employed to investigate displacement and 
resettlement in the case study, and describes the case study itself. 
The third part describes the findings of the choice experiment and the adverse 
incorporation framework as applied to the case study and assesses their potential 
contribution to resettlement research. Evidence of the performance of resettlement in 
Polavaram in practice is also provided. It is found that the resettlement of the Polavaram 
affected people is likely to fail in preventing further impoverishment and to lead instead to 
their adverse incorporation into the local process of development. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The day I arrived in India for my fieldwork in April 2009 the India International Centre 
of Delhi was hosting a retrospective on Werner Herzog's work, with a screening of the 
movie Fitzcarraldo (at least that’s how it was advertised in that week's edition of Delhi's 
Timeout). The movie tells the story of Fitzcarraldo, a rubber baron who, in the early 20th 
Century, projects to transfer a steamboat from the Ucayali River in Peru to the Amazon 
river, having it hauled over an intervening mountain by the local indigenous people. 
Herzog's movie had vividly struck my imagination when I first saw it, and I had just 
come to India to investigate a project that plans to alter nature in the name of progress, 
imposing the burden of the operation on the local indigenous people, namely the Polavaram 
dam project in Andhra Pradesh. So, despite the absurdity of Fitzcarraldo's mission, I 
considered an interesting and inspiring coincidence that the movie was being screened the 
day I set to start my research.  
Of course the analogies between Fitzcarraldo's project and the Polavaram dam project 
end here, for a start because Fitzcarraldo acts in name of his own (hedonist) interest, that is 
earning enough money to build an opera house in the town of Iquitos, Peru. The Polavaram 
dam instead is claimed to be built in name of the common good, that is for the provision of 
irrigation and electricity for the population of Andhra Pradesh. The high – but apparently 
unavoidable – price to pay for this common good is the submersion of 177 villages and the 
displacement of 200,000 people.   
The Polavaram dam is just one of the many displacement-inducing development projects 
being implemented in India (and across the world). The price paid so far has been high: it 
has been estimated that 60 million people have been displaced by development projects in 
India since Independence (Fernandes 2011). More displacement is foreseeable in the future, 
as the development strategy pursued currently by the government is intensive in natural 
resources, in primis in land and water. Land and water for instance are required to make 
way to the massive investment in infrastructure considered essential to remove the 
constraints to growth in India (Planning Commission 2006), and that at the moment 
encompasses, among others, the National Highways Development Programme, the National 
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River Linking Project (which aims to connect 37 major rivers of the country through 
artificial dams and canals and of which the Polavaram project is part), and 581 Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) approved since 2005. 
In India, not only the price for development has been high in terms of displacement, but 
it has been also primarily paid by the same displaced people, leading to landlessness, 
homelessness, marginalisation and overall impoverishment (Fernandes 2008, 2011). This 
means that measures to support the affected people in paying the costs of displacement (and 
implicitly to redistribute them among the population) have not been implemented or they 
have failed in achieving their aim. 
These measures are of two types: i) the restitution in cash or in kind of what has been 
lost through displacement,  and ii) the relocation of the displaced people in a new 
settlement, possibly with the provision of housing and other basic services.  
The first type of measures is usually referred to as 'compensation' and it consists 
primarily of the payment of monetary compensation for the loss of house and land, 
according to the legislation on land expropriation in force in each country. Compensation 
for displacement raises two main issues: firstly, whether the restitution of money in lieu of 
land is appropriate and secondly, the identification of the exact losses to be compensated.  
The first issue concerns the impossibility or the unwillingness of the displacing-project 
authority (whether the state or a private entity) to provide land in compensation for the land 
expropriated. The second issue descends from the first, as the loss of land can imply the 
loss of livelihood, for instance if the displaced people are farmers or indigenous populations 
depending on forest produce. If the loss of livelihood is recognised as one of the main costs 
of displacement, then the problem becomes how to estimate this cost, and whether to 
compensate for it or not.  
The second type of measures are referred to as 'Resettlement and Rehabilitation' (or just 
'resettlement' for brevity) and encompasses the physical relocation of the displaced 
population in a new settlement. Relocation is usually combined with the provision of 
additional benefits, which can range from construction of basic infrastructure in the 
settlement, to the attribution of a job to each resettled family. There is no uniformity in the 
definition and implementation of this second type of measures, primarily because of the 
lack of a compulsory legislation establishing its objectives and modalities. This is also the 
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case in India, where at present no national policy or legislation exists which regulates the 
resettlement of people displaced by development projects.  
An extensive literature exists testifying to the failed implementation of the two types of 
measures identified above over 60 years of displacement in India (see Dreze et al 2000, 
Parasuraman 1999, Jain and Bala 2006, Mehta 2009, Modi 2009, Somayaji and Talwar 
2011). 'Failed implementation' refers to two main issues in this context: firstly, the fact that 
these measures have not been implemented at all or have only been implemented partially; 
secondly, the fact that they were put into practice and didn't have the expected results. In 
particular, in most instances resettlement programmes did not prevent the displaced people 
from experiencing a drop in their living standards and fall into poverty.  
So far, the academic and policy debate has explained the failure of resettlement 
primarily in terms of management failures (see for instance Mathur 2006, 2011). 
Meanwhile, it has argued that cash compensation alone can at best restore the level of well-
being previous to displacement, but not to improve it; it has also claimed that in this sense 
cash compensation is unjust, as it does not allow the displaced people to enjoy the benefits 
of the project. The solution proposed by the literature is to provide compensation and to 
approach resettlement as a development project, complementing the cash transfers with 
investments directed at improving the livelihoods of the affected people. These investment 
projects, in turn, should be financed with different mechanisms of benefit-sharing such as 
revenue and equity sharing (see Cernea and Mathur 2008 and in particular Cernea in the 
same volume).  
This thesis contributes to the debate on the failure of resettlement (in particular on the 
second type of failure, i.e. resettlement being implemented but not having the expected 
results), researching how the latter is determined and reflected through, the theoretical, 
methodological and practical levels.  
First, the thesis argues that the failure of resettlement is poorly understood at the 
theoretical level. Second, it claims that at the methodological level inappropriate fields of 
economics are being researched for possible solutions to the failure of resettlement. Third, 
the thesis shows that while the success of resettlement programmes is influenced by 
effective implementation and management, structural factors beyond pure management 
issues play an important role for the success or failure of these projects. Moreover, the 
18 
thesis argues that these structural factors will fundamentally depend on the characteristics 
of the affected population and of the relocation area. As such, this research is also 
concerned with the contribution that economics can make to the improvement of 
resettlement theory and practice, in particular through political economy and choice 
experiment methodology. This contribution is explored employing a political economy 
framework and a consultation exercise based on choice experiment to assess the 
resettlement of the Polavaram displaced people.   
In sum, the three original contributions of this thesis then are: i) the description of an 
instance of development-induced displacement still neglected by the literature; ii) the 
development of a framework based on the notion of adverse incorporation to improve the 
theoretical understanding of resettlement; iii) the investigation of the potential contribute of 
choice experiments to the design of better resettlement packages. 
The rest of this chapter clarifies these three original contributions and how they address 
the three levels (practical, theoretical and methodological) through which the failure of 
resettlement is reflected. First, however, a clarification of the terminology used in this 
thesis is needed. 'Resettlement and Rehabilitation' (abbreviated to R&R), 'resettlement 
programme' and 'resettlement package' are used interchangeably and, unless otherwise 
specified, they refer to both types of measures described above, that is to the payment of 
compensation and to the physical relocation with additional benefits and provision. By 
contrast, when the word 'resettlement' is used by itself, it is meant to indicate the whole 
process encompassing displacement, physical relocation and the effects of each given type 
of resettlement programme. 
 
i. Resettlement in practice: the Polavaram dam as an instance of development-
induced displacement 
Resettlement is first and foremost a problem of policy and must be investigated in 
practice, i.e. in its concrete display. The Polavaram dam project in Andhra Pradesh offers a 
rare occasion to study an instance of displacement and resettlement from the very first 
stages of its implementation, having the dam's construction only started in 2004 and being 
the physical relocation of people far from being completed. Investigating the performance 
of resettlement in Polavaram, and the factors determining its success or failure, is 
19 
particularly important in order to provide an assessment of the Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation (R&R) policy issued by the government of Andhra Pradesh in 2005.  
In addition to issues specific to the dam project itself, the Polavaram dam is also 
emblematic of the wider contradictions and dysfunctional outcomes characterising the 
growth strategy adopted by India. Indeed, the construction of the dam commenced in 2004 
(an electoral year) as part of a massive irrigation development plan called “Jalayagnam”, 
aimed at reviving agricultural growth in the state, as well as generating hydroelectric power 
for industrial activities. Yet, the project is surrounded by a number of controversies which 
have raised doubts about the fairness of the distribution of costs and benefits among the 
affected population. In particular, it is feared that the displaced people will bear most of the 
costs of the project, without enjoying any benefit. The main cause of concern is, together 
with the number of people displaced, their peculiar socio-economic characteristics. Most of 
the people are poor and belong to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs and STs 
henceforth in the thesis). Their main sources of livelihood consist in marginal farming, 
agricultural wage labour and collection of forest produce. Displacement will imply the 
expropriation of land and relocation away from the forest. As a consequence, the 
livelihoods of the displaced people will be disrupted. Besides, the submersion area is 
classified as a Fifth Schedule Area. According to the Indian Constitution, in the Fifth 
Schedule Area, land transfer and use are subject to a special regulation, and STs enjoy 
special rights and provisions.  The main consequence for the Polavaram-affected people is 
that only STs are entitled to land for land compensation, while the rest of the population is 
granted monetary compensation for the loss of land. It can thus be argued that the costs of 
the project will be borne primarily by the most vulnerable section of the population. In 
addition, this research shows that the likely effect of this differential treatment for SCs and 
STs is an increase in landlessness and fragmentation of landholdings for SCs after 
resettlement. 
To investigate the practical consequences of resettlement policies, an in-depth case study 
of the Polavaram dam project has been conducted. The case study consists of both primary 
and secondary data generated and collected during fieldwork in the Polavaram affected area 
in April-July 2009. In particular, visits to the affected villages, to the project site and 
interviews with government officials were used to generate evidence on advance of the 
project and of the resettlement operations. Moreover, a survey was conducted with 167 
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households belonging to 15 affected villages, to collect information on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the affected people. A choice experiment was also implemented with each 
of these families. Finally, focus groups were run in eight of the villages visited. 
 
ii. Resettlement in theory and resettlement theory 
To the extent that a poor theoretical understanding of a practical problem leads to the 
prescription of ineffective policies, the failure of resettlement in practice is originated in the 
weak theoretical understanding reproduced by the dominant discourse around development-
induced displacement.1 
This discourse, termed the “reformist-managerial” approach (Dwivedi 2002), is the one 
brought forward by the World Bank. Its two main pillars are the World Bank’s policy 
framework on involuntary resettlement, and resettlement models which provide theoretical 
support to the management and implementation aspects of the process. The “reformist-
managerial” approach understands displacement as a pathology of development, which can 
be normalized through effective implementation and management of resettlement of the 
affected people. In this view, the failure of resettlement is primarily imputed to insufficient 
government commitment and inadequate or inappropriate institutional capacity. Vice-versa, 
resettlement can be turned into a successful development process provided it is well 
planned, managed, implemented and coordinated, and that the necessary inputs (in terms of 
financial resources, government commitment and legal framework) are made available.  
While identifying important factors leading to the failure of resettlement at the practical 
level, at the theoretical level this approach offers a poor conceptualization of displacement 
and of what resettlement entails in terms of (re)incorporation of the affected population into 
the process of (capitalist) development. Moreover, as also pointed out by Scudder (2005), it 
is still to be demonstrated that an improvement in resettlement practice can indeed make a 
difference in terms of avoiding the impoverishment of the affected population, and induce 
the latter to welcome resettlement as an opportunity for development. For these reasons, a 
theoretical reconsideration of the causes of the failure of resettlement seems to be needed. 
                                                           
1
  Even if resettlement practice so far had not been influenced by its understanding at the theoretical 
level, its poor theoretical understanding would still be responsible of reproducing the failure in the future, 
given the progressive standardisation of resettlement policies around the world to the prescription of the 
‘reformist-managerial’ discourse , see below and section 1.4. 
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Based on the above, this thesis argues that a more significant contribution to the 
understanding of the structural reasons for the systematic failure of resettlement is required. 
This understanding, the thesis attempts to show, is provided by a political economy 
analysis. This political economy analysis entails the detailed investigation of the processes 
of development which require displacement in the first place and then determine the terms 
of (re)incorporation of the resettled population into these processes. 
In order to investigate the potential contribution of political economy to resettlement 
research, this thesis develops a theoretical framework based on the notion of adverse 
incorporation and a relational view of poverty. Such a framework investigates processes of 
impoverishment emphasising, on the one side, how they link to the dynamic of capitalism 
and, on the other, how they are underpinned by power relations, where power is understood 
in voluntaristic and in structural terms. Poverty is then produced and reproduced by 
incorporating people into the process of development, where the terms of incorporation are 
adverse by virtue of the disadvantageous position occupied by the poor in the power 
relations which underpin it. 
It is then claimed that resettlement of people displaced by development projects 
adversely incorporates them into capitalist development in economic, political, socio-
cultural and spatial terms. All these dimensions contribute to the systematic failure of 
resettlement in preventing impoverishment. The analysis focuses particularly on the 
economic dimension of the incorporation, employing the notions of accumulation by 
dispossession and surplus labour. It is first claimed that displacement induced by 
development projects is a form of accumulation by dispossession, as it expropriates people 
of their means of production and reproduction. If the process of accumulation supported by 
the dispossessing project is not labour-intensive and does not create additional employment, 
the displaced population turns into surplus labour. To the extent that surplus labour engages 
in relations of production and reproduction which limit its capacity to rise above 
subsistence, displacement leads to impoverishment. 
Then, resettlement is required to dispose of people expropriated of their means of 
production and reproduction and made redundant by accumulation by dispossession. It is 
this very fact which makes resettlement a process of adverse incorporation. Besides, 
resettlement fails in preventing impoverishment because neither cash nor land 
compensation enable people to escape surplus labour. Indeed, cash is not able to replace the 
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means of production and reproduction, i.e. to provide the basis for rebuilding a new 
livelihood; in a similar vein land for land compensation is entrenched within power 
relations and reinforces pre-existing inequalities or creates new ones. The failure of 
resettlement is, therefore, affected by shortcomings in its design and implementation, but it 
is also substantially affected by structural factors which depend on the characteristics of the 
local growth process, in particular by the conditions of the agrarian sector and the labour 
market. 
This thesis then applies the adverse incorporation framework to the case study of the 
Polavaram dam. The focus of the analysis turns to the sources of livelihoods of the affected 
people, and how access to these sources is altered as a consequence of displacement and 
resettlement. This analysis allows to identify the dynamic consequences of resettlement, 
namely increase in landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings and casualisation of labour; 
it also highlights the fact that these dynamic consequences underpin the production and 
reproduction of surplus labour in Andhra Pradesh. Overall, through the adverse 
incorporation framework resettlement in Polavaram is assessed from two points of view: i) 
in terms of the ability of the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package to (PRRP) 
enable the displaced people to reconstruct their disrupted livelihoods or generate new ones, 
and thus lead to a sustainable reduction in poverty and ii) on the grounds of the position 
that the displaced people will come to occupy after resettlement into the local process of 
capitalist development. 
 
iii. Resettlement and methodological contributions from economics 
This thesis identifies the failure of resettlement at the methodological level in the 
inappropriate use of the economic discipline in providing principles and guidelines for the 
design of compensation and resettlement packages. The argument originates from the 
observation that Cernea’s (1999a) claim that resettlement research and the design of 
resettlement programmes should be informed by economics, has been met by the existing 
literature by only focusing on compensation and resettlement as a problem of public choice. 
The problem is to be addressed with the tools offered by mainstream welfare economics, 
that is cost-benefit analysis and the compensation principle. This thesis claims that the 
compensation principle is unfit to drive policy making: if taken seriously it would 
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recommend the non-payment of any kind of compensation to the displaced people; while if 
not taken seriously, it does not have anything to say on the circumstances in which actual 
compensation should be paid. Cost-benefit analysis instead recommends the estimation of 
the costs of displacement through methodologies designed to elicit passive use values of 
non-market goods. In particular, the costs can be approximated by the willingness to accept 
money in exchange of displacement of the affected population. Willingness to accept, 
however, is a controversial concept, whose use rests on the acceptance of the assumptions 
postulated by a particular model of mainstream consumer theory. These assumptions also 
underline the methods traditionally employed for the estimation of willingness to accept. 
i.e. stated preferences methods like the contingent valuation method and choice 
experiments. This reliance on assumptions heavily restricts the applicability of these 
methods, and possibly the plausibility of the results, in many real-life circumstances, 
including displacement and resettlement. 
If the contribution of economics to the problem of resettlement and compensation for 
displacement is restricted to the field of welfare economics, then we will be left with weak 
methodologies for the estimation of compensation and no principles to inform the design of 
resettlement. Further, it will have the undesirable consequence of restricting the analysis to 
the identification of the optimal amount of monetary compensation, under the presumption 
that the latter is sufficient by itself to guarantee the success of resettlement.  
However, despite above criticism, this thesis argues that choice experiments can provide 
a valid blueprint for the systematic consultation of the population affected by displacement, 
if the focus is shifted from commensuration of the costs of displacement to investigation of 
resettlement preferences. In fact, choice experiments ask respondents to choose between 
different varieties of the same good, so revealing the preferences for the attributes of the 
good (rather than for the good itself). If used to consult the affected population about their 
resettlement, they can help identifying the favourite forms of compensation and modalities 
of relocation, thereby contributing to the design of more efficient resettlement programmes. 
This research implemented a consultation exercise based on choice experiment with the 
Polavaram affected population, not with the purpose of estimating willingness to accept 
displacement, but rather to explore the preferences of the project-affected families for 
different types of compensation and resettlement packages, and how these preferences vary 
when facing different combinations of “attributes”. Indeed, the exercise allowed identifying 
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what types of compensation and modalities of relocation are deemed acceptable by the 
displaced people and, more importantly, what are the main issues concerning resettlement 
from the point of view of the affected population. 
Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the existing literature on 
displacement and resettlement and identifies where the failure is determined at the 
theoretical and methodological level. Chapter 1 reviews critically the existing theoretical 
discourses and institutional frameworks concerned with development-induced displacement. 
Chapter 2 shows that mainstream economics understands compensation and resettlement 
mainly as a problem of public choice, to be addressed with the tools offered by welfare 
economics: cost-benefit analysis and the compensation principle. The chapter describes 
how the application of these tools recommends the estimation of the costs of displacement, 
and therefore of the optimal amount of compensation, through methodologies designed to 
elicit passive use values of non-market goods. In chapter 3, the potential contribution of 
political economy to resettlement research is explored, and a theoretical framework based 
on the notions of adverse incorporation and a relational view of poverty is developed. 
The second part of the thesis contains two chapters. Chapter 4 clarifies the methodology 
and the methods employed to investigate displacement and resettlement in the case-study, 
providing details on the implementation of the survey in detail. Chapter 5 describes the 
case-study of the Polavaram project and the affected population. 
The third part provides an assessment of resettlement of the Polavaram displaced people 
from three points of view. Chapter 6 applies the adverse incorporation framework to the 
case-study, searching for structural factors which can turn resettlement of the Polavaram 
displaced people into a process of adverse incorporation. Chapter 7 assesses the PRRP 
package on the grounds of two criteria: i) the conformity to affected people’s preferences 
concerning different types of compensation and resettlement, elicited through focus groups 
and a consultation exercise based on choice experiment methodology; ii) the ability of the 
resettlement package to support the reconstruction of the livelihoods disrupted by 
displacement. The main shortcomings of the PRRP are identified and it is highlighted how 
they interact with the structures and mechanisms underpinning surplus labour in Andhra 
Pradesh in turning resettlement into a process of adverse incorporation.  
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Chapter 1 
Resettlement & Rehabilitation of people displaced by development:  
an unresolved challenge   
 
1.1.  Introduction 
 
Development in its different manifestations has always been associated with the physical 
movement – forced or voluntary - of people, and with the transfers of entitlements over 
resources with competing uses. Salient examples include the enclosure movement, which in 
Europe, and particularly in Britain, was at the heart of the shift from feudalism to 
capitalism, or the eviction of people from forests in Colonial India, or the acquisition of 
Native American land for the construction of the First Transcontinental Railroad in the 
United States.  
Development-induced displacement of people is therefore not a new phenomenon, 
peculiar to the contemporary age.2 Nonetheless there are novel elements to the way the in 
which this phenomenon manifests itself today. The first is the extent and the systematicity 
that it has assumed in the past century and even more in the last three decades. The second 
novel feature derives from the first, and concerns the attempt on one side to theorize the 
phenomenon, and on the other side to manage and control it at the international level. Both 
attempts can be interpreted as a reaction to the unavoidable ethical and moral issues that 
displacement in the name of development raises. These issues are present in the many 
contradictions of the current development paradigm and as such are increasingly invoked 
by the social movements opposing and resisting displacement all around the world. The 
attempts at theorization and management of development-induced displacement are 
reflected in a number of discourses around displacement and in an institutional framework 
at national and international levels.  
This chapter explores the existing literature on development-induced displacement 
through the lenses of these two novel features of the phenomenon. The extent and 
                                                           
2 Nor is it exclusive to a capitalist system: as noted by Penz et al, growth requirements in socialist 
countries have also been met with mega-projects, dislocating people (Penz et al 2011:4). Forced displacement 
was also not unknown in pre-capitalist societies.  
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systematic nature of development-induced displacement is discussed in section 1.2.1, while 
section 1.2.2 introduces the theorization and management of the issue, identifying two main 
discourses around displacement which have an institutional framework attached.  
The first discourse looks at displacement as a violation of human rights and is described 
in section 1.3. The second understands displacement as a pathology of development, which 
can be normalized through effective implementation and management of the resettlement 
process. This discourse is advanced primarily by the World Bank.  The policy framework 
on involuntary resettlement of the World Bank and the other international borrowing 
agencies, along with the resettlement models which try to provide a theoretical support to 
the management and implementation aspects of the process, constitute the core elements of 
this discourse and are discussed in section 1.4. This section also shows that the 'reformist-
managerial' approach understands the failure of resettlement as an issue of implementation 
and management, while maintaining that resettlement can be turned into a development 
opportunity, provided the right institutional framework is established. 
 
1.2.  Development-induced Displacement, past and present 
 
1.2.1. The increase and systematicity of Development-Induced Displacement today 
 
The forced movement of people to make way for projects intended to trigger growth and 
development is not a new phenomenon in history. However, it has become more 
widespread and systematic in nature in recent times, and this can be attributed to the spatial 
and resource needs of the current development model. These needs are felt primarily today 
by emerging economies with growing populations such as China and India.  
Detailed and up-to-date estimates of the phenomenon are not easy to produce and obtain. 
The commonly quoted estimate of 10 million people per year displaced by development 
projects since the 1980s was still the one released by the World Bank in 1996 (World Bank 
1996:x). The study that reported that figure also contained a review of the Bank's projects 
involving displacement and resettlement. It was found that in 1993, 146 displacing projects 
were active, with nearly 2 million people being in various stages of resettlement. Dams for 
irrigation, hydropower and drinking water were the single largest cause of displacement (63 
percent of displaced people), and transportation corridors the second largest cause (23 
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percent). 
Detailed figures on displacement due to dam construction were released by the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD hereafter) in 2001.3 According to the WCD's estimation, “the 
overall global level of physical displacement” caused by the construction of large dams 
“could range from 40 to 80 million [people]” (WCD 2000:104). Statistics for China 
indicated that 10.2 million had been displaced in the country between 1950 and 1990 
because of dams. For India between 16 and 38 million people have been displaced since 
Independence in 1947 (ibidem), due to dam projects, out of a total of around 60 million 
people displaced by development projects from Independence till 2004 
For India Walter Fernandes (2011:303) has estimated that around 60 million people have 
been displaced by development projects from Independence till 2004. 
Given the relevance that development-induced displacement has assumed in the 
contemporary world, it is not surprising that it has given rise to multiple theoretical 
discourses and institutional frameworks. 
 
1.2.2.  A theoretical discourse and a policy and legal framework for development-induced 
displacement  
 
Multiple theoretical discourses have evolved around displacement, and these discourses 
are also expressed through models and institutional frameworks in the form of policies, 
laws, regulations and agencies, at national and international levels.  
Two main discourses can be identified. The first one has tried to articulate displacement 
as a violation of human rights.  However, a number of difficulties have arisen, which are 
evident in the persistency of a certain definitional and conceptual confusion and ultimately 
in the lack of a theoretical framework to consistently relate resettlement to displacement as 
a violation of human rights (Dwivedi 2002 and Perera 2011). 
The second discourse, which, following Dwivedi (2002), we call “reformist-managerial”, 
                                                           
3 The World Commission of Dams was a forum of stakeholders and interest groups from the public, 
private and civil society sectors, which in 1998 was tasked by the World Bank and the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN) to assess the worldwide performance of large dams, at the technical, economic, financial, 
environmental and social levels. The investigation produced a knowledge base made up of 8 case-studies of 
large dams, country reviews for China and India, a briefing paper for Russia, a Cross-Check survey of 125 
existing dams, 17 Thematic Review papers, results from public consultations and more than 900 submissions. 
The main outcome was a Report published in 2000. 
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shifts the focus of the attention from displacement to resettlement. The act of resettlement 
is articulated so that, if properly implemented and managed, it can be turned into a 
development process. The discourse is therefore action and problem-solving oriented and is 
fully embraced by the World Bank and by most international institutions.  
Both these discourses also have material manifestations, in the forms of policies, 
regulations and agencies which constitute an identifiable institutional framework. The first 
discourse is described in section 1.3 and the second- which is the dominant one- in section 
1.4. 
A number of authors note the existence of a third discourse on development-induced 
displacement (see Dwivedi 2002, Penz et al 2011, Oliver-Smith 2010), which is labelled  
“movementist”. This discourse has an action focus and is concerned with the causes of 
displacement, the dynamics of resistance among Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs), 
and the social costs of resettlement. It has developed through both academic research and 
resistance movements and is strongly related to a broader critique of development in 
general. For this reason it is more difficult to distinguish as a separate discourse and it does 
not have a clear institutional framework attached. This discourse is not discussed in the 
thesis, because the latter only marginally engages with the issue of resistance to 
development-induced displacement.  
 
1.3.  Displacement, forced migration and the human rights discourse 
 
As previously stated, it is not a new occurrence in history that people are being displaced 
in name of a common greater good called development. In a sense, it is not even new that 
this practice is being criticised and pointed out as a structural contradiction of the very 
same development. What is new, however, is the attempt to link the critique to the human 
rights discourse, presenting displacement as a violation of these rights. 
An important contribution to the establishment of this discourse has come from the work 
of the WCD. According to Dwivedi (ibidem), the WCD Report indeed constitutes an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the 'reformist-managerial' discourse and the concerns of 
the movementist approach. Being concerned with the social effects of dams-induced 
displacement, it calls for an approach based on the “recognition of rights and assessment of 
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risks” (WCD 2001:206), which has to be pursued at the stage of the decision-making 
process, in order to achieve a more equitable negotiation of the distribution of rights and 
benefits.4  
The concern for the articulation of displacement in terms of human rights violation is 
also demonstrated by one of the contributing papers to the final report, which addresses the 
relationship between human rights and development in the context of displacement induced 
by dam construction. In it Rajagopal (2000) identifies five human rights which are 
challenged by development-induced displacement. These are: i) the right to development 
and self-determination (concerning issues of autonomy, culture and land), with which any 
political and moral justification for displacement-inducing projects should be reconciled; ii) 
the right to participation, which should also occur at the stages of   project design and 
planning as well as of considering the different alternatives, monitoring and maintenance; 
iii) the right to life, in the form of livelihood and environment, which is challenged by land 
expropriation, loss of home and sources to make a living; iv) the rights of vulnerable 
groups, particularly indigenous people and women, which are most challenged by the 
impoverishment process triggered by displacement; v) the right to remedy, that is, the 
existence of systems and procedures through which the affected people can appeal the 
decision and obtain a quick and efficacious remedy to halt on-going violations and prevent 
future ones. 
While all of these rights are in one way or another safeguarded by the existing 
international legal and institutional regime (through Covenants, Declarations, dedicated 
Agencies, etc.), none of them is explicitly linked to issues of displacement or resettlement. 
In attempts to trace back and legitimate this link, the literature has followed two different 
paths. 
The first path has viewed displacement as a category of forced migration, establishing an 
analogy between development-displaced people and internal refugees (Cernea 1990) or 
conflict-induced and development-induced internal displacement and resettlement (Muggah 
2003). This approach is also supported by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement5, which define as internally displaced those people “who have been forced or 
                                                           
4 The proposed approach is obviously inspired by Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction 
model, discussed below in section 1.4.3.  
5 The Principles were formulated in 1998 by Francis Deng in quality of Representative to the UN 
Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, and the same year the Commission on Human Rights 
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obliged to flee or to leave their homes or habitual places of residence in particular as a 
result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognised state border”. The scope of the Guiding Principles 
extends to development-induced displacement in view of Principle 6, which states that 
“Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced 
from his or her home or place of habitual residence”. The principle includes in the 
prohibition of arbitrary displacement also displacement “in cases of large-scale 
development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public 
interests”. In addition Principle 9 affirms that “States are under a particular obligation to 
protect against the displacement of indigenous people, minorities, peasants, pastoralists, 
and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to the land.” 
In 1997 the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities appointed a panel to investigate human rights issues in the practice of forced 
eviction. The panel produced a report and a set of guidelines on the practice of forced 
eviction.6 The guidelines note that “[f]orced evictions constitute prima facie violations of a 
wide range of internationally recognised human rights and can only be carried out under 
exceptional circumstances and in full accordance with the present Guidelines and relevant 
provisions of international human rights law.' (Point 4). The guidelines also list the rights of 
the affected people in the eventuality of forced eviction, including the right to a fair hearing 
before a competent, impartial and independent court or tribunal, the right to legal counsel 
and to effective legal remedies, the right to compensation “for any losses of land or 
personal, real or other property goods” and the right to resettlement, which must include 
“the right to alternative land or housing which is safe, secure, accessible, affordable and 
habitable”. 
Understanding development-induced displacement as one of many types of internal 
displacement presents some advantages but also raises a number of definitional and 
conceptual problems. 
As concerns the advantages, Cernea (1990) observes that overcoming the dichotomy 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
adopted a resolution taking note of the principles. For a detailed discussion and a description of the process 
which led to their creation, see Robinson (2003). 
6 “Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-Based Displacement” (UN document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7) 
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between internal refugees and development-displaced people can help in conceptualising-
and using- aid directed to emergency relief assistance as a tool to achieve development 
goals; analogously it can contribute to strengthening the link between development and 
human rights protection. Muggah (2003), on the other hand, makes a strong case for a 
comparative analysis of internally displaced people from war and development. In his 
opinion, approaching the problem from a political economy perspective and searching for 
the connections between development and conflicts, can provide a more dynamic 
understanding of displacement.  
His point is indeed substantiated by the empirical evidence, which shows innumerable 
cases in which the realisation of development projects (typically large-scale infrastructure 
projects or activities for the exploitation of natural resources) has interacted with pre-
existing conflicts, transforming the eviction of the population in episodes of brutal violence. 
A case of this sort, for example, is reported in one of the Thematic Reviews prepared for 
the WCD (Bartolome et al 2000), which reports on the Chixoy dam in Guatemala. The 
Chixoy dam project was financed by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the Italian government and involved an area inhabited by the indigenous Maya 
Achi'. When the population refused to move, a campaign of terror and violence was brought 
upon them by armed police and military forces. An independent investigation undertaken in 
1996 established that between 1980 and 1982, 376 people from the village of Rio Negro- 
mainly women and children- had been massacred, in response to their opposition to the 
construction of the dam. The case of the Chixoy dam is an extreme example of how pre-
existing conflict can lead to the unlawful use of violence by the State in episodes of 
development-induced displacement. For at that time Guatemala was in fact  in the middle 
of a civil war, involving the genocide of local indigenous populations, perpetuated mostly 
by military and para-military forces. The abuse of power by the State and a generalised and 
extremely violent conflict were therefore elements already present even without 
displacement. Yet this example supports the argument that a full understanding of the 
processes underpinning displacement might need to account for the political economy of 
both development and conflicts, possibly drawing on the framework provided by forced 
migration and internal displacement. 
It would seem therefore that there are good reasons to understand displacement within 
the framework of forced migration; upon closer inspection, however, there are some 
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practical obstacles and conceptual problems.  
At the practical level, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UN 1998, 
see footnote no. 5), as they stand, are a rather weak instrument for the protection of the 
rights of development-displaced people (the same is even more true of the Guidelines on 
Development-Based Displacement, see footnote no. 6) They are neither legally binding, nor 
are they connected to a dedicated international agency with a global mandate to assist 
internally displaced people in general and development-displaced people in particular. 
Unlike refugees, internally displaced people are not attributed a special legal status 
recognised by international law. Issues concerning internally displaced people in fact are 
deemed to fall under the domestic jurisdiction or sovereignty of the States concerned 
(Muggah 2003). As a result, there is no binding legal mechanism which compels the 
international community to intervene in favour of the people affected (see Cohen and Deng 
1998). Cohen and Deng however stress that the concept of State sovereignty cannot be 
dissociated from that of responsibility, as “a state should not be able to claim prerogatives 
of sovereignty unless it carries out its internationally recognised responsibilities to its 
citizens, which consist of providing them with protection and life-supporting assistance. 
Failure to do so would legitimize the involvement of the international community in such 
protection and assistance” (1998:7). Their point is that the international community should 
intervene if the national State fails to fulfil its responsibilities towards its citizens. Even so, 
the scope of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement concerns development-
induced displacement only as long as this is undertaken “in cases of large-scale 
development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests” 
[emphasis added]. It remains unspecified who is in charge of defining the boundaries of 
public interests and it is unlikely that international law will be put in the conditions to do so.  
Besides this, analogy of development-induced displacement with forced migration is 
conceptually problematic. For a start, development-induced displacement is not necessarily 
forced or involuntary; to a certain extent it can instead be negotiated, and the element of 
coercion reduced if not eliminated (Penz et al 2011:3). Furthermore, development-induced 
displacement does not always entail migration, and indeed throughout history people's land 
has been more or less forcibly appropriated without the need for forced eviction (ibidem). 
Interestingly, both Marx and the World Bank would agree on this account of the 
phenomenon. Displacement in the form of forced land expropriation is nothing but the 
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primary form of primitive accumulation which precedes and leads to capital accumulation, 
and which Marx had theorised based on his observation of the enclosure of land in 
England.7 Land expropriation corresponds here to the separation of the workers from their 
means of production- no physical movement of shelter is required8. Accordingly, the World 
Bank recommends the application of its policy on involuntary resettlement when the 
involuntary taking of land results in “relocation or loss of shelter, loss of assets or access to 
assets, or loss of income sources or means of livelihood, whether or not the affected person 
must move to another location” (O.P 4.12 pag 19). 
Marx and the World Bank then seem to share the view that expropriation of, or loss of 
access to, the means of production (or sources of livelihood) corresponds to a form of 
displacement. In chapter 3 it will be discussed how this interpretation of the phenomenon 
better allows for political economy considerations in the investigation of both displacement 
and resettlement. 
The second path followed to relate displacement to the human rights discourse has 
focused instead on the articulation of development as a human right itself. This approach is 
justified by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), which defines the 
right to development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person 
and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedom can 
be fully realized” (Article 1.1.).  
Rajagopal (ibidem) argues that, when so articulated, the right to development implies the 
right of people to self-determination. This extends to the use of natural resources, as the 
Declaration establishes people's “inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural 
wealth and resources” (Article 1.2). Also the right to development applies to individuals 
and communities, not to states. The implication is that development-induced displacement 
might constitute a violation of human rights for the simple fact that it usually arises from a 
decision-making process which does not account for the affected people's self-
determination, especially when it comes to decisions concerning the use of natural 
resources or the distribution of costs and benefits from the project (Bartolome et al 
                                                           
7 Displacement as primitive accumulation is thoroughly discussed in chapter 3. 
8 “The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of 
divorcing the producer from the means of production” (Marx 1995:364). 
9 Operational Policy 4.12 is described below in section 1.4.2. 
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2000:12).  
Again, the main limitation of this path is its practical relevance. The boundaries of the 
scope of the Declaration are difficult to define and its recommendations hard to enforce. Its 
legal status is analogous to that of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (UN 1966), which, as Rajagopal points out (ibidem), establishes the legal 
status of “progressive realisation” for the rights that it promotes. This translates into a 
marginal position for these rights into national constitutions and within international human 
rights enforcement mechanisms. 
Finally, it has been noted that the legal framework on development as a right neglects a 
key right for the safeguard of internally displaced people (see Kaelin 2006 and Perera 2011), 
namely the right to ownership of property. In fact, it can be derived from other rights 
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (right to life, private life, 
property and access to justice), but it has never been codified in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights or in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN 1966). 
While this omission was strategic to the ideological conflict characterising the years of the 
ratification of the Covenants (the mid-1970s) (Kaelin 2006), today it is a further obstacle to 
the establishment of a clear right of the internally displaced people to fair compensation and 
restitution (ibidem). 
 
1.4.  Resettlement as a problem of policy and management 
 
1.4.1.  The preponderance of a 'reformist-managerial' approach to Development-induced 
Displacement 
 
The second - and indeed dominant - discourse around development-induced 
displacement articulates the problem in terms of policy and management. The essence of 
this discourse was best sketched by Dwivedi in an article which, together with a review of 
five of the most prominent amongst the recent publications on development-induced 
displacement,10 suggested a classification of the literature on the topic into two groups: the 
                                                           
10  Which were: The Development Dilemma: Displacement in India (Parasuraman 1999); Economics of 
Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and Challenges (Cernea 1999); Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences 
of resettlers and refugees (Cernea and McDowell eds 2000); Dams and Development. A new framework for 
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'reformist-managerial approach', with primarily applied concerns, and the 'movementist' 
approach, characterised by a research focus (not discussed in this chapter). 
According to Dwivedi, the reformist-managerial approach understands displacement and 
its negative consequences as a pathology of the current development paradigm, and 
resettlement as the device intended to normalize the consequences of displacement and 
minimize its adverse outcomes. However, the occurrence of displacement does not 
undermine the legitimacy of the development project which triggered it (Penz et al 
2011:17). In fact, this discourse does not challenge the underlying (or any other) notion of 
development, which is characterised by what Penz et al (ibidem:17) define as an 
“interventionist” conception of the process. That is, development is conceptualised as a set 
of intentional and planned actions taken by specific actors with the explicit aim of shaping 
and directing socio-economic change (in the direction of an increase in income per capita), 
and at the same time limiting or controlling the negative effects of this change. It is an 
understanding of development, as Perera (2011) notes, borne out of modernisation 
theories11 and then, as  Penz et al (ibidem) remark, appropriated by the neo-liberal agenda. 
It leads to an interpretation of resettlement as a systematic process of transformation, whose 
outcomes can be controlled and foreseen. In addition, it is consistent with the 
interventionist approach of first taking the decision concerning the development project, 
and then addressing its negative consequences through resettlement (Penz et al ibidem).  
It is then the ontology of development underpinning the discourse that indicates the 
attitude towards resettlement (and motivates the name attributed to it by Dwivedi). The 
latter is discernible for a primarily problem-solving concern and an optimistic stance. 
Resettlement is conceived as a set of actions whose success depends on how well they are 
planned, managed, implemented and coordinated. Alternatively, the success of resettlement 
is made dependent upon a number of inputs- which, however, all reflect the same tactical 
and technical concern: national legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-
resettlement surveys, planning, consultation, careful implementation and monitoring (De 
Wet 2006:181). 
Faith in careful and efficient implementation and management is so strong that these 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
decision-making. Report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2001); Involuntary Resettlement: 
Comparative Perspectives (Picciotto et al 2001). 
11 Modernisation theories, from Rostow (1960) onwards, predicate development as a uniform, linear 
historical process. 
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institutional qualities are claimed to be able to turn resettlement into a development 
opportunity. This is indeed the view championed by the World Bank, as is evident, for 
instance, in its “Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook”, where this point is explicitly 
argued, and elaborated in the following terms: “The challenge is to not treat resettlement as 
an imposed externality but to see it as an integral component of the development process 
and to devote the same level of effort and resources to resettlement preparation and 
implementation as to the rest of the project. Treating resettlers as project beneficiaries can 
transform their lives in ways that are hard to conceive of if they are viewed as ‘project-
affected people’ who somehow have to be assisted so that the main project can proceed” 
(World Bank 2004:xvii).  
The scaffolding of the reformist-managerial discourse consists of two parts: firstly, the 
policy framework on involuntary resettlement produced by the World Bank and the other 
borrowing agencies (described in section 1.4.2), and secondly, the models which try to 
theorize resettlement and the consequences of displacement (the two main resettlement 
models are the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model and the Four-Stage 
approach. Their main features are sketched in section 1.4.3).  
A few words are necessary here to describe the circumstances that gave rise to this 
discourse, for which the World Bank has played a key role. When it first adopted a policy 
on involuntary resettlement in 1980, the Bank's development strategy was focusing on 
large-scale infrastructure projects, and dams and transport projects were being financed all 
around the world. Soon enough however this strategy proved to be ineffective in promoting 
growth in the receiving countries, while resistance against big infrastructure projects had 
been growing everywhere since the 1970s (Oliver-Smith 2002). An intervention was then 
needed to safeguard the legitimacy of the projects and ultimately of the operations of the 
Bank. This took the form of a self-reflection on its own practice and of progressive 
adjustments to the operational guidelines. 
Between January 1993 and April 1994 the World Bank undertook a review of its 
portfolio of projects entailing resettlement that were active between 1986 and 1993. The 
number of projects involved was 192, with a total of 2.5 million people displaced. The 
objectives of the Review were: to assess the extent of involuntary resettlement within the 
portfolio and its regional and sectoral trends; to compare the performance of the on-going 
resettlement programs and measure them against the policy's prescriptions; and to identify 
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the recurrent problems affecting resettlement performance (World Bank 1996:ix-x). The 
review triggered an extensive process of re-working and re-defining of strategies and 
rethinking within the institution, which culminated in the adoption of the Operational 
Policy 4.12 in 2000 and the full incorporation within the Bank's approach to resettlement of 
the Impoverishment Risks and Resettlement model (ibidem). A similar exercise was 
repeated in 1998, involving selected case studies from six countries (China, India, 
Indonesia, Togo, Brazil and Thailand), again with the purpose of assessing the resettlement 
process in the Bank's portfolio and investigating the related impact on involuntarily 
displaced people. The findings of the 1994 and 1998 studies are discussed in detail below. 
As suggested by Oliver-Smith, there is room to debate whether this concern was 
motivated by real world changes, pragmatic considerations or loss of faith in the theoretical 
paradigm based on the modernisation theory (2010:23). However, whatever the motivations, 
the self-reflection was co-opted by the discourse brought about by the post-Washington 
Consensus, which has been progressively applied within the World Bank to the re-thinking 
of each development-related issue (for an account of this process, see Fine 2006 and 2009). 
One of the tenets of the post-Washington Consensus12, with its discovery of the role of 
institutions in the process of economic growth, is the salvific power retained by the good 
governance agenda, which from the 1990s has been dominating any analysis of failure of 
past practice by the World Bank (see for instance the document Governance. The World 
Bank Experience 1994, the World Development Report 1997 or the more recent 
Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007, 
Kaufman et al 2008). Supported by the new institutional economics paradigm, the good 
governance agenda recommends institutional reforms for developing countries as the best 
way to pursue economic development. Getting “institutions right” typically requires 
democratic government reforms, fighting against corruption and rent-seeking behaviour 
(especially within the bureaucracy and the judiciary system), definition and protection of 
property rights, and the development of corporate governance and of financial institutions. 
The main implication of the good governance agenda is that any type of failures of a 
development activity can be explained by the existence of an ineffective or dysfunctional 
institutional framework. Provided the right institutional devices exist, any type of 
                                                           
12 For a concise account of the main features of the latter see Saad-Filho 2005. 
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development outcome can be achieved.13 
This is the logic which underpins the World Bank's attitude towards involuntary 
resettlement (expressed through its policy framework) and indeed the whole “reformist-
managerial” approach to development induced displacement. The aforementioned 1994 and 
1998 Reviews of the World Bank's project portfolio entirely subscribe to this logic. It is 
claimed there, for instance, that “the key explanatory variable for success in restoring 
livelihoods on a productive basis is the presence of a national commitment to help resettlers, 
reflected in sectoral or national policy postures on the issue” (World Bank 1996:10). This 
logic explains the shift in concerns, from reflecting upon and justifying a development 
strategy which requires massive displacement of people to the management and 
implementation aspects of resettlement. It is also consistent with the problem-solving 
attitude and the optimistic stance, which urges people to think of resettlement as a potential 
“element of a nation's strategy to reduce poverty” (ibidem:2). 
The development by the World Bank of a discourse around displacement with the 
characteristics just described has had two major consequences: it has deeply influenced the 
framing and the understanding of the problem in the literature and it has dictated the 
interpretation given of the failure of resettlement. 
Generally, most of this literature takes the observed failure of resettlement in preventing 
the impoverishment of the affected population as a point of departure for theoretical 
speculation or empirical research on what is needed to improve resettlement. As also 
pointed out by Koenig (2002:11), this is often done retaining the same uncritical attitude 
towards development and the optimistic stance on resettlement which underpin the 
reformist-managerial approach. 
Besides, it has not been highlighted enough that there is a common agreement that 
resettlement has indeed failed, because the World Bank said so. The message has been 
divulged mainly through the 1994 and 1998 reviews mentioned above. The latter have been 
fundamental in drawing the attention of scholars, practitioners and international institutions 
towards the problem, as well as in establishing a shared knowledge around it. The downside 
of the process has been that the failure of resettlement has also been co-opted by the good 
                                                           
13  For a review of the role played by new institutional economics in development economics and the 
good governance agenda and its underlying understanding of institutions, see Harriss et al (1995) and Jomo 
and Fine (2006). 
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governance agenda. That is, the failure of resettlement has been explained in terms of 
institutional failure. 
The main finding of the 1994 Review was claimed to be that “good resettlement can 
prevent impoverishment and even reduce poverty by rebuilding sustainable livelihoods” 
(WB 1996:6). This statement however was just the logical conclusion of the reversal of the 
empirical findings of the Review- which indicated that some of the World Bank's financed 
projects had failed in preventing impoverishment. It was acknowledged in the document 
that “[i]nadequate resettlement design or implementation in a number of completed projects 
has left many resettlers worse off. While systematic documentation is not available for all 
projects completed during 1986-1993, existing evidence points to unsatisfactory income 
restoration more frequently than to satisfactory outcomes, particularly in projects 
completed in the earlier years of the period analysed. Declining income among affected 
populations is significant, reaching in some cases as much as 40 percent among populations 
that were poor even before displacement” (ibidem:109). The unsatisfactory performance of 
the resettlement operations was attributed to the following factors: problems in the 
compensation procedures; inadequate financial resources allocated; the insufficient 
participation of the affected population; and the lack of an adequate legal framework and of 
institutions with a clear mandate and skills to administer the process, which was 
characterised instead by weak commitment and poor performance. Political commitment by 
the borrower, expressed by the adoption of a legal and policy framework which follows the 
Bank's prescription, is indeed indicated as the key variable to explain the performance of 
resettlement operations. Getting institutions right, then, is what is needed to turn 
resettlement from a cause of impoverishment to a successful development operation. A 
similar message is conveyed in the 1998 Review, where, for instance, it is stated that 
“improved assessment of borrower "ownership" and capacity to deliver on the objectives of 
the resettlement policy emerge as a key prerequisite of satisfactory resettlement outcomes” 
(WB 1998:4). The 1998 Review becomes slightly obscure when it comes to the assessment 
of the Bank's performance. It stresses the Bank's “commitment to the principles of 
resettlement” (WB 1998:3), but it laments the “appropriateness of its intervention” and the 
effectiveness of its “follow-through” (ibidem). The rhetorical emphasis is used to cushion 
the statement that immediately follows, which reveals that the Bank “was not able (in this 
sample) to establish a record of effective interventions to support income recovery” 
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(ibidem). That resettlement activities were ineffective in allowing people to recover the lost 
income seems a rather strong finding, suggesting that creation of employment opportunities 
matters a lot for the prevention of impoverishment. This point, however, is not further 
developed in the report (and indeed is absent altogether from the reformist-managerial 
approach), which, consistent with the good governance agenda, instead insists on the 
message that the failure of resettlement is to a large extent to impute to the local 
government and the dysfunctional role played by “political processes”.  
This thesis argues that the almost exclusive focus of the reformist-managerial discourse 
on implementation and management issues results in an incomplete understanding of 
resettlement, because it misses the fact that there are structural factors which also 
significantly contribute to the systematic failure of resettlement. This argument is further 
developed in chapter 3, where it is suggested that political economy is better suited to 
investigate the mechanisms that prevent resettlement from significantly and positively 
impinging on the lives of the displaced people. 
Some final considerations are needed on the peculiarity with which the approach to 
resettlement has evolved within the World Bank. Despite bending to the influence of the 
post-Washington Consensus, it has so far resisted the economic imperialism which has 
been taking over most development issues (Fine 2009). Research on resettlement is still 
mostly undertaken by sociologists and anthropologists, and it does not configure as a well-
defined and separate field into development economics. The monopoly of the topic by the 
two disciplines, even within the World Bank, is to a large extent to attributable to the strong 
legacy left by Michael Cernea, the first in-house sociologist to be hired by the Bank in the 
1970s and a key figure in the debate on the topic. He headed the task force, which in 1994 
reviewed the Bank's project portfolio, and is the author of one of the most influential 
resettlement models (the Impoverishment Risks and Resettlement model, see section 1.4.3). 
His influence has protected the field from the cost-benefit-analysis type of approach which 
was spreading into poverty assessment. Lately however a reversal in this tendency seems to 
be occurring, and Development Economics – especially through its behavioural and 
experimental branches - has been devoting increasing attention to resettlement. How this is 
happening, and on which theoretical grounds, is the object of chapter 2. 
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1.4.2.  International Financial Institutions and their policy frameworks: the World Bank 
and others 
 
It has been said in section 1.3 that the existing international legal and institutional 
framework does not allow room for binding mechanisms to safeguard people displaced by 
development projects, at least to the extent that the safeguard is invoked in the name of 
human rights. Much more binding seems the policy framework constituted by the 
Guidelines and the Operational Policies adopted over the years by the major donor agencies 
and regional development banks, and this framework is also one of the main constitutional 
parts of the reformist-managerial discourse. The authority of this policy framework comes 
from the fact that a great number of projects involving displacement are financed by 
Regional Banks and International Financial Institutions, with the World Bank and the 
International Financial Corporation occupying the first positions.14  
The process of setting up the framework has indeed been led by World Bank, which in 
1980 was the first international lending institution to adopt a policy on resettlement. Since 
then all the other major institutions (i.e. the Asian Development Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the African Development Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank) have followed, and the original World Bank policy has been 
reviewed a number of times.  
 
The World Bank 
In 1980 the World Bank adopted an Operational Manual Statement on involuntary 
resettlement, with a primary focus on resettlement associated with large dam construction. 
In 1990 the policy was reviewed for the first time (and it became Operational Directive 
4.30); the last major review was conducted in December 2001, when the Operational 
Directive was converted into an Operational Policy on involuntary resettlement (OP 4.12). 
The policy is part of the set of ten Bank policies dedicated to Social and Environmental 
Safeguard. 
The stated objectives of the Operational Policy 4.12 are (OP 4.12, para 1, World Bank 
                                                           
14  In 1994 the World Bank estimated that 8% of its ongoing projects 15% of its total lending involved 
displacement and resettlement operations. Bank-funded projects were estimated to account for 3% of the 
resettlement caused by dam construction worldwide and for about 1% of the displacement caused by urban 
and transportation projects in the developing world (World Bank 1996: xii). 
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2001):  
i) to avoid involuntary resettlement where feasible, or minimize it, exploring 
all viable alternative project designs; 
ii) if resettlement cannot be avoided, to conceive and execute resettlement 
activities as sustainable development programs, providing sufficient investment 
resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to share in project benefits. 
Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities 
to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs; 
iii)  to assist displaced persons in their efforts to improve their livelihoods 
and standards of living, or at least to restore them, in real terms, to pre-displacement 
levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of project implementation, 
whichever is higher. 
As concerns the scope of the policy, two important points need to be noted. In the first 
place, the policy is concerned only with the direct economic and social impacts resulting 
from WB financed projects which lead to involuntary resettlement, and the responsibility of 
dealing with the indirect effects is left to the borrower.  
Secondly, the policy is concerned with the effects arising from i) the involuntary taking 
of land resulting in relocation or loss of shelter, loss of assets or access to assets, or loss of 
income sources or means of livelihood, whether or not the affected person must move to 
another location [emphasis added]; or ii) the involuntary restriction of access [emphasis 
added] to legally designated parks and protected areas resulting in adverse impacts on the 
livelihoods of the displaced persons (OP 4.12 page 1). Thus, the policy introduces a 
substantial revision of the concept of displacement, for which the element of the 
geographical relocation of their habitations is not a necessary condition anymore. In fact, 
people are also considered as displaced in the eventuality of a restriction of access to the 
sources of their livelihood, which translates into an economic and occupational dislocation 
(as is frequently the case in nature conservation projects). Cernea (2011) has recently 
stressed the importance of this definitional revision (which surprisingly seems to have been 
otherwise neglected in the literature). The change in definition on the one hand 
acknowledges and emphasizes the inherent inequity of development-induced displacement, 
and on the other, has important practical and operational implications, not least because it 
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expands the applicability of the policy. 
A number of requirements are included in the policy, which the borrowers must meet in 
order to achieve the stated objectives. These include a resettlement plan or a resettlement 
policy framework, which need to specify which measures will be undertaken in order to 
inform and consult the affected people, and adequately compensate and support them 
during and after the relocation phase. 
The policy was then complemented by a Sourcebook (Involuntary Resettlement 
Sourcebook. Planning and Implementation in Development Projects 2004) which aims to 
“provide resettlement practitioners [...] with guidance on the implementation of policy 
principles, the procedural requirements for projects, the technical aspects of resettlement 
planning, and the actual implementation of resettlement. This guidance is intended to 
increase the likelihood that Bank-financed projects will achieve the objectives of OP 4.12” 
(WB 2004:xxiii). The Sourcebook, with its problem-solving focus, represents the 
quintessence of the reformist-managerial approach to displacement.  
The Sourcebook argues that OP 4.12 introduces some novel features in its approach to 
resettlement and that these were motivated by the acknowledgment that impoverishment as 
a consequence of resettlement happened also in projects in which compensation was duly 
paid. In particular OP 4.12 is claimed to differ from previous and traditional approaches in 
three ways. First, it aims at restoring (when improving is not possible) the pre-project 
incomes and living standard, moving beyond the mere compensation of the expropriated 
goods, and thus widening the scope of the policy, which then becomes a policy about 
development, rather than compensation. Second, with the emphasis on income and living 
standards rather than expropriated goods, the category of people recognised as adversely 
affected is expanded (to include those for whom access to resources and assets is restricted). 
Finally, resettlement planning is recognised as being qualitatively different from 
compensation, and as such, in need of particular care when it comes to its implementation 
and management (ibidem: xxiv).15 
Despite the supposedly more progressive nature of the OP 4.12, the policy has been 
criticised by a number of NGOs and academic scholars. As noted by Robinson (2003), and 
                                                           
15  Compensation refers to the restitution of the material losses, in kind or more often in cash. 
Resettlement can include a wide range of activities, from providing access to basic services at the relocation 
centre to implementing self-employment programmes to the resettled people. These activities are meant to 
restore and possibly improve the disrupted livelihoods.  
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also emphasized by Perera (2011), the main criticism has concerned the articulation of the 
objective of the policy in terms of improvement or at least restoration of the livelihoods 
and standards of living of the displaced persons. Using income restoration as a minimum 
benchmark, the policy diverges from its second objective (which is to “conceive and 
execute resettlement activities as sustainable development programs”) and implicitly 
justifies itself in case the latter is not achieved.  
Another important critique revolves around the actual ability of the Bank to enforce its 
policy, given its silence over controversial displacement and resettlement practices 
undertaken by some of the borrowing countries (Bartolome et al 2000 and McCully 1996). 
This concern indeed had been raised by the same Bank in its 1998 review of experience 
with involuntary resettlement. It was argued there that: “[t]he scorecard is not as good as 
OED had anticipated. Projects appraised in the mid-1980s still suffered from 
underdeveloped resettlement components. The Bank played a less prominent role than 
expected, both in strengthening components during appraisal and in monitoring them in the 
first few years of implementation” (WB 1998:3). On this matter it is interesting to note that 
both the Bank’s 1998 review and one of the Reports for the WCD (Bartolome et al 2000:11) 
are careful in drawing a strong link between the Bank's enforcement capacity and the 
features of the regime in power, thus attributing most of the responsibility to the borrower's 
government. This attitude is consistent with the understanding of the causes of the failure of 
displacement promoted within the World Bank, the prescriptions of the good governance 
agenda and the post Washington Consensus, so that resettlement failure is configured 
primarily as a government failure. 
With the aim of enhancing its own and the borrowers' transparency and accountability 
before the affected people, the Board of Directors of the World Bank also prompted the 
creation of an Inspection Panel, whose task it is to accept requests for and implement 
inspections of cases in which the Bank is claimed to have failed to follow its own 
operational policies and procedures.16  
 
 
                                                           
16   In India for instance the Panel has recommended an investigation into the displacement and 
resettlement activities operated by the National Thermal Power Corporation in the Singrauli region, to which 
the Bank loaned more than $4bn for a project which has led to the displacement of over 300,000 people in 40 
years. 
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The Asian Development Bank  
The Asian Development (ADB) is the international financial institution which, after the 
World Bank, has dedicated most attention to the issue of resettlement. It adopted its own 
policy on Involuntary Resettlement in November 1995, following the blueprint provided by 
the World Bank’s Operational Directive 4.30. The policy covers issues related to 
compensation for loss of assets, resettlement of the affected people, government budgetary 
planning for resettlement and compensation, institutional framework for involuntary 
resettlement, and interactions with civil society concerning resettlement (ADB 2007). In 
1998 the ADB also released a Handbook on involuntary resettlement, which describes the 
resettlement process and the operational requirements within the Bank’s project cycle. 
The objectives and principles of the ADB's policy echo those of the World Bank. It is 
stated that involuntary resettlement should be avoided whenever possible, and if 
unavoidable, population displacement should be minimized. Compensation and assistance 
for affected people after relocation should guarantee a better economic and social future 
than the one that would have been expected in the absence of the project. Information and 
consultation of the affected people is required and the project authorities should seek to 
involve and interact with the existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their 
hosts. It is also stated that the absence of a formal legal title to land should not be a bar to 
compensation; special attention is given to households headed by women and other 
vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Finally, involuntary 
resettlement is requested to be conceived and executed as a part of the project, its full cost 
to be included in the presentation of project costs and benefits, and to be considered for 
inclusion in Bank loan financing for the project (ADB 1998:2). 
Generally, the ADB policy devotes additional attention to issues related to the estimation 
of compensation. It incorporates requirements which were already present in the WB's 
policy, but emphasizes them more in light of the criticism of past compensation practice. 
These requirements were recalled in a report released by the ADB in 2007, investigating 
the issue of Compensation and Valuation in resettlement, following the observed failure of 
three of the Bank's borrowing countries (Cambodia, China and India) to comply with the 
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ADB's requirement for compensation of lost assets to be paid at “replacement cost.”17 The 
document explicitly identified the lack of appropriate valuation and compensation as one of 
the major factors leading to the impoverishment of the affected population. The ADB 
policy also stressed the following points: that compensation for lost assets be paid in such a 
way that the affected people see an improvement in their economic and social perspectives; 
that the absence of formal legal title to land should not constitute an impediment to 
adequate compensation; and that the affected people are to be fully consulted about the 
compensation and should have basic access to mechanisms for enforcing their entitlement 
to just compensation.  
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the African Development 
Bank 
The Inter-American Development Bank first adopted a set of operational guidelines in 
1991 and it has periodically updated them since then. The most recent update (Operational 
Policy 710), made in 1998, closely follows the main principles found in the WB and ADB 
policies. However, two new elements appear under the heading “Special Considerations” 
for the preparation of the resettlement components. First, an Impoverishment Risks 
Analysis is recommended if the affected population belongs to marginal or low-income 
groups. If this is the case, cash compensation can only be offered as an option, provided the 
socio-economic characteristics of the population make it a viable alternative. Second, 
displacement of indigenous communities can only be supported by the Bank if certain 
conditions are met (resettlement must provide direct incremental benefits to the displaced 
population, customary rights must be recognised and compensated, land-based 
compensation must be offered as an option, and the affected people must have given their 
consent to resettlement and compensation activities). 
The African Development Bank adopted a policy on involuntary resettlement for the 
first time in 1995 and revised it in 2002.  
 
 
                                                           
17   Replacement cost, according to the policy, should be estimated, including market value, premium, 
transaction costs, interests, and direct damages (ADB 2007:v). 
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
In 1991 Michael Cernea was asked to help the OECD draft a policy on involuntary 
resettlement. The process resulted in the adoption in 1992 of the Guidelines for Aid 
Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Development Projects, which 
appeared as part of a wider set of “good practices” on Aid and Environment promoted by 
the Development Assistance Committee. The OECD Guidelines are  inspired by the World 
Bank policy, in reason of Cernea's influence. They distinguish themselves by mentioning 
the need for special resettlement provisions for women, whose specific needs and 
preferences should be considered. The Guidelines also attribute the primary responsibility 
for resettlement to the government, while donors have the duty to mitigate the size and the 
impact of displacement. 
 
1.4.3.  Resettlement models: the Four-Stage Model and the Impoverishment Risks and 
Reconstruction Model 
 
The Four-Stage model  
The Four-Stage model was originally proposed by Scudder and Colson in 1982. It 
consists of a diachronic framework built upon the concept of 'stage'. The description which 
follows draws on a later re-elaboration made by Scudder in the volume “The future of large 
dams” (2005).  
The model describes the way in which resettled communities can be expected to behave 
during a successful resettlement process. It is thus a predictive and behavioural model, 
which uses stages to remark the existence of patterns in the way communities respond to 
resettlement. The focus is on the actors: the resettled people, and to a certain extent, the 
project authorities. For instance, the first stage, “Planning and Recruitment”, deals with 
who is to be resettled and the planning for their removal, rehabilitation and development. 
The involvement of the affected population at this stage is deemed essential, and it is 
expected to intensify as the time of displacement approaches. The second stage is called 
“Adjustment and Coping” and it concerns the physical process of resettlement and the years 
immediately following. The behaviour of the resettled population during this period is 
expected to be risk-averse and a drop in their living standard is predicted due to 
multidimensional stress, the difficulties in adjusting to the new place and life-style, and a 
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possible increase in expenses at the new location. Risk-aversion can be interpreted as a 
coping strategy, and continuity is favoured over change, in the attempt to recreate the 
previous cultural patterns. Interestingly, Scudder also observed that during this stage 
resettlers behave as if their sociocultural structures were a closed system, as they 'cling to 
the familiar' and avoid engaging with the external world. During the third stage 
“Community Formation and Economic Development” are observed. People are willing to 
engage in riskier economic activities (i.e. start cultivating cash crops) and the living 
standard improves for the majority of the population. There is also an increase in inequality 
and stratification, together with diversification of economic activities and investment. 
However these changes are possible only if two sets of conditions exist: radical changes in 
the resettlers' behaviour and the emergence of development opportunities. Scudder suggests 
that post-removal behaviour is likely to be less culturally constrained and this can prompt 
the adoption of innovative activities. 
The fourth and final stage is characterised by the handing over (of the first generation to 
the second generation and of the project authorities to the resettlers and local institutions) 
and the incorporation of the community in the wider economic system. 
 
The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction Model. 
This model was formulated and developed during the 1990s by Michael Cernea in the 
context of his work within the World Bank (Cernea 1997, see also Cernea's interview with 
H.M. Mathur in Mathur 2011b) and it has played a fundamental role in determining the 
approach taken by the Bank to the problem of resettlement. Indeed the model was applied 
on a wide scale in the 1994 World Bank review on involuntary resettlement. Cernea has 
also deeply influenced and inspired all subsequent research on resettlement. 
The model describes the mechanisms through which displacement can lead to the 
impoverishment of the affected population. These mechanisms are understood as 
'impending social hazards' (Cernea 1997:1572) which can turn into actual risks as a result 
of the displacement process, or of bad resettlement practice. These risks are: landlessness, 
joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, loss of access to common 
property resources, increased morbidity and mortality, and social disarticulation.  
If reversed, these mechanisms also indicate what actions need to be undertaken in order 
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to prevent or mitigate the risk, so providing a blueprint for an effective resettlement plan. 
Although in different proportions, intensity and modalities, all good resettlement plans 
should include measures to guarantee land-based resettlement, re-employment, house 
reconstruction, social inclusion, improved health care, adequate nutrition, restoration of 
community assets and services, networks, and community rebuilding.   
The internal logic of the model is, in its author's view, one of its major strengths, as it 
enables its use as a diagnostic, a predictive, a problem-resolution and a research guidance 
tool. The model in fact reveals what aspects of the affected people's life have to be tackled 
and how, as well as what is likely to happen if this is not properly addressed. Besides all 
this, at the research level, the model has the potential to contribute to define the contours of 
an 'economy of reconstruction' (ibidem:1580).  
This faith in the multiple functions of the model reflects the problem-solving attitude 
characterising the reformist-managerial discourse. The model in fact understands 
resettlement as the management of risk and sets out to identify the most effective strategies 
to achieve this, and then proceed to the reconstruction of the lost livelihood. At the same 
time however, it also specifies that the activation of the preventive potential of the model 
requires the following steps: i) a risk assessment in the field; ii) adequate response of the 
decision makers and planners to predict risks; ii) the proactive response of the population 
directly at risk, and transparent information and communication between decision 
makers/planners and populations at risk. The IRR model has played a significant role in the 
development of the research on involuntary resettlement, both at the theoretical and the 
empirical level. Many of the major contributions to the topic have in one way or another 
arisen as an empirical application of the model or as a criticism to it. Moreover, it has also 
contributed to focussing attention on the negative effects of displacement, explicitly 
establishing a link with the impoverishment of the affected population. The breaking down 
of impoverishment into different types of risks does indeed constitute a fundamental 
departure point for further investigation of the process. In addition, risk analysis is a well-
defined exercise which government agencies and project authorities can be required to 
perform and which, if properly executed, can provide precious information on the affected 
population and their major vulnerabilities. Yet, the model also has some significant 
shortcomings, which are discussed in chapter 3. This thesis takes these shortcomings as a 
point of departure to call for an approach to resettlement which more explicitly links the 
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outcomes of the latter to the process of development which triggers displacement in the first 
place. This alternative approach is then applied to the case-study in chapter 6. 
 
1.5.  Overview and Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has identified two new features of development-induced displacement: the 
emergence of theoretical discourses and institutional frameworks. Both of these have 
evolved as attempts to explain and control the phenomenon and its negative consequences.  
A dominant discourse around displacement can be traced to the World Bank, which 
shifts the focus to the implementation and management aspects of resettlement, with the 
optimistic premise that if the right institutional devices are implemented, resettlement can 
be turned into a development opportunity. An essential element of this discourse is the 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model, which links displacement to 
impoverishment through the concept of risk: displacement triggers mechanisms which 
create or enhance the risk of impoverishment in its multiple dimensions.   
This discourse also offers an interpretation of, and a solution to, the empirically 
observed failure of resettlement programs in preventing the impoverishment of the affected 
population. Consistent with the logic of the post-Washington Consensus, failure of 
resettlement is mainly attributed to insufficient government commitment and inadequate 
institutional setting. Improving resettlement practice means performing resettlement as the 
management of risk, following the guidelines indicated by the World Bank, which should 
be turned into a national policy by each country. Altogether, the reformist-managerial 
discourse, with its policy-oriented attitude, has the merit of offering a practical solution and 
of explicitly attributing the responsibility of its implementation to the entities inducing 
people’s displacement. It also assumes that resettlement is a true cost of a displacing project 
and that as such it must be internalised; this requires adequate financial resources and 
careful management. 
However, this approach offers an insufficient explanation of the failure of resettlement. 
This is also true of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model, despite its 
attention to the dynamics of impoverishment and the emphasis on risk prevention. In both 
cases resettlement fails to be understood as part of that same development process which 
led to displacement in the first place. Consequently, resettlement is not fully recognised as 
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leading to a problematic incorporation into development of the affected population, with an 
appreciation of the importance of the dynamics of social and spatial mobility, the 
underlying power and labour relations, and the challenge of creating new income 
opportunities. That is, it is missed the fact that structural factors exist which significantly 
contribute to the failure of resettlement.  
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Chapter 2 
The Contribution of Economics to Resettlement & Rehabilitation  
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
The increasing uneasiness with the failure of Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) 
programmes, as well as governments’ willingness to provide clear-cut and rigorous 
guidelines to prompt and guide the adoption of laws and regulations on R&R, has led 
experts and scholars to turn to economics. Cernea (1999b, 2003, 2008) has been the most 
eloquent in pointing out that the determination of fair compensation and the design of 
effective R&R programmes need to be driven by economic principles. Inspired by these 
considerations, some recent literature has embarked on a quest for economic principles 
which might indicate what constitutes an effective compensation (see Pearce and Swanson 
2008; Kanbur 2003; Garikipati 2001). This literature seems to have assumed without 
questioning that compensation for displacement is merely a problem of public policy, and 
consequently that the contribution of economics has to be in the estimation of the costs of 
displacement and compensation. In other words, this literature has neglected to ask the key 
question of why compensation for displacement and resettlement of displaced people are 
economic problems in the first place. 
It is argued in this thesis that compensation and resettlement indeed are economic 
problems, which however need to be investigated in a political economy framework to be 
fully understood as such. In order to show why seeing compensation and resettlement 
exclusively as a problem of public policy is too simplistic and short-sighted, it is worth 
taking seriously this interpretation and bringing to its extreme conclusions an application of 
welfare economics to compensation for displacement. This is in fact what the following 
discussion aims to do. It will look at what neoclassical economics has to say on 
compensation for displacement, firstly checking whether its prescriptions, represented by 
the compensation principle, have been applied in the practice of policy making, and 
secondly if they are appropriate to drive the design of fair compensation and effective R&R 
programmes. This investigation will also discuss some methodological considerations and 
make suggestions for the improvement of the design of R&R packages. From a critique of 
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cost-benefit analysis (henceforth CBA) to displacement-inducing project, it will be found 
that methodologies developed within CBA for the estimation of non-market values, have 
the potential to be employed for the improvement of R&R programmes. Finally, it will be 
suggested that more fruitful contribution to the improvement of resettlement can come from 
political economy. 
 
2.2.  The economics of compensation and resettlement 
 
Displacement and resettlement, and their impacts on the affected populations, have 
primarily been of interest for anthropologists and sociologists, but for a long time have 
failed to attract the attention of economists- even of development economists. It is then 
ironic that this neglect has been emphasised and lamented not by an economist, but by a 
sociologist,  Michael Cernea, the first in-house sociologist hired by the World Bank (in 
1974) and substantially responsible for the adoption of social analysis in World Bank 
projects. Cernea also led the Task Force which in 1994 reviewed the experience of the 
World Bank with projects involving involuntary resettlement operations financed in the 
period 1986-1993. In 1991 he also contributed to the elaboration of the Guidelines for Aid 
Agencies on involuntary displacement and resettlement adopted by the OECD. 
In 1999 Cernea published an article unambiguously titled “Why economic analysis is 
essential to resettlement” (Cernea 1999b), and similar statements appeared in later chapters 
and articles (Cernea 2002, 2003, 2008). In the introduction to his latest edited volume he 
calls for the need to reform resettlement and argues that “such reform must start with 
economic and financial foundations of planning displacement and resettlement” (Cernea 
2008:1). 
The trigger for his reflections is the observed persistent failure of R&R programmes, 
which, in his view, is partially attributable to the poverty with which economics has been 
applied to the issues of displacement and resettlement. His critique is articulated at 
theoretical, methodological and policy levels (see Cernea 1999b, 2003, 2008). 
At the theoretical level, his analysis highlights that the only concern of the economics of 
compensation has been loss restitution, with no analysis of the economic dimensions of 
resettlement and of the other social costs of displacement. There has been no theoretical 
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elaboration of the categories involved. To a large extent this has been the consequence of 
the conventional understanding of displacement as a dysfunctional by-product of 
infrastructure projects, typically of dam construction. Thus, displacement either does not 
appear in the economic evaluation of the projects (so that all the costs are externalised and 
borne by the affected people) or it is relevant only to the extent that some of its material 
costs are internalised within the project budget. The other reason for the focus on loss 
restitution, is that the only theoretical underpinning of the economics of compensation is 
the compensation principle, which is concerned merely with the identification of the costs 
and benefits of a project. This has skewed the attention away from what is one of Cernea’s 
main conclusions: that compensation alone is unable to achieve restoration of the disrupted 
livelihood (see Cernea 2008). 
Moreover, Cernea argues, even when internalisation of the costs is attempted, it is 
grounded on an unsatisfactory methodological practice. The routine CBA at best includes 
the material costs of displacement (with typically an inadequate and arbitrary valuation of 
expropriated assets), with no account of the distributional consequences, no use of risk 
analysis, and inadequate analysis of income loss and resettlers' income curve over time. 
This approach is unable to assess the peculiar types of deprivation that displacement entails 
and the economics needs of resettlement and livelihood regeneration (Cernea 1999b, 2003, 
2008). 
At the level of policy, Cernea stresses the lack of commitment by the governments and 
the project authorities in taking resettlement seriously. This is reflected in the absence in 
most developing countries of formal policies and laws on involuntary resettlement, as well 
as in the inadequate budget allocation for resettlement. 
One of the main findings of Cernea's work on displacement and resettlement is that 
compensation alone cannot prevent the impoverishment of the affected population and that 
compensation therefore needs to be supplemented with development-oriented investment 
and some forms of benefit-sharing (see especially Cernea 2008). To provide a theoretical 
justification for this finding he advocates a shift from the “economics of compensation” to 
an “economics of resettlement with development”. The latter, he argues, should be 
articulated around three main issues: i) the analysis of the risks triggered by displacement, 
which can then be addressed in resettlement design; ii) a methodology for project 
evaluation which accounts for the peculiar processes and costs generated by displacement, 
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with consideration for the distributional impact; and iii) an investigation into the sources of 
recovery, which can turn resettlement into a growth-enhancing process. He also recognises 
in welfare economics, environmental economics and political economy the three branches 
of the discipline which can contribute to this shift (Cernea 1999b).  
Cernea's plea for attention has not gone unheard, but it seems that the existing literature 
has focused merely on the second point and only looked at what welfare and environmental 
economics might have to say on the issue, with little attention paid to political economy. As 
a matter of fact, the debate which has arisen as a result of Cernea's analysis has been 
primarily concerned with the examination and re-examination of the compensation 
principle (Kanbur 2003, Cernea 2008, Garikipati 2011) and the use of methodologies drawn 
from welfare and environmental economics for the estimation of the costs of displacement 
and resettlement (Pearce and Swanson 2008, Garikipati 2011). 
Kanbur (2003) was the first contribution to take Cernea's challenge seriously and 
directly respond to it. He acknowledges that a contradiction emerges when one tries to 
apply the compensation principle consistently with the prescription of new welfare 
economics. As the latter shuns interpersonal comparisons of welfare, it recommends the use 
of egalitarian weights in CBA, and that means using the compensation principle with no 
actual payment of compensation. Were compensation actually paid, that would correspond 
to weighting the costs (borne by the losers from the project) more than the gains of the 
winners. Accepting the contradiction and the uselessness of the principle for policy making, 
Kanbur recommends the use of ad hoc compensation mechanisms and automatic safety nets 
to prevent negative distributional consequences. Despite the fact that Kanbur's analysis 
ultimately suggests that there is nothing in (welfare) economics to answer Cernea's request 
(claiming that the use of ad hoc mechanisms equates to an admission that no rule exists), he 
assumes a defensive stance towards economics, challenging other disciplines to find a 
solution to the dilemma.  
The challenge has instead been taken up by other economists, giving it a methodological 
twist. Cost-benefit analysis, as justified by the compensation principle, presupposes that a 
project can be undertaken (with no violation of the Pareto principle) as long as benefits are 
greater than costs and part of the former can be utilised to pay back compensation to those 
who bear the costs. This logic is easily applicable to displacement-inducing projects. The 
challenge has then been perceived as finding a way to estimate the costs and benefits 
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generated and the compensation required to re-establish economic efficiency. It is indeed 
the very fact that the compensation principle offers a methodology for its implementation 
that leads Garikipati to say that it is possible to “restore some of the theoretical confidence 
in the compensation criterion” (Garikipati 2011:185). The principle allows one to measure 
costs of displacement by the Willingness to Pay (WTP) to avoid displacement of the 
affected population (i.e. how much money the displaced people would be willing to pay to 
avoid displacement) or, as suggested by the displacement literature (see especially Pearce 
and Swanson 2008 and section 2.3 for a detailed description of WTP and WTA) 
Willingness to Accept (WTA) money in exchange for displacement. The measures can also 
indicate the optimum compensation required to make up for the losses supported by the 
affected population. The logic is evident: if the displaced people are in fact paid the amount 
of money estimated through WTA, then it can be claimed that their previous level of well-
being is restored, the project does not make anyone unhappy, and Pareto efficiency is re-
established. Pearce and Swanson (2008) therefore identify in the estimation of WTA money 
in exchange for displacement (and the underlying theoretical apparatus) the appropriate 
methodology for the economic evaluation of projects involving forced displacement. 
The elicitation of preferences and the estimation of welfare measures based on the 
concept of WTA requires the adoption of stated preferences methodologies, and 
particularly of the contingent valuation approach (see section 2.4 for a detailed description). 
The latter is an experiment-based methodology which is used for the estimation of the 
values of non-market goods, and asks the respondent to state their WTP to obtain that non-
market good or their WTA in exchange for its loss. The use of stated preferences 
methodology is widely debated and criticised in the economic literature, as it relies on 
people's answers to hypothetical questions, rather than on their actual behaviour. Apart 
from the cognitive difficulties involved in such a practice, it raises issues in terms of the 
“incentive compatibility” of WTP/WTA questions aimed at estimating compensation.  
These problems contribute to explain the scarcity of empirical studies applying WTP 
and WTA for the estimation of compensation for displacement. The specialised literature 
however seems rather open to, and in fact encouraging of further applications of the method. 
For instance, in a 2007 report on Compensation and Valuation in Resettlement, based on 
the experiences of Cambodia, China, and India, the Asian Development Bank includes 
among its recommendations the inclusion of WTP and WTA questions in the Initial Social 
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Assessment (ISA - or the phase of the project cycle that, according to the ADB's 
involuntary resettlement policy, should lead to the determination of the scope and resources 
needed for resettlement planning). While the report acknowledges the controversial nature 
of the contingent valuation method and that further experimentation of the estimation of 
compensation through WTP/WTA is required, it argues that its inclusion can provide a 
check for other valuation methods (particularly for the determination of compensation for 
the loss of common property resources), and inform the process of setting a compensation 
offer determined through direct consultation (ADB 2007). 
Garikipati's study (2002, 2005, 2011) on the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada 
valley is the one which most closely resembles these methodological recommendations, i.e. 
the use of the contingent valuation method to elicit WTA and explore what kind of 
compensation makes displacement voluntary.18 On the basis of a village survey conducted 
with the population affected by the dam project in 1998 and in 2003, Garikipati explores 
the possibility of consulting the displaced population regarding their compensation and 
resettlement. 
The survey involved interviews with 847 households belonging to three different types 
of villages: three villages which had not yet been displaced (in Madhya Pradesh), four 
resettlement sites villages (one in Maharashtra and three in Gujarat), and two partially 
submerged villages (in Gujarat). The primary purpose of the survey was to elicit the 
preferences of the displaced population regarding resettlement, adopting an incentive-
compatible methodology and specifically estimating the affected people's WTA cash in 
exchange for displacement. 
Garikipati uses the close-ended variant of the contingent valuation approach, in which 
the respondent is asked to perform a discrete choice, in an “accept or reject” format:  each 
respondent is offered four different hypothetical compensation packages, containing 
different typologies of resettlement and varying amounts of cash in exchange for the loss of 
one of the important aspects of their pre-displacement life: commons, community and 
                                                           
18  The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is part of the Narmada Valley Development Project, which 
encompasses the construction of 30 large, 135 medium and 3,000 small dams across the states of Gujarat, 
Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra. The SSP is the largest of these dams, as well as one of the largest dams in 
India and one of the most controversial dam projects in the world. The dispute surrounding the SSP has 
played an important role in the adoption of the new World Bank guidelines on resettlement (see for instance 
Cullet 2007).  
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irrigable land. 19  Accepting or rejecting the package, the respondent would provide an 
indication of the monetary value that he or she places on that specific aspect of life and that 
they would therefore be willing to accept as compensation for its loss. For instance 
Garikipati finds that the marginal rate of substitution of commons for cash is much lower 
than that of community for cash, that there is evidence that people do appreciate cash 
compensation and that they do not deem commons to be irreplaceable. 
She then concludes that a contingent valuation experiment is useful in eliciting the 
resettlement preferences of the affected population without incurring the problem of 
incentives compatibility. She also suggests replacing resettlement schemes with tailor-made 
schemes which respond to the different preferences. Her research also shows that elicited 
resettlement preferences are influenced by socio-economic circumstances of the 
respondents (a finding which also justifies the use of contingent valuation method based on 
the random utility model, see below). 
To conclude this section, it is worth recalling Cernea's initial concern: a search for 
principles within the economics discipline which might drive a reform of compensation 
practice, as well as the institution of an “economics of resettlement with development”. 
Responses in the literature to this challenge seem to take a rather narrow interpretation of 
what the role of economics should be. This interpretation is consistent with the 
identification of economics with welfare economics, whose main concerns are the 
conditions for economic efficiency. As a result, it emerges that the contribution of 
economics to the improvement of Resettlement & Rehabilitation is to indicate the most 
effective way to estimate the costs of displacement. The underlying assumption is that 
displacement can be made fair if these costs are evaluated in the correct way and the right 
amount of compensation is paid. There is no further elaboration of the question of why 
compensation is an economic problem, apart from the restoration of efficiency through the 
right policy choice. 
It is the author's opinion that little improvement to R&R can come from economics if its 
contribution is limited in this way. To understand why, it is necessary to take a closer look 
                                                           
19  No-Commons package offered housing and land for land compensation, plus cash compensation for 
the loss of commons; No-other-caste offered the same as the No-Commons package with relocation with own 
tribe only (vis a vis the entire community); No-Community offered the same as No-Commons but cash was 
given as relocation without the community; Only-Cash offered only money as compensation for displacement 
(see Garikipati 2005 and 2011 for a detailed description). 
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at the theoretical and methodological apparatus discussed so far. To that end, the next 
sections will illustrate what an application of welfare economics to compensation for 
displacement entails, from a theoretical and a methodological point of view. Section 2.3 
discusses the implications and the limitations of using CBA to assess a displacement-
inducing project. Section 2.4 looks at the roots of CBA, describing the compensation 
principle and what it means to rest on its methodological recommendations to estimate 
compensation for displacement. Finally, section 2.5 describes the techniques available to 
elicit WTP and WTA, namely the contingent valuation method and choice experiments. 
Considerations are drawn on their potential contributions to the design of better R&R 
programmes. 
 
2.3.  Cost-Benefit Analysis for Displacement-Inducing Projects 
 
The most simplistic way of looking at displacement and compensation for displacement 
is through the lenses of welfare economics and public choice theory. 
A displacement-inducing development project is approached as any other project or 
policy, generating winners and losers, and the most straightforward criteria to address the 
relevant decision-making process is CBA. The project is implemented if the benefits for the 
winners are higher than the costs for the losers. Considering the range of material and 
immaterial, direct and indirect costs and benefits that a displacement-inducing project is 
likely to generate, the main preoccupation becomes how to estimate then. 
The estimation of costs and benefits is performed in the first place by identifying the 
expected effects of the policy or project on the state of the economy, and classifying these 
effects into those which generate gains and those which generate losses. Gains and losses 
then need to be quantified and aggregated. The state of the economy with the project or 
policy is then compared with that without it (Dreze and Stern 1987). If what is gained is 
greater than what is lost, in line with the compensation principle (see below), it is efficient 
to implement the project. 
Being in the domain of welfare economics, costs and benefits are reflected in changes in 
the welfare level of the individuals (i.e. changes in their utility). Monetary measures of 
welfare change that have a WTP or WTA interpretation can be estimated through the 
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specification of a utility function, where the independent variables are either inputs or 
outputs of the project.20  
Generally, WTP reflects the amount of money that an individual would be willing to 
give up in order to purchase some good or service or, in a more extensive interpretation, to 
avoid a loss, the forgoing of a gain or some harm. Analogously, WTA indicates how much 
one would accept in exchange for selling or forgoing some good, or to bear a loss or some 
harm (Zerbe and Bellas 2006:18). 
The extensive interpretation of WTP and WTA allows employment in CBA as a 
measure of costs and benefits. Benefits from a project can in fact be interpreted as either 
gains for which someone is willing to pay, or losses restored, for which someone would be 
willing to accept a negative amount of money. Costs will then correspond to losses, which 
can be measured by the amount of money that the person would be willing to accept to bear 
them, or forego gains for which someone would be willing to pay a negative amount of 
money. As WTP and WTA are measures of gains and losses from the status quo, these 
measures are subjective to the extent that they depend on the initial distribution of property 
rights. While WTA assumes ownership of the good or the gain which is lost, WTP does not 
(for an extensive discussion see Carson 1999 and Zerbe and Bellas 2006:19). For this 
reason, Pearce and Swanson claim that a right-based approach to CBA and compensation, 
should rely on WTA for the estimation of the costs of displacement from the point of view 
of the affected people. 
Employing one or the other has not only conceptual and moral implications (as it 
recognises that what is expropriated belongs to the affected people), but also a substantive 
consequence. In fact, while the theory predicts that if income effects and transaction costs 
are low, the divergence between WTA and WTP is small, the empirical literature has found 
that they do differ.21 A number of explanations for this difference have been suggested (for 
a detailed review see Pearce 2003), some trying to reconcile it with the assumptions of the 
neoclassical model (Hanemann 1991) and others instead claiming that it is not consistent 
with the model (Horowitz and McConnell 2002). It is useful to mention here those 
                                                           
20 The use of inputs is a cost of the project as it corresponds to a reduction in its private use or increase 
in its production; the production of outputs from the project is a benefit as it corresponds to a decrease in 
private production of the good or an increase in its private consumption.  
21 Horowitz and McConnell (2002) review 45 studies on WTP/WTA disparities and find that the 
disparities are real, that they are bigger the less the good is like an “ordinary market “ good and that they do 
not depend on differences in survey designs. 
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explanations which are relevant for our discussion on CBA and compensation for 
displacement. 
Hanemann (1991) argues that the gap can be explained by the existence of an income 
and substitution effect, where the latter depends on the elasticity of substitution between the 
commodity to be valued (in case it is  a public good) and private substitutes. The lower the 
degree of substitutability, the greater the difference. This can be translated by saying that if 
the status quo is deemed to be not substitutable, WTA will be significantly higher than 
WTP. If people displaced by a dam project value the land on which they live more than its 
market value (because of some kinds of spiritual, cultural, or moral attachment), it can be 
expected that their WTA for displacement will be higher than their WTP. However, a 
higher WTA for displacement could also be explained by the existence of reference-
dependent preferences (or loss aversion effect)- the idea that consumers value goods more 
once they own them -, so that losses are valued more than gains (Tversky and Kahnemann 
1991).22 WTP and WTA then differ according to whether ownership could be claimed for it 
or not. Given that the displaced population own the expropriated land, WTA will be higher.  
These speculations are relevant here to the extent that, whatever the reason for their 
disparity, the inclusion of WTP or WTA makes a difference in terms of CBA. Using WTA 
will lead to a higher evaluation of the losses, and to a higher compensation required. As 
claimed by Zerbe (2007) and Garikipati (2011), using WTA is then a way to partially 
correct CBA introducing some ethical and distributional considerations (see below for more 
on this). 
As WTP/WTA are measures of welfare change which do not require the attribution of a 
cardinal value to welfare, they are particularly appropriate when CBA enters the field of 
non-market welfare measurement. This has increasingly been the case because of the 
progressive application of CBA to policies and projects which produce goods and services 
not transacted in the market, and the push to account for immaterial effects and externalities 
in CBA practice. The most obvious example is the application of CBA to environmental 
projects, such as the expansion of a Natural Park, the restoration of a habitat, or of a Co2 
emissions reduction plan.  
Generally, as long as the analogy with the market transaction which is implicit in the use 
                                                           
22   The implication is that utility is endogenous, in the sense that it depends on the endowment of the 
consumer. 
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of WTP/WTA is accepted, and the costs and benefits are translated into welfare changes, 
any kind of project can potentially be evaluated through CBA. Obviously this is also true 
for a project causing displacement. Indeed, a fair CBA should include costs and benefits 
arising not only from the project itself, but also from the process of displacement. The latter 
however generates a wide range of indirect and immaterial effects, which need to be 
accounted for.  
In order to attribute a value to an environmental good (be it the expansion of the area of 
a National Park or a reduction in the level of pollution in the air), so that it can be used to 
compute a CBA, environmental economics relies on the notion of passive use or existence 
value. In Adamowicz et al' s words, “passive use value is the economic value arising from a 
change in environmental quality (or any other situational change) that is not reflected in any 
observable behaviour” (Adamowicz et al, 1998b:1). Thus individuals derive utility from 
knowing that a certain environmental good exists, without necessarily consuming or 
experiencing it directly (FAO 2000). WTP and WTA capture the total economic value of a 
good, which includes both its direct (market) value, if there is any, and passive use value. 
This implies that the estimation that they provide is independent of the agent's motives; it 
does not allow one to incorporate or discern these motives from the monetary value elicited 
(Carsson 1999). The use of CBA for an assessment of the (material and immaterial) costs 
and benefits of displacement is also likely to require the notion of passive use values. This 
is the case, for instance, if the purpose is to attribute a price to the loss of the forest by tribal 
people, who value it for its economic functions (as it provides products for subsistence and 
trade) but also for cultural and emotional reasons.  
Eliciting the WTP to avoid the project of the displaced people, or their willingness to 
accept money in exchange for displacement allows one to catch both the direct use and 
passive use value attribute to the losses. These measures would in fact be representative of 
the costs of displacement from the point of view of the affected people. The underlying 
assumption is that when stating their WTP and WTA, people are correctly able to foresee, 
identify and quantify all the possible (material and immaterial) costs that they will incur 
during the process of displacement and resettlement.  
For discussion of the techniques developed to elicit WTP and WTA and their 
applicability to the estimation of the costs of displacement, see section 2.5. The analysis 
here proceeds with some more considerations on the use of CBA to estimate the costs of 
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displacement and from there, compensation. 
In the first place it has to be stressed that using the notion of WTP/WTA to measure the 
costs of displacement in order to incorporate them into a CBA exercise implies recognizing 
that displacement is indeed a social cost and offers a way to internalise it. In a way, as 
stressed by Penz, Drydyk and Bose, CBA “turns out to be illuminating even with respect to 
distributive justice, because of its focus on compensation” (Penz et al 2011:59).23 
However, as a strategy of choice based on commensuration of costs and benefits, CBA 
is far from being neutral, objective and completely transparent. This depends on the fact 
that any form of commensuration can be claimed to be a “symbolic, inherently interpretive, 
deeply political” (Espeland and Stevens 1998:315) process, as well as on the specific 
theoretical and methodological apparatus which commensuration in CBA requires.  
Espeland (1998, 2001) defines commensuration as the quantification of qualitative 
features, where the qualitative differences between things end up being expressed as a 
magnitude in terms of a common metric. It is the transformation of the qualitative into the 
quantitative to make the process symbolic, political and interpretive, because it is based on 
the assumption that entities (including values) of a very different nature can be expressed in 
standardized forms, and that doing so does not fundamentally changes their meaning 
(Espeland 1998:24-26). In other words, Espeland points out, commensuration can create 
relationships between intrinsically distant things making them comparable (as also 
discussed below, CBA makes it acceptable to weight moral values and physical possessions 
against each other), possibly altering the relations of authority between these things, or 
create new social entities altogether.24  
Commensuration is an essential part of CBA, because it is the reduction of costs and 
benefits to a common metric which makes it possible to apply a strategy of choice based on 
the pick of the alternative represented by the highest number. In other words, it is 
commensuration that makes CBA a “rational” strategy for decision-making. Yet, it is also 
what makes it a symbolic, interpretive and political act. These latter features of CBA 
emerge most clearly in the patterns of inclusion and exclusion that the commensuration of 
                                                           
23  The same authors however also claim that CBA is inadequate in accounting for the ethical issues 
raised by displacement by development, for it does not account for distributive justice (2011:82). 
24
 Espeland uses the example of the census to exemplify these processes: a census is much more than a 
procedure for counting people, rather it’s a “mechanism for constructing and evaluating relations among 
citizens of a state and region” (Espeland and Stevens 1998:317) according to a specific rule of inclusion based 
on a specific definition of citizenship. That is, a census is a deeply social and political act. 
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costs and benefits creates. On one side, only what is technically commensurable finds its 
way in CBA; on the other side, the inclusion into CBA of non-market goods, as can be 
required for the estimation of the costs of displacement, can threaten identities built around 
those non-market and incommensurable goods.  
Espeland (1998, 2001) provides two practical examples of how these patterns can 
operate, using the Orme Dam in Arizona as a case-study (disputes around the project took 
place in the 1970s and culminated in the decision in 1981 of not constructing the dam). The 
first example concerns the attempt of including among the costs of the dam construction the 
loss of a free popular recreational activity in the area, that is the floating down the river on 
inner tubes. Espeland reports that whilst the economists in charge of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment were committed to account for this loss into the overall CBA, and 
experimented a number of strategies for estimating a demand curve for “tubing” along the 
river (including trying to elicit people’s WTP for tubing), the attempt failed. As the results 
of these strategies were not robust enough, eventually the value of “tubing” was excluded 
from the economic analysis. This example clearly shows that commensurability is a 
technical as much as an intrinsic feature of the object and that technical circumstances can 
lead to the exclusion of important information from CBA.   
The second example concerns a less mundane negative impact that the Orme Dam 
would have had, that is the submersion of a Native American reservation, home to the 
Yavapai people. The same economists that wanted to estimate the value of “tubing” along 
the river, were also determined to include into CBA the social and cultural costs for the 
Yavapai people of losing their ancestral land (for a full account see Espeland 1998 and 
2001). However, the Yavapai resisted this initiative. Land was for them a “constitutive 
incommensurable” (Espeland 2001:1844), that is their identity was built on the basis of 
their relationship to land and on deeming land as non-reducible and non-comparable to 
anything else, least money. The attempt to estimate and include into CBA their social and 
cultural costs from displacement was perceived as a repudiation of their values and a threat 
to their identities.  
This example is particularly relevant for our discussion because it demonstrates how the 
use of CBA for the estimation of the costs of displacement is far from being a neutral and 
technical act. Rather, it can have a strong symbolic value and provoke resistance with a 
political meaning. This is all the more the case the more CBA ventures into the estimation 
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of entities which are deemed as incommensurables by the affected people (as was land for 
the Yavapai or the forest for the people affected by the Polavaram dam, see chapter 7) 
Critical to Espeland’s study of the Orme Dam is the notion of “rationality” intended as a 
practical, organizational and political accomplishment, acting as a powerful framework for 
interpreting the world. She provides an account of how a certain type of rationality was 
practiced, resisted and institutionalised in the course of the disputes surrounding the Orme 
Dam by three interest groups represented by the Yavapai people, the “Old Guard” and the 
“New Guard” of the Central Arizona Water Control Study (the agency in charge of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment of the project). The three groups differed for their 
attitude towards commensuration (in the form of CBA) imposed by the application of a 
rational choice framework to decision-making. While Espeland’s analysis focuses on the 
interconnection between a certain type of rationality and the forms of politics that develop 
around it, the connection between commensuration and the paradigm of rationality on 
which CBA is based that she exposes, brings us back to the theoretical and methodological 
apparatus underpinning CBA. 
CBA is based on a paradigm of rationality which comes from rational choice theory. A 
rational choice is one which is made to maximise one's goal, namely individual utility. 
Hence, in this paradigm rationality is instrumental, that is it's assessed not for its own sake, 
but in terms of its consistency with the desired outcome. Everybody's goal is the same, i.e. 
maximise utility, yet individual choices can and do vary. This is because individual 
preferences differ, and preferences are reflected in the choices taken. In rational choice 
theory, preferences are rational too, where rationality does not come from reasonableness of 
taste, but from their conformity to a set of assumptions. In particular, a preference ordering 
must have the following properties: completeness, transitivity, convexity and more is 
always preferred to less (Frank 2010). Besides, preferences are stable, exogenous, 
precedent to choice and independent on the outcome.  
Rational choice theory, and CBA with it, is also consistent with utility theory of value. 
The latter states that utility is the ultimate source of value and that this value is reflected in 
the price at which goods are exchanged on the market (an object is purchased only if its 
price is no more, in fact equal to, than the marginal utility derived from the consumption of 
that good). As mentioned already, the value of non-market goods can be estimated 
mimicking a market transaction and eliciting individual WTP/WTA for that good.   
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Thus, it is this theory of value which provides the common metric on which 
commensuration in CBA is based, namely money. In other words, it is through the 
relationship between utility, value and price that is possible to assess costs and benefits 
together. This theory of value makes it also plausible the use of the notions of WTP and 
WTA to estimate the value of non-market goods. 
As should be clear from this short examination, rational choice theory and utility theory 
of value (i.e. CBA’s theoretical and methodological apparatus) are extremely demanding in 
terms of assumptions. The more CBA is applied to non-market goods, and the more these 
goods are deemed as incommensurable, the more these assumptions are stretched and 
become untenable.  
However, the use of WTP and WTA in CBA for the estimation of the costs of 
displacement is liable to criticisms also in reason of problems which can arise even when 
all the necessary assumptions hold.  
In the first place, as pointed out by Nussbaum (2000a), using WTP to measure costs and 
benefits implies a very specific system of weighting, one which assigns weights in 
accordance with the intensity of the preferences expressed for the good evaluated (whether 
conceptualised as a cost or a benefit). This is reflected in the fact that the WTP for any type 
of good (be it access to a natural park or a vaccine against malaria) will always, ceteris 
paribus, be higher for a rich person than for a poor person, from which one might infer that 
the rich person values the good (i.e. environment or health status) more than the poor one. 
Similarly, it could be found that the WTP to avoid displacement is lower for the poorer 
household, because of more stringent budget constraints. As discussed, when it comes to 
estimating the costs of a project involving displacement, the problem can be solved using 
WTA rather than WTP. WTA is in fact unconstrained and potentially infinite, if it were not 
for the fact that low income people are likely to report amounts of money in the range of 
those they are used to. Furthermore, the less people are used to market transactions, the 
more difficult they will find it to state an amount of money in exchange for the loss of a 
non-market good, such us the forest. Despite these problems, on the grounds that WTP is 
income-constrained whereas WTA is potentially infinite, Garikipati argues that the use of 
WTP and WTA opens a window of opportunity for a more equitable CBA (Garikipati 
2011:189). If, as it often happens, the beneficiaries of the project are comparatively richer 
than those adversely affected by it, the WTP of the former will be weighted less than the 
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WTA of the latter in CBA, with some sorts of redistributional effects. Even the potentially 
equitable twist of using WTP and WTA, however, is acceptable only as long as the use of 
preferences as normative principles for political judgements and social choice is acceptable. 
This use of preferences though has received criticism from the outside as well as from 
within welfarist social choice theory, particularly in relation to the debate around 
capabilities and development (see particularly Nussbaum 2000b and the bibliography 
quoted there). This debate is brilliantly summarised by Nussbaum (2000a and 2000b), but it 
is worth mentioning here the main limitations of the concept of preferences, which are then 
reflected in the shortcomings of the notion of WTP and WTA when applied to the 
estimation of compensation for displacement. 
In the first place, as Sen maintains (see for instance Sen 1984 and Sen 1995), 
preferences are adaptive by nature. That is, they are shaped by habit, social pressure, 
experience, existing laws and institutions. Rather than an intrinsic personal inclination, a 
preference can just reflect the adaptation to a bad state of affairs. People displaced by a dam 
project and originally living on the bank of the river, might prefer to keep living in their 
original location despite the prospect of their house and land being flooded every year.25 
More generally, using WTP and WTA does not allow one to distinguish adaptive 
preferences from autonomous (Elster 1982) preferences, as well as preferences based on 
ignorance, haste, resentment, etc. Staying with the case of displacement and resettlement, a 
group of people might have a very high WTA displacement just because that would entail 
relocation in an area close to a population belonging to a different ethnic group or caste. In 
this case of course the debate remains open whether such preference, based on prejudice, 
should be respected or not by the policy maker. The existence of this dilemma is, however, 
just another aspect of the limits of the notion of WTP/WTA as based on preferences. The 
dilemma emerges because the validity of the value expressed through the WTP approach is 
based on the validity of the procedure adopted, not on its consistency with a substantive 
theory of justice and human capability (which should be reflected in the value of the good 
assessed and the motives behind such subjective evaluation). 
Two types of solutions have been advanced here. Nussbaum (2000a) suggests  
continuing with CBA, but abandoning the notions of WTP and WTA and replacing them 
                                                           
25  Of course the counter-argument, which is also the core of the critique to a Platonist approach to 
preferences (Nussbaum 2000b) is that there is wisdom embodied in people's preferences which comes from 
actual experience, and this wisdom should not be discarded as irrational or naive.  
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with some system of weighting the alternatives which is externally determined. This 
strategy has the advantage of bringing the debate on weighting out of CBA, thus clarifying 
its ethical and eventually political nature. Although Nussbaum does not explicitly say it, it 
also has the implication that CBA has to abandon the claim of accounting for non-material 
costs and benefits (in other words, for incommensurables), at least as long as an alternative 
is not found to hedonistic pricing. This also means that CBA cannot be used to estimate the 
costs and benefits of displacement (and hence compensation for it). Sen (2000) makes a 
similar point in arguing that a CBA which accounts for distributional equity needs to 
abandon the market analogy and explicitly incorporate social choice judgements. 
A less radical approach is suggested by Zerbe (see Zerbe and Bellas 2006 and Zerbe 
2007), who is so positive of having found a way to redeem the discipline, that he names it 
“ethical cost-benefit analysis”. CBA is “ethical”, provided it meets the following 
requirements: 1) all moral values for which WTP or WTA exists, are accounted for in the 
analysis, including those concerning distributional and ethical considerations; 2) no 
compensation test is performed and the only requirement is that the Net Present Value of 
the project is positive; 3) the definition of losses and gains is grounded in law and in the 
existing structure of property rights, with WTP used for gains and WTA for losses; 4) gains 
and losses which are legally illegitimate or which violate moral principles are excluded, 
whereas transaction costs of operating a project are included; 5) government intervention is 
justified by transaction costs and not by market failure; 6) the purpose of CBA is to 
generate information and predictions, not to constitute a rule for decision-making.  
Zerbe claims that this approach to CBA accounts for moral and distributional 
considerations and therefore addresses most of the criticisms raised against it. However, 
even accepting the validity of the corrections made, two issues remain. 
In the first place, ethical CBA still relies on the concepts of WTP and WTA and the 
notion of preferences, as postulated by the compensation principle.  Not performing a 
compensation test only implies a less stringent requirement for CBA to pass (a positive Net 
Present Value, rather than a Net Present Value big enough to pay compensation), with all 
the other methodological prescriptions retained. 
Secondly, ethical CBA, like “normal” CBA, neglects or hides what Martha Nussbaum 
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calls “the tragic question”26: “is any of the alternatives open to us free from serious moral 
wrongdoing?” In fact, ethical CBA brings commensuration to its extremes: as long as what 
is good and what is bad is measurable, it is included in the accounting exercise, no matter 
whether we are talking of the chance of survival of a bird species, of the speed and fluidity 
of traffic at a roundabout or the displacement of a tribe form its ancestral land. In this sense, 
the inclusion of moral values in ethical CBA hides the question even more, as it blends 
moral values with pure economic considerations.  
Therefore a CBA for displacement-inducing projects which incorporates benefits and 
costs of displacement, at best generates information based on very strong assumptions, but 
it still does not provide a rule for decision making (admittedly, this is also one of Zerbe's 
point). Moreover, it does not tell anything on the nature of the costs generated and the 
moral compromises needed to pass the project. Ultimately displacement is conceptualised 
in terms of costs and benefits rather than dynamic consequences and development paths.  
Finally, even if no issues arise in the estimation of the non-market losses of 
displacement and hence of its overall costs (and benefits), there still is nothing in CBA 
which makes the passage from estimation of the costs to payment of compensation 
automatic. Estimating the losses is different from paying them back and since CBA in itself 
is nothing more than an accounting methodology, it needs some external criteria to 
determine what type of losses - and in which circumstances- should be compensated. 
Unfortunately CBA rests on a normative framework which has nothing to say on the matter, 
as it purposefully discards equity considerations.  At this point, therefore, an exploration of 
this normative framework is necessary, and specifically, the compensation principle.  
 
2.4.  The Compensation Principle  
 
Cost-benefit analysis is theoretically and methodologically derived from the 
compensation principle- on which however, as seen in section 2.2, the literature on 
displacement has assumed a very critical stance. It is therefore worth looking at what 
exactly this principle suggests, on which assumptions it is based and what it would 
                                                           
26  Nussbaum (2000a) also acknowledges that CBA can answer the “obvious question, “what shall we 
do?”. 
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prescribe if applied to compensation for displacement.  
In the domain of welfare economics, the creation of winners and losers from a policy 
change is a violation of the golden rule of Pareto Efficiency. As is well known, “a Pareto 
efficient allocation is one for which each agent is as well off as possible, given the utilities 
of the other agents” (Varian 1992:225). Therefore, an alteration of the existing equilibrium 
(be it a change in price or the construction of a dam) is considered efficient, and therefore 
an improvement to the existing situation, if, and only if, it makes someone better off, 
without making anybody worse off. Obviously, the creation of winners and losers through a 
policy intervention does not match with this definition of improvement.  
Thanks to the work of Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939), welfare economics is 
provisioned, however, with another (apparently) reasonable and yet elegant principle, 
which makes efficient the creation of losers from a project and avoids worries about 
distributional issues when using the Pareto principle. Indeed the whole logic and theoretical 
justification of CBA rests on this principle.  
According to the compensation principle, Pareto efficiency is preserved if the winners 
can use part of their gains to compensate the losers, so that the latter also prefer the new 
allocation.27 In other words, the aggregate benefits are greater than the aggregate costs, and 
theoretically it would be possible to redistribute the benefits so as to make everyone better 
off. 
It takes an attentive reader to identify the paradox within the principle. Compensation 
from winners to losers needs to be possible in order to have a potential Pareto improvement, 
but it does not need to actually take place. To quote Hal Varian in his Microeconomic 
Analysis “it seems reasonable that if the winners do in fact compensate the losers, the 
proposed change will be acceptable to everyone. But it is not clear why one should think x' 
is better than x merely because it is possible for the winners to compensate the losers.”28 
(Varian 1992: 405). As Varian explains in the following paragraph, it does not need to be 
clear, as the only purpose of the compensation principle is to restore allocative efficiency, 
                                                           
27  The principle also works using weak preferences: losers are compensated if they are indifferent 
between the old and the new allocation. While the use of strong or weak preferences makes little difference 
for the formal consistency of the model, it has strong implications in practical and policy terms. It is, for 
instance, the difference which exists between saying that a fair compensation is one which pays back the 
material losses and arguing that an effective resettlement programme should supplement compensation with 
development-oriented investments. 
28 X' and x correspond respectively to the new and the old allocation. 
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with no concerns about equity. As it is, the compensation principle only provides a decision 
criteria (should the change be implemented or not?) on the basis of Pareto efficiency, but 
has no normative claims. 
Paradoxically, a complete application of the compensation principle would offer the 
possibility of a well-informed choice, at least within the domain of a model of welfare 
economics. As a matter of fact, although the compensation principle dismisses the need of 
actual compensation, it still requires the feasibility of such compensation to be tested. That 
is, tests are required to ascertain which allocations through redistribution are potentially 
achievable and whether they would correspond to a Pareto improvement. 
Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939, 1943) addressed this problem by suggesting that 
costs/losses and benefits/gains were to be measured through welfare measures (the 
compensating and the equivalent variations) and that a project would respect the 
compensation principle and hence pass the test if the welfare measures for the gains were 
greater than the welfare measures for the losses. 
The compensating variation and the equivalent variation are defined as income 
adjustments that maintain the consumer at the original level of welfare after a policy change 
(in their original formulation, after a change in price). 
More precisely, Just et al define compensating variation as “the amount of money which 
when taken away from an individual after an economic change, leaves the person just as 
well off as before. For a welfare gain, it is the maximum amount that the person would be 
willing to pay for the change. For a welfare loss, it is the negative of the minimum amount 
that the person would require as compensation for the change” (Just et al 1994:9). 
Equivalent variation is instead “the amount of money paid to an individual which, if an 
economic change does not happen, leaves the individual just as well off as if the change 
had occurred. For a welfare gain, it is the minimum compensation that the person would 
need in order to forgo the change. For a welfare loss, it is the negative of the maximum 
amount that the individual would be willing to pay to avoid the change” (1994:9).29 
The Kaldor-Hicks test is then passed if the aggregation of the individual WTP for the 
project is greater than the aggregation of the individual WTA compensation for the losses it 
                                                           
29 One of the appeals of using a WTP/WTA interpretation of the compensating and equivalent variation 
is that it avoids the attribution of a cardinal interpretation to the welfare change. 
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generates. 
So, for instance, using the example of a dam project generating displacement, and 
assuming that the farmers are those who receive all the benefits (in the form of improved 
irrigation) and the indigenous peoples are those who bear all the losses (in the form of 
expropriation of land and displacement), the test is passed if the WTP of the farmers for the 
project is higher than the indigenous peoples’ WTA in exchange for displacement. 
Note that for the purpose of CBA, the compensating variation is the relevant welfare 
measure (i.e. the economic change does happen); in addition, as the Kaldor-Hicks test 
assumes the status-quo and the existing structure of property rights as the starting point, 
gains are measured by WTP and losses by WTA.  
As we have seen in section 2.2, when asked to provide principles which might guide the 
determination of an effective compensation and the design of successful resettlement, the 
economic literature has turned its attention to the compensation principle and the concepts 
of WTP and WTA. 
To seriously assess the contribution that welfare economics can give to the issue of 
compensation for displacement and resettlement, it is therefore necessary to verify what the 
application of the compensation principle would predicate for the resolution of this policy 
problem.  
In the first place, a displacement-inducing project is implemented as long as the benefits 
outweigh the costs (including benefits and costs arising from displacement). Benefits and 
costs, even those involving immaterial and non-market goods, can be estimated and 
computed into CBA, by conceptualising them in terms of WTP and WTA. More precisely, 
the benefits must be sufficient to pay back the losers their compensating variation, or that 
amount of money that they would be willing to accept in exchange for the losses, and that 
therefore would restore their pre-project utility level. The Compensation Test does require 
the estimation of the willingness to accept displacement of the project-affected people, 
which is then a measure of the efficient amount of compensation. Not only the 
compensation so obtained is consistent with Pareto efficiency, but being obtained through 
WTP and WTA, it also reflects the true preferences of the affected people and is able to 
account for the material (whose value is estimable using market price) and immaterial 
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costs.30. 
As the existence of benefits large enough to pay the compensating variation is a 
sufficient condition for the re-establishment of economic efficiency, the compensation 
principle does not have anything to say on the payment of actual compensation.31 That is 
because in its original formulation the principle embraced an understanding of welfare 
economics which sees the separation of efficiency considerations from equity consideration 
as an achievement.32. This separation however turns out to be one of the main limits of the 
compensation principle, as it is evident when one tries to associate it with policy making 
and, particularly, to improving resettlement practice. Before looking at these limits, it is, 
however, worth summarising the internal critique which has been moved against the 
principle. 
In the first place, it has been shown that the fact that a project passes a Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation test is not a sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency. The most notorious of 
these critiques is the Scitovsky reversal paradox (Scitovsky 1941), which occurs when (1) 
the winners from the project can compensate the losers using the initial prices and income 
distribution to evaluate the change, but (2) the losers can compensate the winners when un-
doing the project, using the post-project prices and income distribution. So it can happen 
that the with-project situation is preferred to the without-project situation, but the without-
project situation is also preferred to the with-project situation. In order to avoid the paradox, 
Scitovsky suggested an “augmented” version of the compensation principle, where a 
project is desirable (i.e. economically efficient) if the winners can compensate the losers, 
and the losers cannot bribe the gainers into not undertaking the project (for a description 
see for instance Just et al 1994 and Little 1960). 
The existence of this paradox is an indicator of the weakness of the principle, which 
turns out to be not even strong enough to guarantee efficiency. Besides this, the amount of 
data needed to implement a Kaldor-Hicks and a Scitovsky test is considerable (see Keenan 
and Snow 1999 on the informational burden of the test), so decreasing its feasibility in 
                                                           
30 That is to include both direct use and passive use values. 
31 The Compensating Variation should nonetheless enter CBA, which must account for all the costs and 
benefits. 
32 In Kaldor's words, when it comes to the part of Welfare Economics dedicated to distribution, “the 
economist should not be concerned with 'prescriptions' at all […]. For it is quite impossible to decide on 
economic grounds what particular pattern of income distribution maximises social welfare” (Kaldor 
1939:551). 
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practice and the likelihood that it is actually applied for policy making. 
Considering all these limitations, the compensation principle appears to be, in Sen's 
words, “either redundant or unconvincing” (Sen 2000:947). The questionable use of the 
principle is underlined by the fact that it is not possible to observe its systematic application 
in policy-making. 
Of course the principle is fundamental for policy making. Any articulation of the latter 
always generates winners and losers and actual compensation is not always paid, at least 
not in the form of direct compensation, with an explicit transfer which is meant to re-
establish the original welfare level. This practice can be justified in three ways: i) the 
purpose of the government is indeed to favour the winners at the expense of the losers; ii) 
the losers are such only apparently, as they will receive indirect benefits; iii) the 
compensation principle exists, whereby some form of redistribution could be arranged in 
theory and that is all that matters.  
However, in some cases actual compensation is paid. This is observed especially when 
some form of taking by the State is involved, even more if displacement and evictions are 
undertaken. At the same time, the criteria applied in the determination of the compensation 
to be paid vary immensely, according to the historical period, the country, the type of 
project and the social group taken into consideration.  
These criteria are not provided by the compensation principle, in reason of its 
constitutive separation between equity and efficiency consideration, that is, of its neglect 
for the distributive consequences of the project to be evaluated. Attempts have been made 
to reconcile equity and efficiency, one of the most remarkable being Little's (1960) Welfare 
Criteria. This states that an economic change is desirable if i) it results in a good 
redistribution of wealth; and ii) the potential losers could not profitably bribe the potential 
gainers to oppose the change (Little 1960:275). In other words, Little adds a “good 
distribution criteria” to the Scitovsky and Kaldor-Hicks test. Despite the fact that it might 
be argued that actual compensation is provided when a project has a significant 
distributional impact, Little's Criteria does not add much to what we already (do not) know. 
In fact, it has nothing to say on what makes a “good distribution” and not even a 
distributional change “significant” and therefore liable to be compensated for. 
This brings us back full circle to CBA and its observed inability to prescribe the 
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circumstances in which compensation should indeed be paid. As nothing of the sort is 
present in the compensation principle, it is evident that the search for economic principles 
driving the improvement of resettlement practice remains unsatisfied.  
The original concern of this discussion was an investigation into what the economic 
discipline has to offer in terms of principles guiding the design of compensation for 
displacement. As long as the search is limited to welfare economics, little seems to be 
available. The compensation principle, which is in fact one of the pillars of welfare 
economics and particularly of CBA, turns out not to be a sufficient condition for economic 
efficiency; it has an excessive distributional burden, it provides no useful criteria for policy 
making and in fact it does not explain what is observed in practice when it comes to 
compensation for displacement. At this point one should wonder whether other disciplines 
are more suited to saying something on the criteria driving the attribution of compensation, 
particularly when the appropriation of land is involved. This study attempts to follow an 
alternative approach: without abandoning the economic discipline, it explores the potential 
contribution of political economy. This analysis is carried out in chapter 3 at a theoretical 
level and in chapter 6 at an empirical level.  
Before turning to political economy, the investigation into the welfare economics of 
compensation for displacement has to be completed, particularly with regard to its 
methodological implications. Let us recall in fact that the literature investigating 
compensation for displacement and resettlement has been claiming that something could be 
saved of the compensation principle (Kanbur 2003, Pearce and Swanson 2008, Garikipati 
2011). It is the methodological blueprint that the latter offers for the estimation of the 
(material and immaterial, use value and non-use value) costs of displacement and from 
them of compensation which is emphasised by this literature, which is seen as a potential to 
be developed. In this sense the criticisms above do not impinge on the utility of the 
principle. Unfortunately, it is in its operationalisation as a tool for the estimation of the 
right compensation that the compensation principle meets its most significant limit. The 
notions of WTP and WTA, from which the costs of displacement and compensation are 
supposed to be derived, are the expression of a very rigid model of human behaviour which 
is badly equipped to represent the complexities of the processes of displacement and 
resettlement. Even more problematic is the translation of this model into numbers. The 
estimation of WTP and WTA requires the use of Stated Preference methods, which require 
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that model of human behaviour to be reflected in preferences expressed not through actions , 
but through a cognitive process which results in a hypothetical choice. 
The two main stated preferences approaches, the contingent valuation method and 
choice experiments, are reviewed in section 2.5. 
 
2.5.  Estimating the costs of displacement with State Preference Methods. Is it possible 
and what good can it do?  
 
When applied to the problem of displacement, the compensation principle recommends 
the estimation of compensation through the elicitation of the WTA (cash in exchange for 
expropriation and resettlement) of the affected population. 
As mentioned in section 2.1, this is in fact what is suggested by the most recent literature 
on compensation for displacement and resettlement. This literature is substantiated at the 
empirical level by Garikipati's investigation of resettlement preferences of the Sardar 
Sarovar's affected population. This study is to date the only practical application of WTA’s 
methodological apparatus to resettlement. 
In order to assess what it means to translate into policy the theoretical claim that an 
efficient compensation for displacement can be obtained from the estimation of WTA, a 
review of the methodologies available is needed.  
It is important to bear in mind in the first place that estimating WTA displacement 
means entering the field of non-market goods evaluation. The latter has troubled the 
economic discipline since its dawn, but it acquired a practical relevance only in the Eighties 
with the spread of environmental economics and environmentalism in general. The 
economic discipline felt in fact that it had to give its contribution to the rescue of the planet 
through the development of techniques suitable to attribute a price to the environment. 
These techniques have developed in two different directions: the Revealed Preferences 
approach and the Stated Method approach; both are extensively adopted for environmental 
policy analysis and assessment of public projects. While in the Revealed Preferences 
approach the unknown value of the non-market good is obtained through the observation of 
demand behaviour, the stated preferences approach elicits it directly from the consumer 
through hypothetical questions. 
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The stated preferences approach has acquired popularity as the methodology answering 
the needs and the challenges posed by damage assessment in litigation cases in US and 
Canada, in reason of its focus on the estimation of passive use values (Adamowicz et al 
1998b). It has then evolved with the purpose of quantifying the benefits of non-market 
environmental goods and attributes, so that the estimated values could be used for cost-
benefit calculations  (Bateman and Willis 1999). 33 
The first technique to be developed within the stated preferences approach was the 
contingent valuation (CV henceforth) method , which came to the fore following the 
running aground of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez in Alaska.34 An extensive CV assessment 
of the passive use damages caused by the environmental disaster was in fact commissioned 
by the State of Alaska. In reaction to this, the Exxon company commissioned a study to 
investigate the validity of the CV technique, particularly with respect to the problem of 
embedding (where values for a good are conditional upon the circumstances of its 
presentation). The interest for the technique was obviously motivated by very material 
considerations, as the CV assessment was supposed to be used for the estimation of the 
compensation to be paid by Exxon for the non-use damages. However, it prompted a high-
profile academic debate, which culminated with a symposium (Cambridge Economics 1992) 
and a book (Hausman 1993) as well as with the consolidation of a split in the acceptance of 
the validity of CV studies. The two positions were represented by two articles by 
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a and 1992b) on the embedding problem and an article by 
Smith (1992) on the other. 
The dispute was somehow resolved by the NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration) scientific panel, commissioned by the US Federal government. No less 
than two Nobel laureates were mobilised, being chaired by Kenneth Arrow and Robert 
Solow. The panel investigated the validity and reliability of the use of CV for the estimation 
of non-use values, concluding that “CV studies can produce estimates reliable enough to be 
the starting point for a judicial or administrative determination of natural resource damages, 
including lost passive-use value” (as quoted in Carson 1999:7).  
The CV method aims at estimating the value that a person places on a non-market good, 
directly trying to elicit his or her willingness to pay for that good or the willingness to 
                                                           
33  As an alternative or a supplement to travel-cost and hedonistic-price models. 
34 The disaster caused the release of 11 million gallons of crude oil and the death of 36,000 sea-birds, 
1,000 sea otters, and over 150 bald eagles (Maki 1991 quoted in Bateman and Willis 1999). 
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accept a sum of money in exchange for the loss of that good. Different kinds of questions 
can be used to elicit this value, but all in one way or another imply an explicit exchange 
between a sum of money and the good under investigation. In other words, a hypothetical 
transaction must be built for the analogy with the market to work. The outcomes are 
therefore contingent upon respondent choices.  
The hypothetical transaction can be built using an open-ended or a closed-ended (or 
dichotomous choice) format. In the first case, the respondents are explicitly asked to 
indicate an amount of money, that is their WTP for the good. In the close-ended format 
instead, the respondent has to choose between the status quo (the existing good or service) 
and the modified scenario (an alternative version of the existing good or service), which 
implies the payment of a given sum of money (the “price” for the alternative scenario is 
usually assumed to be charged by the government authority through increased taxes, higher 
prices associated with regulation or user fees). The respondent is free to accept or refuse the 
alternative offered. This format is modelled within a discrete choice framework from which 
welfare measures can be estimated (for a detailed treatment see Hanemann and Kanninen 
1999). 
For instance Adamowicz et al (1998) employ a closed-ended format to investigate the 
WTP and the WTA for a Woodland Caribou Habitat Enhancement programme, where the 
respondents were asked whether they would accept the programme upon the payment of a 
given sum of money or not. 
If, as it has usually been the case in the empirical literature employing this method (see 
below), the objective is estimating WTP or WTA for some type of environmental good, the 
consumption of environmental goods needs to be modelled as one of the determinants of 
individual utility. 
Specifically, utility will be a function of price p and income m, as well as of 
environmental goods q, so that an improvement in the availability or quality of 
environmental goods will determine an increase in the level of utility. Formally: 
U1= (p, q1,m)>U0= (p, q0,m). 
U is here the indirect utility function, q represents the environmental good and q0 and q1 
are the alternative levels of the good or quality indexes (with q1>q0). 
As explained, the change in utility can then be measured by the compensating variation 
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interpreted as the WTP for that change. Formally, WTP is that amount of money that, if 
taken away from the person's income, given the improvement in the good consumed, will 
keep his or her utility constant: 
U1 (m-WTP, p, q1)= U0 (m, p, q0). 
If the environmental good deteriorates rather than improves (with q0>q1), WTA is the 
correct welfare measure to employ, so that: 
U1 (m+WTA, p, q1)= U0 (m, p, q0) 
If the alternative scenario q1 presented to the respondents is randomly associated with 
different cost levels, it is possible to trace out a distribution of the WTP for it. When a 
parametric functional form is assumed for the WTP distribution, summary statistics such as 
mean and median WTP can be estimated.  
More recently, and despite the criticism which arose against CVM (see below for a 
review of the critiques), the application of the stated preferences approach to environmental 
evaluation has further advanced towards techniques which permit the evaluation of the 
characteristics of the damaged good, so as to determine the appropriate restoration project 
(Adamowicz et al 1998; Alpizar et al 2001). The underlying idea is that the restoration of 
the losses can be achieved with the implementation of actions aimed at enhancing existing 
or creating new environmental goods, in a measure equivalent to those lost (Adamowicz at 
al 1998). Such practice requires identifying and quantifying the attributes of environmental 
goods (and of the services that they provide) which are deemed valuable by the people and 
that therefore can be improved as part of a compensation package. The contingent CV does 
not allow such practice, whereas choice experiments do. 
Choice experiments (CEs henceforth) are a method of preference elicitation through the 
generation of behavioural data from consumers, so that an explicit link to a theory of choice 
behaviour can be established. In particular, CEs are based on Lancasterian consumer theory 
(Lancaster 1966), which states that consumers derive utility from the characteristics of the 
goods, and not directly from the goods themselves. Therefore consumers make choices not 
on the basis of the marginal rates of substitution between goods but between attributes of 
these goods.  
A CE requires the creation of a hypothetical setting where the consumer is asked to 
make a choice between two or more alternatives. Each alternative represents a different 
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version of the (non-market) good, being characterised by different attributes or level of the 
attributes.  By choosing an alternative the consumer expresses an opinion of how highly a 
certain attribute (or combination or level of attributes) is valued in comparison to the 
others. This allows the researcher to attach a value to the attributes and enables the policy 
maker to understand which alternative should be implemented. A monetary compensation 
for the change in the attribute(s) can also be estimated through the evaluation of the 
appropriate welfare measures (see below).   
In terms of economic models, applying Lancasterian theory to CEs requires the use of 
discrete choice random utility models to relate choices to attributes level (Hanemann 1984, 
1999). Such models are grounded on the hypotheses that individuals make choices based on 
the attributes of the alternatives, along with some degree of randomness, which is 
consistent with individual preferences. It is also assumed that the researchers have only a 
partial knowledge of the real structure of the respondent's preferences, while the unknown 
component is assumed to behave stochastically. Random utility models also allow the 
estimation of the probability that a consumer will choose a certain scenario with given 
attributes on the basis of a set of explanatory variables. Thus a CE can predict a consumer's 
choice by determining the relative importance of various attributes in the consumer's choice 
process (Hanemann and Kanninen 1999).  
The rationale is that individuals will choose the scenario which provides the greatest 
utility, and hence the probability of selecting a given alternative increases with the utility 
associated with it (Adamowicz and Boxall 2001). 
The consumer n is then assumed to have a utility function of the form: 
Uin= U(Ai, pi, m, Zn); 
where Ai is the alternative i  (where A is a vector of attributes), pi is its price, m is 
income and  Zn is a vector of explanatory variables (representing the socio-economic 
characteristics of the consumer n). 
The probability that the consumer will chose the i-th scenario is then: 
Pr(i│C) = Pr[Uin>Ujn] = Pr[Ui(Ai,pi, m, Zn )> Uj(Aj,pi, m, Zn )], ∀ϵ C; 
where C is the complete choice set of alternative scenarios. 
The reliance on a random utility model necessitates the identification of a systematic and 
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of a random and unknown component of utility. The latter is represented by the disturbance 
εi and is due to omitted variables, measurement errors and mistakes in the elicitation 
process. 
The probability the consumer n will choose profile i then becomes: 
Pr(i│C) = Pr[Ui(Ai,pi, m, Zn, εi )> Uj(Aj,pi, m, Zn, εj )], ∀ϵ C .35 
The extent to which the systematic component of utility Ui- which arises from the 
attributes of the environmental good, can be captured through estimation depends on how 
well the factors which influence the choice of the consumer are included in the model. 
These factors can be calculated using a preference determinant function which includes 
socio-economic and institutional circumstances. However this requires one to make 
assumptions about the direction and the magnitude of the influence of the variable (that is 
about how the characteristics relate to the preferences). Assumptions are therefore needed 
on how personal and community characteristics relate to preferences. 
These assumptions, and more generally, the relationship between the factors identified 
and the choice behaviour, need to be formally specified in a utility function, so that the 
systematic component can be expressed as a function of a vector of explanatory variables: 
Ui=β'xi ; 
where β is the vector of utility coefficients (i.e. marginal utilities) associated with the 
vector x of explanatory variables (income, prices, other socio-economics, individual 
characteristics). The objective is then the estimation of the vector β. Assuming a linear 
utility function, the ratio of the coefficients of two attributes provides their marginal rate of 
substitution (Alpizar et al 2001). What is observed is how choices of the different scenarios 
proposed (and hence preferences for different attributes) vary with the characteristics of the 
respondent.  
The main purpose of CEs however is to estimate the welfare effects of changes in the 
attributes of a non-market good (Alpizar et al 2001). Choice experiments do not directly 
elicit WTP or WTA, although their estimation is possible through the estimation of the 
                                                           
35 The exact form assumed by the econometric model then depends on what specification of the 
probability distribution of the random error term is adopted. The most commonly adopted model has been the 
Multinomial Logit model (Hanley et al 1998; Alpizar et al 2001), which assumes that the random components 
are independently and identically distributed with an extreme value type I distribution (Gumbel). Such 
distribution is characterised by the scale parameter µ and a location parameter δ2, where varε=π2/6µ2. The 
choice probability then becomes: Pr(i│C)=exp(µUi)/∑ j ϵ C exp(µUj). 
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compensating and equivalent variations (for which the specification of the underlying 
utility function and consumer choice model is required). 
The compensating variation CV is given by: 
U
 
(Ai,pi, m)=U (Aj,pj, m+CV). 
Conceptually it corresponds to that amount of money that, if given to the consumer, 
would leave his or her level of utility unmodified among the different scenarios, i.e. that 
amount of money which makes up for the change in the attributes (assuming that the 
change decreases utility). Moreover, assuming constant marginal utility of income, the 
marginal WTP for a change in the attribute will be given by the ratio between the 
coefficient of the attribute βi and the marginal utility of income γ (the coefficient on the 
price attribute in the logit equation can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income) (see 
Hanley et al 1998 and Alpizar et al 2001). 
So it seems that contingent valuation (CV) and choice experiment (CE) offer a route for 
the estimation of the costs of displacement, and through them, of compensation. The extent 
to which they can contribute to the improvement of compensation for displacement and 
resettlement, however, needs to be assessed in the consideration of the limits of these 
techniques. CV and CE are based on a methodology which assumes a closed system, where 
economic agents think and act rationally, i.e. according to the characteristics postulated by 
(Hicksian and Lancasterian) consumer theory. The latter employs the notion of WTP and 
WTA to provide a measure of the compensating and equivalent variations. The 
compensating and equivalent variations are observable if the demand functions are 
observable and they satisfy the conditions implied by utility maximisation and consumer 
theory (integrability conditions). Additionally, they can be given a WTP/WTA 
interpretation only as long as there is a dual relationship between demands and 
preferences.36  Finally, preferences must behave as postulated by rational choice theory.  
Thus, the limits of CV and CE are of two types: the closed system assumed is a 
meaningful approximation of reality, but CV and CE are not adequate to elicit and represent 
it; or the assumptions on which CV and CE rest do not hold and therefore the answers that 
they elicit cannot be used for policy making. 
                                                           
36  That is, just as demands can be derived from preferences through utility maximisation, one can 
determine preferences in an ordinal context from consumer demand equations. 
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The first type of problems have mainly to do with the fact that Stated Preference 
methods are based on  information revealed by the economic agent upon request (rather 
than on their observed behaviour). As (stated preferences) surveys are “structured 
conversations between strangers” (Mc Fadden et al 2005), problems of confusion, 
misinterpretation, imperfect recall, presence of second aims, and minimisation of effort are 
likely to be the norm rather than the exception. If the CV or CE requires complex and 
elaborate cognitive processes, the respondents might report only their best guesses and/or 
estimates, using a more or less sophisticated heuristic (McFadden et al 2005). Answers 
which reflect these problems and in particular the adoption of some sort of strategic 
behaviour cannot be easily detected from those which reflect truthful preferences. Biased 
answers can also be due to the presence of incentives for not truthfully revealing 
preferences, as it might be the case in consequential surveys. The latter are surveys 
perceived by the respondent as liable to potentially influence authorities decisions, or 
surveys whose outcome the respondent cares about. A survey investigating the preferred 
type of compensation for displacement and targeting the affected people, is likely to be a 
consequential survey. 
The adoption of lexicographic ordering for instance might be a strategy adopted by the 
respondent as a result of excessive task complexity, carelessness, learning, or fatigue effects 
(Alpizar et al 2001). Another implication is that the values elicited are contingent upon the 
circumstances with which the exercise takes place (as the same name “contingent 
valuation” suggests), so they may depend upon the elicitation method adopted and more 
generally to how carefully the experiment is designed (Bateman and Willis 1999).  
The second type of problems arise when the respondent does not behave as predicted by 
the economic model underlying CV and CE, so that the preferences for the good evaluated 
are not well-defined and/or do not have the characteristics postulated by the theory. 
Bateman and Williss (1999) classify these problems in three categories (with reference to 
environmental goods): 1) cognition problem: difficulties of observing and understanding a 
particular environmental system and weighing up the attributes of the good; 2) problem of 
incongruity: individuals being unable to accept that price can capture all relevant 
information about a good and its value; 3) problem of composition: the inability of 
individuals to accept that an environmental good can be commodified in order to be priced 
separately from its intrinsic contribution to the whole. 
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The cognitive problem is due to the fact that CV and CE are based on hypothetical 
transactions, as the goods evaluated (such as the survival of a bird species, the protection of 
a given amount of hectares of the Amazonian Forest, or the fact that one is living on the 
land of your ancestors) are not experienced through market exchange, and in fact they are 
rarely thought of in terms of monetary value. This problem arises more compellingly in CV, 
as a monetary evaluation is always implicit in the choice, and less so in CE, where the 
focus is on qualitative attributes. Nonetheless problems can arise if the preferences for the 
good and the attributes are not very well defined This is likely to be the case the less 
familiar the respondents are with market transactions and therefore in CV and CE exercises 
carried out in household surveys in developing countries.  
The cognition, incongruity and composition problems can explain why preferences do 
not necessarily behave as postulated by the economic model. It is the case of the embedding 
and the warm glow effect. Embedding, or insensitivity to scope, corresponds to an 
implausible relationship between the increase in WTP and the increase in the quantity or 
scope of the good being provided. The cause of this phenomenon has been indicated in the 
“warm-glow” effect, or the feeling of moral satisfaction that one experiences from the act 
of paying for a good, independent of the actual characteristics of the good (see for instance 
Carson 1999 and Hanemann 1999).37 
The misbehaviour of preferences has led some to argue that passive use values should 
not be included in economic analysis at all, whether it is because this value cannot be 
properly elicited, because it does not exist, or because either way, attempting to do it is 
morally dubious. This claim rests on the idea that trying to attribute a price to the 
environment, to wildlife, to tribal culture, is just the extreme manifestation of 
commensuration and commodification theoretically justified by the application of 
neoclassical economics to every field of policy-making. As the price is considered as the 
bearer of every purposeful information and its attribution the ultimate scope of economic 
analysis, CV and CE are built so as to generate this type of information, in conformity to 
the theory's assumptions. This can come at the costs of forcing the interpretation of the 
behaviour observed into the assumptions, and neglecting all the additional knowledge 
around the issue contained into the unpredictable and irrational behaviour observed.  
                                                           
37  The same authors however also claim that CBA is inadequate in accounting for the ethical issues 
raised by displacement by development, for it does not account for distributive justice (2011:82). 
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This is very much the case when it comes to using CV and CE to investigate 
compensation for displacement and resettlement. In the first place, it implies the 
commodification of every loss (and gain) associated with displacement, be it the loss of the 
spiritual connection with the forest, the increased accessibility to health services or the loss 
of access to free firewood. In fact, any change in the lives of people is translated into a 
welfare change, representable through a utility function and measurable through the 
concept of WTP/WTA if a hypothetical market transaction is implemented.  
In addition, the value of the welfare change so elicited incorporates not only the value of 
what is lost, but also the cost of obtaining a substitute for the loss. It means assuming that 
the respondent is able to attribute a value to the lost livelihood, to the cost of building a new 
one and consistently reporting this value through the stated WTA (or the stated choice). Not 
only this intellectual exercise appears demanding and liable of leading to implausible 
results, but, as discussed in section 2.3 in reference to the case of the Yavapai people, it is 
also liable to encounter resistance and unpredictable reactions. Resistance to participation 
to the exercise by the affected people is possible if the use of CV and CE for estimation of 
the costs of displacement threatens to overcome the social and cultural boundaries which 
separate the commensurable from the incommensurable. Unpredictable reactions, 
particularly in the form of misbehaved or “irrational” preferences, would be justified by the 
fact that incommensurables by definition cannot be reduced or compared to something else, 
and therefore do not admit trade-offs (Espeland and Stevens 1998). 
Moreover, as WTP/WTA are elicited mimicking a market transaction, they assume that 
the exchange hypothesised is voluntary. However, as stressed by Daly (2008) there is little 
voluntary about displacement, and for as much as the transaction between the goods 
expropriated and the compensation is hypothetical, it is still induced by force and coercion 
rather than by the aim of maximizing one's utility. As a result the preferences expressed 
have one reason more not to conform to the characteristics postulated by Consumer's 
Theory (which assumes voluntary choice). 
At this point it is necessary to point out how CE, unlike CV methods, have the potential 
to overcome some of the limitations just discussed. As mentioned, a CV focuses on a 
precise scenario and aims at generating information on respondents' choice and preferences 
regarding this scenario, while a CE focuses on different attributes of the scenario and the 
preferences for these attributes. So, both postulate the existence of well-behaved 
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preferences, but a CE shifts the focus from commensuration to the elicitation of the 
preferences for different attributes. Recalling the example drawn from Adamowicz et al 
(1998) on the Woodland Caribou Enhancement Programme, the authors used the case-study 
to implement both a CV exercise then a CE. While the CV asked the respondent whether 
they would be willing to pay a certain amount of money (in the form of increased taxes) for 
the implementation of the programme (including caribou and wilderness area increases, 
recreation restrictions and employment creation) the CE asked respondents to choose 
among different versions of the programme, differing in terms of the five dimensions 
mentioned (increase in taxation, employment creation, recreation restrictions, wilderness 
area and wildlife population). 
This approach allows CE to be used to understand the general trade-offs which an 
individual is willing to make concerning the good and its attributes (Adamowicz et al 
1998b).  The information elicited on the preferred attributes are likely to be useful in policy 
making, as most decisions are concerned with changing the attributes of a good (be it an 
environmental good or a public service), rather than losing or gaining it (Hanley et al 
1998). Not only is the evaluation of multi-level scenarios more transparent with this 
approach, it is also possible to focus on those attributes which have a lower degree of 
substitutability or for which it is more difficult to make a choice. The challenge is then the 
choice of the attributes which describe the alternatives.  Finally, the trade-offs between the 
attributes (and their WTAs and WTPs) can be commensurated if a monetary attribute is 
included, but estimation of a monetary value is not necessary to give meaning to the CE. 
Therefore, commensuration is not necessarily the primary objective of a CE. 
This approach differs for example from the use of the CV method made by Garikipati 
for the investigation of the resettlement preferences of the displaced population. She 
designed four R&R packages with different attributes (and levels of cash compensation), 
which were then offered to the affected people, in a hypothetical transaction, in exchange 
for the status-quo. The amounts of cash compensation contained in the package accepted 
were to reveal how much the status-quo was valued by the respondent, so providing 
indications on the amount of cash compensation to be paid and the other attributes to be 
included in the resettlement package. The focus of the exercise is ultimately on the 
estimation of WTA, therefore on the commensuration of the alternatives offered.  
In light of what said so far on the potentialities and the weaknesses of CE and CV, this 
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thesis suggests to abandon the focus on commensuration (i.e. the estimation of WTP and 
WTA for displacement), in favour of resettlement preferences, to be investigated through a 
CE approach. Offering different resettlement packages with different characteristics 
through a CE should reveal which are the aspects of the status quo that people value the 
most and are unwilling to give up, and which are instead the features of an acceptable 
resettlement package. As explained, WTA can be estimated through a CE if a monetary 
attribute is included, but it is argued here that this is not necessary to give meaning to the 
experiment. In general the focus is on the attributes and how they relate to each other, not 
necessarily on their monetary value. Cash compensation is just one (and not necessarily the 
most important) aspect of a good R&R package. Eliciting information on what are the 
attributes of a R&R package which the affected people deem important might therefore be 
even more useful than estimating the “exact” cost of displacement. 
Before concluding, a few considerations must be made on the strengths and limitations 
of a CE approach, in particular in comparison to a CV. 
First, a CE still assumes the existence of preferences for the alternative attributes 
offered, and to the extent that it is grounded on an economic model, it also requires these 
preferences to behave as postulated by rational choice theory. As we’ve seen, the existence 
of “rational” preferences is not guaranteed when we enter the field of non-market goods, all 
the more so if these goods are deemed “incommensurable” by the participants to the 
experiment. In this sense, a CE is open to similar criticism than a CV. 
However, if the CE is not used to estimate WTP or WTA, but only to elicit and analyse 
preferences in a systematic way, the theoretical and methodological apparatus required by 
CBA to estimate the value of non-market goods can be dismissed. In other words, the 
assumptions imposed by rational choice theory and utility theory can be removed. 
Preferences still must exist, but they don’t have to be “rational” and they are not attributed 
a normative meaning (see also chapter 4 on this).  
Of course, a CE employed in this fashion is something quite different from a stated 
preferences method. In fact, it’s a tool for the direct consultation of people concerning their 
favourite forms of resettlement and compensation, rather than an instrument to test human 
behaviour on the grounds of an underlying economic model. This thesis argues that such an 
approach can provide useful information for design of R&R programmes. A problem that 
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the approach is not able to overcome, is the fact that a choice is requested from the 
respondent even if none of the alternatives is truly liked. This is particularly likely to be the 
case if the alternatives are exogenously given and therefore imposed to the respondent. 
However, the problem can be attenuated complemented the CE with more interactive and 
participatory consultation methods, like focus groups. 
This thesis adopted a CE approach in the way just described to investigate the 
resettlement preferences of the people affected by the Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh, 
the case study object of this research. Chapter 4 makes some further methodological 
considerations on the use of CE as a consultation tool, while chapter 7 describes the results 
of the experiment as implemented with the Polavaram affected people. 
 
2.6.  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to review what the field of economics has to offer for the 
creation of an “economics of resettlement with development”. The underlying motive was 
the observed failure of Resettlement & Rehabilitation programmes and the search for 
principles and theories which might illuminate their reform. 
The review of the economics literature on compensation and resettlement has revealed 
that the issue has been interpreted mainly as a problem of public choice, to be addressed 
with the tools offered by welfare economics, that is, cost-benefit analysis and the 
compensation principle. On this matter, CBA recommends the estimation of the costs of 
displacement through methodologies designed to elicit passive use values of non-market 
goods. In particular, the costs can be approximated by the WTA money in exchange for 
displacement of the affected population. Willingness to accept however is a controversial 
concept, whose use rests on the acceptance of the assumptions postulated by a model of 
Consumer Theory. Furthermore, its elicitation is performed through stated preferences 
methods, which also require very strong and in some cases implausible assumptions on 
people’s behaviour. Moreover, the examination of the compensation principle has revealed 
that it is unfit to drive policy making, particularly in the case of development projects 
inducing displacement, as it would lead to unfair, morally and logically questionable and 
socially unfeasible prescriptions. If taken seriously it would in fact recommend the non-
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payment of any kind of compensation to the displaced people. If not taken seriously, it does 
not have anything to say on the circumstances in which actual compensation should be paid. 
We are thus left with no strong methodologies for the estimation of compensation and 
no principles for the determination of compensation. More importantly, looking at 
displacement and resettlement through the premises of welfare economics has the 
undesirable consequence of reproducing the discourse around displacement in terms of 
costs and benefits rather than the legitimacy and fairness of the development process it 
presupposes. The effects of displacement are numerous and complex; they emerge along 
different time-spans and are often dynamic. As such, they cannot be simply categorised as 
costs and benefits to which a monetary value can be attributed. There is no such thing as a 
price for displacement: displacement means for the affected people the loss of a livelihood 
and the disruption of a life-style. What they lose cannot be easily substituted, not even with 
the payment of the “correct” amount of money. 
The fact that welfare economics is not equipped to address the complexity of the 
problem does not mean that the discipline of economics has nothing else to offer for the 
improvement of Resettlement & Rehabilitation.  
In line with Cernea (1999b), it is argued here that economics can and should in the first 
place drive the identification of the differential impacts of displacement and the ensuing 
costs and benefits. It should also provide criteria for the full internalisation of these costs. 
In this sense CBA is the appropriate technique, if employed according to Nussbaum's 
interpretation, i.e. as a neutral accounting tool for which external moral prescriptions are 
needed, and not a rule for decision-making. Economics can also play an important role in 
risk analysis, particularly of the risks of impoverishment inherent in displacement. Risk 
analysis is also needed for the design of effective resettlement programmes, which should 
supplement compensation with investment and other interventions aimed at economic 
recovery and growth enhancement. For this, economics can be expected to have something 
to say. Finally, although Stated Preference methods are likely to generate questionable 
results if employed for the estimation of compensation through the elicitation of WTA 
money in exchange for displacement, they offer a framework for the systematic 
consultation of people’s preferences which can be adapted to the investigation of the most 
effective (or the least disliked) type of resettlement. This is particularly the case of choice 
experiment, in virtue of their focus on the attributes of a good.  
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Chapter 3 
A Political Economy approach to Displacement and Resettlement: 
the Adverse Incorporation framework 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
This thesis claims that the failure of resettlement at the practical level is mirrored by its 
weak understanding at the theoretical level. The theoretical weakness is particularly 
embodied in the reformist-managerial approach to resettlement described in chapter 1. It is 
also argued here that using political economy to investigate resettlement can lead to a richer 
and more articulate understanding of resettlement, and of the structural factors which lie at 
the roots of its failure. 
This chapter first analyses the two main theoretical models on which the reformist-
managerial approach rests, showing their weaknesses (section 3.2). Then, it develops a 
framework based on the notions of adverse incorporation and a relational view of poverty 
(section 3.3). The framework is applied step-by-step to the problem of resettlement (section 
3.4). It is claimed that resettlement of people displaced by development projects can be 
configured as a process of adverse incorporation and that adopting this framework can help 
to identify the structural factors which explain its systematic failure in preventing the 
impoverishment of the displaced people. The economic dimension of incorporation in 
particular is explored using the notions of accumulation by dispossession and surplus 
labour. It is found that resettlement programmes are by themselves unable to tackle the 
problem of surplus labour, and this inability indeed largely explains their systematic failure. 
 
3.2.  Critique of the reformist-managerial approach to resettlement: lack of political 
economy 
 
It has been claimed in chapter 1 of this thesis that the current, dominant discourse 
around development-induced displacement, originating from the World Bank, understands 
resettlement primarily as a problem of implementation and management, and its failure in 
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preventing impoverishment essentially as a form of institutional failure. A number of 
critiques of this approach have been put forward, and the one on which this thesis focuses 
has very important practical implications: it is argued here that this current approach misses 
important reasons for the failure of resettlement and hence it promotes a solution which 
cannot fully eliminate the problem. This is not to suggest that the institutional landscape, 
the accuracy and the transparency of implementation and management do not play a role in 
determining the performance of a resettlement programme. However, these factors alone 
cannot prevent the impoverishment of the affected population, if certain dynamics are at 
play within the development process in which the affected people are incorporated as a 
result of displacement. Indeed, it is claimed here that the main limitation of the reformist-
managerial approach is its failure to account for the process of development which requires 
displacement in the first place and which then determines what are the terms of 
(re)incorporation of the resettled population into that very same process. In other words, the 
focus on implementation and managerial aspects can lead to standardised blueprints of 
action in which no space is left for the endogenous processes at play in the resettlement 
region, i.e. where, no room is made for political economy considerations which link the 
displacement-inducing project to its dynamic consequences on the resettled population.  
However, explaining the failure of resettlement without accounting for political 
economy factors does not allow one to identify what the mechanisms are which prevent 
different forms of restitution and rehabilitation typically incorporated in a resettlement 
programme, from positively impinging on the lives of the affected people. Put it in another 
way, the solutions suggested can mitigate the problem (i.e. the failure of resettlement and 
the impoverishment of people), but not eliminate it. 
 This inability to identify (let alone explain) key mechanisms is not only a shortcoming 
of the World Bank guidelines but also a flaw in the two main theoretical models 
underpinning the reformist-managerial approach: Scudder's Four-Stage model and Cernea's 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model. 
Scudder's Four-Stage model has for instance been criticised for an excessive level of 
generalisation, being based on the assumption that resettled people respond in the same way 
everywhere and at any time. According to De Wet’s (1992:322), the model is unable to deal 
with variation as “[it] is formulated to explain the similarities, rather than the differences in 
people's reactions to involuntary relocation”. Scudder's response (2005:42) is that the 
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existence of variation does not invalidate the theory on which the model rests. Indeed it is 
unavoidable that a theory aiming at predicting human behaviour generalises it, and it is 
based on observed regularities. What is criticisable is rather that the model seems to be built 
on a tautology and not a theory. Recall that the model describes how resettled communities 
can be expected to behave during a successful resettlement process and that the path to 
success is defined by a sequence of stages. Final success is defined as “development that is 
environmentally, economically, institutionally and culturally sustainable into the second 
generation” (ibidem:32). But according to the model, this is achievable only as long as each 
stage is successfully completed, and completion of each stage is in turn defined by the 
occurrence of certain behaviours. The “conditions” which make these behaviours possible 
are taken as exogenous and not qualified. So the model predicts that when resettled people 
behave in a certain way, then success is achieved. However achievement of success is in 
turn defined as the occurrence of that very same behaviour. Hence the underlying theory 
appears to be little more than circular reasoning, with no explanatory power and from 
which little can be learnt on what a resettlement programme should do to achieve success. 
These conclusions are reinforced by a closer look at the Fourth Stage: Handing Over 
and Incorporation. Incorporation involves here “integration of the resettlement area or 
areas into the surrounding political economy in which on-going success requires that the 
second generation be able to compete for their share of national resources” (ibidem:32). 
One the one hand, no qualifications are made of the terms of this integration (what type of 
integration are we talking about?). On the other, integration seems to happen in a vacuum, 
in the sense that it is not affected by the specific political economy processes which are at 
play in each specific circumstance. 
Cernea's Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model turns the attention from 
describing expected behaviours in successful cases, to explaining the mechanisms of 
impoverishment triggered by resettlement. Cernea claims that his model captures “the 
dialectic between potential risk and actuality”, as “all forced displacements are prone to 
major socio-economic risks, but not fatally condemned to succumb to them” (Cernea 
2000:19). Using the concept of risk has the advantage of establishing a direct link between 
resettlement and impoverishment. Indeed the establishment of this link can be claimed to be 
the most important contribution of the model, as it makes explicit that the observed 
negative effects of displacement are a consequence of it, and that resettlement is 
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responsible for preventing or attenuating them. As the negative effects refer to the multiple 
dimensions of impoverishment, it also provides a theoretical justification to bring 
compensation for displacement beyond mere asset restitution. 
More generally, the concept of risk makes poverty easily reducible within a policy 
framework from which pre-settled and standardised measures can be drawn. In particular 
the model makes clear those aspects of well-being that a resettlement plan is responsible for 
(housing, food security, health care). Cernea's model retains the problem-solving and 
optimistic attitude of the reformist-managerial approach, as “[t]he policy message 
embodied in the model is clear: the general socio-economic risks intrinsic to displacement 
can be controlled by an integrated problem resolution strategy, but not by piecemeal 
palliatives; and by allocating adequate financial resources” (Cernea 1997: 1580). If this 
approach emphasises the need for policy actions to prevent poverty and make them a 
responsibility of resettlement, it also conveys an understanding of poverty and 
impoverishment where again no room is made for political economy factors and relational 
aspects. 
The ecological, social, political and economic landscape in which resettlement takes 
place, for instance, is treated as an exogenous variable, so that we do not know how 
different contexts can cause resettlement and impoverishment risks to interact differently. 
The lack of political economy dimension also means that, as noted by Muggah (2000), all 
the focus is on the consequences of displacement with no consideration for its causes, and 
that, more importantly, no link is established between causes, consequences and 
resettlement methods. Another implication is the lack of analysis of the role of the different 
actors. In Penz et al 's (2011:20) words, the IRR model does not address “why particular 
developers, political agents and beneficiary groups are powerful enough to initiate 
development projects that will displace people, and why the oustees are comparatively 
powerless to resist”. This problem is also emphasised by Muggah (ibidem), who points out 
that the model treats displaced people as passive victims in the face of adversity. Put in 
another way, no agency is recognised to the beneficiaries of resettlement in preventing or 
opposing the impoverishment mechanisms. The role played by the State is also left out of 
the analysis, despite the fact that indeed the State is a key agent in both development-
induced and conflict-induced displacement. Again this means disregarding an important 
variable for the performance of resettlement. For instance, Muggah (ibidem) found this to 
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be the case for Colombia, where the State, through its armed forces, was directly 
contributing to conflict-induced displacement, which had negative effects on the efficacy 
and effectiveness of the resettlement efforts.38 
It is true that Cernea acknowledges that the model needs to be contextualised (see for 
instance Cernea 1997), but he does not specify what the processes are, nor the actors and 
the institutions which should be taken into consideration for contextualisation. In other 
words, the model is able to detect different types of risks, but not to explain how they arise 
and why, as it leaves out of the analysis the categories needed for these explanations. 
Finally, understanding impoverishment as a risk implies conceptualizing poverty as the 
outcome of unexpected events, whereas production and reproduction of poverty is generally 
based on regularities (regularities which concern the terms of incorporation in the process 
of development). Processes of impoverishment triggered or reinforced by resettlement are 
also ascribable to these regularities. In fact, displacement increases the exposure to them, 
and resettlement can avoid the intensification of poverty only to the extent that it breaks 
these regularities. The implications of this understanding of poverty is further developed in 
section 3.3; for now it suffices to say that, to the extent that these regularities are 
underpinned by social relations (indeed social relations of power), they must be 
investigated through a political economy approach. If political economy is needed to make 
sense of the mechanisms of impoverishment, then its neglect leads to a weak understanding 
of resettlement failure. 
By analogy with what was stated for the reformist-managerial approach, neglect of 
regularities and limited regard for contextualisation determine the inability of the model to 
pinpoint the mechanisms which prevent a resettlement programme from positively 
impacting the lives of the affected people.39 
 
 
 
                                                           
38  The relationship between the state and the affected population was also found to play an important 
role in influencing resettlement in the case-study object of this thesis, see chapters 6 and 7. 
39  Taking the risk of landlessness as an example, the model does not help in the understanding of what 
sorts of dynamics lead to landlessness in a specific context- and therefore of how to prevent them. The same 
considerations apply when the model is reversed to be used as a problem-resolution tool. No room is found 
for a discussion of the constraints which can arise to land-restitution and land-based resettlement. 
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3.3.  Impoverishment as a regularity: relational approach to poverty and adverse 
incorporation framework 
 
It has been claimed in the previous section that the production and reproduction of 
poverty is the outcome of regularities rather than unexpected events, and that a political 
economy approach is needed in order to detect (and act upon) these regularities. It is a 
central argument of this thesis that such an approach needs to be employed to investigate 
the poverty produced and reproduced by displacement despite, and possibly, through 
resettlement. It is also suggested that such a political economy approach can be 
operationalised through a theoretical framework based on a relational understanding of 
poverty and the notion of adverse incorporation. This section presents the main elements of 
this framework, while section 3.4 develops the framework in reference to displacement and 
resettlement. 
 
3.3.1.  Relational approach to poverty 
 
An exhaustive critique of the limits of the mainstream approach to poverty research is 
far beyond the scope of this work, which instead builds on the growing literature calling for 
a political economy approach to poverty research (for some of the most significant 
contributions see Bracking 2003, 2005; Green and Hulme 2005; Green 2006; Harriss 2007; 
Mosse 2007, 2010), or to put it in John Harriss's words for “bringing politics back into 
poverty analysis” (Harriss ibidem). Departing from the predominant view which sees 
poverty as an entity to be attacked and as external to the social relations which generate it 
(Green 2006), this essentially means accepting and elaborating from the fact that poverty is 
instead a structural aspect of how modern societies function (Harriss ibidem). The 
underlying assumption is that poverty (in fact, chronic poverty) 40  is produced and 
reproduced by historically determined social relations which are embedded within the 
existing political institutions and economic structure, and that the category of power is key 
to understanding the mechanisms which underpin this production and reproduction. This 
clarifies our previous claim that poverty is the outcome of regularities. 
The most thorough and engaging exploration so far of what is entailed by a relational 
                                                           
40
  See Hulme and Shepherd (2003) for a discussion of the concept of chronic poverty. 
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approach to poverty (a term first employed by Bernstein et al 1992:24) has been provided 
by David Mosse in two recent contributions (2007 and 2010), which systematise in a 
coherent framework different disciplinary understandings of the social relations of poverty. 
It emerges that a relational approach to poverty is one which “first views persistent poverty 
as the consequence of historically developed economic and political relations […], and 
second, that rejects the individualism of neo-liberal rational choice models by emphasising 
the effect of social categorisation and identity in reproducing inequality and making 
exploitation socially viable” (Mosse 2010:1157). It also “understands poverty as the effect 
of social relations, understood not narrowly in terms of connectivity or networks, but in 
terms of inequalities of power” (Mosse 2007:5). 
As extensively discussed by Mosse, this approach then requires one to incorporate 
power with its multiple interpretations into the analysis. Unlike the (rather meagre) 
literature which has explicitly investigated the relationship between poverty and power 
(Mosse 2007 quotes Alsop 2005 and Eyben 2006), the focus here is not on empowerment 
as a strategy for poverty alleviation, but on power relations as the root causes of poverty. 
The challenge is to account for the fact that social relations of power are generated at 
multiple levels (that is in the realm of different social facts, from the family to the political 
system) and that all of them must concur to provide a full explanation of poverty. Put 
differently, a relational approach to poverty has to account for the tension which exists 
between structure and agency in the (re)production of power relations.41 Mosse (2005:53 
and 2007:8) describes this tension identifying two understandings of power which poverty 
research needs to combine: a structural view and an actor-oriented /voluntaristic view of 
power. 
The structural view of power is needed to account for the systematic nature of social 
behaviour and the fact that inequalities are produced by the relative position occupied in the 
socio-economic system. The systematicity of social behaviour is what reproduces the 
                                                           
41  As Mosse makes clear in all his contributions quoted here, the relationship between structure and 
agency is only one of the many challenges in dealing with the multiple dimensions and concepts of power in 
poverty analysis. For instance, his framework heavily draws on the concept of three-dimensional power by 
Lukes (2005), so that the powerlessness of the poor is to be understood as: i)subjugation to someone else's 
will; ii)failure to become a constituency and influence the terms of the political representation of poverty; iii) 
consensual compliance to the interests of the dominators, expressed through autonomous/independent actions, 
preferences and decisions. The perspective offered by the tension between the structural and the actor-oriented 
views of power however, better serves the purposes of the present task in discussing how power relations 
determine the terms of incorporation into the process of capitalist development. 
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structures of domination and it is indeed the first sense in which poverty (as a relation of 
power) is the outcome of regularities. This mechanism can be explained resorting to 
Bourdieu's concept of habitus (i.e. “a system of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed towards acting as structuring structures”, 1977:72): 
individual strategies and collective practices operate in a way which reproduces the existing 
structures of domination because they obey the logic of the habitus (in fact of its cognitive 
and meaning structures), which in turn is shaped by the working of the relations of 
domination (for a discussion see Gledhill 2000). Adopting a structural view of power then 
means looking at poverty as the outcome of dynamics of capitalism, and privileging class 
analysis as the social fact (or the ‘structured structure’) which determines the position in the 
socio-economic system and the source of the regularities in the working of power relations. 
The social relations that we are interested in (the regularities of social behaviour which are 
relevant for the production of poverty), are then those of production, reproduction, property, 
accumulation, dispossession, differentiation and exploitation (Bernstein et al 1992). Even 
from this perspective however, class is not the only social fact relevant for the analysis. 
This is another point developed in Bourdieu's analysis: class consciousness, as used by 
Bourdieu and its material interests, are defined not only in terms of the relation to economic 
capital, but also by the different dimensions of power relations (Gledhill 2000:141). 
Of course this just brings us back to our initial point that a structural view of power 
needs to be complemented by an actor-oriented view of power, that is, one which 
conceptualises power as a voluntaristic expression (Mosse 2007). So, in order to 
understand how the social relations listed above work while avoiding determinism, they 
must be explained in each specific circumstance as the outcome of context-specific and 
autonomous “strategies, interests and complicity” (ibidem:8). This implies incorporating 
identity, culture and agency in the explanation of how relations of power are reproduced 
and how the structural configurations of poverty are shaped. If social behaviour has a 
meaning which is locally defined, then the same is true for the regularities which produce 
and reproduce poverty.   
The role of categories which define identity (based on race, gender, ethnicity, class, age, 
disability, etc.) in producing durable inequalities has been most convincingly theorised by 
Charles Tilly (1998). According to Tilly, social categories are functionally used by the 
system to reproduce inequalities and hence power. This is done through mechanisms of 
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exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation and adaptation,42 which generate divisions 
following the categories (of caste, ethnicity, gender, age, class, educational level, etc.) 
available in the society. The different categories however are not attributed explanatory 
power by themselves: it is not the belief or the ideology underlying the category which 
generates inequalities, but the way in which they are functionally used by the system (by 
determining certain types of interactions among groups and individuals) to make the 
mechanisms above function (Mosse ibidem). Tilly’s approach thus overlooks the 
voluntaristic dimension of the exercise of power, and also of the subordination to power. In 
order to achieve an actor-oriented perspective then, culture needs to be brought into the 
analysis. Following the line of analysis proposed by Mosse, it is through culture that the 
exercise of power and subordination to it are made intentional and acquire a locally defined 
meaning. This happens through culturally legitimised formal systems (e.g. party-politics, 
the State) and informal systems (e.g. patron-client relationships). Within these systems, 
poverty takes the form of “powerlessness, subordination and injustice in the face of 
intentional assertions of unaccountable power rather than complicity in categorical 
distinctions” (ibidem:21). Finally, agency is fundamental in understanding power in its 
second and third dimensions, which encompass political power as representation and 
decision-making, and the capacity to secure the consent to domination of willing subject  
(Lukes 2005, see also footnote no. 42).43 
Resolving the tension between structure and agency in power relations is not task of this 
thesis (see Gledhill, 2000 for an illuminating examination of the problem), but it was 
important to remark here how a full explanation of poverty requires a relational approach 
                                                           
42
  Exploitation “operates when powerful, connected people command resources from which they draw 
significantly increased returns by coordinating the effort of outsiders whom they exclude from the full value 
added by that effort”; opportunity hoarding “operates when members of a categorically bounded network 
acquire access to a resource that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network activities, 
and enhanced by the network’s modus operandi” (Tilly 1998:10). They are reinforced by mechanisms of 
emulation (“the copying of established organisational models and/or the transplanting of existing social 
relations from one setting to another”, ibidem) and adaptation (“the elaboration of daily routines such as 
mutual aid, political influence, courtship, and information gathering on the basis of categorically unequal 
structures”, ibidem). In this way, the transactions implicit in mechanisms of exploitation and opportunity 
hoarding generate unequal categories and when these categories match with those available in the society, the 
costs of performing those transactions are reduced. Emulation and adaptation contribute to maintain the 
stability of those categories. 
43
  Mosse provides an example of how these different conceptualisations of poverty are at play at the 
same time, pointing out how “transactions across unequal categories and opportunity hoarding today pervade 
economic activity in India, reproducing caste inequality and disadvantage even in the absence of hierarchical 
value” (2010: 1162) and at the same time, culturally-legitimised informal systems play a key role in 
perpetuating inequalities- typically through caste dominance, patronage and brokerage. 
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which accounts for both views of power. This approach allows us in fact to relate the 
external manifestation and proximate determinants of poverty at the micro level with the 
ultimate causes at the macro level, while articulating this nexus of causality as a structural 
feature of the society rather than a pathological exception. These conclusions are being 
progressively strengthened and developed by current strands of the literature reflecting on 
the concepts of sustainable livelihood, social exclusion and chronic poverty. Green and 
Hulme (2005:876), for instance, emphasise the need to research the ultimate causes of 
poverty, differentiating them from its external manifestations (e.g. illness, malnutrition, 
illiteracy) and proximate determinants (e.g. lack of assets) by “exploring the constraints that 
close off opportunities for upward social and economic mobility, and analysing the 
politically entrenched social relations (household, community, national and international) 
that work to produce the effects that constitute the experience of chronic poverty”.44 
The need to link the macro with the micro level of the analysis is also found in Hulme 
and Shepherd’s review of the concept of chronic poverty: while they express their support 
of using the livelihood framework for investigating chronic poverty at the micro and meso 
level, as “it permits the tracking over time of a household’s asset […] in relation to its 
vulnerability context” and it “recognises human agency” (Hulme and Shepherd 2003: 414), 
they also argue that the framework fails to account for social relationships and power, and 
as such, “it needs to be supplemented by an analysis of how any specific household fits into 
wider social structures” (ibidem). Similar considerations are found in Murray (2001), which 
also discusses the potentials and limitations of the livelihood approach. In particular, 
Murray underlines the need to achieve a better understanding of the tension between the 
different levels of analysis, i.e. the micro level of the household, the meso level of 
institutional intervention and the macro level of national policy-making. He also 
acknowledges the need to support livelihood research with an analysis of the structural, 
historical and institutional context. 
However, the most important conclusion to which most of the poverty literature 
engaging with a political economy approach is progressively advancing, is the trivial, yet so 
                                                           
44
  These ideas are expressed in the paper “From Correlates to Characteristics to Causes: Thinking 
about Poverty from a Chronic Poverty Perspective”, contained in a special issue of the World Development 
(Volume 33, Issue 6, June 2005) dedicated to political issues of (discursive and material) representation of 
chronic poverty. The approach to chronic poverty delineated by most of the papers is the one which underpins 
most of the research carried out by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC), within which the 
framework of “adverse incorporation” (see below in this section) has been developed. 
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far neglected, idea that poverty is the outcome of adverse terms of incorporation in the 
dominant socio-economic system, i.e. in capitalism (see in particular Bernstein et al 1992; 
Murray 2001; Bracking 2003; Du Toit 2004; Harriss-White 2006; Harriss 2007; Hickey and 
Du Toit 2007). In other words, poverty is created by including people in the process of 
(capitalist) development, not excluding them from it. What impoverishes people are the 
terms with which they are incorporated, which are adverse to the extent that they are 
underpinned by a disadvantageous power relation. In this sense, the concept of adverse 
incorporation allows us to operationalise the relational approach to poverty, also 
incorporating the tension between the structural and the agent-oriented views of power. 
Indeed, making reference to the dynamics of capitalism emphasises how poverty is the 
outcome of regularities. In this sense it is the structural view of power which prevails, with 
poverty as the outcome of relations of power which are given by the relative position in the 
socio-economic system. The terms with which incorporation takes place are adverse in a 
sense that is locally meaningful, because the power relations that define the adversity are 
given by the context specific articulation of identity and culture. 
 
3.3.2.  The Adverse Incorporation Framework 
 
Harriss-White (2006) has been the most eloquent in drawing a direct link between the 
expansion of capitalism and the production and reproduction of poverty. She identifies 
eight processes through which this happens. The first is the dispossession of productive 
assets and the forced reallocation of property rights that occurs with primitive accumulation 
(this point is further explored in section 3.4.1). The second is the reproduction of 
pauperising petty commodity production carried out through the super-exploitation of 
family labour and debt relations. Processes of rural differentiation, for instance, pull 
peasants into pauperising petty commodity. The third process is the creation of pools of 
unemployment through two mechanisms: the decrease in the elasticity of labour absorption 
with respect to growth as a consequence of technological progress, and the adjustment of 
markets to fluctuations through the creation of idle capacity in labour. The fourth is the 
process of commodification of domestic work carried out to meet physical and emotional 
needs. The fifth is the production of pauperising and socially harmful commodities and 
waste (like weapons, alcohol and tobacco). The sixth process concerns the creation of new 
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poor through economic crisis and the subjugation of public finance and debt management 
to the unstable wills of the financial markets. The seventh is the poverty generated by 
global environmental destruction (including global warming) and ecological disasters 
arising from environment exploitation pursued in the name of economic growth. Finally, 
the eighth process concerns capitalism’s ability to determine what kind of individuals are 
eligible to enter the work-force and the ensuing exclusion of some as unproductive, 
undeserving poor and the criminalisation of others as social enemies. 
These eight processes make clear how poverty is indeed the outcome of regularities 
which are structural to the reproduction of the system. Additionally, they illustrate how 
exploitation is not the only way through which incorporation into the process of capitalist 
expansion can lead to poverty. However the exploration of poverty as the outcome of 
adverse incorporation is not exhausted by the mechanisms illustrated above. That would in 
fact lead to an excess of determinism and a neglect of the role of agency, as shaped by 
factors of identity, politics and culture.   
A more exhaustive framework for the operationalisation of the concept of adverse 
incorporation, which also allows the relational conceptualisation of poverty described 
above, is the one proposed by Hickey and du Toit (2007) and then further developed within 
the Chronic Poverty Research Centre. The authors argue that poverty research should focus 
on investigating the causal processes which lead poverty to be produced and reproduced. 
According to them this means looking at processes of Adverse Incorporation and Social 
Exclusion (AISE), and how they relate to the state of chronic poverty. Objects of study are 
particular forms of interaction among the state, the market, communities and households, as 
well as the politics and the political economy of these interactions. The relevance of 
context-specific institutional arrangements and cultural frameworks is thus acknowledged. 
Objects of study then are long-term historical processes concerning the nature and forms of 
capitalism, different stages and types of state formation and institutionalised patterns of 
social norms and attitudes. In order to understand how these processes are related to 
poverty production and reproduction, the authors propose to explore four dimensions of 
AISE: economic, political, socio-cultural and spatial dimensions. 
The economic dimension of AISE (i.e. how economic aspects of adverse incorporation 
and social exclusion lead to poverty) is primarily concerned with the way the poor engage 
with and within the market, where the latter is intended in a dynamic way. In the authors’ 
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view, four aspects of this dynamicity need to be taken into account: the social and power 
relations in the context of increasingly complex economic networks, the implications of 
globalisation, the development and restructuring of transnational commodity systems and 
the changing internal structure of the economies of developing countries. 
According to the authors, this resolves into focusing on four types of economic relations. 
The first are labour relations and more generally the labour market, which are topical in 
determining the terms of incorporation. Attention must be paid to both the lives of the 
working poor and to the relationships at firm level between employers and employees. The 
second type of economic relations concerns the broader structure of the economy, going 
beyond dualist explanation of the relations between formal and informal, marginal and 
mainstream sector. The third type of relations are the processes of restructuring 
(modernisation, urbanisation, monetisation, de-agrarianisation) and the power relations 
attached to them, which ultimately influence the terms upon which the poor people take 
part in the process of economic growth. Here particular attention must be given to structural 
adjustments and privatisation and liberalisation policies. The fourth type are the 
transnational processes of integration, particularly the ways in which developing countries 
are inserted into the international trading system and the power relations that are created 
through the restructuring of the international commodity chains. 
More generally, it is argued here, the economic dimension of AISE is concerned with the 
articulation of the relations of production and reproduction and the specific characteristics 
assumed by capitalist accumulation in a specific context, which must be investigated in 
their evolution and in consideration of the relationship in which they stand with each other. 
The political dimension of AISE should look at processes of political inclusion and 
exclusion in terms of citizenship and clientelism. The authors claim that the relationship 
between chronic poverty, citizenship and clientelism is complex and controversial, in at 
least four ways. Firstly, citizenship can involve important exclusionary dimensions; indeed 
the dominant notions of citizenship necessarily involve the exclusion of, and from other 
groups. Secondly, clientelism can constitute a winning strategy for the poor, at least in the 
short term. Engaging in patron-client relationships, the poor can in fact trade agency with 
social security. While this undermines their perspectives for the future (see Wood 2003 on 
the ‘Faustian bargain’ implicit in this transaction), it can address survival needs in the short-
term more effectively than weak citizenship entitlements. Moreover, clientelism and 
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citizenship are to be understood not as a dichotomy but rather as inter-related forms of 
political subjectivity, as “the prospects of the poor shifting their status from clients to 
citizens via their incorporation into political society will be shaped less by issues of 
democracy and good governance than by challenging particular forms of political rule and 
governamentality- the practices and performances of power undertaken by those in 
positions of authority vis a vis poor and marginal groups” (Hickey and du Toit ibidem:12). 
Finally, both clientelism and citizenship have to be understood in relation to wider political 
processes of political representation and competition, state formation and modes of 
governamentality. 
The socio-cultural dimension of AISE is concerned with the way factors of identity, 
culture and social norms articulate with political and political economy processes in 
producing and reproducing poverty through discrimination and gender inequality. 
Understanding this articulation is particularly important considering the intertwined 
relations which develop between socio-cultural categories (e.g. caste and ethnicity, and also 
gender) and forms of economic disadvantage. It is equally important to understand how 
these relations tend to become institutionalised, so that their effects are reproduced over 
time. 
The spatial dimension of AISE explores the ways in which persistent forms of poverty 
and inequalities are linked to systematic forms of spatial disadvantage. This involves 
investigating the terms in which remote areas are linked to other places, processes and 
institutions and how local exclusionary dynamics interact with the uneven impact of trade 
openness and globalisation. In the authors’ words, “it is precisely the ways in which 
spatiality both reflects and combines with other processes and relationships associated with 
AISE to produce interlocking and multidimensional forms of chronic poverty that is of 
interest here” (ibidem: 20). 
It is finally important to note that the authors choose to include in the framework 
processes of social exclusion, despite acknowledging the problematic aspects of the concept. 
They underline how the idea of adverse incorporation draws upon research on social 
exclusion, which, within poverty analysis, was the first to look at processes of 
marginalisation and deprivation as the outcome of dynamics of economic and social 
transformation, focusing on the analysis of the context, historical processes and issues of 
causality (see for instance Ruggeri Laderchi et al 2003 on the innovations introduced by the 
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social exclusion discourse into poverty research). There are however a number of problems 
with the idea of social exclusion, primarily its implicit assumption that incorporation in the 
mainstream is a good thing, according to pre-established criteria on how social life should 
be organised (for a critique see, for instance, Jackson 1999 and du Toit 2004). Besides, 
while neglecting the role of agency, the social exclusion discourse also leaves out of the 
analysis the concept of exploitation (Byrne 2005).45 All these points, and particularly the 
latter, are addressed by the concept of adverse incorporation. In Murray’s words: “the 
experience of the rural poor must be understood in relation to the experience of other social 
classes. For this reason the idea of ‘differential [or adverse] incorporation’ into the state, the 
market and civil society is perhaps more appropriate than the now conventionally 
predominant idea of ‘social exclusion’ from the state, the market and civil society” (2001:5). 
On the other hand, however, economic, social, political and cultural marginalisation (which 
indeed is an aspect of poverty) is not fully captured by adverse incorporation. Hickey and 
du Toit therefore chose not to rule out social exclusion from the analysis, but rather to put it 
into a relation of critical dialogue with adverse incorporation.46 
While we agree with this choice from an ontological and methodological point of view, 
this thesis is primarily concerned with the innovative explanatory power of the concept of 
adverse incorporation and will not elaborate on the notion of social exclusion. It instead 
applies the adverse incorporation framework and the relational approach to poverty to the 
investigation of resettlement and the causes of its failure in preventing impoverishment. In 
chapter 6 the framework is applied to the case of the Polavaram dam in Andhra Pradesh 
(AP henceforth) and to the resettlement package designed by the government for the 
displaced population. The following section, by contrast, is mainly theoretical, and shows 
why it can be claimed that resettlement of displaced people is a process of adverse 
incorporation. 
 
                                                           
45
  However the existence of declinations of social exclusion which adopt a more problematic 
conception of the term, must be acknowledged, as, for instance, in Kabeer, 2000. Drawing on Fraser (1997) 
the distinction between ’affirmative’ and ‘transformative’ remedies for injustice, she argues in favour of the 
adoption of a ‘radical social policy’ based on transformative remedies against social exclusion, which 
challenge the hegemony of the market forces and destabilise the distinction between economic growth and 
social welfare.   
46
  The complementarity of the notions of adverse incorporation and social exclusion is also pursued by 
Mosse in his systematisation of the relational approach to poverty, through the combination of Marxian ideas 
of exploitation and dispossession with Weberian notions of social closure (2010:1157). 
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3.4.  Resettlement of displaced people as a process of adverse incorporation 
 
This chapter so far has argued that the refomist-managerial discourse offers a weak 
understanding of displacement and of the reasons for the failure of resettlement. It has been 
claimed that its main limitation consists in neglecting the dynamics which underpin the 
development process which triggers displacement in the first place and which determine the 
terms of the incorporation of the resettled population into that very same process. We have 
also claimed that poverty is the outcome of regularities, where these regularities are 
underpinned by relations of power. It is in these terms that the poverty produced and 
reproduced by displacement and resettlement must be understood. 
On this basis, this thesis argues that a political economy approach to resettlement, 
founded on the notion of adverse incorporation and a relational approach to poverty, can 
enlighten the understanding of resettlement and the reasons for its failure to prevent the 
impoverishment of the affected population. In particular, the adverse incorporation 
framework stresses the importance of the dynamics of capitalism in determining the terms 
of incorporation into the process of development, while accounting for the tension between 
the structural and actor-oriented views of power. Understanding resettlement through the 
framework can help identify the structural factors which determine the failure of 
resettlement. With this aim, section 3.4.1 explores in detail the economic dimension of 
incorporation using the notions of accumulation by dispossession and surplus labour. The 
remainder of this section describes in general how the four dimensions of adverse 
incorporation are relevant for resettlement, and how they translate in the reproduction of 
poverty. The analysis is drawn referring primarily to development projects implemented in 
rural areas, but the conclusions (with the due distinctions) also apply to cases of forced 
eviction in urban areas. 
Displacement of people as a consequence of development projects typically implies the 
expropriation of their land (and possibly of other assets) by the State or a private entity, and 
the abandonment of their place of residency. To the extent that land expropriation is 
regulated by a national legislation and that the project authority is responsible for the 
relocation of the population affected, displacement also implies some forms of restitution of 
the losses incurred and resettlement in a new location. Both the form (and extent) of 
restitution and the destination of relocation are decided by the project authority and not by 
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the ‘beneficiaries’ of these measures. As widely discussed in chapters 1 and 2, these 
measures are intended to compensate for the costs suffered by the affected population, to 
avoid their impoverishment, and ultimately to restore justice. However, as described in 
chapter 1, there is a common agreement within the literature and among policy makers that 
resettlement practice so far has more often than not failed in achieving these objectives. 
This systematic failure is explained by the incapacity of the measures typically included 
in a resettlement programme (i.e. monetary and non-monetary forms of compensation, 
relocation activities and other types of benefits or transfers) in restituting or regenerating 
the sources of livelihood of which people are deprived as a consequence of displacement. 
To understand why these measures have been ineffective, it is necessary to stress how 
the whole displacement-resettlement process (to which we will henceforth refer to only as 
resettlement) adversely incorporates the affected people into the process of development, in 
all the four dimensions of AISE described in section 3.3.2. 
In the first place, incorporation in this case assumes a strong spatial dimension: as stated 
above displacement typically involves relocation in a place determined by the project 
authority. Resettlement colonies can be expected to be built in accessible locations, for two 
reasons: to keep the promise of improved access to social services after relocation, which 
usually comes with the imposition of abandoning one’s home; and to make it easier for the 
project authorities and the State bureaucracies to control the whole resettlement process. To 
the extent that displacement-inducing projects are implemented in geographically remote 
areas (as is often the case for dam, mining and other extractive industry projects), resettled 
people are incorporated in the sense that from a situation of isolation they are brought 
(relatively) closer to where the process of development is happening. The adversity of the 
incorporation also has a clear spatial dimension, as relocation often implies the deprivation 
of the access to a given landscape and its natural resources. Displacement and resettlement 
then often become entrenched with pre-existing conflicts around access to those resources 
and either deepen inequalities or create new ones. The spatial dimension of incorporation is 
for instance very relevant for the tribal people affected by the Polavaram dam, who will be 
forced to move from a hilly forest area to plain areas, losing access to their traditional 
environment. These dynamics will be described in detail in chapters 6 and 7. 
It was stated in the previous section that the terms with which incorporation takes place 
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are adverse in a sense that is contextually meaningful. Socio-cultural factors then are 
relevant for resettlement in two senses. Firstly, the repartition of costs and benefits 
following a displacing project is driven by inequalities of class, but also of caste, ethnicity 
and gender. Resettlement programmes are usually unable to combat these inequalities and 
often reinforce them. Secondly, there is a symbolic meaning to the losses triggered by 
displacement, which is determined by local factors of identity, culture and social norms. 
These losses can disarticulate social relations within the family and the community to the 
extent that they involve inalienable possessions, that is possessions which are “imbued with 
intrinsic and ineffable identities of their owners” (Weiner 1992:6) and which consist in 
“basic productive resources [that] express and legitimate social relations and their 
cosmological antecedents” (ibidem:4). Moreover, “the loss of such an inalienable 
possession diminishes the self and by extension, the group to which the person belongs” 
(ibidem:6). Not only are these intangible losses impossible to compensate, but they can also 
lead to the disintegration of individual and collective identities and either increase the 
marginality of the resettled communities or trigger dysfunctional relations between 
individuals, the community and the ‘external world'’. Needless to say, the loss of 
inalienable possessions can seriously affect the success of a resettlement programme. 
The political dimension of adverse incorporation takes place primarily at the level of the 
decision-making process. Not only is the decision of realising a displacement-induced 
development project imposed on those who bear the costs in terms of resource 
dispossession, but it is also the outcome of the interplay of power relations among the 
dominant proprietary classes. The determination of the winners and the losers of a project, 
then, is driven by the dynamics of the local politics. Resettled people are also incorporated 
in the sense that they become the explicit object of a state intervention. If they rarely have a 
say in decisions concerning the implementation of the project, where they locate with 
respect to the tension between citizenship and clientelism, and the extent to which they 
constitute an electoral constituency can instead affect their ability to negotiate the amount 
of compensation and the details of the resettlement package. 
However, it is in the economic dimension of incorporation that the failure of resettlement  
in preventing the impoverishment of the displaced people is most immediately evident. 
Indeed, the failure of resettlement here leads to adverse incorporation because it equates to 
the inability of reconstructing the livelihoods disrupted by displacement. Using the adverse 
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incorporation framework here means investigating the link between the dynamics of 
capitalism which require displacement in the first place and the systematic failure of 
resettlement in preventing impoverishment. The economic dimension therefore concerns 
primarily the relations of production and reproduction in which the affected people engage 
before and after resettlement, as well as the characteristics of the process of economic 
development in which the displacement-inducing project is located. 
The affected people are incorporated through the dispossession of their means of 
production and physical and social reproduction, which are needed for the project. In turn, 
the project is supposed to promote growth, creating physical capital and new investment 
opportunities. To the extent that the latter do not ‘trickle down'’ to the dispossessed people, 
and do not translate into restoration of the old livelihoods or creation of new sustainable 
ones, the incorporation is adverse. Through dispossession and displacement people become 
part of the process of development, but this ‘membership’ is dysfunctional if livelihoods are 
lost and not restored or recreated. 
The argument just described has three significant implications. 
First, the failure of resettlement programmes is the failure to support the restoration of 
the disrupted livelihoods or to promote the creation of new ones. Second, this failure is 
determined outside the resettlement programmes even more than inside them. In other 
words, saying that resettlement is a form of adverse incorporation equates to saying that 
structural factors exist which hamper its success in preventing impoverishment; these 
structural factors derive from the characteristics of the development process of which the 
displacing project is part. Third, there is a logic which links the requirements of the 
development process (in terms of natural resources and primarily land) to the means 
employed to satisfy those needs (dispossession and displacement) and the deepening of 
inequalities and poverty which follows resettlement. 
The next section will develop these three points, and in particular, it will show how this 
logic is explained if development-induced displacement is understood as a form of 
accumulation by dispossession, which leads to the generation of surplus labour. 
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3.4.1.  The economic dimension of adverse incorporation: accumulation by dispossession 
and surplus labour 
 
According to Marxian political economy, primitive accumulation is “the historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production” (Marx 1995:364) through 
extra-economic means. As mentioned above, Harriss-White (2006) pointed out that the 
accumulation of capital through the dispossession of productive assets, and the ensuing 
forced reallocation of property rights in favour of the capitalist class, is indeed the first 
mechanism through which capitalism produces poverty. 
That development-induced displacement is a form of primitive accumulation (in fact, of 
accumulation by dispossession, see below) has been variously and more or less directly 
suggested in the literature (see for instance Cammack 2002; Escobar 2003, 2004; De 
Angelis 2004; Akram-Lodhi 2007; Chandra and Basu 2007; Perspectives 2008). 
Displacement of people in the name of development projects implies the expropriation of 
their land and the negation of access to other natural resources, which enter capitalist 
accumulation as means of production. The process therefore implies the commodification 
of the environment on the one hand, and the disruption of pre-existing modes of production 
(i.e. livelihood strategies) and customary relations to land, forest and water on the other. 
This is particularly true in the case of dam and mining projects, which target areas often 
inhabited by tribal communities intensively relying on forest produce, and more generally 
on the landscape, for their subsistence. These types of projects also constitute excellent 
avenues for capital to find new investment opportunities with the protection of the State, 
which has the legitimacy to enforce expropriation, resorting to coercive ways. The 
redistribution of property rights, which comes with expropriation, forces most of the 
displaced people to become wage labourers. The ‘proletarianisation’ of the displaced 
people however does not occur if the displacing project does not create additional 
employment and is part of a growth process which is not labour-intensive. If this is the case, 
then the displaced people become surplus labour. 
Claiming that development-induced displacement is a form of accumulation by 
dispossession has therefore important implications for the destiny of the displaced people, 
specifically for their resettlement. These consequences, however, have not been researched 
in the literature. The remainder of this chapter takes for granted that displacement equates 
to accumulation by dispossession and focuses instead on the consequences for resettlement 
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and its outcomes. It shows in particular how these consequences can explain the systematic 
failure of resettlement. 
 
In order to proceed with the discussion, a qualification of the notion of primitive 
accumulation is needed. In particular it must be emphasised how primitive accumulation is 
understood here as a continuous and constitutive character of capitalist accumulation. It is 
with the purpose of emphasising this character that here it is referred to as ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’.47 This interpretation of the phenomenon has been advanced by a number of 
authors (Perelman 1983, 2000; De Angelis 2001, 2004; Bonefeld 2001, Harvey 2003, 2005; 
Glassman 2006; Sanyal 2007)48 in contrast to the understanding of primitive accumulation 
as the necessary historical event prior to capitalist accumulation. The latter descends from 
a literal interpretation of Marx’s description of the process of land enclosure which 
underpinned the transition from feudalism to capitalism in England and paved the way for 
the Industrial Revolution. The underlying logic of this view is stringent: if “capitalist 
production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour-
power in the hands of producers of commodities” (Marx 1995:363) and “the complete 
separation of the labourers from all property is the means by which they can realise their 
own labour” (ibidem: 364), then primitive accumulation, intended as “the expropriation of 
the immediate producers; i.e. the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its 
owner” (ibidem:378), is antecedent to capital accumulation. 
According to this view, primitive accumulation serves the purpose of creating the 
preconditions for capitalist accumulation and characterises the transformation towards 
capitalism of the agricultural sector.49 Moreover, by separating the direct producers from 
the means of production, it releases free labourers which come to depend on the market for 
their subsistence and therefore turn into proletarians.  To the extent that this process leads 
to an improvement of the material conditions and to an advancement in the social relations 
outside the sphere of production, with the overcoming of oppressive relations of power not 
                                                           
47
  However the term 'primitive accumulation' will still be used in authors’ quotes. 
48
  Although in different terms, the idea is also found in Rosa Luxemburg (2003) and Samir Amin (1976 
and 1977). 
49
  In this sense it played an important role in the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
(e.g. Dobb 1947 and Brenner 1976), and, similarly, is still a key aspect of the debate in the agrarian transition 
(e.g. Bernstein 1996 and Araghi 2009). 
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based on class, primitive accumulation also has a progressive aspect.50 
In modern times, this function of primitive accumulation has been played by land reform 
as carried out by the Developmental State through the non-market reallocation of land, of 
which the most successful examples are South Korea and Taiwan (Byres 2005). 
However, more often primitive accumulation has been observed with modalities and 
outcomes differing from those predicted by the theory. On the one hand, it appears in 
contexts where a transition to capitalism has already taken place, and on the other, it occurs 
in non-capitalist settings without leading to a transition to capitalism, and alimenting 
instead the pool of surplus labour. 
The occurrence of primitive accumulation in already capitalist contexts has been most 
emphatically stressed by Harvey, who coined the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ to 
emphasise the ongoing nature of the process (Harvey 2003:144). According to Harvey, 
privatisation and commodification, financialisation, management and manipulation of 
crises and State redistribution are the four key modalities assumed by accumulation by 
dispossession under Neoliberalism (Harvey 2005:159-160).51  According to Harvey, the 
primary objective of accumulation by dispossession is the overcoming of an over-
accumulation crisis through the release of assets at a very low cost (through their 
expropriation by extra-economic means or their devaluation), which the over-accumulated 
capital can appropriate and put into profitable use (Harvey 2003:149-150). In this sense, it 
is an essential aspect of neoliberal strategies of expansion and redistribution of wealth and 
income (2005:159). 
The failure of primitive accumulation in the form of land dispossession to lead to a 
successful capitalist transformation in certain developing countries has, for instance, been 
pointed out by Byres (ibidem). According to Byres, this inability is attributable to the 
absence of an accumulating urban bourgeoisie of sufficient size, of a resolution of the 
agrarian question 52  and a state of capable intervention (ibidem:88). Moreover, these 
                                                           
50
  Without entering the debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, primitive accumulation 
in Europe was progressive to the extent that it allowed the “emancipation from serfdom and from the fetters 
of the guilds” (Marx 1995:365) of the producers turned into wage-labourers. 
51
  The complementarity of the notions of adverse incorporation and social exclusion is also pursued by 
Mosse in his systematisation of the relational approach to poverty, through the combination of Marxian ideas 
of exploitation and dispossession with Weberian notions of social closure (2010:1157). 
52  Byres means here the occurrence of an uncompleted agrarian transition, that is, an agrarian transition 
that “do[es] not necessarily imply the full development of capitalist social relations of production in 
agriculture as part of the establishment of the dominance of capitalism within a particular social formation 
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conditions do not arise because they are suffocated by the same neoliberal policies which 
have been reactivating processes of dispossession in those countries (ibidem).53 
However, the observed feature of contemporary primitive accumulation (i.e. of 
accumulation by dispossession) which is of primary interest for our discussion of the causes 
of resettlement failure, is its tendency to create surplus labour. 
This tendency is the object of thorough analysis with specific reference to the Indian 
context by Sanyal (2007), who describes primitive accumulation in post-colonial capitalism 
as follows: “a scenario in which direct producers are estranged from their means of 
production, the latter are then transformed into constant and variable capital, but not all 
those who are dispossessed find a place within the system of capitalist production. Bereft of 
any direct access to means of labor, the dispossessed are left only with labor power, but 
their exclusion from the space of capitalist production does not allow them to turn their 
labor power into a commodity. […] Primitive accumulation of capital thus produces a vast 
wasteland inhabited by people whose lives as producers have been subverted and destroyed 
by the thrust of the process of expansion of capital, but for whom the doors of the world of 
capital remain forever closed” (Sanyal 2007: 52-53). 
Surplus labour is therefore composed of the ‘inhabitants of the wasteland’, who engage 
in a need economy, intended as “an ensemble of economic activities undertaken for the 
purpose of meeting needs” (ibidem: 209). Sanyal also stresses how this notion of surplus 
labour differs from Marx's reserve army of labour. In Sanyal's words, “Marx's reserve army 
as a category supplements the working class, in that it is maintained for later use by capital; 
the inhabitants of the wasteland resist being captured in terms of any such characterisation 
as their exclusion from the domain of capital is permanent” (ibidem:55). While the reserve 
army of labour is functional to the accumulation of productive capital (as it serves the 
purpose of providing wage workers while maintaining a low wage rate), surplus labour is 
either irrelevant or dysfunctional to it. 54  Sanyal is suggesting that the free labourers 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009:21). For a review of the debate on the agrarian question and the agrarian 
transition (including Byres' perspective) see, for instance, Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009) and Bernstein (2009) 
in the same volume. 
53  A similar point is made by Akram-Lodhi when noting that expanded commodification in the context 
of neoliberal agrarian restructuring in developing countries, in the form of enclosures of land and transfer of 
assets and space to capital, “has not, in many instances, been reflected in a marked increase in the rate of 
accumulation” (2007: 1453). 
54  See Bhattacharya 2010 for a review of the literature on the distinction between surplus labour and 
the reserve army of labour. 
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released by the separation of the direct producers from the means of production that 
constitutes the core of primitive accumulation, are a waste or a by-product of, rather than a 
pre-condition to capitalist expansion. The latter is just not able to productively employ the 
newly free labourers created, who therefore remain trapped in the need economy. Finally, 
according to Sanyal surplus labour and need economy define the informal sector. 
Sanyal’s account of the relationship between accumulation by dispossession and surplus 
labour and of the features of the latter provides the cornerstone of our argument that 
structural factors explain the failure of resettlement. Specifically, the creation of surplus 
labour through accumulation by dispossession is the key structural factor which explains it. 
To clarify why this is the case, some of the features of surplus labour as understood here 
must be clarified. In order to do that, we substantiate Sanyal's understanding of the informal 
sector as the locus of surplus labour engaged in a need economy55 with notions of the 
informal sector drawn by Breman (1996, 2001, 2003, 2007), Davis (2006) and Harriss-
White (2003).56 
First however, we must stress a key difference between Sanyal's understanding of 
surplus labour and the one adopted in this thesis. Sanyal understands surplus labour as 
constituted by the dispossessed direct producers which are unable to turn their labour power 
into a commodity, and therefore are excluded from the space of capitalist production. By 
contrast, it is stressed here that surplus labour can be part of the capitalist system and can 
be employed for a wage. What qualifies surplus labour (or labour adversely incorporated 
into capitalism) is its being in excess of the existing means of production. Then, the  worker 
is not freely entering a labour relation even when it's employed for a wage. The worker's 
freedom is bounded by the terms of the labour contract (which can be exploitative on the 
basis of power relations defined outside the realm of class) and by the fact that the latter is 
pursued as a coping strategy, when other employment (or livelihood) opportunities are 
negated or inexistent.  
As the locus of surplus labour, the informal sector is intended as liquid and mobile 
category which crosses sectoral and spatial (rural and urban) boundaries and is 
                                                           
55
  We subscribe to this understanding without implying that accumulation by dispossession is the only 
force explaining the existence of the informal sector. 
56 Despite the fact that two of the three authors mentioned, namely Harriss-White and Breman, write 
with specific reference to the Indian context, the considerations made here on the features of surplus labour 
can be extended, with the due distinctions, to developing countries in general. 
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characterised by a heterogeneity of activities (small and marginal farming, petty trade, 
micro-enterprises wage labour) and modalities of employment. 
The labour relations in which the inhabitants of the informal sector engage are 
underpinned by often temporary, precarious and more or less exploitative employment 
arrangements. The latter are shaped by inequalities of caste, religion, ethnicity and gender, 
which act as ‘social structures of accumulation’ (Harriss-White ibidem). Temporariness and 
precariousness mean lack of formal contracts establishing rights and protections, and a high 
level of competition and increasing inequality within the sector. As a result, the abundance 
of short-term and short-distance labour migration, often entrenched with some form of neo-
bondage contracts, is another key feature of the informal sector (Breman ibidem). 
As stressed by Davis (ibidem), the heterogeneity of activities and the diversification of 
livelihoods are to be understood as coping strategies pursued by surplus labour. Indeed, 
they signal that none of the activities in which surplus labour engages guarantees by itself a 
secure and sufficient income. 
Further, the role that the agricultural sector plays in this configuration of the informal 
sector and surplus labour must be stressed. Two aspects are particularly relevant. First, 
processes of dispossession occur primarily in the agricultural sector, triggered by 
globalisation and neoliberal agrarian restructuring, which require the commodification of 
products, labour, nature and space (Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2009). Dispossession 
leads not only to landlessness, but also to fragmentation of landholdings and differentiation 
of the classes of agrarian labour (Bernstein 2009). Second, the processes just described 
increase small and marginal farming while decreasing its profitability (Rigg 2006), so that 
farmers are forced to diversify their “forms and spaces of employment and self-
employment” (Bernstein 2009: 248). Thus, small and marginal farming is in itself a form of 
surplus labour. 
Overall, surplus labour is configured here as a heterogeneous category which inhabits 
the informal sector and encompasses different modalities and combinations of wage 
employment and self-employment across the rural and urban sector. Its inhabitants engage 
in relations of production and reproduction which can only guarantee their subsistence, but 
not a systematic improvement in the standard of living. Finally, the agrarian sector is at the 
root of this “crisis of labour as a crisis of reproduction” (Bernstein ibidem:251) which 
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characterises surplus labour.   
We started this discussion with the claim that accumulation by dispossession must be 
understood not as the moment of creation of the pre-conditions to capitalist accumulation, 
but as a continuous and constitutive character of the latter. It was argued that this claim is 
empirically supported by the fact that accumulation by dispossession is not necessarily 
associated with capitalist transition and it rather generates a by-product in the form of 
surplus labour. These empirical observations raise the question of what then is the function 
of accumulation by dispossession in relation to capitalist accumulation, and why it occurs 
in certain contexts with given modalities and not in others. A clear consensus in the 
literature in response to this question has yet to be found, and reviewing the debate on the 
ontological status of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession is beyond 
the scope of this chapter and of this thesis (but see De Angelis 2001 and Glassman 2006 for 
a synthetic review of the debate). However, the two main positions found in the literature 
are reported here to complement our discussion. 
The first is Harvey’s argument that accumulation by dispossession works as a fix for a 
crisis of over-accumulation through the provision of assets which capital can appropriate at 
a low cost.57 Central to his argument is, therefore, the existence of an organic relation 
between accumulation by dispossession and expanded reproduction (Harvey 2003:142). 
The second position is best illustrated by De Angelis (2001, 2004). According to De 
Angelis, primitive accumulation and capital accumulation only differ in the conditions and 
the form with which they realise the separation between the immediate producers and the 
means of production. In the case of primitive accumulation, the separation is perpetrated 
ex-novo and it is driven by extra-economic forces (with a key role often played by the 
State), whereas capital accumulation proceeds through the reproduction of the separation. 
This separation is indeed what underpins the alienated character of labour and ultimately 
the conflictual nature of capitalist accumulation. In De Angelis’ view, then, primitive 
accumulation occurs when obstacles are posed to the reproduction of the separation, that is 
to capitalist accumulation. These obstacles arise at the margins of the capitalist mode of 
production, where the margins are both geographical as well as social.58 The continuous 
                                                           
57  For a critique of this argument see Levien (2011). 
58  According to De Angelis, capital strategically identifies the limits to its expansion, whose 
overcoming through modalities of primitive accumulation creates new social spaces for accumulation. There 
are two  types of  limits: limits as a frontier, that is spaces of social life that are still relatively uncolonised by 
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character of primitive accumulation, then, is given by the “oppositional nature of the 
capitalist-relation” (De Angelis 2001:19). When oppositions to capitalist expansion arise 
outside the capitalist mode of production, primitive accumulation comes into play. 
The two positions, which are not mutually exclusive, share a common element: 
accumulation by dispossession arises when expanded reproduction ceases to be self-
subsistent and needs to resort to some external element to reproduce the conditions of its 
existence. This also explains why surplus labour is created: it can happen that capitalist 
accumulation requires the dispossession of the means of production without being able to 
productively employ the dispossessed free labourers. We do not wish to carry out a 
discussion on the relationship between accumulation by dispossession and expanded 
reproduction here; rather we reformulate the previous observation as a hypothesis: the 
modalities and the outcomes assumed and displayed by accumulation by dispossession 
depend on the relation in which it stands with expanded reproduction, and on the conditions 
of the latter. 
While we leave the investigation of this hypothesis to further research, we stress here 
how it implies that the analysis of accumulation by dispossession in concrete cases needs to 
take into account what the relationship is with expanded reproduction and what forms the 
latter assumes. This implication in turn brings us back full circle to the claim made in 
section 3.4 that investigating resettlement as a process of adverse incorporation means 
looking at how the systematic failure of resettlement links to the dynamics of capitalism 
which require displacement in the first place. If development-induced displacement is a 
form of accumulation by dispossession which arises when obstacles are met by expanded 
reproduction, then the displaced people are likely to turn into surplus labour. Put differently, 
capitalist accumulation requires the displacing project, but it is not at the same time able to 
create sufficient, secure and appropriately remunerated employment for the free labourers 
released with dispossession. 
The systematic failure of resettlement then rests in the inability (in fact the impossibility) 
to contrast these processes by itself. To clarify this point, the benefits and the provisions 
(including cash and land compensation) typically provided with resettlement programmes 
are not able by themselves to either undo the separation between the direct producers and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
capitalist relations of production and modes of activity; and limits as political recomposition, where the limit 
is identified in a social force that poses its activity in opposition to capital (De Angelis 2004:72-73). 
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the means of production, nor solve the problem of surplus labour. Often they are also 
unable to attenuate the crisis of reproduction which underpins surplus labour. In the best 
case scenario, the people displaced by development projects are relocated in a colony built 
by the project authority and compensated for their material losses with cash and land. Land-
for-land compensation, however, (in the increasingly rare cases in which it is indeed 
granted) does not shield the small and marginal farmers from the processes of 
differentiation, commodification and polarisation mentioned above. In fact, they can find 
themselves exposed even more than before to the riskiness and decreasing profitability of 
agriculture, as well as to the pressure towards further fragmentation of land-holdings. This 
is due not only to the intrinsic difficulties of starting up a new activity and recreating a 
livelihood, but also to the embeddedness of land relations in power relations and inequality.  
It can also be argued that as long as we are facing a form of accumulation by 
dispossession, compensation for displacement cannot be expected to fully replace the 
expropriated means of production. Indeed expropriation followed by land compensation 
which does put the farmer in the conditions to start an accumulation process, would simply 
not be an instance of accumulation by dispossession. What instead is consistent with the 
latter is compensation in the form of devalued land or land which cannot be put to 
profitable use, an eventuality which also will emerge in the analysis of the case study. 
A similar point can be made about cash compensation: to the extent that we are facing 
accumulation by dispossession, cash compensation cannot truly be assumed to enable the 
re-purchase of the dispossessed means of production. As will be shown in chapter 7, the 
amount of money granted as cash compensation to the farmers displaced by the Polavaram 
dam, is not sufficient to acquire land in the relocation area. Independent of the amount of 
land compensation, as the case-study will also reveal, cash in itself is not sufficient to 
regenerate a new profitable livelihood (be it based on farm or non-farm activities). And of 
course money does not buy a job, particularly when the displaced population is underskilled 
and belongs to socially discriminated categories, and the industrial sector is either incapable 
of creating new employment or purposefully relies on casual and unorganised labour. 
For these reasons land and cash compensation do not enable resettled people to escape 
the category of surplus labour. 
Finally, neither cash nor land compensation can make up for the fact that displacement 
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often also implies the loss of the means of physical and social reproduction, at the level of 
the family and of the community. This is typically the case of tribal populations which as a 
consequence of displacement lose access to the forest and its produce. Again, the 
impossibility of replacing the means of reproduction is a structural feature descending from 
accumulation by dispossession, as the latter “entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-
existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession” 
(Harvey 2003:146). The loss of means of reproduction indeed is a major factor keeping 
people trapped in the need economy, all the more so, when the means of reproduction are 
ascribable to the category of inalienable possessions described in section 3.3.59 
The concepts of accumulation by dispossession and surplus labour have helped to 
explain the existence of structural factors hampering the ability of resettlement programmes 
to prevent the impoverishment of the displaced people. This explanation directly relates the 
performance of resettlement to the dynamics at play in the process of development. Before 
concluding, two weaknesses of this explanation must be underlined and addressed. First, as 
it stands, this explanation of the failure of resettlement suffers from excessive determinism. 
In fact, it offers an explanation of the reproduction of poverty which is entirely based on a 
structural view of power, neglecting the voluntaristic dimension which we have emphasised 
in the previous section. Furthermore, our claim that resettlement is a process of adverse 
incorporation is not exhausted by the economic dimension of the process, that is, by the 
interpretation of the phenomenon through the Marxian notions of accumulation by 
dispossession and surplus labour. 
The first point can be addressed by accounting for the fact that the terms of 
incorporation into the process of development are context specific,60 which is to say that the 
relations of production and reproduction in which surplus labour engages are underpinned 
by context-specific power relations, determined outside the category of class.61 In particular, 
they depend on the historical articulation of the relations of power and the categories along 
                                                           
59 Referring to the commodification of inalienable possession entailed by accumulation by 
dispossession, Julia Elyachar suggests that the latter undermines historically constituted forms of collective 
identity and cosmology (2005:28). 
60  So are the conditions of expanded reproduction and how this relates to accumulation by 
dispossession. 
61  Harvey seems to suggest something similar when he states that “[t]he process of proletarianisation 
[…] entails a mix of coercions and of appropriations of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, 
habits of mind, and beliefs […]. Kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and 
authority relations (including those exercised through religion and its institutions) all have their part to play” 
(2003:146). 
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which they develop. In this way, the actor-oriented view of power can be incorporated into 
the analysis.  
Regarding the second point, we wish to reinforce the argument that the failure of 
resettlement is not determined exclusively by the economic dimension of adverse 
incorporation. The centrality attributed in this thesis to the economic dimension rests on the 
fact that one of the main purposes of this thesis indeed is to demonstrate the potential 
contribution of political economy to the understanding of resettlement. While all the 
dimensions of adverse incorporation should fit in a political economy framework, reasons 
of time and space have imposed the focus on one single dimension. Given the 
aforementioned purpose, the chosen dimension necessarily had to be the economic one. 
 
3.5.  Overview and Conclusion 
 
This chapter has illustrated how a political economy approach can enrich the 
understanding of resettlement, offering an alternative explanation of its apparently 
systematic failure in preventing impoverishment of the affected population. For this 
purpose, it has developed a theoretical framework based on the notion of adverse 
incorporation and a relational view of poverty. 
This framework is used to investigate processes of impoverishment, emphasising on the 
one hand how they link to the dynamic of capitalism, and on the other, how they are 
underpinned by power relations, where power is understood in voluntaristic and in 
structural terms. Poverty, then, is produced and reproduced by incorporating people into the 
process of development, where the terms of incorporation are adverse due to the 
disadvantageous position occupied by the poor in the power relations which underpin it. 
The adversity of the incorporation has an economic, as well as a political, a socio-cultural 
and a spatial dimension. 
It has then been claimed that resettlement of people displaced by development projects 
adversely incorporates them into development in economic, political, socio-cultural and 
spatial terms. All these dimensions contribute to determine the failure of resettlement to 
prevent impoverishment. The analysis has particularly focused on the economic dimension 
of incorporation, employing the Marxian notions of accumulation by dispossession and 
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surplus labour. The use of a Marxian framework has allowed the possibility of identifying 
the mechanisms which systematically prevent resettlement from positively affecting the 
lives of the people involved. 
In light of this framework, it has emerged that what makes resettlement a process of 
adverse incorporation is the fact that it is required to dispose of people who are 
(purposefully or not) made redundant by the same process of development, which proceeds 
through projects that appropriate new sources of capital (read natural resources and land) at 
a low cost. In Marxian terminology, displacement equates to a manifestation of 
accumulation by dispossession in contexts where capital accumulation encounters limits to 
its expansion. To the extent that this takes place in conditions where the agrarian sector 
does not guarantee sustainability and subsistence, and the process of development does not 
create enough employment to accommodate everyone, the displaced population is bound to 
enter the informal sector and turn into surplus labour. When the displaced people are 
already part of surplus labour, displacement enhances the precariousness of the position 
that they occupy into it, and the regressivity of the social relations that they enter. In other 
words, the conditions of expanded reproduction (especially concerning labour and agrarian 
relations) are such that the free labourers released by accumulation by dispossession cannot 
be absorbed by capitalist expansion. Surplus labour engages in relations of production and 
reproduction which limit its capacity to rise above subsistence. The regressivity of these 
relations depends on context-specific power relations (determined outside the category of 
class), and also on the extent to which the means of production expropriated through 
accumulation by dispossession also constituted means of physical and social reproduction 
at the level of the household and the community.  
Resettlement then fails because neither cash nor land compensation enable people to 
escape surplus labour nor to contrast the adversity created and perpetuated by the processes 
underpinning the informal sector. The inability of resettlement programmes to counteract 
surplus labour is explored in chapter 7 in reference to a concrete case of displacement and 
resettlement. More generally it will be shown how using the adverse incorporation 
framework can help identify the structural factors which in a concrete case limit the ability 
of resettlement to prevent the impoverishment of the displaced people. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology, Strategies of Inquiry and Methods 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction, Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
This research is the outcome of a four-year reflection on the problem of resettling people 
displaced by development projects. My understanding of the problem has significantly 
evolved over time and this evolution is reflected in the multiple levels of analysis contained 
in the thesis. Resettlement is first of all a practical problem and a policy issue, and I 
initially approached it in this way. The concrete nature of the problem is mirrored in the 
importance attributed in this work to the description and analysis of the case study. The 
investigation of the practical reasons of the failure of resettlement, however, brought to the 
surface the limits of this very same approach, particularly in recognising that a considerable 
part of the failure is due to the actions of structural factors which exist prior to and 
independently from resettlement. These factors interact with resettlement and affect its 
performance. In order to uncover these structural factors, it increasingly seemed necessary 
to re-think resettlement from a theoretical and from a methodological point of view. Indeed, 
this is what this thesis attempts to do, framing the problem within the following research 
questions: 
1) What explains the persistent failure of Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) 
programmes in avoiding the impoverishment of the population displaced by development 
projects? 
2) What contribution can economics give to the design of improved R&R programmes? 
3) Does a choice experiment constitute a useful methodology to improve the design of 
R&R programmes? 
The literature review contained in the first part of the thesis (chapters 1 and 2) is in fact a 
meta-analysis of the existing discourses about resettlement and its failure, and of the use of 
economics for resettlement research and practice invoked by this discourse. This analysis 
led to the formulation of three hypotheses in response to the research questions: 
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HYPOTHESIS 1: The failure of R&R is explained by, and reflected through, 
shortcomings at the theoretical, methodological and practical levels. 
1.i) At the theoretical level, there is an unsatisfactory conceptualisation of 
displacement and of what resettlement entails for the displaced population in terms of 
(re)incorporation into the process of (capitalist) development. In particular, the 
existing theoretical framework does not acknowledge that the systematic failure of 
resettlement is attributable to structural factors of the context-specific process of 
development.  
     1.ii) At the methodological level, excessive emphasis has been attributed to the 
potential contribution of welfare economics in providing principles and guidelines for 
the design of compensation and resettlement packages, while neglecting the potential 
contribution of political economy. If translated into policy prescriptions, this excessive 
emphasis implies an exclusive focus on cash compensation. 
1.iii) At the practical level multiple failures tend to occur: flaws in the 
implementation of the resettlement packages, no application of the official guidelines, 
insufficiency of the money allocated for resettlement. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Political economy can significantly contribute to address the observed 
systematic failure of resettlement and improve its performance.  
2.i) Political economy conveys a richer and more articulated understanding of 
resettlement, incorporating into the analysis the processes of inclusion, exclusion and 
adverse incorporation which underpin it, thus uncovering the link between the failure 
of resettlement and the regularities in the production and reproduction of poverty. 
2.ii) Resettlement of people displaced by development projects can be configured as 
a process of adverse incorporation into (capitalist) development. 
2.iii) Employing political economy, and, in particular, the notion of adverse 
incorporation to investigate resettlement allows for the identification of the structural 
factors which determine the failure of resettlement to prevent the impoverishment of the 
displaced population. Identifying the structural factors also leads to the reformulation 
of the policy prescription for a successful resettlement programme. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Methodologies for the estimation of values of non-market goods 
through stated preferences elaborated within welfare and experimental economics are not 
suitable for the estimation of the immaterial costs of displacement and resettlement (and 
hence for the estimation of a just compensation). However they can provide a useful format 
for the direct consultation of the affected population about the preferred typologies of 
compensation and resettlement, thus contributing to the design of more effective and fair 
R&R programmes. 
The case study then serves the purpose not only of investigating the failure of 
resettlement at the practical level, but all the three hypothesis above, following three 
strategies of inquiry described in section 4.3.  
Specific attention is merited here for hypothesis 2 and in particular 2.ii. Testing the 
hypothesis that political economy conveys a better understanding of resettlement and of the 
factors which determine its performance requires the drawing of a theoretical framework 
for the analysis of resettlement which employs the categories of political economy. This 
indeed has been attempted in chapter 3, following a retroductive research strategy (Blaikie 
2000). This kind of strategy begins with the observation of a regularity, which is assumed 
to be explained by structures and mechanisms that are not directly observable. In our case, 
the observed regularity is the failure of resettlement, and the unobservable structures and 
mechanisms are the structural factors that cause it. The task of the researcher is therefore to 
construct a model of these structures and mechanisms, an operation which was performed 
in chapter 3 and which resulted in the adverse incorporation framework and the 
highlighting of the categories of accumulation by dispossession and surplus labour. The 
model is then tested as a hypothetical description of actually existing entities and their 
relationship, which is the task undertaken in chapter 6, where the adverse incorporation 
framework is applied to the case study. The next stage consists in identifying further 
consequences of the model, which can be stated in a manner open to empirical testing. This 
is also carried out in chapter 7, showing how the dynamic consequences in Polavaram (i.e. 
the deepening of landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings, and casualisation of labour) 
correspond to the processes underpinning the production and reproduction of surplus labour 
in AP. Consistent with the retroductive research strategy, the intent of the framework is not 
predictive but explanatory, where “explanation is achieved by establishing the existence of 
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the structure or mechanism that produces the observed regularities” (ibidem:113). This 
explanatory intent is particularly appropriate for investigating a phenomenon which is 
currently in progress and whose effects and outcomes have just started to display 
themselves. Finally, the retroductive research strategy is consistent with two key 
characteristics of the adverse incorporation framework: the fact that the terms of 
incorporation are context-specific, and the inclusion of both a structure-oriented and an 
actor-oriented view of power. As concerns the first characteristic, retroduction allows for 
regularities to be explained by the aggregation and the interaction of the mechanism with 
the context.62 Regarding the second characteristic, individual choices are understood as 
being constrained or enabled by characteristics of the social context in which the individual 
is located, thus allowing both agency and structure to enter the explanation. 
The following sections describe the methodology adopted by this research, the strategies 
of inquiry and the methods for data generation and data collection.  
 
4.2.  Methodology: Case study 
 
A case study methodology has been employed to investigate the research questions. The 
hypotheses are tested with respect to a specific instance of resettlement, following three 
different strategies of inquiry (described in section 4.3).  
The understanding of case study methodology adopted in this thesis corresponds to the 
definition suggested by Yin (2003:13-14): “Case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study 
inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data point, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from 
the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”. 
The very first purpose of adopting a case study methodology here is indeed to describe 
an instance of mass displacement which is still in progress (in fact, at its initial stages). The 
                                                           
62
 In Blaikie’s words: “explanation of social regularities, rates, associations, outcomes or patterns come 
from an understanding of mechanisms acting in social context” (ibidem: 112) 
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second purpose is to test an alternative theoretical model for the explanation of the failure 
of resettlement. This model attributes explanatory power to structural characteristics of the 
context of analysis, thus emphasising that the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are not clearly evident. Finally, not only are there a number of variables of interest, 
but also of perspectives of analysis adopted. Multiple methods were employed to generate 
evidence concerning the case study, and all of them contributed to provide evidence for the 
strategies of inquiry.  
It must be also emphasised that the description of the case study on the basis of original 
evidence is in itself one of the aims of this research, in consideration of the little academic 
literature existing on the Polavaram dam. With this aim, a range of different methods and 
sources (described in section 4.5) have been employed for the collection and production of 
primary data. 
 
4.3.  Strategies of inquiry 
 
The ‘strategy of inquiry’ describes the logic linking the data to the hypothesis. Here, 
three strategies have been adopted to interrogate the case study about the research questions 
and the following hypothesis. All of them correspond to a way of assessing resettlement in 
Polavaram, from a theoretical, a methodological, and a practical perspective.  
 
1) Consultation methods: choice experiment and focus group (chapter 7) 
The first way in which resettlement in Polavaram is assessed is through the affected 
population’s own opinion and preferences. The strategy of inquiry is their direct 
consultation through focus groups and a choice experiment (CE hereafter), which question 
the affected people about their favoured forms of restitution and relocation.   
The hypotheses addressed with this strategy are hypothesis 3 (directly) and hypothesis 
2.ii (indirectly). With regards to hypothesis 3, the CE is tested on the Polavaram affected 
population, and the results are triangulated with those of the focus groups. The CE and the 
focus groups therefore have here an explorative function and are employed as methods for 
the generation of primary evidence. As concerns hypothesis 2.ii, the preferences expressed 
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by the affected population are measured against the emphasis on cash compensation 
implied in the prescriptions of welfare economics and of the compensation principle. 
Anticipating the results of this strategy of inquiry, it transpires that monetary compensation 
is not the factor which in itself determines the success of a resettlement programme. The 
conclusion that follows is that attributing to the tools of welfare economics the capacity to 
solve the failure of resettlement, through the estimation of the efficient (and fair) amount of 
cash compensation, is therefore misplaced.  
 
2) Description and assessment of the compensation and resettlement operations 
(chapter 6 and 7)  
The second strategy of inquiry directly addresses hypothesis 1.iii, but it also generates 
evidence in support of all the other hypotheses. The case study in this instance plays a 
descriptive purpose, as the strategy consists in the description of what constitutes the 
resettlement package in Polavaram and the details of its practical implementation. Both 
primary and secondary data are employed. The description also allows for a preliminary 
assessment of resettlement in Polavaram, on the basis of three criteria: i) the 
implementation and management performance, and the completion with the policy and 
legal framework of reference; ii) the comparison with the affected people’s preferences 
elicited through the CE and the focus group; iii) the capacity of the package to support the 
reconstruction of the disrupted livelihoods. The first criterion is discussed in chapter 6, 
while the second and the third criteria are examined in chapter 7. 
This preliminary assessment generates evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the 
failure of resettlement is determined not only by shortcomings in implementation and 
management, but also by structural factors. 
 
3) Application of the adverse incorporation framework to the case study (chapter 6 
and 7)  
The third strategy of inquiry consists in the application of the theoretical and analytical 
framework developed in chapter 3 to the case study. It is argued that resettlement in 
Polavaram is a process of adverse incorporation. Consistent with the retroductive research 
strategy, it is examined whether the key categories of analysis of the framework are 
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relevant for the case study, and whether the factors identified as the structural causes of the 
failure of resettlement are at play in the case of the Polavaram dam project and people. The 
context-specific articulation of these categories and factors and their role in determining the 
outcome of resettlement is emphasised. In particular, chapter 6 identifies the structures and 
mechanisms underpinning surplus labour in Andhra Pradesh, and how they are relevant for 
the displaced population; chapter 7 shows how these structures and mechanisms interact 
with the shortcomings of the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package (PRRP) 
in turning resettlement into a process of adverse incorporation. 
The adverse incorporation framework, however, is not applied to the concrete case in its 
entirety. The framework in fact identifies four categories of incorporation (economic, 
political, social, and spatial), while only the economic dimension is explored in the case 
study.  
Finally, this strategy relies more than the others on secondary evidence, because not all 
the categories of interest could be investigated during fieldwork; in addition, many of the 
phenomena of interest have a meso and macro dimension (that is, they are determined at the 
district, state and national level). 
 
4.4.  Fieldwork 
 
The strategies of inquiry described in section 4.3 employ primary evidence generated 
during fieldwork in India, through four methods of data collection: interviews, focus groups, 
survey, and a consultation exercise based on CE approach (for brevity, often referred to as 
“choice experiment” throughout the thesis). 
The fieldwork took place from April to July 2009 across Delhi, Hyderabad, Eluru, and 
the Polavaram affected areas. The first two weeks of my stay in India were spent in Delhi, 
residing at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) Guest house. There I had the chance to 
plan with more detail the work for the following months, meet my supervisor (who was on 
sabbatical at the Institute of Advanced Studies at JNU) and make useful contacts with 
academics and journalists. From Delhi I moved to Eluru, the head-quarter of the West 
Godavari district in Andhra Pradesh (AP). Eluru is a town of around 400,000 habitants 
located close to the important railway junction of Vijayawada, where my main contact was 
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based, a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) named SEEDS, and its executive 
director, Mr Pagano Didla. For the following months I was a guest of SEEDS, lodging in 
the office of the organisation. 
SEEDS works mainly with tribal people and has considerable experience in the areas 
and in the villages which will be directly affected by the Polavaram project. The staff of 
SEEDS shared with me their knowledge of the Polavaram project and of the local context. 
Their support was essential for the success of my fieldwork, particularly in reaching and 
interviewing the affected people. I was assisted in particular by four people: Mr Shyam 
Karamsetty, Mr Israel Ray Abbadasari, Mr Murthy Peddireddi, and Mr Subba Rao (all of 
whom will hereafter be referred to as ‘research assistants’ or by name). 
These research assistants helped me to organise the logistics of the visits to the 
Polavaram affected villages, accompanied me during the trips, and played the role of 
gatekeepers, intermediaries and translators during each mission on the field. Murthy and 
Israel often travelled in advance to the villages which I had planned to visit in order to 
inform the people of our arrival. They also visited the offices of the local administration to 
request official documents on the project and resettlement package.  
During my stay in Eluru, I travelled six times to the field, each time for a period of 2-4 
days, visiting in total 19 of the affected villages. The focus groups, the survey and the CE 
were implemented during these visits. 
Each trip was preceded by a meeting with the research assistants and Pagano Didla, 
during which not only the logistics, but also the objectives of the mission were discussed, 
as well as the questionnaires for the focus groups, the survey and the CE. The latter were 
repeatedly improved upon what had happened during the previous trips (including the 
misunderstandings that emerged at the stage of translation) and the comments and 
contributions of the research assistants. Pagano played a key role in this phase: being 
familiar with the requirements of academic research; during these meetings he mediated the 
communication between me and the research assistants and helped me frame the research 
problems into questions which could then be translated into colloquial Telugu sentences. 
All the questionnaires were written in English, while the focus groups, the survey and the 
CE were conducted in Telugu by my research assistants, who then translated back the 
answers in English to me. Telugu is one of the official languages of AP and the one spoken, 
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together with some local dialects, by the people living in the Polavaram affected villages 
and, generally, in the rural areas of the State. Because of my ignorance of the Telugu 
language and my research assistants’ level of English, the language barrier did occasionally 
constitute an obstacle. In particular, it often meant the loss of details of the conversation, as 
I was given a shortened and standardised version of the answer provided by the respondent. 
The quality of the survey was not significantly affected by this situation, as the same 
structure of the questionnaire requires standardised answers. The focus groups, however, 
did suffer from the impossibility to establish a fluid conversation and from my inability to 
control the dialogue. Yet, as also emphasised below and elsewhere in the thesis, the fact 
that the multiple methods employed obtained similar results, and that this was the case 
regardless of which research assistant was translating, this contributes to confirm the 
validity and the reliability of the findings. 
I deliberately chose not to record the conversations held with the villagers to avoid 
inhibiting them and generating the suspicion that their comments on the compensation 
received and the resettlement process might be later used to their disadvantage. 
The final weeks of my fieldwork were spent in Hyderabad meeting with key 
stakeholders of the project: government officials, representatives of NGOs and a journalist 
(see section 4.5.4). I did not record these interviews either, in this case for fear that my 
interlocutor (especially in the case of government officials) would not otherwise reveal 
important details about the project.  
 
4.5.  Methods for data generation and collection  
 
Different methods were employed during fieldwork for the generation of primary 
evidence on the case study: interviews, focus groups, survey and choice experiment. 
Official and unofficial government documentation concerning the project and the 
resettlement operations was also collected. 
Interviews, focus groups and documents are classified  as qualitative data, and were 
analysed as such. The survey and the CE, generating information in numerical form, qualify 
as quantitative data. To the extent that the three strategies of inquiry adopted in this 
research draw from both types of data, this thesis embraces a ‘mixed method’ approach 
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(Creswell 2009). This method rests on the possibility to triangulate the qualitative and 
quantitative data as a way of confirmation and cross-validation of the findings. This indeed 
was performed within each strategy of inquiry; in particular the results of the focus groups 
were triangulated with those of the CE, while the government documents (reporting 
information on the affected population) constituted the base for the validation of the results 
of the survey.  
Before describing the methods of data collection in detail, the procedures adopted for the 
analysis of the quantitative data must first be clarified. In both cases (i.e. survey and CE) 
the ‘numerical information’ obtained was not used for statistical inference, but only for 
descriptive purpose, i.e. for the estimation of averages and proportions. In addition, both 
methods also produced qualitative information. For instance, the CE was complemented by 
follow-up questions which asked the respondent to explicate and justify the preference 
expressed. The survey contained a section with semi-structured questions investigating the 
level of awareness of the respondent concerning the displacement and resettlement process. 
This type of information was processed through coding and contributed to qualify and 
corroborate the other findings.   
 
4.5.1.  Household Survey 
 
The purpose of the survey is primarily descriptive, that is, it aims to provide a snapshot 
of the Polavaram affected population and of its characteristics. In this sense, it is functional 
to all the strategies of inquiry described in section 4.4. It is functional in particular to the 
application of the adverse incorporation framework to the case study, to the extent that it 
informs on the sources of livelihood of the affected population. The notion of sustainable 
livelihood adopted here is best described by Chambers and Conway (1991:6), according to 
which a livelihood comprises “the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) 
and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope 
with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and 
assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generations, and which 
contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short 
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and long term”.63 
While the unit for the selection of the survey sample was the household (a term which is 
used here interchangeably with family), the survey also collected information at both 
family and individual level. The respondent to the survey questionnaire was the same 
person to whom the CE was administered, so that the second purpose of the survey was to 
collect information on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents to the CE. 
Until the early stages of my fieldwork, the latter was in fact the main purpose of the survey, 
as the socio-economic characteristics were to be used to estimate a preference determinant 
function to be associated to the CE in the framework of a discrete choice random utility 
model.64 The underlying assumption was that individual and family characteristics would 
explain the preferences expressed by the respondents at the individual level. For this reason, 
I attempted to include in the sample not only the head of the household, but also members 
staying with the latter in various relationships. Similarly, when possible women were asked 
to answer the questions, so as to attempt an equal share of male and female respondents.65  
A note is needed at this point on the underlying definition of household. For the purpose 
of the sample selection, the residential unit was assumed to coincide with the family unit.66 
The respondent was then asked to list the members of the family. The respondent 
subjectively interpreted this as the nuclear family, including married sons and daughters. It 
was not always clear whether the latter were living in the residential unit being analysed or 
elsewhere. For this reason, none of the variables of analysis is adjusted for the family 
number. 
The selection of the survey sample was based on a multi stage sampling procedure: first 
the clusters, i.e. the villages were identified, and then families were selected within each 
village.67 At both stages a non-probability sampling procedure, based on quota sampling, 
was followed. Quota sampling consists in the identification of category of interests to the 
research topic on the basis of which the population is to be selected; it is then decided what 
                                                           
63 See also chapter 3 for a discussion of how the sustainable livelihood approach informs the adverse 
incorporation framework. 
64 This plan was later abandoned due to the impossibility of assuming that the preferences expressed 
did behave consistently with the proprieties postulated by the theory, see section 4.5.2. 
65 In spite of this, an equal share of female and male respondent in the sample was not achieved. 
66 The residential unit is more relevant if the purpose is investigating those who will be displaced as a 
result of the submersion of their house. 
67
 As the sample selected for the survey was also administered the choice experiment, the considerations made 
here in terms of sampling strategy for the former also hold for the latter. This is also true for the sampling 
errors discussed later in this section. 
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proportion of respondents to include in each category: whether equal numbers in each 
category or numbers proportional to their real incidence in the population (Blaikie 2000). 
Besides pursuing quota sampling, my other objective in determining the sampling 
strategy was to maximise the dimension of the sample and the number of villages visited 
(i.e. to maximise the sample frame with respect to the universe), given the amount of time 
and resources which I had available. The reason of this choice was that with my fieldwork I 
wanted to obtain a general overview of the displacement scenario, including a snapshot of 
the affected population and of their knowledge of the project and feelings towards 
displacement and resettlement. I also wanted to use the consultation tool based on CE with 
as many villages as possible, in order to diminish the endogeneity of the results obtained 
with it. The main limitation of this strategy is that it came at the expenses of the statistical 
representativeness of the sample (see below). 
At the first stage of the sampling procedure, a total of 15 villages were selected, of 
which four are in West Godavari (Ramayapeta, Chegondapalli, Tutigunta, Pydipaka), three 
in East Godavari (Kondamodalu, Talluru, Kegunduru), and eight in Khammam 
(Lacchigudem, Rudramkota, Aghra Koderu, Sabari Kothagudem, Vinjaram, Gundala, 
Bovanagiri, Totapalli). In addition, four villages in West Godavari were visited for the 
preliminary focus groups (Devaragundi, Mamidigundi, Koruturu, Sirivaca). For the purpose 
of selecting the villages, the two categories of interest were the geographical location and 
the social composition. First, all of the three affected districts were to be covered. The 
highest proportion of villages included are located in Khammam because this district is 
home to almost two thirds of the total project affected population. The preliminary focus 
groups were all conducted in West Godavari because the villages of this district will be the 
first to be displaced and resettled. Interviewing the people of these villages about their 
resettlement was therefore deemed to be of particular interest. Second, villages with varied 
social compositions were included. Thus, of the selected villages (including the four visited 
for the preliminary focus-groups), 13 had a majority of Scheduled Tribe (ST) population, 
three a majority of Scheduled Caste (SC) population and three had a mix of SC and Other 
Castes (OCs), with a minority of STs. The final choice of the villages was, however, also 
determined by their accessibility, by logistical considerations (mainly the ability of the 
village to host the whole research team, which was composed of at least four people plus 
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the driver), and by the presence of Naxalite groups in the area.68  
Basic information on each of the villages visited was collected through a questionnaire 
which was filled out by one of the research assistants with the help of key local informants, 
usually the head of the village (Sarpanch), a teacher, or the coordinator of the self-help 
groups. The information collected concerned the presence of infrastructure in the village 
and the availability of public transport and health and education services. They were 
primarily designed to assess the level of remoteness of the village. 
At the second stage, 167 families69 were selected with the aim of replicating the social 
group composition of the total affected population. The category of interest was therefore 
the social group; for each social group the number of families included was proportional to 
their real incidence in the total affected population. Thus, 56% of the interviewed families 
were from STs, 25% were from SCs, 9% from Backward Castes (BCs), and 10% from OCs. 
The families were not selected following a probability sampling procedure, primarily 
because of the lack of a readily available list or census of the families (or the individuals) 
living in each village. Generating this list by myself for each village would have required 
additional time and resources which were unavailable, or would have involved reducing the 
number of villages included in the sample. As mentioned above, it was preferred to use the 
time and resources available to maximise the number of villages covered rather than 
pursuing statistical representativeness of the sample (although quota sampling guarantees 
that at least the categories chosen are distributed in the sample as in the population of 
reference), consistently with the explorative nature of this study (i.e. investigating a new 
instance of displacement and testing a new tool for consulting people about their 
resettlement preferences).  
The choice of which families to interview was taken upon our arrival in each village, on 
the basis of the information provided by my research assistants (in case they already knew 
the village) or our local key informant. In many cases we would just walk from house to 
house in search of a family with the desired characteristic and willing to participate. If 
necessary, we would ask the same villagers to indicate to us a family belonging to the 
desired social group. 
                                                           
68 Naxalite groups are present in Khammam district, including in the areas affected by the project. 
69 Distributed as follows: 12 in Ramayapeta, 11 in Chegondapalli, 13 in Tutigunta, 10 in Pydipaka, 6 in 
Kondamodalu, 12 in Talluru, 12 in Kegunduru, 13 in Lacchigudem, 12 in Rudramkota, 12 in Aghra Koderu, 6 
in Sabari Kothagudem, 12 in Vinjaram, 14 in Gundala, 8 in Bovanagiri, 14 in Totapalli.  
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Each family was approached by one of the research assistants, who would clarify our 
identity and the purpose of our visit. He would then ask whether a member of the family 
was willing to take part in the survey and the CE. When this was the case, it was explained 
to the person identified in more detail the purpose of my research and the type of questions 
that we were going to ask. It was stressed in particular that we had no type of relationship 
with the government, and that neither the participation in the CE, nor the answers provided 
were in any way to affect the resettlement package that the family was going to receive. A 
written consent form was presented at the beginning of each survey questionnaire, which 
the respondent was asked to sign after having agreed to participate in the survey (the form 
was written in English and orally translated into Telugu). 
 
Sampling and non-sampling errors 
Generally speaking, the results of a survey are affected by two types of errors: sampling 
and non-sampling errors. Sampling errors derive from the procedure adopted to select the 
sample. For the purpose of this survey, a non-probability sampling procedure was adopted, 
with the implication that the findings could not be statistically tested. The main potential 
bias derives from the fact that the villages were selected from among those already known 
by my research assistants (with the exception of three villages), as they had already 
undertaken some social development work there (not necessarily on behalf of SEEDS), and 
in some cases, precisely on issues linked to the Polavaram project. This ensured a friendly 
and collaborative attitude by the people; however it also implies that the level of awareness 
concerning the project and the resettlement package demonstrated by these villages might 
not be representative of that of the whole sample. The previous acquaintance with the 
villages selected might also have induced a response bias in the CE, in the sense that people 
belonging to these villages might have systematically provided the answers that they 
thought would have pleased us, or alternatively they might have felt free to provide certain 
answers because reassured by the friendly atmosphere. 
In addition, the adoption of quota sampling with selection of families ‘on the spot’ until 
the quota was achieved, meant the elimination of the problem of non-response, but created 
other potential biases. In particular, this method could have excluded families living at the 
margin of the village. Minimising this bias was attempted by specifically asking the key 
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informant to indicate us families with given characteristics, including the poorest and most 
isolated. Further, endogeneity biases in the responses obtained might have arisen for (at 
least) three reasons. First, my research assistants might have been inclined to approach 
more often families which were known to them, thus reinforcing the biases described above 
for the village level coming from previous acquaintance. Second, when we would ask the 
respondent just interviewed to introduce us to a new family, the person in question might 
have indicated us families with similar resettlement preferences than his own. This sort of 
self-selection mechanism of families with similar resettlement preferences might contribute 
to explain the homogeneity of the responses obtained in the CE. However, as only a small 
part of the sample families were approached in this way, even if some endogeneity in the 
preferences indeed is present, it does not seem sufficient to account for all of the response 
similarity. Finally, another source of preference endogeneity might have come from the fact 
that usually we would let the family decide which member should reply to our answers. 
This usually resulted in the respondent being the head of the family and/or literate. To the 
extent that literacy and the role played within the family affect resettlement preferences, 
endogeneity in the latter might have been caused by this other respondent selection 
mechanism. Once again, while the effect of this bias cannot be ruled out, here two factors 
can be mentioned which attenuate its relevance. First, there is no obvious association 
between being literate or the head of the family and a given resettlement preference (e.g. 
there is no obvious reason why literate people should prefer more often than non-literate 
people relocation in the forest). Second, although freedom was left to the family to choose 
the respondent, some care was taken to include in the sample respondents of different 
gender, age and role within the family. When the results of the CE were examined, no 
systematic difference was observed in the answers provided by respondents with 
characteristics other than being male, literate and head of the family. 
Non sampling errors are related to the validity (the degree of approximation to the ‘true’ 
value of that characteristic in the universe’) and the reliability (the consistency of the 
measurement) of the findings of the survey. In our case, non-sampling errors might have 
been induced by the respondents willingly or unwillingly reporting untrue or inexact 
information. Another source of potential bias might have come from the fact that half of the 
interviews were conducted by two of my research assistants (usually Murthy and Shyam) 
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without me being present.70 However, upon examination of the findings of the survey, the 
latter did not seem to be the case, to a large extent because the survey addressed objective 
aspects of the life of the respondents and left little space for subjective interpretation, either 
by the research assistant or the respondent. As concerns the CE, where subjectivity was a 
fundamental aspect of the questions, the homogeneity of the findings (see chapter 6) rules 
out the possibility that a significant bias might have been induced by the person asking the 
questions.  
Regarding the possibility of faulty answers, and the general validity and reliability of the 
survey, three factors should have minimised the former and maximised the latter: first, the 
climate of friendliness and cooperation established during the conversation, thanks 
primarily to the attitude of my research assistants; second, and in confirmation of the first 
point, the very low level of missing information;71 and third, the fact that the objective 
reality (i.e. material conditions and sources of livelihood) described by the findings of the 
survey is consistent with the other existing sources of information on the Polavaram 
affected population, including the census and the government survey (see chapter 5). 
 
The survey questionnaire 
As mentioned above, the survey questionnaire was designed with the purpose of 
collecting information on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondent and of his or 
her family, which could explain the preferences expressed during the CE. Eventually 
however, the survey was used as a source of information on the objective material 
conditions of the affected population. The explanatory purpose was therefore replaced by a 
descriptive one. This was possible because the characteristics assumed to influence 
preferences about compensation and resettlement referred exactly to the material conditions 
of the family. 
In particular, the questionnaire was comprised of six sections, which are illustrated 
below. 
 
                                                           
70 We  usually  conducted the interviews in two groups and I would usually work with Israel or Subba 
Rao. 
71 These include the level of literacy in eight cases, the primary source of lighting in one case, 
ownership of land in one case, and extent of land owned in three cases. 
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1)  and  2) Characteristics of the respondent and of each member of the family 
These included gender, age, relation to the head of the household and educational level. 
 
3) Household and housing characteristics and income 
This section inquired about the social group of the family (ST, SCs, BCs, OC), its 
average monthly income72 and the primary source of energy for cooking and lighting. Two 
questions were also included about the ownership of livestock and of a range of durable 
consumer goods. 
A comment is needed here to clarify the purpose of these questions. The survey did not 
aim to estimate the level of income or consumption of the households. This operation 
would have required a completely different survey by itself. Moreover, official government 
estimations already reveal that 95% of the Polavaram affected population is below the 
poverty line 73  (see chapter 5). However, it was deemed important to collect some 
information on the level of income and wealth of the families, for two reasons: i) to make 
comparisons within the sample, in particular within villages which had already received 
compensation and villages which had not;74 ii) to obtain a benchmark for future comparison 
of the level of income and wealth before and after resettlement.  
 
4) Land ownership 
This set of questions asked whether the family owned any land, for how long they had 
owned it, and if they were in possession of any official title of ownership. It also asked 
what crops were produced and whether they were for sale at market or for self-consumption, 
as well as whether any assigned land was cultivated. Finally, it was asked whether land 
improvements had been made recently or were planned in the near future. 
 
                                                           
72  The answer to this question was not expected to be a precise approximation of the real level of 
income of the household (and it has not been used as such in this thesis). In fact, it was interpreted by the 
respondent as the earnings from agricultural wage labour. In this sense, it provided a useful indication of the 
salary received for this activity. 
73 The understanding of poverty adopted by this thesis has been thoroughly discussed in chapter 3. 
74 This could for instance be done estimating an asset index using the data obtained on the possession 
of durable goods (for an example see Wall and Johnston 2008). 
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5) Main economic activities of the family 
The aim of this section was to identify the main sources of livelihoods of the family. For 
this purpose, it asked the respondent to indicate the main source of income, whether the 
family was participating in any government employment scheme and whether it was 
practising any communal labour sharing. The respondent was also questioned about the 
products collected from the forest and whether these were sold or consumed by the 
respondent’s family. 
 
6) R&R package related question  
The last part of the survey questionnaire included questions related to the level of 
awareness regarding the dam project and the Resettlement & Rehabilitation package 
provided by the government of AP to the affected families (see chapter 7). The respondent 
was asked whether he or she was aware that the family was going to be displaced as a result 
of the construction of the dam, and who had conveyed this information. The respondent 
was also asked whether he or she knew that the family was entitled to compensation for the 
loss of house and land and to a resettlement package, and whether they had already 
received any money. If this was the case, it was also asked how this money had been used. 
Finally, the respondent was asked to indicate whether someone in the family had ever taken 
part in a protest against the dam or against the R&R package. 
 
4.5.2.  Consultation exercise with Choice Experiment Approach 
 
Choice experiment methodology, together with its theoretical underpinnings, was the 
object of thorough discussion in chapter 2. It was argued there that, if used as a consultation 
tool to explore resettlement preferences, a CE can provide useful information for the design 
of resettlement programmes. The consultation exercise based on CE approach implemented 
with the Polavaram affected population is described in detail in chapter 7. This section 
further qualifies the use of CE as a consultation tool,  focusing in particular on the 
underlying ontological understanding of preferences. 
As discussed in chapter 2, choice experiment and contingent valuation (CV) survey 
belong to the class of stated preferences methods, whose aim is the estimation of the value 
139 
of non-market goods. Theoretically, it is argued by the literature reviewed in chapter 2 that 
they could be used to estimate the subjective cost of displacement and therefore the amount 
of monetary compensation which, if paid, would make displacement voluntary. In this 
sense, their main purpose is that of commensuration. The only study that to the author's 
knowledge applies a CV survey to the problem of compensation for displacement, is 
Garikipati's investigation of resettlement of people displaced by the Sardar Sarovar project 
(Garikipati 2000, 2005, 2011). She uses the CV method to elicit the willingness to accept 
different amounts of money and typologies of resettlement in exchange for displacement. 
She also estimates a preference determinant function and finds that the elicited preferences 
are explained by the socio-economic circumstances of the respondents. Garikipati's study 
(which is reviewed in detail in chapter 2) significantly inspired my research and influenced 
the design of my CE, there are however some relevant differences between her approach 
and mine which are worth mentioning here. 
Garikipati uses a CV survey with an ‘accept or reject’ format, which allows her to 
estimate people’s WTA for relocation with loss of commons, relocation with loss of one’s 
own community, relocation with no housing or land provided. People either accept or reject 
the sum of money offered with one of these three forms of relocation, thus implicitly stating 
a price for the loss associated with each type of relocation. The focus of her approach is 
therefore on attributing a ‘price’ to the losses which come with displacement. This focus is 
consistent with the CV method, which always implies an exchange between a sum of 
money and the good under investigation (in this case, one of the losses triggered by 
displacement). 
This thesis, by contrast, shifts the focus away from attributing a price to the losses 
induced by displacement and re-directs it to the attributes of a resettlement programme 
which are preferred by the affected people. For this reason, it adopts a CE rather than a CV 
format. The two differ in that the CE asks the respondent to make a choice between two 
goods of the same type but which differ for some attributes. If one of these attributes is 
expressed in money, by making a choice the respondent implicitly indicates the monetary 
value that he or she gives to that attribute. Thus a CE can also be used to estimate WTA and 
other welfare measures, and in this sense it is similar to a CV survey. However, including a 
monetary attribute is not necessary for a CE to be an informative exercise. It can also be 
used to explore what attributes of a good are preferred by the people. It is precisely in this 
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sense that a CE is adopted by this thesis. Its purpose here is to explore the aspects of 
people’s present life which are valued the most, and at the same time what characteristics 
make a resettlement package acceptable by the displaced people.75 
Moreover, a CE is used here as a method of direct consultation for the elicitation of 
people’s opinion and desires about their resettlement, not as a methodology to test human 
behaviour on the grounds of an underlying economic model. As made clear in chapter 2, 
using a CE as a methodology would have implied assuming that preferences follow the 
properties postulated by rational choice theory and that they can be explained by a random 
utility model. While retaining the assumption that people’s socio-economic characteristics 
affect their preferences, this study does not assume that these preferences behave as 
postulated by the theory. Of course, in refusing this assumption the CE cannot be grounded 
in a consumer utility model and a preference determinant function could not be estimated, 
nor could WTA. In addition, the preferences expressed cannot be used for their indirect 
informative content, i.e. the subjective monetary value attributed to goods and their 
attributes. 
However, this does not imply that the preferences expressed, and therefore the whole CE, 
are meaningless. Rather, they are used for the direct information that they convey, namely 
people’s desires, inclinations and opinions. A statement is not made about the extent to 
which these desires, inclinations and opinions are autonomous and authentic rather than the 
outcome of adaptation, that is, the result of habit or adjustment to life as it is known. The 
reason is that this statement is not needed for the use of CE which is made in this thesis. 
The preferences expressed are taken to indicate what aspects of their life people value 
(independently of the reason why they value them) and for which they should be 
compensated, if the purpose of compensation is to re-establish justice. At the same time, the 
preferences expressed indicate the attributes of a resettlement programme which are more 
likely to make it acceptable by the displaced people. Finally, in offering a standard format 
for the direct consultation of displaced people about their resettlement, a CE has the 
potential to bring to the surface resettlement related issues which might otherwise remain 
hidden (this potential is widely discussed and demonstrated in chapter 6). In consideration 
of all this, preferences expressed through a CE can inform the design of resettlement 
                                                           
75  Asking people to make a choice between attributes, rather than explicitly or implicitly asking them 
to assign a monetary value to them, also reduces the cognitive burden of the exercise. 
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programmes without necessarily being attributed a normative value. To further clarify this 
point, if the CE finds that tribal people prefer to stay in the forest rather than being 
relocated in plain areas, the implication is that the loss of life in the forest induced by 
displacement should first of all be adequately compensated, and second, be considered as a 
sensible issue with possible negative consequences to be addressed in the design of the 
resettlement package. No value judgement of the loss of the forest is needed to arrive at this 
conclusion.  
Consistent with this assumption that the preferences expressed are meaningful, 
respondents are also deemed capable of making a choice between a sum of money and an 
aspect of their life which is otherwise lost (for instance, life in the forest). However, that 
sum of money is not taken to represent the monetary value attached to the forest. Again, the 
focus is not on the estimation of the price for the loss, but on understanding what is valued. 
This is consistent with what is said elsewhere about monetary compensation not being the 
most important determinant of a successful resettlement package.  
 
4.5.3.  Focus Groups 
 
Focus groups were implemented during fieldwork in eight villages affected by the 
Polavaram dam with a twofold purpose: to generate information for the design of the CE, 
and to adopt a direct consultation method alternative to the CE so as to create a base for 
triangulation of the findings.76 Four focus groups were held before the proper set-up of the 
CE, in order to obtain information which could guide the design of the resettlement 
packages to be offered with the CE. They were used specifically to investigate the losses 
induced by displacement from the point of view of the affected population and therefore the 
attributes to include in the packages.77 In addition, they were used for testing the feasibility 
of some questions and identifying the key words and the key concepts on which to focus in 
the translation from English to Telugu. 
                                                           
76 The questions asked during the eight focus groups and the answers obtained are discussed in detail in 
chapter 6.  
77 The same literature on stated preference methods claims that qualitative methods can sensibly 
improve the results of studies based on choice experiment and contingent valuation. In particular focus groups 
can help in gaining an understanding of how the issue is perceived by the target population, enriching the 
meaning of the valuations elicited and determining additional explanatory variables of the preferences (Powe 
2007). 
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In contrast, the second set of focus groups was run in four of the same villages where the 
CE was being implemented. In this case the aim was to ask people’s opinion about their 
resettlement options, in order to create evidence which could be triangulated with the 
findings of the CE.  
The focus groups took place in the collective space normally devoted to village meet-
ings: typically under a tree or in the temple. Participation was voluntary and no limit was 
set on the number of people who wanted to join in. The conversation was held by one of the 
research assistants in Telugu and then translated to me. As also mentioned above, the lan-
guage barrier did constrain the conversation and my ability to catch the nuances of the an-
swers received. Furthermore, on the side of the villagers the conversation tended to be ma-
nipulated by two or three persons, usually the Sarpanch, a teacher, or the coordinator of the 
self-help groups. For this reason, it cannot be assumed that the focus groups were immune 
from a ‘person bias’ (Chambers 1983), namely that the answers obtained were representa-
tive of the opinion of individuals which hold a position of authority in the village, but not 
of that of the ‘voiceless’ people. Yet, the homogeneity of the findings obtained across dif-
ferent villages with different characteristics, and their consistency with the results of the CE 
constitute a proof of their validity and reliability. 
  
4.5.4.  Interviews and informal conversations 
 
During my stay in AP I had the chance to meet a number of people variously involved 
with the Polavaram dam project and the resettlement process. These meetings took place as 
semi-structured interviews, and constitute a source of evidence for this research to the 
extent that they widened and enriched my understanding of objective facts concerning the 
project and the resettlement process, and of the social, economic and political context in 
which they take place. They also offered me perspectives of different types of stakeholders 
on these issues. At the government level, I met with the Resettlement & Rehabilitation 
Commissioner and Special Secretary to government, Mr Chiranjiv Choudary; the former 
Joint Collector of West Godavari, Mr Law Agarwal; and the then Revenue Divisional 
Officer of West Godavari, Mr Venkateswarulu Vasam. At the level of the civil society, I 
was in contact with the representatives of two NGOs based in Hyderabad, namely 
SAMATA and SAKTI. Both work on forest and tribal rights related issues and were closely 
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following the events concerning displacement and resettlement in Polavaram. I also had a 
conversation with Ms Uma Maheshwari, one of the few independent journalists who has 
been documenting the project since 2004. Finally, I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with two families living in the resettlement centre for the village of Devaragundi, the only 
centre which had already been completed at the time of my visit. 
 
4.5.5.  Government documents and other official sources 
 
Thanks to the visits paid by my research assistant to the local administrative offices (the 
Mandal Revenue Offices and the Forest Department), I was able to obtain some internal 
government documents concerning the project and the resettlement process. These include 
technical reports of the Polavaram project, descriptions of the affected population, and 
details of the compensation and resettlement operations. Considering the lack of 
information surrounding the Polavaram project, they represent a precious source of 
evidence. The content of these documents is analysed in chapter 5. Appendix VI lists the 
main sources (government documents, independent reports, newspaper articles) employed 
for the description of the case study. 
 
4.6.  Conclusion  
 
Before concluding this illustration of the methodological approach adopted by this thesis, 
it is necessary to add some key aspects of the failure of resettlement which are not 
addressed here and which will need to be taken into consideration for future research.  
First, the structures and mechanisms identified by the adverse incorporation framework 
as being at the root of the systematic failure of resettlement, primarily through the 
production and reproduction of surplus labour, need to be investigated in more detail with 
respect to the Polavaram affected population. This includes implementing a survey 
researching the features of agricultural wage labour and small and marginal farming, 
including, in relation to the latter, tenancy agreements and the processes underpinning the 
diversification of farming. The investigation must be directed not only at the affected 
population, but also at the resettlement area.  
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Second, the dimensions of adverse incorporation that this thesis does not fully 
investigate deserve to be further explored. 
Third, gender must be incorporated into the analysis, at the level of the theoretical 
framework and of the empirical analysis, in particular, the relationship between 
resettlement and the incorporation of women in the labour market through surplus labour.  
Fourth, considerations on the failure of resettlement in Polavaram and of its outcomes in 
terms of adverse incorporation should be enlightened by a thorough analysis of the 
(potential) benefits of the project and their capture by the affected people. Finally, a risk 
analysis of resettlement of the Polavaram displaced people, based on the Impoverishment 
Risk and Reconstruction model should complement the investigation of the structural 
causes of the failure of resettlement through the adverse incorporation framework. This 
would create the basis for a broader reflection on how the two frameworks can inform each 
other.
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Chapter 5 
The case-study: the Polavaram dam project and the displaced 
population 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
This thesis adopts a case-study approach in order to investigate the reasons for the 
failure of resettlement and explore the different methodological approaches which can be 
adopted to improve its performance. The case in question is the Polavaram dam in Andhra 
Pradesh (AP hereafter), whose construction is still in progress and which will eventually 
lead to the displacement of around 200,000 people. This chapter is dedicated to the 
description of the Polavaram project and of the population displaced by it. It also examines 
the resettlement process as it is being carried out by the government in Polavaram, looking 
at the legal and policy framework of reference and at the state of advancement of the 
resettlement operations. The technical details of the dam, its claimed benefits, its negative 
effects and the controversy surrounding it are dealt with in section 5.2.3. It must be noted 
that this is not a work on the political economy of dams in AP, and as a consequence, a 
selective approach has been adopted in treating issues related to its official and unofficial 
positive and negative effects. This thesis does not attempt a review of all the social and 
economic costs and benefits of the dam, nor does it assess whether the project is indeed 
justifiable in the name of the common good. As the focus is on resettlement, the main cost 
that we are interested in, is the displacement of people, their loss of access to a specific 
environment which is not replicable elsewhere, and the ensuing disruption of their 
livelihoods. These are also the aspects from which the controversial nature of the dam 
project arises and which are also reflected in the complexity that resettlement assumes in 
this very specific case. For these reasons, the review of the negative effects focuses on 
these aspects and is not exhaustive. As concerns the benefits, they are reviewed in section 
5.2.1, but thereafter are not frequently discussed in the rest of the work. We anticipate here 
that they are unequally distributed from a geographical point of view. Andhra Pradesh is 
divided into three geographical regions (Telangana, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra) 
which differ in terms of socio-economic characteristics due to historical processes and their 
specific resource bases. The districts which will benefit from the Polavaram project (East 
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Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna and Visakhapatnam) all belong to Coastal Andhra, 
while the district where the majority of the displaced population is concentrated and which 
does not receive any benefit (Khammam district) is located in the Telangana region. The 
benefits generated, moreover, will have limited relevance for the resettlement population. 
This chapter also introduces one of the key findings of this thesis: that the characteristics 
of the displaced population and more generally of the submersion and resettlement areas 
affect the dynamic effects of displacement and contribute to turn their resettlement into a 
process of adverse incorporation. In the case of the Polavaram dam, resettlement assumes a 
very specific character as almost half of the affected population belongs to STs and the 
submersion area is classified as Fifth Schedule Area78. This argument is substantiated in 
section 5.3 with a description of the socio-economic profile of the affected population, with 
particular reference to their sources of livelihood. Section 5.3.1 looks at the conditions of 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) at the national, state and district level on 
the basis of secondary data. Section 5.3.2 puts flesh on the bones on this data, explaining 
how historical processes of tribal land alienation and forest eviction have determined the 
current livelihood strategies adopted by STs (and to a certain extent SCs).  
The legal background of resettlement in Polavaram (or lack thereof) is described in 
section 5.4.1 with reference to the national level, while section 5.4.2 looks at the state 
policy on R&R. Section 5.5 describes the state of advancement of the resettlement 
operations in practice on the basis of primary and secondary data. 
Finally, it is to be noted that there is striking paucity of academic research on the 
Polavaram dam and very little media coverage, especially at the international level. The 
reasons for this warrant investigation, especially since the project is set to be one of the 
largest and most disruptive ever realised in India.79  The present research has involved an 
intense process of tracking down sources and reconstructing the details and the events 
surrounding the project. The main sources on which the following account draws are listed 
in Appendix VI.  
Figures 5.2-5.5 show different maps of the Polavaram project, the affected area and the 
submergence villages. Appendix X contains a short description of these maps.
                                                           
78 See section 5.2.2 for details on the Fifth Schedule Area. 
79 The lack of media coverage and academic interest is particularly striking in comparison with the 
national and international attention raised by the Sardar Sarovar dam project in the Narmada valley. 
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Figure 5.1 Map of Andhra Pradesh  
 
Source:  http://maps.newkerala.com/andhra-pradesh-travel-map.php 
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Figure 5.2 Map of the Polavaram dam affected area, showing the type of terrain 
 
 
Source: Googlemaps, snapshot modified by the author 
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Figure 5.3 Map of the Polavaram dam affected area, showing the submersion villages
 
Source: “Brief Note on Indira Sagar Polavaram. Jangareddigudem division”, government document modified by the author 
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Figure 5.4 Map of Polavaram dam affected villages, West Godavari and East Godavari Districts 
 
Source: extract from “Indira Sagar Multipurpose Project. Map showing the details of submergence villages and rehabilitation centres. West Godavari 
District”. 
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Figure 5.5 Map of the Polavaram project, Main Right and Left Canals 
 
 
 
 
Source: Perspectives on Polavaram, Gujja et al 2006
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5.2.  The Polavaram dam project 
 
5.2.1.  Technical details and claimed benefits 
 
The Polavaram dam is a large multi-purposes dam,80 located next to Polavaram town, on 
the Godavari river, in the West Godavari District in the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh. It 
is the first of the projects within the National River Linking Project to be realised, which 
envisions a link between the Krishna and the Godavari rivers. The National River Linking 
Project aims at transferring water from water-surplus basins of the country to water-deficit 
basins in order to reduce the imbalance in the water availability across the various Indian 
regions. It plans to connect the 37 major rivers of the country through 30 links, a dozen 
large dams and thousands of kilometres of canals. The construction of the Polavaram dam 
will allow the realization of the first of these links, between the Godavari river, which is 
classified as a surplus-basin, and the Krishna river, which is in water deficit (GoI 1999).81 
There are two main sources which provide technical details about the project: the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of 2005, prepared by the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation for the Government of AP and the Feasibility Report of Polavaram 
(Godavari)- Krishna (Vijayawada) Link Project, prepared by the National Water 
Development Agency (NWDA) for the Government of India in 1995 and circulated in 1999. 
The figures reported by the two studies differ on some technical details, the two most 
important being the length of the dam and the dimensions of the submergence area. 
According to the EIA, the dam will be 2.31 km long and the reservoir created will cover an 
area of 38,186 Ha.82 The NWDA study, meanwhile, reports a length of 2.16 km and a 
submergence area almost twice the size of 63,961 Ha.83 As noted by Stewart and Rao 
(2006), the existence of such substantial disparity in key technical details indicates 
                                                           
80 An earth-cum-rock fill dam. 
81 The classifications of the Godavari River as surplus basin made by the National Water Development 
Agency (the institution put in charge by the Government of India to realise the feasibility study of the project) 
is, however, questioned by a study of the International Water Management Institute. Its authors criticise the 
methodology used by the NWDA to estimate the water available for link transfers. In particular, they contest 
the use of annual time-step data rather than monthly flow time series to estimate the water available at 
different levels dependability (50% and 75%). They claim that the use of annual data does not capture enough 
variability in flows and can lead to overestimate the water available throughout the year. As a result, much 
more water can be perceived to be originally available at a site of transfer than is the actual case (i.e. 
Smakhtin et al 2007). 
82 Of these, 3223 ha are Reserved Forest land, 403 ha are Wet land, 22479 are Dry land and 12081 are 
Poramboke land (unassessed land which is property of the Government). 
83 Of this total, 60,063 ha are in Andhra Pradesh, 2398 ha in Madhya Pradesh, 1230 ha in Orissa, while 
no data on submersion was reported for Chhattisgarh. 
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incompetence and/or untrustworthiness by one (or possibly both) of the two parties. 
This is indeed just one of the many examples of the lack of transparency and reliable 
information which surrounds the project. For instance the Water Resources Information 
System website of the Irrigation Department used to report an estimation of 8908 acres 
(equivalent to 3604.94 Ha) of land which needed to be acquired by the government 
(http://irrigation.cgg.gov.in/OngMaj/Polavaram.htm, page updated at 01/06/2004 and 
accessed on 16/02/2009). However this information, along with any details on the area, 
villages and population to be submerged, has later disappeared from the webpage, which 
now reports an estimation of the total land to be acquired for works of 25,713 acres or 
10,405.48 ha (page updated at 01/09/2010 and accessed on 8/07/2011). Internal government 
documents, to which I had access during my fieldwork, report yet other estimates. A 
document titled Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Project affected families rehabilitation 
plan (PAFERP), signed by the Executive Engineer, the Superintending Engineer and the 
Chief Engineer of the project (which I found as Annexure to yet another document: the 
Application for prior approval for diversion of 16 ha of forest land in Badrachalam (North) 
Forest division under F(C) Act 1980 & under amended rules for 2003 Indira Sagar Project, 
2008), indicates that 44,763.84 ha are needed (of which 3223 ha are of forestland). 
The Full Reservoir Level (i.e. the level at which the river will rise once the dam is 
finalised) has been fixed at 150 feet (45.72 metres). The project will divert water to the 
Krishna delta through two canals. The Right Main Canal is planned to be 174 km long and 
to divert 80 TMC84 into the Krishna river near Vijayawada and to provide irrigation to an 
area of 129,000 ha in the West Godavari and Krishna districts. It will also provide drinking 
water to the villages along its path. The Left Main Canal will be 181.5 km long, and will 
provide irrigation facilities for 162,000 ha located in the East Godavari and Visakhapatnam 
districts, besides diverting 23.44 TMC of water for drinking and industrial needs to the city 
of Visakhapatnam, the local Steel plant and the villages en route. It is also planned that 960 
MW of hydroelectric power will be generated.85 
Thus, the benefits in terms of irrigation are supposed to be felt by 54 Mandals86 located 
                                                           
84 TMC= a thousand million cubic feet=28,000,000 cubic metres. 
85 There is no disparity between the studies indicated concerning the Full Reservoir Level, whereas the 
estimation concerning the two canals do differ in a substantial way. The data used here are those reported in 
the 2005 EIA, unless otherwise stated. 
86 In Andhra Pradesh, a Mandal is the administrative division below the district level. 
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across four districts (East Godavari, West Godavari Krishna and Vishakapatnam), while 
water for industrial uses will mainly benefit the city of Visakhapatnam. The latter is the 
second largest port of India and is located in an economically dynamic region (Amis and 
Kumar 2000). The area hosts India's first port-based steel industry and the Visakhapatnam 
Special Economic Zone, and it will also be crossed by the Vizag-Kakinada Industrial 
corridor. The supporters of the project stress the fact that the improved availability of water 
and electricity will benefit sectors vital for economic growth and that will positively affect 
a region with strong potential.  
However, despite the wide range of claimed benefits, the project remains highly 
contested, in reason of its costs and negative effects, but also because of concerns regarding 
the real effectiveness of the benefits. In the first place it has to be noted that the project has 
been left on stand-by for more than sixty years. It was firstly conceived in 1941, after which 
a number of plans with different technical characteristics (especially in terms of site 
location and height) followed, whose realization, however, was hampered by financial 
constraints and technical difficulties. The proposal which was finally agreed by all parties 
and all States involved (see below) was finalised in 1978 and submitted to the Central 
Water Commission (with later modifications in the 1980s and in 2005). The convergence of 
political and private interests necessary to realise the project however was only achieved in 
the early 2000s87: the government decided to proceed with the execution of the project in 
July 2004 and in March 2005 the contractors commenced the works (and were accordingly 
paid), without waiting for the approval of all the necessary clearances from the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry (Osskarsson 2005, Gujja et al 2006, see also below). The 
opponents of the project argue that it is this convergence of interests, which is benefiting 
mainly politicians, contractors and some local corporate companies, which is the main 
motivation of the project (Naagesh 2006; Rao 2002). This claim is somewhat supported by 
the fact that the revival of the project in the 2000s came with no major update of the plan 
elaborated in the 1980s. There has been no investigation of the evolution of the needs in the 
meantime, no attempt to account for the change in the socio-economic and demographic 
                                                           
87 The project was revived by the newly elected Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh Y. S. Rajasekhara 
Reddy as part of a wider irrigation development plan called “Jalayagnam”, which is still in execution. Its 
objective is to increase the gross area under irrigation from 44 per cent (5.797 million Ha) to 90 per cent 
(11.755 million Ha) resorting to the otherwise unused water of the state (Reddy 2006). The plan was one of 
the key measures adopted by the Government as a reaction to the agrarian crisis that had been affecting the 
state since the early 2000s (Srinivasulu 2009). 
155 
conditions of the area, and no exploration of more cost-effective alternatives (Stewart and 
Rao ibidem, Naagesh ibidem).88  
More concretely, it seems that the neglect of an updated needs analysis might lead to 
creation of new irrigation facilities where they are not primarily needed. As mentioned 
above, the command area of the dam has been estimated to be equal to 291,000 ha (129,000 
ha by the right canal and 162,000 by the left canal), leading to the claim that the main 
achievement of the dam will be the creation of new irrigation in a region where this type of 
infrastructure is lacking. However it has be found by several sources that the region is in 
fact already under irrigation in its most parts. According to Naagesh (ibidem), 90% of the 
command area of the right canal and 60% of the command area of the left canal are already 
irrigated.89 The feasibility study of the Polavaram-Krishna link prepared by the NWDA 
found that the total cultivable area of the Polavaram link canal (i.e. the Main Right Canal) 
is 139,740 ha. Of this area, 71 % (99,755 ha) is irrigated by bore wells, tanks and open head 
channels from the river, while only 29 % (39,985 ha) is non-irrigated. Moreover, an 
independent study of the International Water Management Institute on the National River 
Linking Plan and specifically the Krishna-Godavari river link, found that 95 per cent of the 
cultivated area in the canal's command area is already under irrigation, of which 84% is by 
groundwater and 9% by canals (Bhaduri et al. 2007 quoted in Bharati et al. 2009). 
Admittedly, the widespread reliance on groundwater irrigation might also provide a 
justification in favor of the construction of the dam, given the low degree of economic and 
environmental sustainability of groundwater irrigation (see section 6.2.2.2). 
At best, then, the project is set to provide additional irrigation where it is not primarily 
needed, while the land which will be submerged is in fact among the most fertile in the 
country. The project's EIA of 1985 described the target area as backward and undeveloped, 
whereas twenty-five years later it is one of the most agriculturally advanced regions in the 
state. Besides this, its proximity to the ports of Visakhapatnam and Kakinada, has meant 
that the region is experiencing significant changes in land use (moving towards 
industrialisation), which make irrigation less of a priority (Naagesh ibidem). Already at the 
                                                           
88 Stewart and Rao (ibidem) mention an alternative brought forward by the Institute of Engineers Of 
Hyderabad which combines three lift irrigation schemes and redistributes the water more in favour of the 
Telangana region; Naagesh (ibidem) reviews a number of other alternatives, which are based on a lower Full 
Reservoir Level, or on a different location of the barrage, or the combination of different lift irrigation 
schemes. All these alternatives are less costly than the Polavaram project. 
89 In the case of the right canal, most of the irrigation is provided by bore wells. 
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end of the 1980s, for instance, it was found that the growing capitalist farmer class was 
investing its surplus outside agriculture (Upadhya 1988). 
Finally, there is the possibility that many of the benefits will be eroded by environmental 
problems triggered by the creation of an artificial basin. This is for instance the case of 
sedimentation and the backwater effect that this can create. Backwaters are caused by 
heavier sediment being deposited in the back of the reservoir, where the water enters, so 
that a backwater delta is created, which gradually advances towards the dam. As a 
consequence there is a rise in the water level of the dam, whose capacity is diminished, and 
an increased risk of flooding for the surrounding towns, villages and farmland. This 
problem seems to have been largely ignored or underestimated by the government (Stewart 
and Rao ibidem; Naagesh ibidem).  
 
5.2.2.  The negative effects: details of submergence and displacement 
 
The negative effects of the Polavaram dam are primarily due to the environmental 
impact of the creation of an artificial basin and the resulting submergence of land, forest 
and villages. Since the point of departure for this exploration of the project is the 
resettlement of the affected population, it is in displacement that we are primarily interested 
when discussing the negative effects. It is relevant therefore to dwell on the characteristics 
of the population due to be displaced and of the area to be submerged.  
There is uncertainty over the total area to be submerged, and the total number of villages 
and people affected (see table 5.1 for a summary of displacement estimations according to 
different sources).90 According to Reddy's report on resettlement (1996), 276 villages will 
be submerged, corresponding to a total population of 117,034. The villages identified are 
spread across nine Mandals: Chintoor, Polavaram, Velairpadu, V.R. Puram, Devipatnam, 
Kunavaram, Bhadrachalam, Kukkunur, Burgampadu, and belong to three districts: West 
Godavari, East Godavari and Khammam. In Vol. II of the 2005 EIA, the number of affected 
villages drops to 157, but because of demographic growth, the total population increases to 
170,000. While the increase in population is consistent with the demographic growth which 
the tribal population is experiencing, Stewart and Rao (ibidem) explain that the decrease in 
                                                           
90  It must be mentioned that all the estimations reported here do not account for the land and the people 
who will be displaced by the major canals infrastructure, which according to the 2005 EIA amounts to 
9,489.31 ha and 15,105 households.  
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the number of affected villages might come from using the 2001 Census of India ‘revenue 
villages’, which incorporates the population of the non-revenue hamlets.91 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of displacement estimates according to different sources 
Source of information 
 Reddy (1996) IEA 2005 G.O.Ms.No. 
111 
PAPERF R&R 
Commissioner 
No. affected villages 276 157 412  277 
No. affected people 117,034 170,000  187,211  
No. affected families    44,574 42,701 
Submersion in other states 10 villages in 
Chhattisgarh 
7 in Orissa 
    
Social composition of 
affected population 
47% ST 
14.4% SC 
53.17% ST 
12.58% SC 
  47.36% ST 
15.42% SC 
 
Moreover, a document of the AP Government released in July 200592 estimates the 
number of “villages likely to be affected fully or partially under the project” as 412 
(including villages located in the Krishna and Visakhapatnam districts). In a later 
document93 it is stated that the number of project-affected families is 44,574 which, using a 
family size of 4.48 (which is the figure reported in India Census 2001 for AP) corresponds 
to a population of 187,211.  
According to Reddy’s studies, ten villages in the Dantewada district in Chhattisgarh and 
seven in Malknagiri district in Orissa  will also be submerged due to their proximity to the 
conjunction between the Sabari and Sileru effluents with the Godavari river (although, 
different numbers have been reported by different sources).  However there is no mention 
of these villages in the EIA, nor has there has been a public hearing in the respective states, 
nor have any R&R plans been prepared for them yet. 
                                                           
91  A “revenue village” is the basic unit of analysis of the Indian Census, i.e. the smallest area of 
habitation. It can be  composed of many clusters of habitations, which are called hamlets.  
92  G.O.Ms.No. 111, Irrigation and CAD Department. 
93  The aforementioned Resettlement and Rehabilitation. Project affected  families rehabilitation plan 
(PAFERP).  
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The most up-to-date information is found on the website of the Commissioner of 
Resettlement & Rehabilitation of the government of AP,94 which contains data on the state 
of advancement of the resettlement operations. According to this source, the total number 
of affected villages is 277, of which 119 will be fully submerged and 158 will be partially 
submerged. By the 31st of May 2011, all the 277 villages had been notified about the 
project and in all of them a new round of surveys had been conducted. Of the 277 villages, 
43 are in East Godavari, 29 in West Godavari and 47 in Khammam. The total number of 
affected families is 42,701, of which 40,100 (94%) are below the poverty line (see table 
5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 Details of affected villages and populations according to R&R 
Commissioner 
District Tot. number of 
affected villages 
Project Displaced 
Families 
Families Below Poverty 
line 
East Godavari 43 4,630 4,409 (95%) 
West Godavari 29 4,363 4,139 (95%) 
Khammam 205 33,708 31,552 (94%) 
Total 277 42,701 40,100 (94%) 
Source: Status of R&R villages as on 31-05-2011 and Status of PAFs and PDFs of R&R Projects as on 31-05-
2011, both from the website of the Commissioner of Resettlement & Rehabilitation of the government of AP 
(http://www.aprr.gov.in/RandrAction.do?fwdpage=abstract). 
 
As concerns the social composition of the affected population, the aforementioned 
internal government document states that 21,109 of the affected families are from STs 
(47.36%) and 6875 are from SCs (15.42%). These figures are consistent with those reported 
by Reddy (ibidem), who found that 47% of the affected population was from STs and 14.4% 
from SCs. The 2005 EIA found instead that 53.17% of the affected people are from STs 
and 12.58% are from SCs.  
Stewart and Rao (ibidem) estimate a much greater number of people affected, i.e. 
400,000. This number is obtained by adjusting the estimation provided in 1985 by the 
Environmental Impact Assessment of 150,697 people for the population growth rate 
experienced by the area. The high incidence of tribals among the affected population is 
particularly significant in view of the fact that at the State level they represent only 6.5% of 
                                                           
94   http://www.aprr.gov.in/RandrAction.do?fwdpage=abstract 
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the total population (while SC are the 16.2%; see also section 5.3). 
It is not by chance that the majority of the affected population belongs to either SCs or 
STs. Indeed, the whole submerged area is covered by the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution 
and/or by the Integrated Tribal Development Agency. The Fifth Schedule is contained in 
Article 244 of the Indian Constitution and lists the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled 
Areas which are given special safeguard in view of their disadvantageous conditions and as 
a measure to compensate for the historical injustice suffered by the ST in the form of land 
alienation and forest eviction.95 The Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) is the 
institution which in AP has been established for the administration of schemes and 
programs dedicated to the development of tribal people. Both the Fifth Schedule and the 
ITDA delineate special provisions for land administration, benefits and protective 
legislations which are intended to safeguard the rights of STs. Around half of the tribal 
population of AP (approximately 2.8 million people) lives in areas covered by the Fifth 
Schedule and/or ITDA and is therefore entitled to their special treatment. 
All the Polavaram submerged villages are located in Mandals which are administered by 
the ITDA, and all of those in the East and Godavari districts are also located in Scheduled 
Area. As will be discussed in the following sections and chapters, the special provisions 
emanating from the Fifth Schedule and the ITDA make the project particularly 
controversial and have serious implications in terms of the way land compensation and 
resettlement are delivered. 
Another aspect of the submerged area needs to be considered among the factors which 
make the project controversial, especially from the point of view of the displaced 
population. As mentioned before, the 2005 EIA estimates that 3223 ha of the submerged 
area are located in the forest. The latter constitutes a fundamental source of livelihood for a 
broad section of the displaced population. The main implication, widely discussed in the 
following chapters, is that a large proportion of the displaced population will lose access to 
a key source of livelihood which is not replicable at the resettlement site. 
 
                                                           
95  According to Article 342 of the Constitution, the Scheduled Tribes are the tribes or tribal 
communities, or part of, or groups within these tribes and tribal communities which have been declared as 
such by the President through a public notification. As per the 2001 Census, the Scheduled Tribes account for 
84.33 million people, representing 8.2%  of the country’s population. Scheduled Areas are found in nine 
states: Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Orissa and Rajasthan. 
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5.2.3.  The controversies surrounding the project 
 
Since 2006, the construction works have slowed down and proceeded intermittently, 
indicating the permanence of controversies around the project. These concern the existence 
of tangled legal disputes, and the rising costs of the project, and the inability of the State 
government to fully support them. Interestingly, while different forms of grassroots 
resistance have been displayed in the first phases of implementation of the project, they 
seem to have subsequently faded away. This might be due to the inability of the different 
people's organisations and local tribal leaders to form a unitary movement, which is also 
linked to the lack of a strong political opposition to the project and the apathy of local MPs 
in representing the interests of the tribals (Bondla and Rao 2010).  
The controversies linked to the legal disputes arise for two reasons: for the fact that the 
land to be submerged is subject to special rules and provisions accruing from the Fifth 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution; and because the catchment area of the Godavari river 
falls across six states (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Chhattisgarh and Orissa), meaning that inter-state agreements are needed to regulate the use 
of the river basin and its water (Laksmaiah 2006).  
In order to address the inter-state issues, in 1969 the Godavari Water Disputes Tribunal 
(GWDT) was constituted, within which in 1980 AP achieved an agreement with Madhya 
Pradesh, Karnataka and Orissa concerning the technical characteristics of the dam required 
to minimise submersion in the riparian States. According to this agreement the dam's height 
was fixed at 150 ft., AP committed to the payment of compensation to the submergence 
areas in the neighbouring states, and to ensure protection to the areas above 150 ft. level in 
other states, either by constructing protective embankments or by paying compensation. 
This agreement was incorporated into the Bachawat Tribunal Award and the Central Water 
Commission took note of it. 
Despite the agreement, the project continues to be contested by the other riparian states 
which will also face submersion, particularly Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Indeed they claim 
that the AP Government is violating a number of constitutional and statutory provisions.  
Orissa has reached the point of appealing in the Supreme Court against the 
Environmental clearance, the Forest clearance and the Central Water Commission clearance.  
The Environmental clearance for the project was obtained in October 2005 upon 
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submission of the Environmental Impact Assessment. Orissa contests the clearance in 
reason of the change by the Central Water Commission of the estimation of the Probable 
Maximum Flood of the dam (from 102,000 to 140,000 cusecs96). The clearance was based 
on the original estimation and does not account for the higher levels of inundation in the 
neighbouring state that the new estimation implies (particularly in the Malkangiri district of 
Orissa). As concerns the Forest clearance, it was agreed by the Union Ministry of 
Environment and Forest (MoEF) in July 2010 on the condition that in order to avoid 
submergence in Orissa and Chhattisgarh, AP would build protective walls along the Sabari 
and Sileru rivers. Orissa, however, claims that the proposed embankments do not guarantee 
safety, and that no public hearings have been held with the affected parts, as had been 
requested by the MoEF.97 
Orissa is also contesting the project on other grounds: that the construction works have 
started before obtaining the clearance from the Central Water Commission in 2009; that the 
Environmental Impact Assessment is based on an outdated study (completed in 1985) and 
hence its validity cannot be trusted; and that, generally, the conditions of the 1980 
agreement are not adequately met. 
Despite all these legal issues concerning different aspects of the project, in April 2011 
the Supreme Court turned down Orissa’s plea to stop the construction works and it 
appointed instead a commission formed by CWC members to inspect the project and 
submit a report (The Hindu 2011). As a reaction to the Supreme Court's denial of a stay of 
the project, Orissa government plans to apprise the Apex Court of a violation of the Forest 
Rights Act and of the Environment Protection Act by the project (Outlook India 2011). 
The violation of these two acts is related to the other main legal issue, that the land to be 
submerged belongs to the Fifth Schedule Area, and as such, is subject to special rules and 
provisions. In execution of the latter, in 1959 the government of AP passed a stringent 
legislation prohibiting alienation of tribal land to non-tribals (Rao et al 2006): according to 
                                                           
96 Cusecs is a measure of flow (cubic meters per second). In this case the estimation refers to the water 
which is supposed to flow through the spillway, that is that structure which controls the release of water from 
the dam to the downstream area in case of a flood, so that the excess water does not overtop and damage the 
dam. 
97 The government of Andhra Pradesh came up with the proposal of constructing protecting walls to 
avoid submergence for the first time in 2006, following a decision of the High Court of Orissa which 
prohibited the submersion of land and forest in the state. A new Environmental Impact Assessment 
comprising the embankments was submitted, but again no public hearings were held. As a consequence, in 
2008 the National Environment Appellate Authority revoked the environmental clearance. The issue was also 
raised in the clearance of the Central Water Commission in 2009.  
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the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation of 1959 (as amended by 
regulation 1 of 1970) in the Fifth Schedule Area, non-tribals are prohibited from purchasing 
land from tribals and non-tribals alike. The presumption is that all land in the Scheduled 
Area originally belonged to the STs (Balagopal 2007; Ramachandraiah and Venkateswarlu 
2011). As discussed in detail in section 5.4.2, this has substantial consequences in terms of 
the compensation provided for the expropriated land, as established by the Resettlement & 
Rehabilitation Policy of AP. 
However, the law which is being more blatantly violated is the Scheduled Tribes and 
Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006 (Forest 
Rights Act hereafter). This Act explicitly acknowledges the right of tribal people and more 
generally of traditional forest dwellers to live in the forest, to collect minor forest produce, 
to cultivate and graze cattle, to fish and use other products of water bodies in the forest area. 
In light of the future discussion of resettlement policies in India, it is important to point out 
here who is considered a potential beneficiary of the Act, and on which conditions. In the 
first place, both individuals and communities are entitled to these rights, as long as they 
belong to “forest dwelling scheduled tribes” or to “other traditional forest dwellers” groups. 
The former are defined as members or communities of STs who primarily reside in and 
who depend on the forests or forest lands for bona fide livelihood needs. The latter are 
members or communities who have for at least three generations (i.e. 75 years, with the cut-
off date for claiming residency fixed on the 13th of December 2005) primarily resided in, 
and who depend on the forest or forestland for bona fide livelihood needs.   
The Forest Rights Act is the most comprehensive institutional reform of forest rights in 
India since Independence and it stems from the recognition that a historical injustice has 
been perpetrated by the State forestry bureaucracy against the rural population (Sarin and 
Springate-Baginski 2010). The act provides the legislative basis to redress this injustice, as 
it establishes the right (subject to checks and proofs) of individuals and communities to 
claim ownership (private title or patta) of land and common property resources currently in 
State forest land. While the Act remains subject to the right of eminent domain of the State 
to expropriate land for the purpose of development projects, it also establishes that the 
forest rights have to be settled first.  
The Polavaram dam project is set to displace a considerable number of people who are 
entitled to claim the recognition of forest rights, yet most of them are not aware of the 
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existence of these rights. Rather than addressing this information gap, the government is 
delaying the implementation of the Act in the Polavaram affected area (Reddy et al 2010). 
The motive is obviously to avoid attributing entitlement to land and other forest resources 
for which compensation would then have to be paid. Reddy et al (ibidem) report that three 
of the five Panchayats98 to be submerged in the Polavaram Mandal (West Godavari District) 
appealed for the recognition of community forest rights, which however were denied due to 
the fact that the claimed lands are revenue lands, and as such, don't fall within the Forest 
Rights Act. Besides, fifty-two villages (from West Godavari, East Godavari and Khammam 
districts) have complained to the Union MoEF that their forest rights are not being settled 
(Mahapatra 2011). Despite this, the project obtained Forest clearance from the Ministry and 
in fact the government of AP is accused of lying about the non-existence of pending rights 
in order to obtain the clearance.99 It is on this basis that Orissa is contesting the Forest 
clearance and claiming the violation of the Forest Rights Act.  
There is another legal safeguard of SCs and STs that is suspected to have been violated 
by the Polavaram project. This is the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Area) Act, 
1996 (commonly called PESA Act). The Act makes it mandatory for the State government 
to consult the local Gram Sabha100 before the undertaking of any development project, and 
furthermore, no land can be acquired for this purpose in the Scheduled Area without the 
Gram Sabha's consent. In order to obtain the forest and the environmental clearance, the 
State government assured the Ministry of  Environment and Forests that consultations had 
been held and the Act's provisions had been complied with. However several sources (Rao 
2006a, Rao 2006b, Mahapatra 2011) have reported that the procedure has been violated at 
different levels. The government conducted public hearings on the 10th of October 2005 
simultaneously in four districts: Khammam, West Godavari, East Godavari Visakhapatnam 
                                                           
98 The Panchayat is an institution of self-government established by the article 243B of the Indian 
constitution and it serves the purpose of basic unit of administration in rural areas. It has 3 levels: village, 
block and district (the district level is the relevant level in this case). At the village level, the Panchayat is 
represented by the Gram Sabha, a body whose members are elected at the village level (The Constitution of 
India). 
99 I found an analogous discrepancy in the internal government documents to which I had access, where 
it is stated that none of the 44,574 project-affected families live in Reserved forest area. Given that 95.92% of 
the forest cover of the state is classified as Reserved Forest, and my own experience of having crossed large 
tracts of land indeed densely covered with trees and bushes during my fieldwork to visit the project affected 
villages, this statement seems dubious, if not  fallacious. 
100 The Gram Panchayat is the lowest level of local self-government and has the power to convene the 
Gram Sabha, i.e. the village assembly. “Village” here indicates the revenue village, which in some cases can 
contain several hamlets spread over a large area. At the same time, in some states a single Gram Panchayat 
can include several revenue villages.   
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and Krishna. However, many villages claim to have been deceived in the obtaining of their 
consent, with the minutes of the meetings with the Collector held as a proof of the 
Panchayat's consent and used as an official certificate.  
Moreover, clearance from the Tribal Welfare Department has been obtained much later 
than the project had started, despite a Government Order of 1990 stating that clearance 
from the Tribal Welfare Department is needed to take up any project in the Scheduled Area. 
 
5.2.4.  Cost and sources (lack there)of funding 
 
The other main reason for the delay in the completion of the project is the difficulty 
faced by the government in financing it. The only additional source of funding at the 
moment, apart from the state's own budget, is the national Ministry of Water Resources, 
through the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Program (AIBP101) The project is experiencing a 
cost overrun when it is still far from being completed and according to Down to Earth 
(2011) the rehabilitation works have stopped because the budgeted money has already been 
exhausted.  
The real cost of the project is another key piece of information on which it seems 
impossible to achieve clarity and uniformity. Stewart and Rao (ibidem) indicate that 
according to official government figures (for which no base year is indicated but which the 
authors locate in the second half of the 1990s) the total cost of the project is Rs 10,850.3 
crores102 (approximately $ 2.437 billion103), of which Rs 8194.4 crores ($ 1.84 billion) is 
for capital works and Rs 2655.9 crores ($ 596.5 million) is for economic rehabilitation. 
They also report that a later government source (probably at 2005 prices) updated the total 
cost to Rs 13,000 crores ($2.92 billion). The 10,850-13,000 crores range for the total cost is 
confirmed by other sources: the aforementioned Water Resources Information System 
website of the Irrigation Department states that the estimated cost of the project is Rs 9072 
crores ($ 2.04 billion) and the revised cost is Rs 10,151.04 crores ($ 2.28 billion) and that 
on July 2010 a total of Rs 3229.14 crores ($ 725 million) had been spent for the project 
since inception (including capital investment, R&R and others, but excluding Operations & 
                                                           
101 The programme was conceived in 1996 to provide financial assistance to states to complete various 
ongoing projects. 
102 1 crore= 10,000,000 
103 Exchange rate as on 15th of July 2011: INR/1 $= 44.5262 (Reserve Bank of India official data) 
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Maintenance).104 Not only has one third of the estimated budget already been spent with the 
project far from completion, but a sharper escalation of the costs is to be expected in the 
future. As noted by Stewart and Rao (ibidem), cost overrun of big dams projects in India 
have averaged 300-400% (with a peak of 2,900% for the Tehri dam and 714% for the 
Sardar Sarovar dam). If these ratios were to be applied to the Polavaram costs, assuming 
(although unlikely) that the project will be completed by 2015, the total final cost would 
amount to Rs 33,000-52,000 crores ($7.4-11.68 billion). 
The public finances of AP are in relatively good health, mainly as a consequence of the 
process of fiscal reforms and consolidation embraced by the State since 1996.The public 
debt, for instance, was 30.28% of the Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) in 2004-5 but 
declined to 21.8% in 2010-11. Similarly the fiscal deficit was 3.87% of GSDP in 2004-05 
and 2.42% in 2010-11 (GoAP 2011). The State also managed to eliminate the revenue 
deficit and the Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as the share of GSDP increased in the same 
period, from 25.86% in 2004-05 to 29.43% in 2008-09. (GoAP 2011). However, the 
government is also embarking on a number of infrastructure projects, particularly in 
irrigation, which are requiring increasing outlays and levels of borrowing (Osskarsson 
2005). For instance, at present there are 86 active irrigation projects (44 Major + 30 
Medium + 4 Flood Banks + 8 Modernisation), for which financial assistance has been 
obtained or requested by the World Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development of India and the Union Government 
under the AIBP (GoAP 2011). Two issues can be noted here in relation to the Polavaram 
project. 
First, as it stands, the AP Government is unable to seek foreign sources of funding 
(although both the World Bank than the US Exim Bank have already been approached) as 
Foreign Direct Investments require prior approval from the Central Government, and the 
Constitution of India allows only the Department of Economic Affairs of the Central 
Government to receive foreign aid. So for instance, in order to receive a loan from the 
World Bank for the Polavaram project, the government needs to go through the Department. 
                                                           
104 It is worth mentioning another relevant source which indicates yet a different estimation: an internal 
governmental document (Brief Note on construction of Indira Sagar (Polavaram) Project, released by the 
Forest Division of Badrachalam) states that the cost of the project as submitted by the Irrigation Department is 
Rs 11,411 crores ($2.56 billion). 
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But the process of recognition of the Polavaram as a National Project is dragging behind.105 
Indeed, it is unlikely that it will be obtained until the inter-state disputes are resolved, an 
eventuality which in view of Orissa's latest appeal to the apex court seems unlikely to 
happen in the near future.106 
Secondly, heightened reliance on external borrowing  risks  falling into a debt trap if the 
rate of growth of the economy is not able to keep up with the interest rate. This 
consideration is significant in light of the fact that interest payment as a share of total 
expenditure has increased steadily since 2006-07 (from 10.6% in 2009-10 to 14.38% in 
2010-11, calculated using data from GoAP 2011). Moreover, if the GSDP growth rate 
seems to have recovered in 2010-11 up to 8.9%, it had dropped 5.02% and 5.79% 
respectively in 2008-09 and 2009-10, while the interest rate fixed by the Reserve Bank of 
India was 7.5% in 2007-8 and 6% in 2010 (GoAP 2010 and 2011).  
Even if the State's economy keeps growing as forecast, and the debt trap is avoided, a 
trade-off persists between the increasing amount of resources needed to service the debt 
and social sector expenditure. The cost overrun of the Polavaram project is likely to 
intensify this trade-off, particularly if its completion is delayed for years or decades. If the 
project receives national recognition and it is financed by external loans, the debt exposure 
will increase. If this does not happen, the excessive financial burden that would ensue is 
likely to translate into a lack of money for resettlement and other forms of assistance for the 
affected population. 
 
5.3.  The Polavaram displaced population: socio-economic characteristics and sources 
of livelihood 
 
The previous section has enumerated a number of controversies surrounding the 
Polavaram dam project which explain why the project is experiencing several delays in its 
implementation. It was made evident that many of the issues arise from the fact that at least 
                                                           
105  Besides in February the state government was urging the UPA Government for declaring “Indira 
Sagar Project” a National Project (NewKerala 2011a). However it seems that the project has received no 
special treatment in the current budget allocation. (NewKerala 2011b). 
106  In June 2011 however the chief minister N Kiran Kumar Reddy announced a tender worth Rs 16,010 
crores (around $3.6 billion) for executing the four main components of the project. Three of these (earthen-
cum-rockfill dam, spillway, foundation pit for powerhouse) will be realised by contractors under the 
responsibility of the Irrigation Department, while the powerhouse is to be constructed by AP Genco (the 
Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Limited) (The Hindu 2011b; The Times of India, 2011). 
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half of the project-affected population belongs to SCs and STs. In order to proceed in the 
next chapters with an examination and an assessment of resettlement in the case of the 
Polavaram project, the peculiar socio-economic characteristics of the affected population 
need to be taken into consideration. Indeed, the examination of these characteristics is 
important in support of the argument that structural factors exist which affect the 
performance of resettlement. In the case of the Polavaram dam these structural factors 
include the characteristics of the affected population, particularly their social composition, 
their sources of livelihood and the type of engagement in the labor market. This section 
provides a first analysis of these characteristics in reference to SCs and STs on the basis of  
data at the National, State and District level. Chapter 6 examines in specific how they are 
displayed by the Polavaram affected people. 
 
5.3.1.  Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Andhra Pradesh 
 
According to the 2001 Census, at the State level SCs represent 16.2% of the population, 
while 6.6% belong to STs.107 For the three districts primarily affected by the dam, (East 
Godavari, West Godavari, Khammam), the presence of SC and ST is described in table 5.3. 
West Godavari is the district with the highest share of SCs population (higher than the State 
average) and East Godavari is the one with the highest share of STs (also higher than the 
State average). 
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes constitute the most vulnerable social groups in 
India. Mehta and Shah (2001), for instance, report that whereas in 1993-94 at the all-India 
level 37.23% of the total rural population was found to be poor, the share was of 52% for 
STs and 48% for SCs. Estimates of severe poverty also showed that whereas 12% of non-
Scheduled Caste and Tribe rural households were severely below the poverty line, as many 
as 22% SCs and 25% of ST households were in severe poverty. A 1997 report of the World 
Bank (based on a 1996 Survey of the National Council of Applied Economic Research 
investigating the socio-economic characteristics of the poor in India) similarly indicated 
that the incidence of poverty for SC was 50% and for ST 51% (World Bank 1997b). More 
recent data based on a smaller survey carried out by the NCAER in 2005 (the India Human 
Development Survey, see footnote no. 111) reveal that the rate of poverty is 32.3% among 
                                                           
107 The SCs of AP are 7.41% of the total SC population of India, while STs are 5.96% of the total ST. 
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Dalit and 49.6% among Adivasi108 (Desai et al 2010).    
 
Table 5.3 Distribution by district of SC and ST population  
as a percentage of Total Population 
District 
% of SC of 
District 
Population 
% of Total 
State SC 
population 
% of ST of 
District 
population 
% of Total State 
ST population 
Khammam 16.5 3.5 26.5 13.6 
East Godavari 17.9 7.1 3.9 3.8 
West Godavari 19.2 5.9 2.5 1.9 
Source: 2001 Census data, quoted in GoAP 2006 
 
 
Table 5.4 Head-Count ratio (HCR) at the All-India  
and Andhra Pradesh levels, 2004-2005 
 INDIA ANDHRA PRADESH 
 
Com-
bined Urban Rural 
POVERTY LINE              
(Rs per-capita per 
month) 
Com-
bined Urban Rural 
POVERTY 
LINE 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
HCR based on 
URP* 
consumption 
27.5% 25.7% 28.3% 538.6 356.3 15.8% 28.0% 11.2% 542.9 293.0 
HCR based on 
MRP** 
consumption 
21.8% 21.7% 21.8% 538.6 356.3 11.1% 20.7% 7.5% 542.9 293.0 
Tendulkar 
Committee 
Poverty Line 
37.2% 25.7% 41.8% 578.8 446.7 29.9% 23.4% 32.3% 563.2 433.4 
Source: GoI 2009, Mehta et al 2011. 
*URP stands for Uniform Reference period. It means that household consumption is estimated on the basis of 
all the items consumed in the previous year as reported by the household.  
**MRP stands for Mixed Reference Period, on the basis of which consumption of certain items is recalled by 
the household with reference to the previous year and for others with reference to the previous week or month. 
 
The latest poverty estimation for India and AP for the whole population (based on the 
result of the 61st Round of the NSSO Household Consumer Expenditure survey, conducted 
between July 2004 and June 2005 and released by the Planning Commission) indicates that 
poverty rates range between 21.8% and 41.8% in rural areas for India and between 7.5% 
                                                           
108 Dalit is an alternative term for  SCs and Adivasi is another way to refer to tribal people. 
169 
and 32.3% for AP. The corresponding figures for urban areas are 21.7% and 25.7% at the 
all-India level and 20.7% and 28% for AP (see table 5.4).109  
According to the estimation of the Planning Commission (which uses the Uniform 
Reference Period consumption), AP has been particularly successful in reducing poverty in 
the last decades, with the poverty rates in rural areas declining from 20.92% in 1987-1988 
to 11.2% in 2004-05 (GoAP 2011). The reliability of these data is questionable, however, 
and there has been criticism of the methodology adopted by the Planning Commission for 
their estimations (for a review see Deaton and Dreze 2002, Sen and Himanshu 2004, 
Deaton and Kozel 2005). Without engaging in a critical review of these problems, it is 
important to note here how in fact the data depict a puzzling reality. In the first place, they 
suggest that poverty in AP is higher in urban than in rural areas, unlike the rest of India. 
Second, the low headcount poverty ratio would suggest a good performance in terms of 
human development. However, the state has been lagging behind in terms of the Human 
Development Index (which was 0.416 in 2001,below the Indian average, CESS 2008), 
ranking 10th among the other 15 major Indian States in 2001. The relatively bad 
performance of the Human Development Index is driven by a literacy rate which is also 
lower than the Indian average (60.5% versus 65% in 2001), particularly for women (51% 
versus 54% in 2001). Even worse is the situation for SCs and STs: in Andhra  Pradesh in 
2001 only 53.5% of the SC and 37.1% of the STs were literate. Another indicator of 
deprivation which is surprisingly high and contrasts with the relatively low poverty rate is 
the incidence of child labour, which is the highest among the Indian states: 6.6% of 
children were working in AP in 2004-05 (the corresponding figure at the all-India level was 
3.3%; NSSO 2006). The estimations of poverty based on the Tendulkar Poverty Line (see 
table 5.4) seem therefore to be more consistent with the reality depicted by indicators of 
human development.  
Lanjouw et al (2003) used the NSSO data on household consumption to estimate 
poverty at the regional level in AP110 using a different methodology from the Planning 
Commission. They find that poverty declined in both rural and urban areas between 1993-
                                                           
109 The different estimations are the result of the use of alternative poverty lines. The official 
methodology adopted by the Planning Commission is the one which produced the lowest rates, while the 
highest rates are found using the poverty line proposed by the Tendulkar Committee, which moves away from 
anchoring the poverty line to a calorie intake norm and uses another method to construct the reference poverty 
line basket (for a description of the new poverty line see GoI 2009). 
110 They use an alternative methodology which seeks to correct for some of the aforementioned 
problems. 
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94 and 1999-2000 in all the regions, but less than the levels suggested by the official 
methodology. Moreover, in all the regions rural poverty is higher than urban poverty. 
Rayalaseema I has the highest incidence of poverty and Coastal Andhra has the lowest. 
Little is available in terms of direct estimation of the incidence of poverty among SCs 
and STs in AP. The Sachar Committee (GoI 2006) used the data of the 61st Round of the 
NSSO and the official methodology of the Planning Commission (based on Uniform 
Reference period consumption) to estimate the incidence of poverty among socio-religious 
groups in different Indian States in 2004-05. For Andhra Pradesh they find that 16% of SCs 
and STs (the two groups were considered together) in rural areas were poor and 41% in 
urban areas.  
 
Table 5.5 Regional level estimates of poverty  (Head-Count ratio) 
 1993-94 1999-2000 
Region Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Coastal 31.2% 19.1% 24.3% 16.2% 
Telangana (Inland North) 25.9% 12.1% 20.6% 9.7% 
Rayalaseema I (Southeast) 38.6% 20% 33.1% 27.3% 
Rayalaseema II (Inland South) 21.9% 25.2% 22.3% 12.4% 
Andhra Pradesh 29.1% 17.8% 23.6% 13.6% 
Source: Lanjouw et al (2003). 
 
It is worth noting that the socio-economic profile of the poor in India, as well as in AP, 
tends to correspond with that of the ST and SC population. Firstly, poverty is still 
concentrated in rural areas: according to the poverty estimation for 2004-05, 73.2% of the 
total poor population of India live in rural areas (Mehta et al 2011), and the SC and ST 
population of AP are mainly rural-based: according to the 2001 Census, 83% of total SCs 
population and 92% of STs lived in rural areas (GoAP 2006).   
Not only are the poor concentrated in rural areas, they are also found primarily in two 
employment categories: casual wage labourers and marginal farmers. The aforementioned 
study of the World Bank indeed found that these two categories at the all-India level 
accounted for 61% of all poor households. Similar results emerge from two more recent 
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household surveys conducted between 2004 and 2005 by NCAER.111 The first of the two 
surveys (table 5.6) suggests that the occupation of the chief earner for 63% of the 
households in the bottom quintile of the distribution was labour, and for 30% of them was 
self-employment in agriculture. Similarly, the second survey (table 5.7) indicates that the 
main source of income for 35% of the households in the bottom quintile of the distribution 
was agricultural wages, for 19% was non-agricultural wages, and for 21% was cultivation.  
 
Table 5.6 Distribution of households by occupation of chief earner and household 
income quintile, 2004-05 all-India level 
Occupation of chief earner Distribution (%, Quintile 1 lowest 20%) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
RURAL      
Regular salary/wages 14 3.3 6.1 15.2 34.3 
Self-employment in non-agriculture 4.3 7.4 13.1 18.4 16.9 
Labour 63.1 48.4 31.0 18.0 5.7 
Self-employment in agriculture 30.3 39.8 47.8 44.6 38.7 
Others  0.9 1.1 2.0 3.8 4.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
URBAN      
Regular salary/wages 10.6 9.7 22.3 36.9 56.2 
Self-employment in non-agriculture 24 16.3 33.2 32.8 33.3 
Labour 59.0 67.8 38.4 20.5 2.7 
Self-employment in agriculture 3.3 2.8 1.9 3.8 2.1 
Others  3.1 3.4 4.2 6.0 5.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Mehta et al 2010, based on data from NSHIE 2004-05, NCAER (see footnote No. 111) 
 
 
These data suggest a picture of the poor as still mainly dependent on agriculture and 
increasingly shifting from self-employment to (casual) wage labour. This pattern is also 
identifiable among SCs and STs.  For instance, it is revealed by the second of the survey 
                                                           
111  The first one is the National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (NSHIE 2004-05), 
whose results are presented in the volume “How India earns, spends and saves” R. Shukla 2007, New Delhi: 
The Max New York Life Limited; the second one is the India Human Development Survey (HIS), whose 
results constitute the basis of the report “Human Development in India. Challenges for a society in transition”, 
Desai et al 2010. 
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mentioned (see table 5.7) that 29% of the Dalit and 30% of the Adivasi households depend 
on agricultural wages as the primary source of income, while 27% and 22% respectively 
rely on non-farm wages and 11% and 23% on cultivation. 
 
 
Table 5.7 Distribution of households by source of income and household income 
quintile, 2004-05 all-India level 
Occupation of chief earner Distribution (%, Quintile 1 lowest 20%) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 All 
Salary 7 9 17 29 49 21 
Agricultural wages 35 27 17 8 1 18 
Non-Agricultural wages 19 28 25 17 5 19 
Family business 8 11 15 18 19 14 
 Cultivators 21 20 20 20 17 20 
Other 10 5 6 8 9 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Desai et al. (2010), based on data from HIS (2005), NCAER (see footnote No. 111) 
 
Table 5.8 Proportion of households income by source,  
for All-India and by social group 
 
All 
India 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Social group (All-India level) 
Forward 
Caste 
Hindu 
Other 
Backward 
Caste 
Dalit Adivasi Muslim Other 
religion 
Salary 22 23 32 21 19 15 19 30 
Agricultural wages 18 35 8 17 29 30 11 10 
Non-Agricultural wages 19 16 9 17 27 22 27 12 
Family business 14 11 18 14 8 7 21 16 
Cultivators 20 9 24 23 11 23 16 21 
Other 8 7 10 7 7 4 7 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Desai et al. (2010), based on data from HIS (2005), NCAER  
 
In AP the process of casualisation of labour in rural areas is even more pronounced 
than at the All-India level. As shown in table 5.8, the share of households that depends on 
agricultural wages is higher than for all-India (35% versus 18%). Similar results are 
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suggested by the 2007-08 Employment and Unemployment Survey of the National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO), which found that 36.7% of households were engaged in 
agricultural labour in AP, versus 26.6% at the all-India level.  As for the occupation of SCs 
and STs in AP, in 2004-05 38.9% of the STs families and 59.6% of the SCs families 
worked as agricultural labourers, while 27.7% and 10.4% respectively were self-employed 
in agriculture (NSSO 2006). 
Agricultural wage labour is identified with casual labour, being characterised by low 
wages, lack of formal contract and social security benefits and absence of regular 
availability of work (Bino et al 2009). Yet, most of self-employment in India (and in AP) 
shares these characteristics and can be considered casual labour (ibidem). According to this 
definition of casual labour (i.e. including employed and self-employed workers), 48% of 
the workforce of AP was a casual labourer in 2005-06 (see table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.9  Percentage distribution of rural households by household type 
 Household type 
      
Rural 
Self-employed in Agricultural 
labour 
households 
Other 
labour 
households 
Others 
Total 
(including 
n.r.) Agriculture 
Non-
agriculture All 
Andhra Pradesh 22.9 14.5  37.4  36.7  9.8  16.1  100.0 
All India 35.0  14.4  49.4  26.6  11.5  12.5  100.0 
      
Urban Self-employed Regular 
wage/salaried 
Casual 
labour Others 
Total 
(including 
n.r.) 
Andhra Pradesh 32.8  40.4  15.5  11.2  100.0 
All India 36.6  40.9  13  9.6  100.0 
Source: NSSO 2010 
 
Table 5.10 Percentage of Casual Labour to the Total Employed 
 Rural Male Rural Female Rural Person 
Andhra Pradesh 44.0 53.6 48.0 
India 33.7 40.2 35.7 
Source: Bino et al 2009 
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In Andhra Pradesh the process of casualisation of labour has proceeded together with the 
fragmentation of landholdings, particularly among SCs and STs. As can be seen from tables 
5.11 and 5.12, over time there has been an increase in the total area operated by SCs and 
STs (15% for the former and 32% for the latter); however this increase has involved only 
small and marginal SCs farmers and marginal, small and semi-medium STs farmers. For 
medium and large farmers of both social groups there has been, instead, a decrease in the 
total area cultivated. The process of fragmentation is also confirmed by the increase in the 
total number of individual holdings for SCs and STs, by a percentage much higher than the 
increase in the total area cultivated.  
Finally, an important feature of the livelihood strategies implemented by STs (and in 
certain areas also by SCs) is the reliance upon the forest and its products. The next section 
looks at this relationship in a historical perspective, while chapters 6 and 7 look at its 
implications for compensation and resettlement. Indeed, the relationship with the forest 
landscape has traditionally shaped tribal culture and identity, as well as its economy. 
Scheduled Tribes of AP resort to forestland for cultivation, grazing, hunting, and fishing 
(Reddy et al 2010). Collection of minor forest produce (firewood, honey, tamarind, soap 
nuts, etc.) also plays an important role in supporting consumption and cash flows when the 
produce is sold in local markets (ibidem). Households tend to rely more on these sources of 
income and consumption the more they are economically marginalised and vulnerable.  
 
Table 5.11  Area operated by different size classes (SC) (area in lakh hectares) 
 1975-76 1980-81 1986-87 1990-91 1995-96 2001 
% increase 
from 1975-76 
to 2001 
Marginal  2.19 2.71 2.91 3.46 3.96 4.13 89% 
Small 2.27 2.57 2.53 3.06 3.07 3.35 48% 
Semi-medium 2.56 2.48 2.35 2.64 2.40 2.41 -6% 
Medium 2.12 1.53 1.4 1.34 0.94 1.06 -50% 
Large 0.7 0.55 0.39 0.32 0.19 0.38 -46% 
Total 9.84 9.84 9.58 10.82 10.66 11.33 15% 
Source: GoAP 2006 
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Table 5.12 Area operated by different size classes (ST) (area in lakh hectares) 
 1975-76 1980-81 1986-87 1990-91 1995-96 2001 
% increase 
from 1975-76 
to 2001 
Marginal  0.76 1.86 1.10 1.50 1.95 2.24 194.7% 
Small 1.19 1.55 1.76 2.26 2.70 3.06 157.1% 
Semi-medium 2.44 2.71 2.79 3.21 3.37 3.56 45.9% 
Medium 3.19 2.79 2.80 2.77 2.38 2.45 -23.2% 
Large 1.39 0.90 0.93 0.71 0.47 0.55 -60.4% 
Total 8.97 9.00 9.45 10.45 10.87 11.86 32.2% 
Source: GoAP 2006 
  
Table 5.13 No. of holdings from 1976-77 to 2000-2001 by social group  
(individual holdings, number in lakhs) 
 1975-76 1980-81 1986-87 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 % increase from 1975-76 to 2001 
SC 8.18 9.28 9.97 11.75 12.83 13.64 66.8% 
ST 3.80 4.71 5.15 6.32 7.53 8.60 126.3% 
Others 48.79 59.59 66.46 74.29 85.34 93.07 90.8% 
All  60.77 73.58 81.58 92.33 105.71 115.31 89.75% 
Source: GoAP 2006 
 
The forest population of AP includes 35 different STs and 59 SCs, and ranges 
between five and ten million people (according to whether SCs and other traditional forest 
dwellers are included or not). The Recorded Forest Area covers 23.2% of the total 
geographical area of the State and 29.9% of the total area of East Godavari, 10.5% of West 
Godavari and 52.6% of Khammam (the three districts affected by Polavaram displacement). 
These three districts are also amongst those with the highest concentration of forest 
populations.  
 
5.3.2.  Tribal  land alienation and forest eviction 
 
A short historical digression on forest eviction and land alienation in AP is useful here in 
support of our claim that the outcomes of resettlement depend on the specific 
characteristics of the displaced population and of the resettlement area. It is in fact one of 
the key findings of this thesis that the history of social relations (particularly power 
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relations, and more specifically, agrarian relations) affects the impact of displacement and 
has to be taken into account to control for the dynamic effects of resettlement. 
The previous section has illustrated how SCs and STs of AP are still primarily employed 
in agriculture and significantly reliant upon the forest and its products.112 It has also been 
shown how these two social groups are progressively moving towards casual wage labour 
in agriculture. This shift is being pushed by two processes which have a long history: forest 
eviction and fragmentation of landholdings. These two processes and the agrarian structure 
resulting from them, currently characterised by the casualisation of rural labour, are 
relevant for the present discussion on resettlement in AP and Polavaram in two ways. 
Firstly, they affect the design of the Resettlement policy (which tries to atone for the 
historical injustice suffered by the tribal population) and the modalities with which 
compensation for land is delivered. Secondly, they influence the impact of displacement on 
the affected population, and even more, the dynamic effect of resettlement. These aspects 
are investigated in chapter 6 and 7 with specific reference to the Polavaram project and its 
affected population. 
A full understanding of their relevance and present features requires a tracing of their 
historical roots. While the tribal society is traditionally defined by its relationship with the 
environment and specifically with the forest, tribal people have been pushed in and out the 
forests for the past two centuries.  
Tribal land alienation began in the 18th Century as an outcome of the penetration of the 
market economy in the hills region (Gadgil and Guha 1993). In the words of Rupavath, in 
AP “[t]he process of land alienation has manifested itself mainly in large-scale migration of 
tribal communities from fertile plain areas to the neighbouring forests. The structural 
changes occurring in the plain areas have been responsible for this shift […].These changes 
introduced rapid capital penetration, irrigation facilities, railway and communication 
facilities, sale and purchase of lands and creation of certain land systems like Zamindari, 
Ryotwari systems, etc.” (2009: 4). The reliance on feudal land systems such as Zamindary 
and Ryotwary by both the Colonial British and the Nizam rule,113 which required the use of 
                                                           
112 The following discussion describes historical processes primarily involving Scheduled Tribes. 
However, the forests of AP host many dwellers who are not tribals but rather belong to low castes. Hence the 
considerations made can to a large extent also be applied to SCs. 
113 Until Independence AP was divided into two distinct administrative regions: the present coastal 
Andhra and Rayalaseema districts were part of the Madras Presidency under the Colonial rule, while 
Telangana was part of the Hyderabad State ruled by Nizam (Laxman Rao et al 2006). 
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intermediaries to administer the tribal areas, was in fact the primary route followed for the 
entrance of non-tribals in these areas. The latter provided foodgrains, clothes and, most 
importantly, money. In fact moneylenders were the first to acquire tribal lands through 
usurious lending methods, which often led to exploitative practices (Laxman Rao et al 2006).  
In some cases tribal land was acquired by non-tribals through marriages with tribal women: 
the non-tribals were then entitled to purchase tribal land in the name of their tribal wives. In 
others the same purpose was achieved through “nestam” or bond of friendship: the non-
tribals entered into these bonds and purchased land in the name of their tribal friends 
(ibidem). 
Being deprived of the land that they occupied at the foothills, tribal people progressively 
retreated into the forest, where they engaged in livelihoods based on shifting cultivation 
(podu) and collection of minor forest produce. Both the Nizam and the British rule, 
however, soon took interest into the richness of resources provided by the forest 
(particularly timber), and so did later the Independent State. This interest translated into the 
monopoly of forest and forest resources through the creation of a Forest Department (by the 
Nizam administration in 1857) and the subsequent issue of forest policies and 
environmental legislation (Gadgil and Guha 1993, Reddy and Kumar 2010). In the name of 
environmental protection (with the tribal population being blamed for the degradation and 
retreat of the forest surface) large tracts of forest were declared “Reserved Forest” and their 
use and access restricted (Saravanan 2009, Reddy et al 2004b). This meant that shifting 
cultivation was de facto declared illegal and amounted to an abrogation of tribals' 
customary rights. 
The post-independence Forest Policies have maintained the focus on the productive and 
profit-making aspects of forest management, eventually just making it another way of 
subsidising the industrial sector. For instance the Forest Policy of 1952 aimed mainly at 
increasing the revenue for the state, declaring production of timber for industries, railways, 
markets, exports and for defense needs as national interests, which had priority over 
domestic and agricultural needs (Reddy et al ibidem ). The 1960s in particular saw an 
increase in large-scale immigration in forest areas and forest encroachment by non-tribals 
from the plains, to the point that the 1985-86 Agricultural Census found that the number of 
tribal holdings in the state was less than 8% of the total (Reddy and Kumar 2010). Only 
towards the end of the 1980s (with the 1988 National Forest Policy) was tribal peoples' 
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dependence upon the forest acknowledged and forest policies designed to safeguard their 
customary rights and well-being (Rao 2006; Saravan ibidem). Until recently however the 
Forest Acts prohibited in one way or another the use of forest products for livelihood. If 
some exceptions were made for tribal people (for instance through Joint Forest 
Management programs, (Reddy et al 2004)), the ban was more binding for non-tribal forest 
dwellers. Most of the high value minor forest produce is, however, still monopolised by the 
State Forest Corporations (which retain the monopoly for the purchase of 35 non-timber 
forest produce varieties) for which forest dwellers end up being employed as daily wagers 
(Reddy et al 2004). 
It is in consideration of these processes that the Forest Rights Act indeed constitutes an 
institutional reform of topical importance for the recognition of the historical injustice 
suffered by tribal people (and other forest dwellers) and as an attempt to atone for the past 
abuse and to guarantee future recognition of their rights. However, apart from the Act's 
limitations due to the inadequacy of some of its statutory provisions and the problems 
linked to its implementation (see Reddy et al 2010; Sarin and Springate-Baginski 2010) and 
what is said below for AP), its enactment at a time when the multiple interests on forest 
resources lead to displacement in the name of development, in a way contributes to 
replicate the push-in-push-out dynamic which has characterised the relationship between 
the tribals, the state and the forest in the past centuries. 
It must also be mentioned that studies which have investigated the performance of the 
Act and of its implementation so far (see Saravan ibidem; Reddy et al 2010; G. Reddy and 
Kumar 2010) have found rather unsatisfactory results, particularly in AP, where the Act has 
been enforced since December 2007. Not only has the government focused entirely on the 
recognition of individual rights, neglecting community rights, but the whole process has 
proceeded in a non-participatory and undemocratic way, with a lack of transparency and the 
omnipresence of the Forest Department. The fact that the government is reluctant to 
implement the Act and recognise individual and community rights in precisely the 
Polavaram affected region (see the discussion in section 5.2.3) is indicative of the 
schizophrenic push-in-push-out attitude  mentioned above.  
Finally, it must be highlighted that the legislation enacted to safeguard STs from the 
unlawful alienation of their land, of which the aforementioned AP Scheduled Area Land 
Transfer Regulation of 1959 is part has had very limited success. The purpose of the Act 
179 
was to prohibit the transfer of tribal land to non-tribals. With its amendment in 1970 (Land 
Transfer Regulation-I), it also postulated that, unless otherwise demonstrated, the land 
owned by non-tribals in Scheduled Areas was assumed to have been acquired from tribals, 
either illegally or by morally-dubious means. The amendment however was not given 
retrospective power and was instead followed by regulations and executive orders which 
limited its application (Ramachandraiah and Venkateswarlu 2011). As a result of this, and 
of the general lack of willingness by the Government to enforce the Act, almost half of the 
total cultivable land in the Scheduled Areas of the state is still occupied by non-tribals 
(ibidem). 
 
5.4. The legal and policy framework of resettlement in Polavaram 
 
This section describes the legal and policy background on the grounds of which 
compensation and resettlement are provided in Polavaram. This discussion makes possible 
to assess the extent to which the Polavaram R&R package conforms to this framework and 
it is functional to the analysis carried out in chapter 7, where the shortcomings of the 
Polavaram package and of the framework of reference are highlighted.  
 
5.4.1.  The Indian policy and legal framework on Resettlement and Rehabilitation  
 
At the time of writing in November 2011 India still does not have a Bill on Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation. The compulsory acquisition of private land by the state is still regulated 
by the Land Acquisition Act (1894), a colonial act which establishes the sovereign power 
of the state to expropriate and defines the boundaries of the eminent domain.114 Despite the 
amendments made over the past decades (the major one in 1984), it retains the 
undemocratic character of the colonial legislation and it is inadequate for regulating 
expropriation of land in view of the extent and the modalities with which it is carried out 
now in India. A review of the main limits of the Act in relation to issues of resettlement can 
be found in Ramanathan (2008) and in Das (2006). As the two authors point out, the Act 
only compels the state to pay compensation for the assets expropriated, but it does not 
                                                           
114  The eminent domain is the power of the State to seize or expropriate a citizen's private property 
under payment of an appropriate monetary compensation, but without need of the citizen's consent. 
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create any other legal liability to bear any additional cost or responsibility. Hence it does 
not create any obligations for the state to rehabilitate the people whose land is expropriated, 
let alone to make provisions for the landless affected population whose livelihood is 
disrupted by the project for which the land acquisition is required. 
In addition, the Act regulates compulsory acquisition of land for development projects 
(with the state acting as the acquiring agency) to be used not only for public purposes, but 
also for the purposes of profit-making private companies. This extended conception of the 
meaning of 'public purpose' is highly contested, in view of the increasing role that the 
private (national and international) sector is playing in the Indian investment strategy, 
especially for infrastructure projects and Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  
Finally, the ways with which compensation is established and delivered are unfair and 
tend to disadvantage the poorest and most vulnerable. Compensation is acknowledged only 
for those landowners who can prove the existence of their property rights over the land 
expropriated. As a consequence traditional forest dwellers who have been occupying and 
cultivating land without legal title are excluded. The same is true for common property 
resources (such as forestland, trees and grazing land), for which no clear property rights are 
defined. The unfairness is enhanced by the fact that, even when they exist, the land records 
are often faulty and the result of illegal transactions. Compensation is also exclusively 
conceived in the form of a cash transfer, while no sorts of assistance or support are 
provided for the loss and reconstruction of the livelihood. More generally, no reference is 
made to resettlement of the people whose land is expropriated, let alone of those who are 
landless but depend on that land for their livelihood.  
Indeed, at present there is no policy or legislation at the national level which regulates 
displacement induced by development projects and resettlement of the displaced people. 
The adoption of a National Policy on R&R (by making the policy into an Act of Parliament 
and thereby legally binding) has been attempted in India since the 1980s, yet in 2011 the 
process still seems far from completion.   
The first attempt to draft a National Policy on R&R was made in 1985, when a special 
committee was appointed by the Central Ministry of Welfare to prepare a rehabilitation 
policy for tribal displaced people. This attempt was made in view of the observation by the 
National Commission for SCs and STs that 40% of the affected populations from 
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displacement-inducing projects were tribals. The committee, however, stated that the policy 
should cover all the displaced people, regardless of their social group (Fernandes 2008).  
The policy drafting proceeded in this direction in the early 1990s, especially following 
the withdrawal of the World Bank from the Sardar Sarovar project on the Narmada river. In 
1993 the Ministry of Rural Development prepared a draft of the policy, which was revised 
in 1994 and in 1998. The various proposals were widely circulated and discussed with 
representatives of civil society. A final decision on the draft was taken only in 2004 and a 
National Rehabilitation Policy was promulgated on the 17th of February 2004. However, 
this version of the policy excluded the progressive clauses that had been incorporated in the 
previous versions. Among its many limitations, this version only provided for extra cash as 
compensation, but did not have provisions for support of livelihood. As a consequence it 
attracted strong criticism and controversy. Consultations were then led by the National 
Advisory Council (NAC) and the outcome was a revised version of the policy, which the 
NAC presented to the Government for consideration. The Government, however, did not 
accept the proposal and in 2006 put yet another new draft of the policy into the  public 
domain. Again criticism and debate followed, which concluded in 2007 when the 
Government announced the National R&R Policy, 2007. In order for it to be passed as a 
law, a process started to present the policy for Parliamentary approval.  
In 2009 the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Bill, 2009 was in fact passed by the Lok 
Sabha, together with the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2009. These two Bills do 
introduce some important elements, resulting from the two decade long discussion and 
consultation process.115 The most relevant of these is probably the removal from the scope 
of the Land Acquisition Bill of the acquisition of land for private companies, together with 
the modification of the definition of “public purpose'. The latter now includes “strategic 
purposes”, “infrastructure projects where the benefits accrue to the general public” and 
“any other purpose useful to the general public, for which land has been purchased by a 
person under lawful contract or is having the land to the extent of seventy percent, but the 
remaining thirty percent is yet to be acquired” (Section 3, clause f). Nevertheless, it has 
been claimed that this definition leaves some loopholes through which private purpose can 
be reintroduced. These concern first, the explicit mention of infrastructure projects, which 
in India are increasingly realised through public-private partnerships; second, the  inclusion 
                                                           
115  For a critical review of the two Bills see Iyer (2011). 
182 
of private projects for which a minimum of 30% government acquisition of land is required. 
Another important change with the Land Acquisition Act is the introduction of tribals and 
other traditional forest dwellers in the definition of “person interested”. The preparation of 
a social impact assessment and of a Tribal Development Plan (if relevant) in agreement 
with the provision of the R&R Bill 2009 are also made mandatory. The explicit reference to 
tribals and other forest dwellers is intended as being in compliance with the Forest Rights 
Act, as it opens the possibility of compensation for the loss of customary rights. Finally, the 
determination of market value of land is still based on the price of land at the displacement 
site, but there remains controversy about the extent to which compensation should be based 
on the projected value of the land after it has been ‘developed’. 
The R&R Bill, applies to affected families, defined as those whose land has been 
acquired and those who have been deprived of the primary source of livelihood due to 
involuntary and permanent displacement caused by land acquisition.  
The preparation of a social impact assessment is made mandatory by the Bill, to be 
prepared by an independent multi-disciplinary group and to be discussed in public hearings. 
Also mandatory is a survey and a census to identify all the affected families and their socio-
economic characteristics. The draft scheme of resettlement is to be discussed with the 
affected families and in case of land acquisition in Scheduled Areas, consultation must be 
undertaken in conformity to the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Area) Act . Land-
for-land compensation is to be provided only to the extent that “this is available in the 
resettlement area” (chapter 6, clause 36(1)) and this applies also to STs. The preparation of 
a Tribal Development Plan is however required in conformity to the Forest Rights Act, with 
the purpose of “laying down the details of procedure for settling land rights due but not 
settled and restoring titles of tribals on alienated land” (chapter 6, clause 49(1)). The 
affected families are also to be given preference in the allocation of jobs created by the 
project, but again this provision is not compulsory. One-off financial assistance is also 
contemplated as compensation for the loss of customary rights for STs.  
This version of the Bill addresses some of the weaknesses of the previous drafts; 
however, it still leaves some important issues open and unresolved.116 For instance it does 
                                                           
116  Due to these shortcomings, the National Advisory Council deemed the two Bills unsatisfactory and  
in May 2011 sent to the government some recommendations for the amendment of the Bill. The most incisive 
change recommended is the consolidation of the Land Acquisition Act and the Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Bill into a unique Bill, whose suggested title is “National Development, Acquisition, 
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not stress enough that the primary objective should be the minimisation of displacement 
and that the affected families should be the primary beneficiaries of the project.  
This section does not undertake a full critical assessment of this version of the Bill, as its 
purpose is rather to define the national legal framework (or lack thereof) in which 
resettlement in Polavaram takes place. However, in the Conclusion of this thesis some 
policy recommendations are made with respect to the national Bill on R&R, in light of the 
findings concerning resettlement in Polavaram.  
It is important to point out that, in the absence of a National Policy, an ad hoc approach 
has tended to dominate the practice in R&R in India. In most cases resettlement 
programmes have been designed specifically for each project (as it has been the case for the 
Tehri Dam or the Sardar Sarovar Project). At the same time policies and legislation 
regulating special instances of land acquisition and resettlement have been adopted by 
Central Ministries and by state governments, as well as by individual companies. While 
these efforts partially make up for the absence of a national policy (and in some cases have 
contributed to keeping the debate alive), this multiplicity of approaches has inevitably led 
to a lack of uniformity of rights and treatment under the different central and state laws and 
policies.  
It has also been noted (see Saxena 2006 and Fernandes and Paranjpye 1997:5) that in 
some cases the state policies were adopted under pressure from the World Bank (see 
Mathur 2008 for the case of the Coal India Limited) and that this might have undermined 
their ownership, which could partly explain the poor record of their implementation. 
The Andhra Pradesh Resettlement and Rehabilitation policy illustrated in the following 
section is a clear example of the development of a policy framework at the state level in the 
absence of a binding legislation at the national level. 
 
5.4.2.  The Andhra Pradesh Resettlement and Rehabilitation policy and the Polavaram 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation package 
 
The Government of AP issued its own Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) policy in 
2005, as G.O. Ms. No. 68 of the Irrigation and CAD (Project Wing) Department (called AP 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Displacement and Rehabilitation Act”. In May 2011 the government declared that it was to accept the 
recommendation of the consolidation of the two Bills (ABC Live 2011).  
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R&R Policy hereafter). For its planning, monitoring and implementation, the Government 
has established an R&R Commissionerate (and an R&R Commissioner as the Head of the 
Department), to which financial powers have also been delegated. The stated objectives of 
the policy are the following: the minimisation of displacement and the identification of the 
non-displacing or least-displacing alternatives; the planning of the resettlement and the 
rehabilitation of the project affected and displaced families (PAFs/PDFs), including special 
needs of tribals and vulnerable sections; the provision of a better standard of living for 
PAFs and PDFs and the facilitation of harmonious relationships between the Requiring 
Body and PAFs through mutual cooperation.  
The state Government has repeatedly presented its Resettlement policy as one of the 
most innovative in the country, and the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package 
(PRRP) as one of the most generous. Details of the PRRP are discussed below in section, 
but it suffices to say here that its implementation is in fact lagging behind schedule and the 
unprecedentedly generous outlay might simply be due to the fact that Polavaram is one of 
projects with the highest number of people affected ever realised in India, and one of those 
for which a more serious attempt to account for the costs of resettlement is made. As 
concerns the AP R&R Policy (whose most important benefits for the resettled population 
are sketched in Appendix VII), it does include some novel elements and special attention to 
the resettlement of the tribal population; however these tend to be responding to the legal 
requirements needed to maintain compliance with the Forest Rights Act,117 rather than the 
impetus of creativity by the policy-maker, as claimed by the state government. Otherwise, 
the policy follows a standard model with generic and vague provisions and does not engage 
in providing directions for its implementation, at the level of management, coordination and 
monitoring (Stewart and Rao ibidem).  
A positive aspect which deserves attention is the adjustment process that the policy has 
gone through since 2005, which has taken the form of a number of amendments. The 
adjustments have been prompted on one side by the need to conform the policy to the 
prescriptions of the Forest Rights Act, and on the other by the requests of the Polavaram 
affected population, often mediated by local NGOs (particularly the NGO SAKTI). This 
has been the case, for instance, of Paragraph 3.10 of the policy, which states that each adult 
son and adult daughter residing with the displaced family must be treated as a separate 
                                                           
117  On the relevance of the Forest Rights Act for the Polavaram dam project, see chapter 5. 
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family (the cut-off date for calculating their age of 18 years is be the date of notification of 
acquisition of the village), and as such, the benefits of R&R are extended to them. While 
this provision is included in the resettlement policies of other Indian states (but not in the 
R&R Bill 2009 approved by the Lok Sabha, see section 5.4.1), it did not appear in the first 
version of the policy, and it has been added to it through amendments and upon the 
insistence of the affected people. The last of amendment was made in 2010 to also include 
as a separate family, adult daughters, in addition to adult sons.  
As concerns the modifications made in order to conform to the Forest Rights Act, the 
most innovative is the obligation for the government to compensate project affected ST 
families with land (rather than money). Paragraph 6.5 in fact states: “government shall 
acquire land within the project benefited area, as per guidelines issued by the Government 
from time to time such that no person should become small or marginal farmers or landless 
due to such acquisition, for allotment of such land to ST PAFs (who become small or 
marginal farmers or landless due to acquisition of their land for the project)”. Land-for-land 
compensation for tribals has also been made mandatory through amendment in 2006, in 
order to comply with the constitutional provisions for safeguard of Tribal Rights and the 
Forest Rights Act, although again this requirement is absent from the R&R 2009 National 
Bill. 
Compliance with the Forest Rights Act has also required a change in the definition of 
“occupiers” and “other traditional forest dwellers”. The first version of the policy defined 
occupiers as “members of ST community in possession of forest land prior to 25th October, 
1980”. This has been later modified in order to also include other traditional forest dwellers 
(Para 3.15), where in accordance with the Forest Rights Act, these are defined as “any 
member or community who has for at least three generations (generation means a period of 
25 years) prior to 13th of December 2005 primarily resided in and who depends on the 
forest land for bona fide livelihood needs”. 
The compliance of the AP R&R Policy with the Forest Rights Act is certainly one of its 
strengths, yet it has important consequences for resettlement, in terms of the modalities of 
its delivery and of its dynamic effects. The requirement of land-for-land compensation for 
tribal people in fact implies that two different types of land compensation are contemplated 
for households which differ according to their social group but which otherwise share many 
characteristics, including the village of residence. Specifically, tribal families are granted 
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land-for-land compensation, whereas non-tribals are paid a price for the land expropriated, 
through a process which is still regulated by the Land Acquisition Act. The primary 
purpose of this different treatment is obviously to atone for the historical injustice suffered 
by tribals; however its dynamic effects can have the opposite effect and indeed contribute 
to reinforce inequality. The lack of explicit criteria for determining a fair price for the land 
expropriated (e.g. valuing the land on the basis of its future rather than on its present use) 
reinforces this problem and can lead to an increase in landlessness and fragmentation of 
landholdings, as will be shown in the next section with reference to the PRRP. Moreover, 
there is not total conformity with the Forest Rights Act, as no mention is made in the policy 
concerning the fact that land and forest rights of tribals need to be settled before 
displacement takes place. As reported in the previous section, the Government of AP has 
been accused of violating the Act with the Polavaram project, by not allowing villages to 
settle their forest rights before displacement.  
An important amendment was introduced in 2009, which makes compulsory the 
preparation of a Social Impact Assessment study (in case of mass displacement), which has 
to take into consideration the project's impact on public and community properties, assets 
and infrastructure and which is to be examined by an independent multidisciplinary group. 
Further, in the case that both Environmental Impact Assessment and Social Impact 
Assessment are required, public hearings must be organised to cover issues related to them. 
The same amendment also made compulsory the appointment of an Ombudsman to settle 
grievances arising out of the matters covered by the policy. In particular the Ombudsman is 
given the power to receive and dispose of petitions of redressal presented by project-
affected families for not being offered the admissible R&R benefits (Para 7.5). 
Since the launch of the Policy in 2005, an institutional framework has also been 
developed around it, primarily at the encouragement of the World Bank.118 In particular the 
Government approved the proposal of the World Bank on Non Lending Technical 
Assistance for “strengthening and transforming institutions for management of Land 
Acquisition and Resettlement and Rehabilitation”.119 For this purpose a Resettlement and 
                                                           
118  There is no clear evidence of the role played by the World Bank in the design of the AP R&R policy 
and of the Polavaram R&R package, however Osskarsson (2005) reports that the compensation package for 
Polavaram was announced in May 2005, two days before a delegation of the Irrigation department visited the 
World Bank and US Exim officials, both institutions having been contacted for a loan to complete the project. 
119  From the website of the Commissioner of Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Irrigation and CAD 
Department, Government of AP (http://www.aprr.gov.in/RANDR/jsp/SMRR.jsp) 
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Rehabilitation Society has been set up to function as executing agency of the Policy, under 
the bombastic name of “State Mission for Resettlement and Rehabilitation”. The agency is 
(claimed to be) endowed with a flexible organisational structure, operational procedures 
and financial autonomy, and its first stated objective is to “bring flexibility in planning, 
implementation and monitoring of R&R” in consideration of the specificities of the local 
conditions. Its governing body consists of at least 17 members, of which 12 are ex-officio 
(including the Chief Minister of AP, the Minister for Irrigation and the R&R 
Commissioner). The five non-official members are to be selected amongst public 
representatives, representatives of NGOs, activists and participating communities. The 
management of the mission is attributed to an Executive Committee composed of seven 
members: the R&R Commissioner, the Joint Director (Finance), a Senior Research Officer, 
a project administrator of the Andhra region, one of the Telangana region and one of the 
Rayalaseema region, and the Chief Executive Officer. The utility and the effectiveness of 
the State Mission will be proved over time: it does not seem to have played a role in the 
establishment and management of the Polavaram R&R package so far, but this is probably 
due to its recent creation. 
Another organisation which is part of the aforementioned institutional framework and 
which seems to have been set up to comply with the World Bank Operational Policy120on 
Resettlement & Rehabilitation (OP 4.12, see chapter 1), is the R&R Monitoring Committee, 
to be separately constituted for each project which requires resettlement (see OP 4.12, 
Required Measures, Para.13(a)). Its task is the monitoring and reviewing of the progress of 
the resettlement plan’s implementation, and its members must include a representative of 
project-affected women, a representative of project affected ST and SC, a representative of 
a voluntary organisation, a representative of the lead bank, a chairperson of the Panchayat 
Raj Institutions located in the affected zone, and deputee of the area included in the affected 
zone. The same probably applies for the provision which requires the preparation of a 
resettlement plan in consultation with the project-affected families which, it is stated, 
should decide upon their preference for location of R&R centre, which should be followed 
in the process of land acquisition for resettlement (see OP 4.12, Resettlement Instruments, 
Para.25).  
                                                           
120  There are no legally binding agreements which compel the government of AP to design a 
Resettlement policy which complies with OP 4.12, but compliance will affect future requests of loans from 
the World Bank, which are likely to made once the Polavaram dam has obtained the status of national project. 
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5.5.  State of advancement of resettlement operations in Polavaram  
 
The construction of the Polavaram dam and its reservoir will lead to the submersion of 
277 villages, forcing 42,701 families (94% of which are poor) to abandon their houses and 
land, and to relocate elsewhere. The government of AP is showing itself to be aware of the 
importance of providing adequate resettlement to the displaced population and is taking 
responsibility for it. Compensation for the expropriated land is provided in compliance with 
the Land Acquisition Act (1894), with the Revenue Department being held responsible for 
the assessment of the houses' value. Relocation and the provision of other benefits are 
granted according to the AP R&R policy. These benefits form a package (hereafter called 
‘R&R package’) which grants different amounts of money to different social groups, 
according to the extent to which their livelihoods are disrupted by displacement (see table 
5.14). Each family receives a subsistence allowance, whose purpose is supposedly to 
compensate for all the intangible costs of displacement and of setting up a new livelihood; 
all the landless families (i.e. the wage labourers) receive a ‘salary’ which should 
compensate for their lack of productive assets; the tribal families receive additional money 
as compensation for the loss of customary rights (i.e. the access to the forest); and finally, 
the non-tribal landowning families who become landless after relocation receive (on top of 
the payment of land compensation) an additional sum of money in acknowledgement of 
this (significant change of status. 
The R&R package implicitly acknowledges that displacement causes the disruption 
of the livelihoods of the affected people, in various ways, including the loss of access to the 
forest and the creation of new landless families. Its purpose then should be to put the 
displaced families in the conditions to regenerate or recreate the disrupted livelihoods. Yet, 
the only content of the package is the payment of a sum of money, whose rationale seems 
to be to compensate for (some of) the costs incurred in the whole displacement-resettlement 
process. The following section will demonstrate how this exclusive focus on cash 
compensation is in fact one of the major shortcomings of the Polavaram R&R package, as it 
does not provide sufficient support for the restoration of the disrupted livelihoods. 
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Table 5.14 Details of financial benefits to each agricultural labourer/farmer 
under R&R package in Polavaram Mandal in West Godavari District (tribal and non-
tribal); all monetary amounts in INR. 
 Tribal Non-tribal  
 
Agricultural 
labourers Farmers 
Agricultural 
labourers Farmers 
Free House site, all categories of 
Project Affected Families-PAFs) 
5 cents  (202 sq. 
metres) 
5 cents (202 sq. 
metres) 
5 cents (202 sq. 
metres) 
5 cents (202 sq. 
metres) 
Grant for House construction 
(Below Poverty Line(BPL) 
families only) 
50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 
Grant for construction of sanitary 
toilets (BPL families only) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Grant of Cattle Shed (all PAFs) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Grant of Transporting material (all 
PAFs) 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Minimum Agricultural wages of 
625 days @ Rs. 80/per day (all 
PAFs) 
50,000 0 50,000 0 
Subsistence allowance of 240 days 
@ Rs. 80/per day (all Project 
Displaced Families-PDFs) 
19,200 19,200 19,200 19,200 
Additional allowance of 500 days 
@ Rs. 80/per day as compensation 
for loss of customary rights and 
usage of forest produce  
40,000 40,000 0 0 
One financial assistance equivalent 
to 750 days of Min.Agrl. Wage @ 
Rs. 80/per day GO 68 (6.19 ) 
0 0 0 60,000 
Total 170,200 120,200 130,200 140,200 
Source: R&R details of Indira Sagar (Polavaram) Project as at 05.06.2009, internal government document. 
 
In this section we look at what is being done in practice to compensate and resettle the 
Polavaram affected population. An effort is being made by the government to provide a 
transparent account of the implementation of the package: the website of the Commissioner 
of R&R of the government of AP contains updated information on the state of progress of 
the construction of the resettlement centres for the Polavaram affected people. 
Unfortunately, an equally transparent attitude is not applied to the release of information 
concerning the payment of the monetary transfers envisioned by the package. In fact, the 
information available, reported in tables 5.15-5.18, indicate a delay in implementation, 
particularly in Khammam district.  
As can be seen from table 5.15, by the 31st of May 2011 all the affected villages had 
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been surveyed, although for more than half of the villages in Khammam the results had not 
been published. Also, a draft plan scheme had been prepared for only two villages of 
Khammam district, leaving two villages in East Godavari and three in West Godavari still 
waiting for one. The absence of a resettlement plan implies that not only the families living 
in these villages have not received any compensation, but also that the timing and place of 
their relocation has not been determined yet. 
 
Table 5.15 Status of R&R villages as at 31-05-2011 
 Tot. no. 
of 
villages 
affected 
No. of 
villages 
notified 
No. of 
villages 
socio-
economic 
survey 
completed 
No. of 
villages 
socio-
economic 
survey 
published 
No. of 
villages 
draft plan 
scheme 
submitted 
No. of 
villages 
draft 
plan 
scheme 
approved 
Draft 
plans to 
be 
prepared 
East 
Godavari 43 43 43 43 43 43 2 
West 
Godavari 29 29 29 29 26 6 3 
Khammam 205 205 205 92 2 2 203 
Total 277 277 277 164 71 51 208 
Source: Status of R&R villages as on 31-05-2011, website of the Commissioner of R&R, Government of 
Andhra Pradesh (www.aprr.gov.in) 
 
Table 5.16 Status of R&R centres as at 31-05-2011 
 No. of R&R centres 
contemplated 
No. of Centres R&R 
land Acquired 
Balance land to 
be acquired 
East Godavari 40 4 36 
West Godavari 35 22 13 
Khammam 205 3 202 
Total 280 29 251 
Source: Status of R&R centres as on 31-05-2011, website of the Commissioner of R&R Government of 
Andhra Pradesh (www.aprr.gov.in) 
 
The creation of the resettlement centres is also behind schedule, as can be seen from 
table 5.16: in East Godavari land has been acquired for only four centres out of 40, and in 
Khammam only for three out of 205. The situation is slightly more advanced in West 
Godavari, where 22 centres out of 35 have been acquired. As table 5.17 and 5.18 indicate, 
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the construction works have only started in ten centres in West Godavari, in four centres in 
East Godavari, and in three in Khammam. 
 
Table 5.17 Status of R&R Infrastructure as at 31-05-2011 
 No. of 
Centres 
Site 
marking Levelling Roads Water Electricity Others 
East Godavari 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 
West Godavari 22 10 10 5 7 8 - 
Khammam 3 3 3 - - - - 
Total 29 17 17 8 11 11 3 
Source: Status of R&R Infrastructure as on 31-05-2011, website of the Commissioner of R&R, Government 
of Andhra Pradesh (www.aprr.gov.in) 
 
Table 5.18 Status of R&R BPL housing units as at 31-05-2011 
 No. of Housing Units for Below 
Poverty Line (BPL) contemplated 
No. of BPL Housing Units 
completed 
East Godavari 4,235 358 
West Godavari 4,139 352 
Khammam 31,552 - 
Total 39,926 710 
Source: Status of R&R BPL housing units as on 31-05-2011, website of the Commissioner of R&R, 
Government of Andhra Pradesh (www.aprr.gov.in) 
 
The reason why West Godavari is ahead of the other districts in the implementation of 
the resettlement operations is that that the barrage of the dam and therefore the construction 
site is located in West Godavari, adjacent to Polavaram town. The villages located in the 
area therefore will be affected much before the project is completed and the reservoir is 
filled up. Accordingly, the relocation of the affected villages of the West Godavari district 
has been divided in three phases. The first phase includes seven ‘immediately affected’ 
villages (Devaragundi, Chegondapalli, Mamidigundi, Thotagondi, Singannnapalli, 
Ramayapeta, Pydipaka) whose relocation was to be completed as soon as possible 
(according to the plans, before June 2008). The second phase of relocation involved four 
villages (including Tutigunta) and was to be completed by June 2009, while the third phase 
involved 13 villages (including Koruturu and Sirivaca) and was to be completed by June 
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2010.   
However, at the time of my fieldwork (between April and July 2009), relocation 
appeared far from completion even for the villages of the first phase. Only the resettlement 
centre for Devaragundi had been completed; houses were still under construction in four 
centres (respectively for Totagundi, Singanapalli, Chegondapalli and Mamidigundi), and 
works had not started yet for Ramayapeta and Pydipaka. Paradoxically, the villagers of 
Ramayapeta would have been the only ones keen to relocate quickly, as their houses were 
being seriously damaged by the bomb blasting which was taking place at the dam work site. 
The situation in Khammam is opposite to that in West Godavari: the villages in 
Khammam are the farthest from Polavaram and will be the last to be submerged. Given the 
slow pace at which the construction of the dam is advancing, their resettlement is not 
planned for the near future. 
More generally, the delay in the resettlement operations is not surprising, given the cost 
overrun experienced by the project and the increasing financial constraints faced by the 
state government (see section 5.2.4). Eventually, it will be the availability of financial 
resources that determines the timing of the resettlement operations. 
The fact that the project is still far from being completed somewhat mitigates the 
concern caused by the delay in the construction of the resettlement centres. Nevertheless, 
delays and uncertainty still raise issues in terms of the efficacy, the transparency and the 
fairness of compensation and resettlement.  
First, they increase the insecurity (and the feeling of powerlessness) in which the 
affected people already live. It was clear that uncertainty concerning the timing and 
modalities of compensation and relocation was a major element of distress for the families 
affected by the Polavaram project whom I interviewed. In most cases, not only did they 
have no idea of when and where their relocation was going to take place but they also 
showed little knowledge of how much money they were to expect as part of the 
resettlement package. During the survey, when asked whether they were aware of the 
existence of a “Resettlement and Rehabilitation package” (meaning the allowances to 
which people are entitled beyond compensation for the expropriated land and house, see 
table 5.14) and of its content, they all invariably replied ‘no’. The answer here must not be 
interpreted literally, i.e. as meaning that they did not know anything about the package (as 
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‘no’ was also the answer in the villages which in fact had already received these 
allowances), rather as the sign that the respondents considered themselves ignorant with 
respect to what they were entitled to. 
Second, delays and uncertainty can also lead to paradoxical situations and waste of 
resources. As mentioned above, the resettlement centre for Devaragundi was ready at the 
time of my fieldwork in 2009 and in fact it had been officially inaugurated in 2008 by the 
Joint Collector of West Godavari. Its construction had also attracted the interest of the local 
media, as it had been presented as the ‘model’ for the future resettlement centres to be built. 
Yet, in June 2009 only three families were living there, while the rest of the villagers were 
refusing to move.121 Of the three families, one had started a business selling bricks to the 
government for the construction of the resettlement houses, while the other two had moved 
to be closer to the land that they had received as compensation, and which they had started 
to cultivate. One year later, not only had the large majority of the villagers yet to move, but 
many had also rented out their houses in the resettlement centre to non-affected families 
(Indian Express.com 2010).   
Third, delays and uncertainty can have detrimental effects on the use of the monetary 
compensation paid to the affected families. If the affected families face binding budget 
constraints, any additional inflow of cash is likely to be spent for everyday consumption, 
emergencies or social expenses (typically dowries). The propensity to save the money, in 
order to invest it in a new livelihood after relocation, is likely to be smaller the further in 
the future and the more uncertain relocation is. Details on how this attitude was displayed 
by the Polavaram affected people are provided in section 7.3.3. 
Fourth, delays in the construction of the resettlement centres -and therefore in 
relocation- often come with delays in the payment of the monetary compensation due to 
each family. The documents made available on the website of the Commissioner of R&R 
do not specify how many families have already been granted their compensation, whether 
in land or in cash. The information which I gathered during fieldwork was also incomplete 
and non-systematic. The internal government documents indicated that the money to be 
paid to each family for the R&R package had been calculated for all the affected villages in 
West and East Godavari (as an illustration, table 5.19 provides the details of the R&R 
                                                           
121  The refusal to move was being used by the villagers to increase their bargaining power in the 
negotiation of the benefits paid within the R&R package with the Government; see below in the text. 
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package benefits estimated for three affected villages in East Godavari). It was however not 
indicated if and where the actual payment had taken place or when it was planned; similarly 
I found no clue of what was happening with the payment of compensation for the 
expropriated land (and houses). More revealing was the information that I collected through 
my visits to the affected villages. Of the 19 villages that I visited, only seven had already 
received some form of monetary compensation. Of these, five (i.e. Chegondapalli, 
Ramayapeta, Pydipaka, Mamidigundi and Devaragundi) were among the seven 
‘immediately affected’ villages, for which relocation was supposed to take place in the 
following months. It was not surprising then to find that these villages had already received 
the compensation for their lost land and houses, and the amount due for their R&R package. 
What was surprising, rather, was to find that none of the villages in East Godavari had 
received any form of compensation yet, but that two villages in Khammam had 
(Rudramkota and Vinjaram), although only  for land. In the case of Vinjaram, it had been 
the political influence of the local non-tribal big farmer (owning more than 200 acres of 
land, of which 100 were of assigned land) that had facilitated the early payment (already in 
2005) of compensation. During my visit to Vinjaram, I had a brief meeting with the farmer 
in question, during which he expressed his disappointment at the low price paid for the land 
expropriated and remarked that it was insufficient to repurchase an equal plot of land 
somewhere else. I did not collect direct evidence to verify whether the same had occurred 
in Rudramkota, but the fact that in the village there is at least one large non-tribal farmer 
suggests that this might have been the case. It was however evident that the early payment 
of only compensation for land had further increased inequality within these two villages. 
The landowners had received a (sometimes considerable) sum of money for a plot of land 
which they were still cultivating, while the landless families had not received anything. The 
unequal relations underpinning the agrarian structure in AP were therefore being deepened 
(rather than corrected) by the payment of land compensation. 
Finally, delays in the resettlement operations and in the payment of compensation 
reduced the accountability and the ability to monitor the whole process. It becomes more 
difficult to guarantee that the operations are carried out evenly across all the villages and 
that everywhere they respect the criteria established by the State R&R policy. Further, it is 
to be expected that the attention of the media and public opinion will fade over time, and 
with it the incentives for the government to carry out the process responsibly.  
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Table 5.19 R&R package benefits for the project affected families; all figures in INR 
Village Name 
Tot 
families 
(survey) 
House 
Constru
ction 
Cattle 
Shed 
Construct
ion 
   
Transport
ation 
Wage 
to 
labourers 
Subsistence 
allowance 
Special 
package 
for 
tribals 
Total 
amount 
Kondamodalu  241 9.36m 225,000 1.20m 9.28m 3.38m, 3.46m 26.9m 
Talluru 100 4m 156,000 500,000 3.28m 1.52m 3.07m 12.5m 
Kegunduru 52 2.08m 60,000 260,000 920,000 798,720 1.44m 5.56m 
Source: Indira Sagar Project. R&R package benefits for the project affected and displaced families. Internal 
Document, R&R Officer Indira Sagar Project and Project Officer, ITDA Rampachodavaram. 
 
 
5.6.  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has served to introduce the case study on the basis of which a key 
hypothesis of this thesis is investigated. The hypothesis argues that resettlement can be 
configured as a process of adverse incorporation, whose outcomes and modalities are 
affected by the characteristics of the population to be resettled and of the areas involved, 
where characteristics cover the socio-economic features, as well as the agrarian structure, 
labour relations and the historical processes underpinning their current status.  
In particular, the chapter described the main features of the Polavaram dam project, 
drawing particular attention to the disputes that it arises and the negative effects it will have 
on the affected population. It emerged that large part of the problematic aspects of the 
project depend on the fact that the submersion area is safeguarded by the Fifth Schedule of 
the Indian Constitution and the majority of the affected people belong to SCs and STs. How 
these characteristics operate in affecting the performance of the resettlement operations will 
be further discussed in chapter 6 and 7. 
Finally, the chapter examined resettlement in Polavaram, looking at its policy and legal 
framework of reference, as well as its state of implementation. This examination allows 
some considerations on the conformity of the PRRP with the aforementioned policy and 
legal framework, as well as a preliminary assessment of its performance. 
First, the evidence provided so far thus suggests that resettlement in Polavaram 
conforms to the existing legal and policy framework, acknowledges that displacement 
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implies the disruption of livelihoods and accounts for (some of) the provisions of the Forest 
Rights Act. However, not all the clauses of the Forest Rights Act are equally complied with, 
as is the case of the pending forest community rights in Polavaram. Moreover, the 
construction of the centres and all the other resettlement operations (including payment of 
compensation) are behind schedule, increasing the uncertainty and the unfairness of the 
process. There is little transparency on the actual payment of monetary compensation and 
an inconsistent attitude is found in the publication of information on the state of 
advancement of the resettlement operations: data are provided on the construction of the 
resettlement centres, but not on the effective payment of compensation and of the other 
allowances.  
 
Before concluding, two points need to be noted. First, the construction of the Polavaram 
dam is still a work in progress, its date of completion is still uncertain and the resettlement 
process has just started. This of course has methodological implications in terms of how the 
case is investigated, and these issues were dealt with in chapter 4. Secondly, since it is still 
in the first stages of realisation, the Polavaram dam project provides a rare opportunity to 
investigate the resettlement process from its very beginning. In addition, as a still rather 
unknown instance of development-induced displacement, it is to be hoped that in the future 
more research will be devoted to its exploration. 
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Chapter 6 
Adverse Incorporation and Surplus Labour in Andhra Pradesh 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
In chapter 3 it was argued that resettlement of people displaced by development projects 
adversely incorporates them into development in economic, political, socio-cultural and 
spatial terms, and that all these dimensions contribute to determine the failure of 
resettlement in preventing impoverishment. It was also claimed that the way in which this 
takes place depends on context-specific structural factors. In this chapter, this theoretical 
argument is applied to the case-study, with the intent of analysing displacement and 
resettlement of the Polavaram affected people through categories of analysis drawn from 
political economy. The analysis which follows needs a few forewords to be fully 
appreciated.  
First, displacement and resettlement still haven’t taken place in Polavaram, although 
some of their effects are already at play. As a consequence, it can’t be fully observed yet 
how adverse incorporation happens as a consequence of these phenomena. This is 
particularly true for the economic dimension of incorporation (which has to do with the 
concrete expropriation of material assets), less so for the other dimensions. For instance, it 
is already possible to observe how political incorporation is taking place through people’s 
consultation concerning the resettlement operations.  
In other words, the application of the framework to the case-study equates to a ‘quasi ex-
ante’ analysis. However, its intent is explanatory and not predictive: it aims at explaining 
what are the structures and mechanisms which turn resettlement into a process of adverse 
incorporation. The framework drawn in chapter 3 used certain categories of analysis to 
explain how adverse incorporation takes place as a consequence of displacement and 
resettlement. What this chapter does, is verifying the existence and the relevance of these 
categories of analysis, clarifying what are the structural factors which are liable of affecting 
the consequences of displacement and the performance of resettlement. Then, in chapter 7 
it will be shown how these structural factors interact with the shortcomings of the 
Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package (PRRP) in making of resettlement a 
process of adverse incorporation.  
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Further, it must be noted that the theoretical framework is not empirically explored to its 
full extent in this thesis. This is true in three senses. In the first sense, the chapter focuses 
on the economic dimension of incorporation and provides only a preliminary analysis of the 
political, socio-cultural and spatial dimension. In the second sense, the categories of 
analysis developed in the theoretical framework are only partially observed empirically. For 
both cases, the reason is that I conducted fieldwork before developing the aforementioned 
framework. As a result, the collection of primary data and the design of the survey were not 
focused on these categories of analysis, so that my primary data allow to say little on the 
current status of rural relations in the Polavaram affected area. To compensate, the picture 
is reconstructed drawing from evidence at the national and state level. This still allows the 
identification of three key mechanisms which characterise surplus labour and are likely to 
turn resettlement into adverse incorporation. Third, for reasons of space and focus, the 
notion of accumulation by dispossession is explored only at the Indian level, but dropped at 
the other levels of analysis. It is left to future research the task to explore the relevance of 
this notion for the Polavaram dam.    
 
6.2  Displacement, resettlement and the economic dimension of incorporation in 
Polavaram 
 
Displacement expropriates people of their means of production and reproduction and 
alters the terms of access to them, as such is usually accompanied by livelihoods disruption. 
Resettlement adversely incorporates displaced people in economic terms when it takes 
place in a situation where agriculture does not guarantee sustainability and subsistence, 
particularly to small and marginal farmers, and economic development is not able to create 
remunerative and secure employment for everyone. In this context, neither cash nor land 
compensation enable people the restore the disrupted livelihoods or create new ones, with 
the result that they are turned or further pushed into surplus labour. Surplus labour was 
defined in chapter 3 as labour in excess of the existing means of production, engaging in a 
variety of employment and self-employment activities which can only guarantee 
subsistence. These activities are often underpinned by exploitative labour relations, limiting 
the worker's freedom to leave the contract. They also belong to the realm of the informal 
sector and are therefore casual, temporary and unorganised. Thus, being part of surplus 
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labour means being adversely incorporated into capitalism. 
In order to investigate displacement and resettlement in Polavaram using this framework, 
this section verifies the relevance of surplus labour, which is the key category of analysis, 
for the case study. Moreover, it highlights what are the structures and mechanisms which 
underpin the production of surplus labour in the case study. In chapter 7 it is shown that 
these structures and mechanisms (i.e. the ‘structural factors’) contribute to turn resettlement 
into a process of adverse incorporation. 
The investigation is conducted at three levels of analysis: India, Andhra Pradesh (AP 
henceforth) and Polavaram. 
At the Indian level (section 6.2.1) it is examined the relevance of the categories of 
surplus labour and accumulation by dispossession, looking at of the role of both in the 
context of postcolonial capitalist development in India. Moreover, the key features 
displayed by surplus labour in India are identified, and key structural factors for its 
(re)production are identified in the existence of ‘social structures of accumulation’, the 
conditions of the agrarian sector and the characteristics of the strategy of capitalist 
development adopted by the country.  
At the level of AP (section 6.2.2), we show that the rural sector is characterised by the 
existence of a pool of surplus labour composed of small and marginal farmers and 
agricultural wage labourers, primarily belonging to SCs and STs. The two main forces 
which have been driving the production and reproduction of surplus labour are the inability 
of the growth strategy to create enough remunerative employment, and the processes of 
transformation which have underpinned the agrarian sector in the past decades.  
The lack of employment creation is reflected in the three mechanisms underpinning 
surplus labour in AP: landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings and casualisation of 
labour. The processes of transformation in the agrarian sector are characterised by the role 
played by social structures of accumulation, in particular caste and gender, in regulating 
social and labour relations (see figure 6.1).  
Finally, at the level of the case-study, (6.2.3) the focus is brought on the characteristics 
of the Polavaram affected people. Drawing from primary data, their social composition, 
sources of livelihood and type of engagement with the labour market are described. It is so 
demonstrated, on one side that the affected people’s livelihoods will be disrupted by 
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displacement, on the other that they are exposed or embedded into to the structures and 
mechanisms which underpin the production of surplus labour in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Figure 6.1 Structures and Mechanisms underpinning the reproduction of surplus 
labour in Andhra Pradesh 
  
 
6.2.1.  Accumulation by Dispossession and Surplus Labour in India 
 
Investigating resettlement as adverse incorporation meant linking its outcomes to the 
dynamics of capitalism requiring displacement. This operation allowed us to identify in 
accumulation by dispossession and surplus labour the key aspect of capitalist development 
which affects the outcomes of resettlement. That this framework indeed is relevant and 
appropriate to assess the case study explored in this thesis is demonstrated by the fact that 
accumulation by dispossession and surplus labour constitute two of the most significant and 
problematic features of capitalist development in India. 
The notion of accumulation by dispossession has acquired a certain prominence in the 
most recent literature on economic development in India in reference to the spread of 
Special Economic Zones in the country (Menon and Nigam 2007; Banerjee-Guha 2008; 
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Levien 2011), but also to dam construction (Roy 1999; Whitehead 2003; Nilsen 2008; 
Naidu and Manolakos 2010). However, accumulation by dispossession in the form of 
development-induced displacement is far from being a novel feature of Indian postcolonial 
capitalism, in fact it has been one of its recurrent elements (Perspectives 2008; Samaddar 
2009). 122  Dam-building in particular has been emblematic of the postcolonial Indian 
development strategy and indeed of the whole narrative of evolution of the Indian State 
from a past of colonial backwardness to a future of progress and modernity.123 In his speech  
celebrating the inauguration of the Nangal dam in 1954, Nehru famously defined dams as 
the ‘temples of the new age’ (Klingensmith 2007: 254), while Mahalanobis recommended 
for the second five-year plan to build dams and factories (i.e. to heavily invest in capital 
goods) to create employment and safeguard the country's economic and political 
independence (Guha 2007:208). In short, dams represented the willingness and the ability 
of the State to trigger a process of structural transformation of the economy in a 
‘developmental’ direction (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Klingensmith ibidem) through a 
scientific approach to planning (Nilsen ibidem). This development strategy, as pointed out 
by Nilsen (ibidem), was pursued through the dispossession of the productive resources from 
the subaltern social groups and their concentration in the hands of the dominant proprietary 
classes (i.e. industrial capitalists, rich farmers and the politico-bureaucratic elite, see 
Bardhan 1998) through state-led initiatives.  
This strategy also entailed the systematic unequal distribution of its costs and benefits, to 
the disadvantage of the subaltern classes, particularly Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 
Scheduled Tribes (STs). These groups have historically experienced cultural, political and 
spatial marginality, which has translated into their repeated defeat in the struggle for access 
                                                           
122 For reasons of space, we leave out of the analysis the role played by strategies of primitive 
accumulation under British Colonialism. It is worth recalling, however, that many of the contemporary 
environmental conflicts and resource shortages which afflict the country are the legacy of the extractive 
patterns of resource use (based on dispossession and changes in the resource ownership and management 
systems) adopted during the British rule. Gadgil and Guha (1993) argue, for instance, that colonial forest 
management, based on forest reservations for commercial uses, caused the impoverishment of the tribal 
populations living in the areas (the relationship between tribal livelihoods, the forest and forced eviction has 
been explored in chapter 5 in reference to AP). D'Souza (2006) claims in fact that the ecological rupture 
instigated by colonial capitalism was functional to the perpetuation of specific economic, political and social 
relations. For instance, it affirmed itself in the Orissa Delta through a set of hydraulic interventions (including 
the Hirakud Dam) which turned the delta from a flood-dependent agrarian regime into a flood-vulnerable 
landscape, thus increasing the capacity of the British rule to control and dominate it.  
123 According to Klingensmith (ibidem), dam-building after Independence was informed by a specific 
political culture and was explicitly pursued as a symbol of the conquest of nature and progress, of the modern 
state and of its empowerment and achievement. 
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to resources. Gadgil and Guha (1995) describe this process as a systematic transfer of 
resources (through dispossession) from the category of the ecosystem people (those who 
directly depend on the environment to meet their basic needs) to that of the omnivores 
(made up of urban consumers, industry and large farmers, politicians and bureaucrats). The 
systematic transfer of resources from the marginal groups to the dominant proprietary 
classes also signals that the aforementioned development strategy has been enabled by the 
Indian specific structure of power relations, which is driven by inequalities of caste and 
ethnicity before class, and by the embeddedness of market relations in forms of authority 
derived from these inequalities. 
Development projects inducing dispossession and displacement have not lost their 
importance in contemporary Indian capitalism. Mining and dam projects are still considered 
essential for the provision of energy, irrigation and raw material required to sustain an 
elevated rate of growth and of capital accumulation (Naidu and Manolakos 2010). More 
generally, economic growth is advancing in the country relying on a wide range of 
displacement-inducing activities (urban renewal, Special Economic Zones, transport 
infrastructure building, and commercial foresting, accompanied by environment and 
wildlife conservation projects), aiming to make resources available to corporate capital 
often through the intervention of the state (Badhuri 2008; Perspectives 2008; Levien 2011) 
The inability of capitalist accumulation to securely and productively employ the 
dispossessed people – i.e. the creation of surplus labour through accumulation by 
dispossession, is consistent with another key feature of the modern Indian economy, 
namely the existence of a massive pool of workers engaged in subsistence activities within 
the informal sector. In 2004-05 in the country there were 94 million working poor (Mehta 
et al 2011). These workers are unskilled and poor, and the labour arrangements in which 
they engage are regulated by social institutions. According to Harris-White, the existence of 
this pool of workers with the characteristics mentioned is one of the distinctive features of 
Indian capitalism (Harris-White and Gooptu 2001; Harriss-White 2003). Harriss-White 
refers to the phenomenon as the ‘unorganised sector’, while here we prefer using the term 
‘surplus labour’ to emphasise its redundancy with respect to the mainstream economy, 
namely the fact that the expanding Indian labour force is in excess of its means of 
production (and therefore of employment). 
For the purpose of our analysis, some features of the phenomenon need to be highlighted. 
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First, as also noted in chapter 3, surplus labour in India cuts across the rural and the 
urban sectors and employment and self-employment arrangements. Diversification of 
livelihoods is pursued as a coping strategy, so that the boundaries between wage workers 
and direct producers are loose and unstable (Ramachandran 2011). There is also a thin 
distinction between free and unfree labour arrangements, where a free worker is intended as 
one who can sell his labour power to the employer of his choice (ibidem). Constraints to 
workers’’' freedom come from their excess supply, but also from the persistence of bonded 
and neo-bonded labour relations. Mosse (2007) and Breman (1996), for instance, show that 
mobilisation of rural labour occurs primarily through mechanisms of neo-bondage based on 
debt as an instrument of coercion. Typically, workers are recruited in their own villages by 
brokers, to whom they tie themselves in exchange for a cash advance and with the promise 
of supplying labour power when and where needed.124  
Second, as widely documented by Harriss-White (1996, 2003, 2005), labour relations in 
India are regulated by non-market institutions (i.e. ‘social structures of accumulation’), 
such as caste, ethnicity, religion and gender. These structures are underpinned by unequal 
power relations which pervade, and are reproduced through, labour relations. To the extent 
that markets are “sites of relationships of control over people” (Harriss-White 1999: 271), 
access to the labour market (and the terms of involvement in it) is determined by non-
contractual relations which are built on those social institutions and take the form of 
relations of patronage-clientelism, neo-bondage and brokerage.125 Similarly Breman notes 
that in India “[s]ocial ties based on other principles than class solidarity play a leading role 
in the articulation of identities in the informal sector milieu. Caste and faith operate as 
signposts in seeking and finding work” (2001:4820). 126  Therefore, social structures of 
accumulation define the boundaries of the contracts in which labourers can engage, de facto 
constraining their freedom and favouring their exploitation. In this sense, they support the 
reproduction of surplus labour.  
                                                           
124  Breman (ibidem) argues that neo-bondage differs from the ‘old’ debt relations for its more de-
personalised and monetised character, and for the removal of the duty of the moneylender (or the broker) to 
provide protection and subsistence.   
125 Brokerage is intended here as the establishment of links of mediation between the State and private 
development institutions such as banks and public works contractors, government schemes for housing and 
employment, etc.). Upper castes and classes increasingly rely on them to achieve political, electoral and 
financial gains (Mosse ibidem: 22). 
126 Breman also argues that such identities (especially gender and localities), far from being forms of 
false consciousness, also permit collective action (ibidem). 
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Third, the transformations experienced by agriculture and more generally by the rural 
sector in the past twenty years in India have played a key role in alimenting the pool of 
surplus labour and shaping its characteristics. The crisis which has been affecting the sector 
since the early 1990s (the literature on the topic is extensive, see for instance Reddy and 
Mishra 2009; Deshpande and Arora 2010), together with the neoliberal reforms adopted in 
the same period, have not substantially affected the rate of capital accumulation in 
agriculture, but have contributed to make peasant agriculture unprofitable 
(Vakulabharanam 2005; Taylor 2011). As a result, processes of rural differentiation have 
polarised the sector between commercial and corporate farming on one side, and a 
peasantry composed of marginal farmers and landless labourers facing a crisis of social 
reproduction on the other (Le Mons Walker 2009; Lerche 2011; Taylor ibidem). This 
agriculture-related crisis of social reproduction is another of the defining characteristics of 
surplus labour in India. The fourth and final point on this topic is that the existence of 
surplus labour is in contradiction to the existence of underutilised capacity and to the good 
growth performance of the Indian economy in the past decade. The unsatisfactory rate of 
employment creation and labour absorption has been pinpointed as one of the major 
shortcomings of the development strategy adopted by the country (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2002; Bino et al 2009; Kannan and Ravendran 2009), and the main challenge to 
poverty reduction (Ghose 2004; Mehta et al ibidem).  
In relation to our discussion, this contradiction reinforces the hypothesis advanced in 
chapter 3 that the existence of a link between the characteristics of capitalist accumulation 
in one given context, and the modalities and outcomes displayed by accumulation by 
dispossession. In a situation of sustained economic growth, the Indian economy is 
repeatedly resorting to accumulation by dispossession to overcome the barriers encountered 
by capital expansion, while being unable to absorb the existing and the newly created 
surplus labour (Sanyal 2007; Battacharya 2010; Levien 2011). It is suggested here (and left 
for future research) that investigating the role played by accumulation by dispossession in 
Indian capitalist development can explain some of the dysfunctional outcomes of the 
country’s development, and in particular the reasons for the production and reproduction of 
surplus labour.  
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6.2.2.  Rural sector, agrarian crisis and surplus labour in Andhra Pradesh 
 
This section shows that the rural sector of AP is characterised by the presence of a 
growing pool of surplus labour, which takes the form of landless families, small and 
marginal farmers, and casual labourers. In this way, it demonstrates the relevance of the 
category of surplus labour for the analysis of the case-study. The section reveals that the 
two main forces which have been driving the production and reproduction of surplus labour 
are the low rate of job creation in rural and urban areas and the processes of transformation 
which have underpinned the agrarian sector in the past decades. Thus, the section also 
shows the structures and mechanisms which characterise the phenomenon and are liable to 
turn resettlement into a process of adverse incorporation. 
 
6.2.2.1.  Employment in the rural sector 
 
One of the main factors driving the production and the reproduction of surplus labour in 
rural areas is the poor performance in employment creation recorded by the State in both 
rural and urban areas since the 1980s. Between 1983 and 2004-05 overall employment in 
the state grew at a rate lower than the average for all India: 1.75% for AP versus 2.04% for 
all India. Besides, the rates of growth of both rural and urban employment declined from 
the pre-reform period (1983 to 1993-94) to the post-reform period (1993-94 to 2004-05): 
from 2.32% to 0.72% in rural areas and from 3.82% to 1.87% in urban areas (see table 6.1). 
In the post reform period, the growth of total agricultural employment was negative, at -
0.29% (CESS 2008). Growth of employment in rural areas has slightly recovered in recent 
years (it was 1.24% between 1999-2000 and 2004-05), but it is still lagging behind the rate 
at the all-India level (which was 2.43% for the same period). 
The causes of these low levels of employment creation in urban areas lie in the sectorial 
structure of the economy and in the process of growth undertaken by the state in the past 
decade. First, the secondary sector, and in particular, manufacturing, has been traditionally 
underdeveloped in AP, unlike  neighbouring states such as Tamil Nadu (Alivelu et al 2010). 
Its growth performance even worsened from the 1980s to the 1990s: the growth rate of 
industry went from 7.36% to 6.2% between the 1980s and the period 1993-94 to 2000-01 
(Rao and Dev 2003). Considering the importance of manufacturing for employment 
creation, it is not surprising that few jobs were created in urban areas in the 1990s.  
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There has been a recovery of the sector in recent years: the growth rate was 7.11% 
between 2000-01 and 2004-05 for the whole sector and 7.73% for manufacturing (CESS 
2008). Furthermore, the share of contribution of the secondary sector to GSDP has 
increased over time, from 19% in 1980-81 to 24% in 2004-05. The same has happened to 
the share of employment in manufacturing, which went from 9.2% in 1993-94 to 10.9% in 
2004-05. These trends are encouraging, but the proportions are still too low for the 
requirements of the country in absolute terms (in terms of employment creation and in 
terms of creation of an adequate demand able to absorb the services offered by the growing 
tertiary sector). 
 
 
Table 6.1 Growth and Elasticity of Employment in Andhra Pradesh and India 
 Andhra Pradesh India 
Growth Period Rural Urban All EE Rural Urban All EE 
1983 to 2004-05 1.5 2.81 1.75 0.305 1.73 3.07 2.04 0.361 
1983 to 1993-94 2.32 3.82 2.59 0.437 2.03 3.03 2.25 0.431 
1993-94 to 2004-05 0.72 1.87 0.95 0.166 1.44 3.11 1.84 0.314 
1993-94 to 1999-2000 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.056 0.62 2.28 1.02 0.159 
1999-2000 to 2004-05 1.24 3.82 1.76 0.289 2.43 4.12 2.83 0.495 
Note: Growth is CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate); EE is employment elasticity. 
Source: CESS 2008; rates computed on the base of various NSS Employment and Unemployment Survey 
data. 
 
The second reason for the low level of employment creation is found in the employment 
elasticity of growth in the post-reform period, particularly in the years 1993-94 to 1999-
2000, and if compared to the all-India average (see table 6.1). The unsatisfactory capacity 
of the growth process to create employment in AP is mainly due to the fact that in the past 
15 years it has been driven by tertiary activities, and in particular the Information 
Technology (IT) sector, which is characterised by a low employment absorption. Andhra 
Pradesh is one of the main contributors to the growth of the IT sector in India: Hyderabad is 
a major destination for IT companies and the state ranks fourth in software exports from 
India, after Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Most of the sector’s expansion has 
occurred since 1996-97, as demonstrated by the number of jobs created since then: 4500 
workers were employed in IT in the state in 1996-97, while the figure had increased to 
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187,450 jobs ten years later (CESS 2008). This considerable growth performance is, 
however, negligible if compared to the total workforce of the state and its characteristics: in 
2004-05 only 0.21% of the total labour force was employed in the IT. Also, the jobs created 
are concentrated in urban areas and require educated and skilled workers. For these reasons 
it seems unlikely that a growth process primarily based on the IT sector can re-activate 
employment creation and solve the problem of the working poor, particularly in rural areas. 
The low rate of job creation in urban areas and in the secondary and tertiary sector has 
not been compensated by a sustained growth of employment in agriculture. With 73% of 
the state population still living in rural areas in 2001 (GoAP 2011) and 15 years of poor 
growth performance of the sector, the inability to create jobs has led to the formation of a 
pool of redundant, unskilled and unproductive employed and self-employed agricultural 
workers. 
Indeed, in 2004-05 agriculture still employed the majority of the population (i.e. 58.5%), 
having declined by just 8.6 percentage points since 1993-94, when it was 67.1% (NSSO 
1997 and 2006).  
 
Table 6.2 Percentage distribution of rural persons by household type,  
Andhra Pradesh 
 Household type 
RURAL 
Self-employed in 
Agricultur
al labour 
households 
Other 
labour 
households 
Others 
Total 
(including 
n.r.) 
Agricult
ure 
Non-
agricult
ure 
All 
1993-94 31.4 14.8 46.2 39.4 8.4 6 100 
1999-2000 28.2 14.1 42.3 43.1 6.7 7.9 100 
2004-05 28.4 17.3 45.7 35.7 9.6 8.9 100 
2007-08 26.1 16 42.1 37.2 10.7 10.1 100 
Source: various rounds of NSSO Employment and Unemployment Survey data. 
 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the composition of this workforce and of its evolution 
since the early 1990s. It shows that in 2007-08 less than half of the rural workforce was 
self-employed (42.1%) and agricultural labour was the first source of employment (37.2% 
of the households). 
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It had already been highlighted in chapter 5 that the high share of agricultural labourers 
of the total workforce is one of the most striking characteristics of the employment 
structure in rural areas of AP. Similarly, it had been noted that the share of casual labour 
(employed and self-employed) of total rural workforce is higher in AP than at the all India 
level (see table 5.10) 
The data in table 6.2 indicate that the share of agricultural labourers increased in the 
post-reform period (1993-94 to 1999-2000), together with a decrease in employment and 
self-employment in non-agricultural activities. As self-employment in agriculture also 
diminished, the increase in the share of agricultural labour was the result of the incapacity 
to create employment opportunities outside farming in rural areas: People engaged in wage 
labour because they were unable to find other sources of employment. This incapacity was 
primarily the result of the lack of public expenditure in agriculture and on rural areas in the 
1990s . No support was given to the development of off-farm activities such as dairy and 
livestock rearing; investment in services and infrastructure almost disappeared and 
traditional rural industrial activities like handloom weaving and beedi making further 
declined (Rao and Dev 2003, Government of Andhra Pradesh 2004; Dev 2007; CESS 2008; 
Taylor 2011). 
The data in table 8.2 also suggest that changes in the structure of rural employment have 
been taking place in more recent years: the share of agricultural labour in fact declined 
again after 1999-2000 and that of employment in non-agricultural activities increased. 
However, it is hard to assess at this stage whether these fluctuations are indicative of an 
effective improvement in the capacity to create employment in rural areas or, rather, an 
evolution of the composition of surplus labour, for at least two reasons. The first and more 
obvious reason in that the data in the table also show a reverse of these trends between 
2005-05 and 2007-08, which therefore need to be confirmed by more recent data.  
Second, changes in the shares of the different employment categories in the period under 
examination (1993-94 to 2007-08) have been accompanied by oscillations and a tendential 
increase in unemployment in both rural and urban areas (see table 8.3).127 The increase was 
mostly evident in 2004-05, when the share of agricultural labourers was the smallest, and 
the share of self-employed was the highest. Analogously, there are indications that the 
                                                           
127 The rate of unemployment in urban areas according to the usual status, weekly status and daily status 
was respectively 3.7%, 5.1% and 8.6% in 1993-94 and 4%, 5.2% and 7.9% in 2004-05.  
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number of days of employment available to workers has been declining in AP 
(Ramachandran 2011). A survey conducted in the villages of Ananthavaram (South Coastal 
Andhra), Bukkarchela (Rayalaseema) and Kothapalle (North Telangana) found that 
respectively 37%, 47% and 33% of the manual workers had worked for less than 180 days 
in the previous year (Ramachandran et al 2010), suggesting that the number of working 
days available to workers is rather low in all the regions of AP. Thus, the decrease in the 
share of agricultural labourers might have been driven by an absolute increase in the 
number of unemployed persons rather than by an increase of off-farm employment.  
 
Table 6.3 Unemployment rates in rural areas of India and Andhra Pradesh 
according to usual, weekly and daily status128 
 Andhra Pradesh India 
 1993-94 1999-2000 2004-05 2007-08 1993-94 1999-2000 2004-05 2007-08 
Usual Status 0.8 1 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.2 
Current 
Weekly Status 2.7 3.9 3.8 3.1 3 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Current Daily 
Status 6.3 8.1 10.9 8.6 5.6 7.1 8.2 8.4 
Source: various rounds of NSSO Employment and Unemployment Survey data. 
 
Finally, the high incidence of casual and agricultural wage labour needs to be 
understood in light of the performance of agriculture in the past two decades and of the 
transformations experienced by the rural sector in the same period. This analysis, 
undertaken in the next sections, will reveal that wage labour is increasingly undertaken by 
rural households as a coping strategy and as the earning activity of last resort. 
 
6.2.2.2.  Agrarian Crisis in Andhra Pradesh 
 
The performance of agriculture in AP has been unsatisfactory since the early 1990s: the 
growth rate of agriculture has decelerated over the last 15 years, and agriculture’s share of 
GDP has gone down, while the proportion of people dependant on it has remained more or 
                                                           
128
 The reference period for the usual status is 365 days. Unemployment is traditionally low or non-
existent in India, especially according to the usual status. The increase in the rate of weekly and daily 
unemployment, which record both chronic and intermittent unemployment are indicative of the increasing 
casualisation of labour in rural areas. 
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less stable. 
In particular, the growth rate of aggregate agricultural output has declined from 3.4% per 
year in the 1980s to 2.3% in the 1990s (GoAP 2004). Growth of Total Factor Productivity 
in agriculture was also low in the 1990s, especially if compared to the national level: during 
that decade it was 1.3% for all India and 0.8% for AP (World Bank 2003). Between 1993-
94 and 2005-06 the sector's output grew at 2.7% per year, but most of the growth was due 
to the good performance of the livestock sector, which in the same period grew by 8.4%, 
while the crop sector grew by a mere 0.9% (CESS 2008).  
 
Table 6.4 Growth rate of gross state domestic product of Andhra Pradesh at 
constant (2004-2005) prices (percentage change over previous year) 
Sector 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 (R) 
2008-09 
(P) 
2009-10 
(Q) 
2010-11 
(A) 
Agriculture Sector 6.12 1.97 17.38 1.97 1.09 8.39 
Agriculture 7.89 2.12 22.95 -0.68 -2.15 8.74 
Livestock 3.99 0.35 9.16 7.25 9.19 6.94 
Forestry and logging 3.80 1.69 2.22 2.40 2.65 2.75 
Fishing 3.46 5.05 15.82 3.40 -0.35 12.88 
Industry Sector 10.05 17.60 10.87 1.51 7.10 7.79 
Service sector 11.04 12.48 10.30 8.26 7.20 9.61 
Gross State Domestic 
Product 9.57 11.18 12.02 5.02 5.79 8.89 
R: Revised, P: Provisional, Q:quick, A: Advanced. 
Source: Socio-economic survey 2010-11, GoAP. 
 
Since 2005-06, the sector has shown signs of recovery but also of great instability, as it 
can be seen from table 6.4. In fact, the high rate of growth of agricultural output (i.e. the 
crop sector) in 2007-08 followed by two years of negative growth suggest that its 
performance is still highly dependent on the monsoon, while the livestock sector keeps 
playing an important part in the overall performance of agriculture.  
The most extreme and dramatic manifestation of the agrarian sector’s poor performance 
was the wave of farmers’ suicides which hit AP and certain other Indian states. Suri (2006) 
reports that according to official statistics, there were 8,900 suicides by farmers between 
2001 and 2006 in the four states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra. 
The phenomenon was particularly strong in AP where it reached its peak in the summer of 
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2004, with more than 400 peasants committing suicide between May and June. Similar 
episodes had already taken place in 1987-88, 1997-98, and 2000, but the phenomenon had 
been limited to farmers growing specific crops such as cotton, tobacco and chillies. The 
wave of suicides in 2003-2004 by contrast related to different crops, districts and agro-
climatic zones of the state. Between 1998 and 2006, 4403 farmers committed suicide 
(Galab et al 2009). These were mainly males in the age group of under 40 years and 
belonging to BCs, SCs and, to some extent, to STs. The incidence of the phenomenon was 
also higher among small and marginal farmers attempting to move from subsistence 
agriculture to high value crops (CESS 2008).  
The farmers’ suicides indicate on the one hand the hardships of the process of rural 
differentiation, and on the other, the fact that liberalisation policies have turned small and 
marginal farming into an unprofitable and risky activity. This last point becomes 
particularly evident upon examination of the proximate causes of the suicides.  
All the studies which have investigated the proximate causes of farmers’ suicides have 
identified the triggering factor as the high level of indebtedness (see for instance Rao and 
Suri 2006, and the review in Galab et al 2009). A high level of debt exposure, particularly 
towards informal sources, is indeed a major problem of the rural economy of AP. 
According to the Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness (GoI 2007), in 
2003 in AP 82% of the farmer households were indebted, with an average loan per 
household of Rs 23,965. Not only was the value of the average loan almost double the all-
India figure, but the share of indebtedness was the highest of the country (NSSO 2005). 
Andhra Pradesh was also the state with the highest reliance on non-institutional sources 
(including for classes of large size of land holdings): 68.6% of the debt was from non-
institutional sources in 2003, and more strikingly, 53.4% was from money lenders. The 
incidence was higher among small and marginal farmers (up to 83% for farmers with a land 
holding smaller than 0.01). 
Both the high level of indebtedness and the widespread recourse to non-institutional 
sources of credit were caused, to a substantial extent, by the neo-liberal economic reforms 
implemented in AP in 1996.129 These included the reform and privatisation of the banking 
                                                           
129  AP was the first among the Indian states to implement a neo-liberal reform agenda, and also the first 
to act under the aegis of the World Bank, through the World Bank's Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring 
Project-APERP (Galab et al ibidem; see also World Bank 1997). Since then the State has been considered at 
the forefront of the liberalisation process and indeed a ‘model’ for other States. 
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sector, which resulted in the decrease in provision of institutional credit to agriculture 
(Galab et al 2009).130 
The decrease in access to institutional credit occurred when farmers would have needed 
it the most, to counteract the increase in the cost of farming caused by the same economic 
reforms. A number of factors combined to make farming more expensive: in the first place 
the generalised decrease or disappearance of support to input access, alongside a neglect of 
research and extension. Subsidies for fertilizers were reduced, power tariffs were increased, 
and other agricultural services, such as seed supply, soil conservation and market 
information were inadequately provided. The elimination of input subsidies and input 
market liberalisation were particularly damaging for small and marginal farmers. In fact, 
the latter had been replacing traditional crops with input-intensive commercial crops (such 
as cotton, sugar cane and oilseeds) since the Green Revolution (Taylor 2011), thus 
increasing their dependence on subsidised inputs.  
The reduction in public expenditure also caused a decline in capital formation and 
investment in infrastructure, particularly in irrigation. The share of agriculture and allied 
activity in state government expenditure under various plans declined from 11.8% in 1980-
81 to 1.8% in 2001-02. Rao and Suri (ibidem) show that, when compared with other states, 
Andhra Pradesh had the lowest share of agriculture spending in total plan expenditure till 
2002-03 (3% in AP as compared to 7% in Karnataka and 5% at the all-India level). Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in agriculture as a share of total GFCF went from 13.83% 
in 1985-86 to an average of 6-7% in the 1990s (Galab et al ibidem). The growth rate of 
private investment also declined, from 5.2% in the 1980s to -1.7% in the 1990s (CESS 
2008). Not surprisingly, the area under irrigation also declined in the same period: from 
27.8 lakh hectares in the mid-1950s it had increased to 43.5 by the end of the 1980s, but 
during the 1990s it declined to 37.1 lakh hectares (CESS 2008).  
The overall effect of the decline of public investment in irrigation was not only a 
slowdown in productivity, but also an increase in the burden of the overall costs of farming 
on single farmers. The latter were forced to supplement the lack of public investment in 
irrigation with risky private investment. In particular, they sought alternative individual 
routes to water provisioning, which were found in the digging of borewells. Today 
                                                           
130 Between 1990 and 2004 the number of rural commercial bank branches in the state went from 2644 
to 2400. Also the share of agricultural lending on total commercial bank credit declined from 80% in 1993-94 
to 50% in 2002-03 (Galab et al 2009). 
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borewells serve as the main source of irrigation in 15 districts of the state. A survey of the 
Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS) of Hyderabad found that 26% of the 
farmers had invested in borewells. The highest share was found among large farmers 
(46.7%), followed by the medium farmers (34.5%), small farmers (23.6%) and marginal 
farmers (14.1%). The incidence was higher in South Telangana, followed by Rayalaseema 
and South Coastal Andhra (CESS 2008).  
The heavy reliance on borewells for irrigation had dramatic effects. Many of the wells 
failed, because of the overexploitation of groundwater, accentuated by the low rainfall level 
and the unstable monsoon which characterise AP. According to the aforementioned survey, 
56.1% of all the investment in borewells was lost due to the  wells drying up. The loss was 
higher in Telangana and Rayalaseema, which are regions characterised by poor rainfall and 
little surface irrigation. Most of the farmers, lacking public support in the form of 
infrastructure and credit, had contracted debt with moneylenders to dig or deepen their 
wells. The widespread failure of the wells led many farmers into a debt spiral which in the 
most dramatic cases ended with the farmer’s suicide. Indeed, all the studies investigating 
the wave of suicides in AP reported indebtedness for digging a well as the most common 
cause of contracting a debt. (Suri 2006, Rao and Suri 2006, Galab et al 2009). 
Finally, the increase in the cost of farming was accompanied by an increase in the 
volatility of the prices of most commercial crops (Galab et al 2009), and in some cases by 
their decline (Vakulabharanam 2005), as a result of the trade liberalisation which came with 
the package of economic reforms. This substantially contributed to reduce the profitability 
of farming, especially for small and marginal farmers, who are more exposed to the 
volatility of prices. 
It was claimed at the beginning of this section that one of the main driving forces behind 
surplus labour in AP has been the transformation experienced by the rural sector in the past 
two decades. This transformation has been characterised on one side by a bad growth 
performance of the sector, and on the other, by processes of differentiation of the rural 
population, and in particular, of the peasantry. Both these phenomena have been heavily 
influenced by the neoliberal economic reforms implemented by the state during the 1990s. 
In particular, these reforms have directed most of the burden of the transformation of the 
sector onto the shoulders of small and marginal farmers, so that the latter were more 
heavily affected by the bad growth performance. In this sense, and as argued by Lerche 
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(2011), the agrarian crisis has been highly class specific. Even after agricultural growth 
took off again in the state, the processes of rural differentiation continued to be 
characterised by a growing number of small and marginal farmers in distress 
(Vakulabharanam 2005; Taylor 2011). Thus, the high incidence of agricultural labour noted 
in section 8.2.2.1 is not only the outcome of the inability to create off-farm employment, 
but also of the necessity to supplement farming with other sources of income. The next 
section discusses two other phenomena indicating the expansion of the class of small and 
marginal as a result of a regressive process of differentiation. These phenomena are 
fragmentation of landholdings and increase in tenancy. 
 
6.2.2.3.  Fragmentation of landholdings and increase in tenancy 
 
Fragmentation of landholdings can be seen as both a cause and an effect of agrarian 
distress. It is an effect to the extent that land is for many farmers the only asset which can 
be leveraged to acquire liquidity in times of emergencies. Repeated crop failures and crisis 
of profitability associated with heavy indebtedness can force farmers to sell their land. It is 
also a contributing cause of distress  because increasingly fragmented landholdings are not 
by themselves sufficient to guarantee subsistence. The demographic growth experienced by 
the state in the past decades has certainly contributed to increase the pressure on land and 
therefore to its fragmentation. However, the growth rate of population has been slowing 
down in the past decades, going from 24% in the decade 1981-91, to 14%  in the decade 
1991-2001 and 11% in the decade 2001-2011 (CESS 2008 and Census of India 2011). 
The distribution of land in AP has significantly changed in the post-Independence era, 
moving towards an increase of the share of holdings at the bottom of the distribution. As 
shown by table 8.4, marginal holdings represented 38.6% of the total holdings in 1955-56, 
56% in 1990-91 and 61.6% in 2005-06. The corresponding shares for small holdings were 
18.3%, 21.2% and 21.9%. Not surprisingly, the share of medium holdings decreased from 
16.7% to 4% in the same period, and that of large holdings from 8.7% to 0.5%. The change 
in the share of operated area by these size classes followed a similar pattern. 
It was noted in chapter 5 that the fragmentation of landholdings is particularly visible 
among SCs and STs, also in confirmation of the relatively disadvantaged position that they 
occupy in rural society. The substantial increase in the SC and ST population in the state 
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has certainly contributed to the process. The 2001 census data suggest that both the number 
and the percentage of SC and ST in the state had increased in the decade 1991-2001, 
following a pattern already started in the 1960s (see table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.5 Percentage distribution of operational holdings by size class, 1956-2006 
 
Share in Number of Holdings Share in Operate Area 
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(ha) 
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1955-56 38.6 18.3 17.7 16.7 8.7 7.9 9.7 16.1 28.1 38.2 2.43 
1970-71 46.0 18.5 17.4 12.7 4.3 8.0 11.3 19.2 30.8 30.7 2.51 
1976-77 46.6 20.3 17.4 12.2 3.4 9.3 12.8 20.8 32.3 24.8  
1980-81 49.3 20.9 16.0 9.1 2.1 13.1 16.2 23.3 28.7 18.7 1.94 
1985-86 54.2 20.8 15.2 8.0 1.8 14.5 17.3 24.0 27.3 16.3  
1990-91 56.0 21.2 14.5 6.9 1.3 16.4 19.6 25.2 26.1 12.8 1.50 
2000-01 60.9 21.9 12.3 4.3 0.6 21.6 24.8 26.4 19.8 7.5 1.25 
2005-06 61.6 21.9 12.0 4.0 0.5 22.7 25.8 26.5 19.0 6.1 1.20 
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad. 
Note: Marginal: 0 to 1 hectare; Small: 1 to 2 hectares; Semi-medium: 2 to 4 hectares; Medium: 4 to 10 
hectares; Large: 10 and above hectares. 
 
Table 6.6 Percentage of SC and ST population on  
total population in Andhra Pradesh, 1961-2001 
 SC ST 
1961 13.8 3.7 
1971 13.3 3.8 
1981 14.9 5.9 
1991 15.9 6.3 
2001 16.2 6.6 
Source: CESS 2008 
 
However, the caste-oriented connotation of landholding fragmentation also suggests that 
the phenomenon has strong historical roots. Its other main contributing factor in fact is the 
insufficient rate of land redistribution and restitution to SCs and STs. This in turn is the 
outcome of the poor performance of land reforms implemented since Independence, which 
on the one hand have favoured the transition to agrarian capitalism, removing those 
inequalities that had been hampering productivity (Le Mons Walker 2009), and on the other, 
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have crystallised the caste articulation in the countryside and its relation to land 
(Srinivasulu 2002).  
The first wave of land reforms implemented in AP included the abolition of 
intermediaries, tenancy reforms and ceiling legislation.131 These measures were successful 
in creating a certain homogenisation of the upper landed castes and in reducing the 
differences between the landlords and the rich farmers. The landless SCs and STs however 
benefited only marginally from this first attempt at land redistribution, which in practise 
contributed to reinforce the process of polarisation of agriculture between a capitalist sector 
and a non-capitalist one. More recently, a second round of land redistribution has been 
attempted, with more convincing results. For instance, the government has assigned surplus 
land to the landless poor, with 43.21 lakh acres distributed to 23.98 lakh beneficiaries, of 
whom 24% where SC and 28% were ST. However, the total land redistributed until 2002 
represented only 29% of the total 20 lakh acres of estimated surplus land. (GoAP 2004). 
As this brief account of the failed attempts at land reform suggests, rural differentiation 
has occurred in AP in conjunction with the persistence of unequal land distribution and 
unequal agrarian relations based on caste. Poor households belonging to SCs and STs over 
the years have marginally benefited from the capitalist transformation of agriculture. 
Instead, today they still constitute the bulk of surplus labour, that is, of small and marginal 
farmers and wage labourers. 
It was previously claimed that the fragmentation of landholdings in AP can be 
understood as both a cause and an effect of agrarian distress, which also has a strong 
historical connotation rooted in the unequal social relations underpinning the rural society. 
Another transformation affecting the structure of landholding shares these same 
characteristics. This transformation is the increase in tenancy observed in the state, and the 
evolution of the same in two directions: on one side towards fixed-cost competitive rents 
paid in cash (present for instance in South Coastal Andhra, see Ramachandran et al 2010), 
and on the other, in the direction of a reinforcement of the ‘tied harvest’ system. The latter 
                                                           
131 The Madras Estates Act of 1948 was the first legislation to remove intermediaries, bringing all land 
in Andhra under the ryotwari system, while intermediaries in Telangana were abolished through the Abolition 
of Jagirdari Act of 1949. As concerns tenancy, the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was 
enacted in 1950 to give protection to tenants, then followed by the AP (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act of 1956 
(amended in 1970). This legislation has had a mixed result and it has often led to concealed tenancy. 
Legislations imposing ceilings on landholdings were passed in 1961 and in 1973 with the Andhra Pradesh 
Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agriculture Holdings) Acts (Ramachadraiah and Venkateswarlu 2011). 
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is based on the advancement of a sum of money by the moneylender (who is possibly also 
the landlord or the lessor) to the renter to pay the rent or purchase inputs, in exchange from 
the renter of a fixed amount of crops at a fixed (devalued) price (Vakulabharanam 2005; 
Taylor 2011). The terms of the contract change according to who is the renter and who is 
the lessor, with smaller and poorer renters facing more disadvantageous conditions 
(Ramachandran 2011). The increase in tenancy among small and marginal farmers at 
disadvantageous conditions and through interlocked contracts is to be interpreted as a 
further sign of the crisis of profitability at the bottom of the land distribution, and of the 
inexistence of opportunities for livelihood diversification outside agriculture.  
 
6.2.2.4.  Wage labour in rural Andhra Pradesh 
 
Agricultural (casual) wage labour complements the livelihoods of the small and 
marginal farmers who can no longer live of farming alone. In this sense, it is a consequence 
of the agrarian crisis described in the previous sections, and of the obstacles encountered by 
farmers to livelihood diversification. However, wage labour is also a social relation which 
has been shaped by the action of the social structures of accumulation mentioned in section 
6.2.1 and investigated in India by Harriss-White (2003).132 These structures (which in fact 
operate as identities), caste and gender in particular, have historically been regulating the 
labour market in AP and still play an important role in the reproduction of surplus labour.  
The bulk of agricultural wage labour in AP is constituted by landless SCs, as a result of 
the historical evolution of agrarian relations. Traditionally agricultural wage labour has 
been associated with landlessness. In AP, and in particular in the Telangana region, the 
entrance of SCs into wage labour was determined by the abolition of bonded labour and the 
decline of their traditional artisanal activities. Traditional extra-economic and exploitative 
forms of extraction of labour and goods were widespread in certain parts of AP until the 
1970s. The phenomenon was particularly relevant in Telangana, where landlords were still 
resorting on vetti, a pre-capitalist form of labour exploitation based on the Hindu jajmani 
arrangement, a system of relations of mutual dependence between different castes 
according to their occupation and the ensuing position in the agrarian society.  
                                                           
132 But see also Olsen (1996) for an exploration of rural social relation in AP which focuses on the role 
of local power structures in regulating markets. 
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The persistence of these forms of labour exploitation triggered in certain areas of the 
state the emergence of agrarian struggles based on mobilisation along class lines. The most 
extreme expression of these struggles was the spread of the Naxalite movement in North 
Telangana in the late 1960s, although forms of resistance were also carried out by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in the two following decades. These struggles 
were successful in eliminating vetti. The abolition of the latter constituted an improvement 
of agrarian social relations in the sense that it freed SCs from a bondage which justified 
their exploitation by the landlord. However, it also deprived them of the norms of mutual 
dependence and cooperation implicit in the jajmani system and of the patronage network 
attached to it, at a time when agrarian relations were being progressively commodified. As 
a consequence of the Green Revolution, in fact, industrial products were increasingly 
entering rural markets, making redundant the traditional artisanal production of these items. 
These artisanal activities, such as handloom weaving and leather work, were typically 
carried out by SCs, in particular by the Madiga (the most numerous SC of Telangana) and 
the Malas (which are prevalent in Coastal Andhra). With the elimination of vetti and the 
decline of traditional activities, most of the rural SCs had to enter the agricultural wage 
labour market (Srinivasulu 2002). 
The transition to capitalist labour relations in agriculture however did not eliminate 
bonded labour arrangements, but just substituted the traditional forms of bondage with 
forms of neo-bondage. The resilience of these arrangements has been widely documented 
in different areas of AP and extending to sectors other than farming (see da Corta and 
Venkateswarlu 1999; Olsen and Murthy 2000; Venkateswarlu 2003; Chakravorty 2004; 
Srivastava 2005; Garikipati 2008). All the studies report that these forms of neo-bondage 
retain the interlocking of the labour contract with a debt relation and often with the sale of 
output to a predetermined devalued price (the already mentioned ‘tied harvest’). Circuits of 
seasonal migration are also often part of these agreements. 
Far from being in contradiction with capitalist development, unfree and (neo) bonded 
labour arrangements are functional for capitalist farmers facing an increase in the cost of 
farming, typical of more advanced stages of agrarian capitalist development (see Brass 
1994; da Corta and Venkateswarlu 1999; Olsen and Murthy 2000). Neo-bondage 
arrangements in fact guarantee secure, cheaper and more disciplined workers and therefore 
help restoring profitability.  
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The increasing feminisation of agricultural (free and unfree) labour found in AP is 
another way in which social structures of accumulation favour the reproduction of surplus 
labour while constraining its freedom. The state has the highest female work participation 
rate of the country, for both rural and urban areas. According to NSSO data, in 2004-05 
48.5% of women in rural areas were participating in the labour force (the corresponding 
figure at the all India level was 33.3%). 
However, micro studies have revealed that the entrance of women in the agricultural 
labour market has a limited impact on their empowerment within family relations and on 
their material well-being, and is instead characterised by high levels of exploitation (da 
Corta and Venkateswarlu 1999; Chakravorty 2004; Garikipati 2008). When women enter 
the labour market in fact they do so to replace men who are moving from wage labour to 
better jobs. This dynamic on one side widens the gap between men’s and women’s income, 
on the other it guarantees to landlords and capitalist farmers that the pool of cheap surplus 
labour is continuously replenished. Further, the substitution of men with women occurs 
also within bondage arrangements: wives substitute husbands in the contract and the burden 
of the repayment of the debt is passed on to them. Da Costa and Venkateswarlu (1999) 
found that in 1995 a higher percentage of female than male labourers was tied (68% of 
female versus 56% of male), while in 1970 the opposite was true (83.8% of male versus 
77.5% of female).133 The wage rate paid to women was found to be structurally lower than 
that paid to men (Garikipati 2008), in a context where the growth rate of real wages has 
declined for both men and women (Vakulabharanam 2005; CESS 2008). 
The downgrading of agricultural wage labour to unprofitable occupation for the “weaker” 
groups of society is also confirmed by the co-opting of children into the process. 
Venkateswarlu (2003), for instance, reports that 450,000 children in the age group of 6 to 
14 years are employed in cottonseed fields in India, of which 247,800 in AP particularly in 
the Telangana and Rayalaseema regions. We have already mentioned in chapter 5 that AP 
has one of the highest rates of child labour in the country, and we also noted there how this 
fact contrasts with the official low rates of income poverty. In the context of this discussion 
it provides further evidence of the distress experienced by rural households.  
 
                                                           
133 The results are based on a survey carried out in two villages and 12 surrounding hamlets in Chittoor 
District in the Rayalaseema region of AP. The survey collected information from 99 women and 97 men 
belonging to 50 households. 
220 
6.2.3. The livelihoods of the Polavaram affected people: a snapshot  
 
This section provides an overview of the livelihoods of the Polavaram affected people, 
describing their socio-economic characteristics and the economic activities in which they 
are engaged. The discussion relies on primary and secondary data. The primary data were 
generated through the survey which complemented the choice experiment, while the 
secondary data come from internal government documents to which I had access. For both 
types of data a few clarifications are needed.  
First, it must be remarked that it was not possible to use the two official surveys of the 
affected population (Reddy's report of 1996 and Vol II of the 2005 EIA), as they were not 
available in their entirety. The internal government documents documenting the process of 
payment of compensation and resettlement constitute a richer source of information. Up-to-
date and detailed information on the socio-economic characteristics of the affected 
population are in fact required for the estimation of the right amount and type of 
compensation for each displaced family. Many of the benefits granted by the AP R&R 
policy and therefore by the PRRP are contingent upon the beneficiary family being above 
or below the poverty line, and having as primary source of income farming on their own 
land, agricultural wage-labour or non-agricultural self-employment. A new survey was 
therefore implemented by the Joint Collector Office134 at the district lever for generating 
this information. By the 31st of May 2011 all the affected villages had been surveyed, and 
the results of the survey had been published for all the settlements except for 113 villages in 
Khammam, which in fact is lagging behind with the implementation of the resettlement 
operations.  
However, the new round of surveys was still running at the time of my fieldwork, 
between April and August 2009. Besides, the government officials whom I visited were 
reluctant to share all the details of the resettlement operations.135 As a consequence, I could 
only collect scattered pieces of information from these surveys, and only for the East and 
West Godavari Districts. This section uses this information when possible, and 
                                                           
134 Districts in India are administrated by the Collectors, which are assisted by Joint Collectors. The AP 
Resettlement & Rehabilitation Policy establishes that the Joint Collector as the institution responsible for the 
administration and implementation of resettlement operations relative to each single project at the District 
level. 
135  The government of AP seems to have adopted a more transparent attitude towards resettlement 
operations, as demonstrated by the creation of a website for the Commissioner of Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation. The website contains information on the state of advancement of resettlement for the main 
irrigation projects implemented in the state. 
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complements them with primary data. The latter were generated through a survey which 
was conducted during fieldwork in the Polavaram affected area and was described in 
chapter 4. The survey was originally designed to complement the choice experiment and 
focused on basic socio-economic characteristics. As land and labour relations were not 
explored, the data available are quite static and are used in a descriptive way to provide a 
snapshot of the life of the Polavaram affected population. The fact that the sample used is 
not random, also excludes the possibility of commenting on the distribution of the 
characteristics of the sample population. 
Despite their limitations, the two sources of data used together still reveal that the 
displaced population experiences the same processes described in the previous section at 
the state level and confirm that the large majority of families is affected by poverty, 
marginality and vulnerability.  
 
6.2.3.1. Social composition of the survey villages  
 
For the purpose of the survey and the choice experiment I visited 19 villages during 
fieldwork. Of these, four are located in West Godavari, (Ramayapeta, Chegondapalli, 
Tutigunta, Pydipaka), three in East Godavari (Kondamodalu, Talluru, Kegunduru), and 
eight in Khammam (Lacchigudem, Rudramkota, Aghra Koderu, Sabari Kothagudem, 
Vinjaram, Gundala, Bovanagiri, Totapalli). Four more villages (Devaragundi, Mamidigundi, 
Koruturu, Sirivaca), all located in West Godavari, were visited for the preliminary focus 
groups, but no survey was implemented there. The over-representation in the sample of 
villages from the Khammam and West Godavari districts is due to the fact that two thirds of 
the affected population are concentrated in Khammam District, and therefore it seemed 
sensible to include more villages from this district; the villages in West Godavari were of 
particular interest because they will be the first to be submerged and therefore among the 
first to be resettled.  
 Tables 6.7-6.9 report the social composition of these villages and show that twelve of 
them had a majority ST population, three had a majority of SC population and in three the 
majority of the population belonged to Backward Castes (BCs) or. Other Castes (OCs).  
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Table 6.7 Social composition of the villages and families below the poverty line  
(West Godavari District, Polavaram Mandal) 
Village 
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Devaragundi 114 96.5 0 0 0 110 114 100 0 0 0 
Mamidigundi 161 86.3 1 1 0.6 137 159 98.8 1 1 0.6 
Sirivaca 82 98.8 0 0 0 78 79 96.3 3 3 3.7 
Chegundapalli 291 83.9 0 0 0 243 290 99.7 1 1 0.3 
Ramayapeta 489 96.9 20 20 4.1 11 11 2.3 443 458 93.7 
Tutigunta 219 98.6 45 46 21 124 126 57.6 47 47 21.5 
Pydipaka 483 86.1 166 172 35.6 1 1 0.2 249 310 64.2 
Koruturu 160 98.1 0 0 0 137 140 87.5 20 20 12.5 
Total   
 (29 affected 
villages in WG) 
4,363 95.0 428 439 97.5 2,456 2,587 94.9 1,255 1,337 93.9 
Source: “Statement showing the particulars of ST and SC project affected families including unmarried, major 
sons for sanction of I.A.Y. of the category of B.P.L. involving Indira Sagar (Polavaram) project in the 
habitations of Polavaram Mandal, West Godavari District as on 22.06.2009”  
*Below Poverty Line 
 
Table 6.8 Social Composition of the villages  
(East Godavari District, Devipatnam Mandal) 
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Kondamo-
dalu 241 114 47.3 127 52.7 5 1 98 112 11 8 0 6 
Talluru 100 96 96 4 4.0 18 0 67 4 6 0 5 96 
Kegunduru 52 45 86.5 7 13.5 29 0 16 7 0 0 0 0 
Source: “R&R package, Indira Sagar (Polavaram) Project. Category wise abstract of project affected 
families”- 
 
 
From the villages visited, a sample of 167 families was selected. Of these, the majority 
belonged to STs (56%) and SCs (25%), and the rest (19%) to OCs. The STs found in the 
area and in the sample are the Koyas and the Konda Reddys, while the main SCs are the 
Malas and the Madigas.  
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Table 6.9 Social Composition of the villages (Khammam District) 
Village 
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Vinjaram 290 1,037 0 0 0 178  61.4 78 BC 34 OC  38.7 
Bovanagiri 
(Alligudem) 125 425 121  96.8 0 0 0 4 BC  3.2 
Ayavaripeta 
(Totapalli) 128 618  600 97.1 0 0 0  
10 BC 
8 OC 2.9 
Gundala 97 310 1 2 0.7  127 41.0  128 BC 153 OC 90.7 
Aghra 
Koderu 308  286  92.9 6  2.0 
14 BC 
2 OC  5.2 
Sabhari 
Kotha Gudem 293 1,097 0  0 287  98.0 6 BC  2.1 
Lacchigudem 113  111  98.2 1  0.9 1 OC  0.9 
Rudramkota 186  3  1.6 100  53.8 50 BC 33 OC  44.6 
Source: fieldwork household survey, village questionnaire. 
 
The majority of the respondents were men (73%); literacy rate for the sample as a whole 
was 48%, lower than the adult literacy rate at the AP level (CESS 2008, on the grounds of 
Census 2001 data). The data disaggregated by gender indicate that 51% of the women 
interviewed were literate, while only 43% of the men were. This data contrasts with the 
reality of facts suggested by estimations at the state and district level for AP, which indicate 
that literacy is higher among men than women (according to the Census 2001, respectively 
65.7% of adult men and 42.5% of women were literate). This discrepancy is most likely 
due to a bias in the selection of the participants to the survey. In most cases the family 
approached was left free to indicate who should answer to our questions; it is likely that 
when a woman was chosen, it was exactly in reason of the fact that she was literate. The 
literacy rate among the tribal respondent was 38%, more in line with the Census estimation, 
according to which in 2001 37.1% of the STs was literate.   
 
6.2.3.2. Poverty level and consumption of durable goods 
 
The greatest majority of the Polavaram affected population is poor: government sources 
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indicate that 94% of the affected families are below the poverty line (see table 5.1). For the 
sample villages located in the West Godavari district, estimations of the headcount poverty 
ratio are available (see table 5.13), and indicate that the greatest majority of the habitants 
are poor (the maximum is 98.78% for Sirivaca and the minimum is 83.85% for 
Chegundapalli). These percentages may appear excessive, yet they are compatible with and 
justified by the socio-economic profile of the affected population, which lives in evident 
conditions of vulnerability and marginality.136 
 
Table 6.10 Three less frequently and three most frequently 
 owned consumption goods 
3 less frequently owned goods 3 most frequently owned goods 
 No. of families 
owning at least 1  
Mode*  No. of families 
owning at least 1  
Mode* 
Land phone 5 1 Bed 164 2 
Fridge 10 1 Chair 141 2 
Sewing 
Machine 
16 1 Sleeping 
mat 
118 1 
*The most frequent value of the number of items owned for each good, excluding the 0 values . 
 
A direct estimate of the level of income or consumption poverty of the Polavaram 
affected population on the basis of primary data was not attempted.137 However, the survey 
collected information on the ownership at the family level of basic durable consumer goods. 
This information provides an indication of the pattern of consumption of the survey 
families. Table 6.10 reports the three most frequently and the three less frequently owned 
items. While the greatest majority of the families owned at least one bed, one chair and a 
sleeping mat, only a small minority could afford more expensive goods such a fridge, a 
sewing machine or a land phone. However, 104 families did own a TV and 66 a mobile 
phone, 77 had a bike and 26 a motorbike. These data become more revelatory if intersected 
with those on the families who had already received some cash compensation (see table 
                                                           
136
       The documents that I could examine do not describe the methodology adopted to estimate the rate of 
poverty, therefore it is difficult to comment on their reliability. However, given that the government has to 
provide a higher compensation to families below the poverty line, it is unlikely that these estimates have been 
exaggerated on purpose. 
137
      The reasons for this choice are discussed in chapter 4 
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6.11). Indeed, the greatest majority of the total goods owned by the sample as a whole was 
in the hands of the families who had already received compensation. This was most 
strikingly the case of land phones (100%), motor-bikes (96%), mobile phones (83%), 
fridges (80%) and bicycles (76%). These data are consistent with what argued in chapter 7 
concerning the fact that cash compensation tends to be used for the purchase of 
consumption goods rather than for productive investments by families with binding cash 
constraints; they also suggest that in the sample ownership of the most valuable 
consumption goods was possible only for those families who had already received some 
cash compensation, while those who had not benefited of this flow of money could not 
afford them.  
 
Table 6.11 Ratio of items owned by families having received cash compensation to 
items owned by the sample as a whole 
 
a) Tot. number of items 
owned by the sample as 
a whole 
b) Tot. number of items 
owned by the families 
having already received 
cash compensation 
Ratio of b to a  
(percentage) 
stools 196 143 73 
sleeping mats 151 95 63 
watch 91 64 70 
bicycle 86 65 76 
chairs 335 235 70 
mobile phone 75 62 83 
land phone 5 5 100 
fridge 10 8 80 
beds 445 294 66 
tv 104 69 66 
radio 20 10 50 
sewing machine 16 12 75 
mattress 54 38 70 
Motor-bike 26 25 96 
fan 143 99 69 
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6.2.3.3. Main sources of livelihood 
 
The relations of production and reproduction of the Polavaram affected people are 
deeply affected by the relationship with the surrounding environment. The typical 
livelihood is made of a combination of direct cultivation on a marginal plot of land, 
agricultural wage labour and collection of forest produce. The engagement with the market 
for the sale of the products farmed or collected is usually mediated by middlemen, who also 
provide credit.  
 
Land ownership and landlessness  
The majority of the Polavaram affected population is employed in agriculture, either as 
small or marginal farmer or as landless agricultural labourer. 
In the 29 displaced villages located in West Godavari, the total extent of land owned is 
4488 acres and 48% of it is operated by small and marginal farmers. There is a high rate of 
landlessness, with 44% of the affected families not owning land. Irrigation is practised only 
on 591 acres of the privately operated land, while 3719 acres are unirrigated and 75 acres 
are fallow. The most common means of irrigation is lift from river (69.5%), followed by 
well (16.6%), canal (10.2%) and tank (3.7%). Rice (paddy), pulses and tobacco are the 
main crops cultivated.138  
Landlessness is even higher in the 43 affected villages located in the East Godavari 
district: government sources139 indicate that 66% of the affected families are landless poor, 
and these are almost equally distributed between ST and non-ST. Indeed, around half of the 
total affected population in the district is tribal (51%) and half non-tribal (49%). Only 28% 
of the affected families own land, and of these the majority (61%) are tribal. From the same 
source, data are also available on landlessness at the village level. In the three villages of 
the district visited for the survey (i.e. Kondamadalu, Talluru and Kegunduru), landlessness 
was respectively 87%, 71% and 44% (see table 6.8). 
In the 19 villages included in my sample, the main economic activity was agriculture, 
often complemented by the collection of forest produce and in some cases by non-
                                                           
138  The source of the data relative to the 29 affected villages in West Godavari is the document “Brief 
Note on Indira Sagar Polavaram. Jangareddigudem division”. 
139
   The source of the data for the 43 affected villages in East Godavari is the document: “R&R package, 
Indira Sagar (Polavaram) Project. Category wise abstract of project affected families”. 
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agricultural activities. In fact, the majority of the respondents, independently of the social 
group, claimed to be engaged in agriculture, either as direct producers or as wage labourers.  
Of the 167 families in the sample, 90 owned land. Of these, 74% (i.e. 67 families) were 
either small or marginal farmers. Of the 22 semi-medium and medium farmers, the great 
majority, 19, were tribal, one was SC and two belonged to other castes. The only big farmer 
of the sample was also tribal, and claimed to own 25 acres. The bias in the distribution of 
land in favour of ST is not surprising, considering that the villages are located in the Fifth 
Schedule Area, where only STs are supposed to own land. Rather, the fact that in the Fifth 
Schedule Area a significant proportion of landholdings (27%) belonged to non tribals is 
indicative of the state of agrarian relations (and of the historical processes described in 
section 5.3.2).  
Landlessness was quite widespread in the sample, with 46% of the families not owning 
land.140 In particular, 40% of the tribals and 61% of the SCs were landless. Tenancy did not 
emerge as a particularly widespread phenomenon within the sample: only six respondents 
(belonging to five different villages) claimed to be renting land and only one to be leasing 
out land. However, these figures might not reflect the true picture, as the questionnaire was 
not designed to detect tenancy and did not explicitly ask for it. More significant is the 
proportion of families cultivating assigned land.141 A total of 33 families in fact claimed to 
be cultivating assigned land, of which 24 were tribal, five were SC and four either OC or 
BC. Of these 33 families, ten were landless, while the other 23 owned some other land. 
However, all of them claimed that they were not in possession of documentation proving 
the ownership of the assigned land. There is implication here in that they will not receive 
any compensation for the loss of this land. Interestingly, three additional families reported 
that they had been assigned land but that they were not cultivating it, despite all of them 
being landless. When asked why, they claimed that farming on that land was not 
sufficiently profitable. 
Given that the majority of cultivators in the sample were small or marginal farmers, it is 
not surprising to find that irrigation other than rainfall was practised only by a small 
                                                           
140 Yet lower than the share of landlessness at the State level, which according to the NSSO data was 
52.3% in 1999-2000.  
141  Assigned land is the land redistributed by the government to poor ST and SC families as part of the 
various land reform initiatives implemented throughout the last decades. The land redistributed was usually 
private surplus land (land above a legal ceiling established by the government) or excess or waste government 
land. 
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minority. Of 101 families cultivating land (either their own or assigned land), only 27 were 
adopting artificial irrigation, and in all cases, always in conjunction with rainfall irrigation. 
The most common means was lift irrigation, adopted by 14 farmers, of which ten were 
concentrated in three villages: Tutigunta (6), Vinjaram (2) and Pydipaka (2). Of the six 
farmers relying on irrigation from a water tank, five were found in the village of 
Lacchigudem. The remaining seven farmers obtained water from a tube/bore well or from 
the river (the latter was, for instance, the case for the only big farmer in the sample). These 
data suggest that artificial irrigation is concentrated in the few villages with available 
irrigation infrastructure.   
As concerns the main crops produced, these were pulses (black, red and green grams, 
dal), rice (paddy), chillies, and to a minor extent, oilseeds, cashew nuts, corn, wheat, cotton, 
tobacco. All the crops apart from cotton and tobacco were cultivated for both sale and self-
consumption.  
 
Engagement with the labour market 
As concerns the incidence of agricultural wage labour, 142  the survey found that it 
constituted either the main or an important auxiliary source of income for the majority of 
the households. Of the 90 families owning land in the sample, when asked about their main 
economic activities and sources of income, 39 also mentioned agricultural wage labour. 
This was also the case with the families claiming to have an alternative source of income to 
agriculture. Overall, 61% of the respondents reported wage labour as one of their main 
sources of income, although most of it was concentrated in three months per year. The 
average salary for agricultural wage labour in the area was reported to be in the region of 
Rs 50 per day for women and Rs 70 per men.  
In 25 cases (13.6% of the sample), an activity other than agriculture was mentioned as 
one of the main sources of income. For three of them this source consisted of a ‘petty shop’ 
complemented by either agriculture or gifts from preaching;143 for 13 it was a regular wage 
(mainly from employment in the public sector) and the remaining 4 were engaged in some 
other self-employment activity.  
                                                           
142 Called cooli in the area. 
143 i.e. the head of the family was a pastor. 
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Table 6.12 Details of income sources outside agriculture 
 OC BC SC ST Total 
Petty Shop 1  1 1 3 
Regular wage (e.g. teacher, anganwadi teacher, 
policeman, journalist, social worker, nurse) 1 1 4 8 14 
Self-employment  (e.g. rickshaw driving, a dairy 
business, fish sale business, tailor and carpenter) 1 1 4 1 4 
Village dhobi144  1   1 
Total 3 3 9 10 25 
  
Forest as a source of livelihood 
Of the 167 families interviewed, 132 (79%) declared that they regularly collected forest 
produce for both self-consumption and trade. This activity allows families to diversify the 
consumption basket and it also provides a small but certain flow of income. While the 
former is particularly important during the lean season, when no agricultural wage labour is 
available and many families exhaust their cash supplies, having access to free staple food 
can mean the only chance of survival in years of weak monsoon and bad harvest. The 
products most commonly collected are honey, tamarind, gum, soap-nuts, bamboo, beedi 
leaves and timber. They are either sold in local markets or consumed. Beedi leaves, which 
are used to manufacture cigarettes, are the most common product collected for sale, and 
they generate around Rs 1000 per year, for no more than 5 to 10 days of work.145 The most 
important product for everyday life collected from the forest is timber, which is needed in 
significant amounts for the construction of houses and tools and even more for fuel. 
Firewood was in fact the primary source of energy for all the families interviewed (only 
two families also mentioned gas as an additional source). Firewood is also sold in the 
market, at Rs 5 for a piece of bamboo and Rs 25 for a piece of wood. The aforementioned 
village survey conducted by the office of the Joint Collector also estimated the income from 
collection of minor forest produce. This information is available at the aggregate level for 
the 29 affected villages located in West Godavari. Surprisingly, the survey reports that only 
176 households were engaged in the collection of minor forest produce. The total value of 
                                                           
144 The Dhobi are a Hindu caste specialising in washing clothes. 
145 This is the amount reported by the respondents during the survey interviews, while Padmanabha Rao 
(2006) finds that among the displaced population each household earns Rs. 919 per year from the collection 
of minor forest produce. During the focus group in Devaragundi, the participants reported that with a half-day 
of work in the forest they collect products to the value of Rs 120. 
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the produce collected was estimated to be Rs 186,000,146 equating to Rs 1,057 per family. 
Of this amount, Rs 174,000 was income derived from the sale of the produce, and Rs 
12,000 was the value of the share which was consumed. These estimates are consistent with 
the findings of my own survey, with the exception of the unrealistically low number of 
families engaged and dependent upon the collection of forest produce.  Irrespective of the 
value attributed to the forest produce, acknowledging (or not) that the forest is a key source 
of livelihood for the majority of the Polavaram affected people has important implications 
in terms of compensation and resettlement. Many villages own teak, mango, coconut and 
palm trees, which are considered common property and provide an important complement 
to people’s diet during the lean season 
 
Credit-debt relations 
Finally, a few words need to be said on the presence of indebtedness in the sample. The 
survey did not contain any direct questions concerning indebtedness, nor was it aimed at 
investigating debt relations. Hence, no systematic evidence was generated on this issue; yet 
the existence of the problem emerged indirectly through people’s answers on the use of 
their crops (in one case it was transferred to the money lender) and the use of the cash 
compensation that they had already received from the Government (sometimes used to 
repay outstanding debts).   
 
6.3 Displacement, resettlement and the political dimension of incorporation 
 
Development-induced displacement and the resettlement of the population thereby 
forced to migrate can have a substantial influence on political processes of inclusion and 
exclusion at their different levels of articulation. As discussed in section 3.4, the adversity 
of the political incorporation manifests itself through the decision-making process 
concerning the construction of the project and the resettlement operations. The 
incorporation is adverse in the sense that decisions are imposed on those who bear their 
costs and the determination of the winners and the losers is driven by the will and power of 
the dominant proprietary classes. However, even when imposed, the decision-making 
                                                           
146 Supposedly per year, although this is not specified in the document. 
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process can instigate dynamics of participation, resistance and co-optation which intersect 
with each other and lead to unpredictable results. 
This section analyses some of these dynamics in reference to the case-study and attempts 
an assessment of the terms of political incorporation (whether adverse, inclusionary or 
exclusionary) of the Polavaram affected people triggered by displacement and resettlement.  
The analysis is preliminary and tentative, as the evidence from which it draws is limited. 
The latter consists on information collected (sometimes accidentally) through the survey, 
interviews and informal conversations that I carried out during fieldwork, as well as from 
newspapers articles.  
 
6.3.1 Decision-making about the dam as an exclusionary process  
 
At a first level, it can be argued that the process of political incorporation triggered by 
displacement and resettlement in Polavaram is adverse because the decision of building the 
dam has been imposed on the people who are going to bear its costs in terms of land 
expropriation. As mentioned in section 5.3.2, the government has been accused to have 
violated the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Area) Act of 1996 (PESA Act) by not 
lawfully consulting the Gram Sabhas concerning the land acquisition of the project, whose 
approval is required for expropriation of land for the purpose of development projects in the 
Scheduled Area. In the case of Polavaram, not only has the approval of the Gram Sabhas 
only been sought ex-post as a confirmation of a decision already taken, but in fact the 
affected people argue that this approval has never really been granted. They claim, in fact, 
that the mere participation of the representatives of the Gram Sabhas in a meeting with the 
Collector was held as a sign of consent and the minutes of that meeting as the official 
document stating it.  
Indeed, different sources suggest that the displaced-to-be population was informed of the 
decision concerning the construction of the dam after that this had already been taken and 
contextually to the notification of land expropriation. The notification was formally given 
by the government officers of the Revenue Department, namely the Revenue Divisional 
Officer (RDO) and the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO), when not directly by the team 
responsible for surveying land holdings and buildings for the purpose of valuing the 
properties to be expropriated (according to the AP R&R policy, the Revenue Department is 
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responsible for both land expropriation and house evaluation). 
This picture is confirmed by the data that I collected through the survey with the affected 
villages. To all the participants, the survey asked whether they were aware of the 
construction of the dam and of the fact that this would have led to their displacement. It 
also asked who had informed them about these facts. All the respondents declared that they 
were aware of the project and its consequences; the greatest majority confirmed that they 
had gotten the news from government officers (the MRO and RDO). Overall, only the 
village of Gundala resulted to have been neglected by the Revenue Department. Later I was 
explained that the submersion of this village was still uncertain, as it lies in the proximity of 
an important Hindu temple close to Badrachalam. In order to avoid the submersion of the 
temple, the government had promised to build an embankment which would also spare the 
village of Gundala. While the villagers did not seem to trust the government's promise, 
survey operations had still not been planned for that village.  
That these visits from government officials could not truly count as a consultation 
process, also stands the fact that when I asked the participants to the focus groups whether 
they knew why the dam was being built, I consistently obtained a negative answer. More 
significantly, I was often told that “nobody came to tell us”, as a confirmation of the fact 
that the transfer of information had only concerned land expropriation and displacement. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a political economy of dam construction, 
but even without an articulated discussion on the winners and losers from the Polavaram 
project, it is evident that the decision to construct the dam was the outcome of an 
undemocratic process. In this process, no space was given to the representation of the 
interests of the affected population, which in fact was made part of it only after a decision 
had been taken. So, if the analysis of the political dimension of the process only looks at the 
decision-making process concerning the dam construction, it is easy to conclude that the 
outcome has been adverse if not exclusionary for the affected people.   
However, if the analysis is extended to the resettlement process, the terms in which 
political incorporation took place through it become more articulated and more difficult to 
locate in the continuum of inclusion-exclusion. In fact, as described in the next paragraphs, 
in Polavaram resistance to the project has been replaced by resettlement as the main space 
of contestation. This shift has been characterised by the fading away of radical forms of 
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resistance to the project and the spread of a feeling of resignation among the affected 
population. Moreover, the space of contestation so created has two opposing aspects. On 
the one side, it presents episodes of negotiations between the affected people and the 
government, with the former wielding a real bargaining power. On the other, it is 
characterised by paternalistic and top-down attempts by the government to involve the 
affected people in the resettlement operations, in a way which may be thwarting 
endogenous forms of participation and articulation of the collective interests.  
 
6.3.2 Resettlement as a space of contestation 
 
As discussed in section 5.4.2, the design of the AP R&R policy was entirely driven by 
the government, with very little involvement of the civil society. This lack of involvement 
was particularly lamented by SAKTI and SAMATA, two NGOs based in Hyderabad and 
active at the state level on issues concerning tribal welfare and forest rights; their exclusion 
from the process of setting up the resettlement policy was therefore particularly indicative 
of the unwillingness of the Government to involve other stakeholders in the process. 
During an informal meeting that I had with Mr Sivaramakrishna, the director of  SAKTI, he 
gave me his account of the process of definition of the AP R&R policy. In his opinion, the 
government did not pursue any formal consultation with NGOs in the elaboration of the 
R&R guidelines, but it did seek and follow his advice in extending the definition of Project 
Affected People. Indeed, as described in chapter 5, the policy did go through a number of 
amendments after 2005 which extended the benefits to additional categories of 
beneficiaries or increased the monetary compensation paid. The primary evidence that I 
collected on the field does not allow to confirm or qualify the extent of Mr 
Sivaramakrishna' s influence on the government's decisions, but it does suggest that at least 
another factor is responsible for the amendments brought by the government to the policy. 
This factor is the pressure that some of the Polavaram affected villages managed to exert on 
the government in adjusting some aspects of the compensation and resettlement package. 
This pressure and the role it played need to be understood in relation to the 
contemporaneous shift observed in the affected population from openly resisting the project 
to accepting  it with resignation and engaging in negotiation with the government. This 
shift is better described in the following paragraphs. 
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In 2005, social unrest was spreading almost everywhere in the Polavaram affected area. 
Many villages had come to the point of prohibiting the entrance of the government officials 
and of the survey team, primarily to prevent the completion of the census operations needed 
for the estimation of land and house compensation. Bondla and Rao (2010) documented six 
forms of resistance implemented against the project between 2005 and 2007: rallies and 
dharnas; silent protests and submission of memorandums to government officials; 
organisation of forums and seminars on the issue; mass demonstrations involving eminent 
social activists; long marches to build solidarity and sensitise communities; relay hunger 
strikes. For instance, in early 2005 around 3000 tribals met for a rally at Chintoor (in 
Khammam district) with the intent of submitting the memorandum to the MRO. As the 
latter refused to meet them and receive the memorandum, the rally turned violent and 
eleven demonstrators were arrested. The latest event that the authors document is a public 
meeting organised by a tribal organisation (the Kula Peddala Ikya Vedika) in November 
2007. The meeting was attended by traditional political leaders from 60 tribal villages, who 
resolved to prompt their communities to oppose the project. 
However, when I visited the affected villages in 2009, I found very little evidence of this 
resolution to oppose the project and get organised about it. In fact, the predominant feeling 
seemed to be one of resignation. Although occasionally I met elder tribal men and women 
vehemently declaring that they would have rather sought shelter on the top of the hills 
rather than abandon the forest, the most recurring sentence that I heard from the people I 
questioned was “we don't want to go but we've to go, we have no choice”. This attitude 
emerged quite clearly in the focus groups that I held with eight affected villages. The major 
concern of people seemed to be that the government would in fact pay the compensation 
and grant the benefits promised in the R&R package. For instance, in the village of 
Kegunduru I was told “we’re not happy to leave the forest, but we can't do otherwise, the 
government has decided. We don't know how to fight. So we are happy as long as the 
government keeps its promises”. Similarly, people in Kondamodalu also told us that they 
“don't know how to protest”. 
I had included in the survey a question asking the respondent whether he or she had 
taken part to any form of protest against the dam and the R&R package. Only 41 persons 
(i.e. less than a third of the total) gave an affirmative answers. On the ground of these 
answers, I found that different villages had differently engaged into initiatives to protest 
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against the project and/or the resettlement package, with various outcomes.  
In a first group of villages, people had taken part to various initiatives in 2005 to protest 
against the construction of the dam, including during the visit of the Chief Minister to V. R. 
Puram (episode also reported by Bondla and Rao 2010). However, they did not mention 
any episode occurred between then and the time of my survey in 2009. These villages were 
Kondamodalu, Kegunduru and Aghra Koderu. Rodramkota had also protested in 2005, 
taking part to an initiative organised by all the villages of the Mandal, which all together  
had submitted a memorandum to the collector. Through this initiative they had obtained an 
increase in the price paid for land compensation from 75,000 RS to Rs 115/130/145,000 per 
acre (according to the quality of land), a measure then extended to all the other villages. 
The villagers of Sabhari Kotha Gudem, Lacchigudem and Bovanagiri recollected instead 
to have protested in 2007 with the government officials and the survey team visiting them 
to inform about displacement and the need to survey all land and houses. Initiatives had 
gone from submission of a memorandum (Sabhari Kotha Gudem) to forbidding the survey 
people to enter the village (Bovanagiri). Since then however, they had not taken any further 
action.  
Finally, five villages located in West Godavari resulted to be the most actively and most 
recently engaged in forms of protest. These were Mamidigundi, Ramayapeta, 
Chegondapalli, Tutigunta and Pydipaka. In these villages, the shift from radical resistance 
to the project to negotiation to obtain better compensation and resettlement was evident. 
That they were more actively concerned than other villages of the content of the 
resettlement package is due to the fact that four of them were among those to be 
immediately displaced and the fifth (i.e. Tutigunta) belonged to the second phase of 
relocation (see section 5.4). Their inhabitants felt resettlement as a more real and urgent 
issue and were more motivated to take action for it. Indeed, in these villages the dialogue 
with the government had resembled a proper negotiation and the pressure they had exerted 
had led to substantial changes to the resettlement package (subsequently also adopted in the 
R&R policy). For instance, from them had come the request to extend the benefits of the 
R&R package (including housing) to all the adult sons and daughters present in a nuclear 
family at the time of the survey. This measure had, at least in words, been granted, and 
included in the policy. The most eloquent in their requests had been the people of 
Ramayapeta and Pydipaka, two villages primarily composed by families not belonging to 
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SCs or STs. These non-SC and non-ST families had even obtained to be relocated in a town 
area in Jangareddygudem Mandal, away from the rest of the community. By large, their 
power of persuasion came from including among their population members of the Kapu 
caste, one of the most influential peasant castes of the district. Uma Maheshwari, one of the 
most active Indian journalists on the issue of the Polavaram dam, reports the example of a 
Kapu landlord of Pydipaka, who, remising his 125 acres of land to the government in 
exchange of compensation, had become the richest man of the village and subsequently had 
moved to Polavaram, leaving the landless working on that land without a job (India 
Together 2009).  
However, not all dissatisfaction had been manifested through negotiation with the 
government and the submission of memoranda. In different instances these villages had 
marched to the dam site with the intent to stop the works. The more recent attempts had 
been carried out by the women of Ramayapeta, whose houses had been damaged by the 
bomb blasting required by the works. Their efforts however had not been successful, as 
when I visited them the resettlement colony for Ramayapeta was far from being completed 
and the bomb blasting was still regularly taking place. 
Overall, the primary evidence that I collected, although limited, quite clearly suggests 
that by mid-2009 the emphasis of the protest had shifted from the dam project to the 
resettlement package. Not only there was no organic resistance movement, but there 
seemed to be also little effort by the affected people to get organised into constituencies for 
the collective representation of their interests. Negotiation of resettlement and 
compensation was being carried out independently by the different villages and I found no 
evidence of the existence of autonomous spaces of confrontation and discussion for the 
affected people.147 
  
6.3.3 From resistance to resignation and negotiation: possible explanations 
 
In order to assess the terms of the political incorporation triggered by the Polavaram 
project, it seems important to answer the question of how and why the radical forms of 
resistance prevalent in 2005 evolved into a generalised feeling of resignation and partial 
                                                           
147
       The fact that I found no evidence of their existence does not necessarily implies that they did not exist 
at all, but it is indicative that government-driven negotiation was easily observable and autonomous and 
independent discussion was not. 
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collaboration. However, this was not one of my research questions when I was in fieldwork 
and the evidence in my possession only allows me to make some tentative hypothesis. In 
particular, in the following paragraphs I draw attention to some factors and events which 
may contribute to explain this  (at least apparent) change in strategy.  
A first explanation of this evolution in attitude and strategy (at least in reference to the 
West Godavari district) was offered to me by Mr Law Agarwal, the Joint Collector of West 
Godavari in the years 2004/05 to 2007/08. I met Mr Agarwal in his office in Hyderabad, 
where at the time he was working for the Ministry of Education. According to his version 
of the events, he had played a major role in increasing the trust of the people towards the 
government and involving them in the resettlement activities. When he took hold of the 
post between 2004 and 2005, there was little and mainly hostile communication between 
the government and the affected villages. Agarwal told me that he took care of the situation 
by regularly visiting the affected villages to explain people the content of the resettlement 
package and the benefits to which they were entitled in exchange of displacement. Indeed, 
of the 19 villages which I visited, only in those of the West Godavari district some of my 
interlocutors remembered to have learned about the project from the Joint Collector and 
recollected his visits. He had tried to earn people's trust presenting himself as the protector 
of their interests and blaming NGOs based in Hyderabad and political leaders to “come to 
see them every three or six months, to tell them not to trust the government and then 
disappear in their nice AC cars”. However, he had truly managed to get a positive reaction 
only when he had obtained the collaboration of the Social Service Centre (SSC), a charity 
linked to the Diocese of Eluru and working with tribals in the Polavaram affected area. 
Through the SSC, more meetings had been organised in the eight Panchayats covering the 
29 affected villages of the district, initially between the collector and five representatives 
for each village, subsequently involving also the other government officials and the rest of 
the village. The five representatives had constituted a committee that in later stages had 
taken charge of supervising the implementation of the R&R package. 
This story was also confirmed by Father Moses (whom I met in Eluru), the director of 
the SSC, and by Israel, one of my research assistants, who had worked as facilitator for the 
SSC during the 'resettlement-awareness' campaign.  
Both Father Moses and Mr Agarwal appeared very confident of the success of their 
initiatives and positive that the majority of the people was now accepting the project and 
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primarily concerned with the terms of compensation and resettlement. Mr Agarwal was 
also very critical of the NGOs encouraging the people to resist the government and to 
refuse any form of collaboration, as he considered resistance to go against people's own 
interests. Analogously, Father Moses stressed the role played by the SSC in convincing the 
people that resistance and opposition were not the winning strategy and that it was in their 
interest to collaborate with the government to obtain better compensation and resettlement.  
The interpretation of the events offered by Agarwal and Father Moses would suggest 
that resettlement evolved from a space of contestation to one of political inclusion, through 
the active participation of the affected people to resettlement activities. However, there are 
a number of other elements in the story which do not fit with this interpretation and suggest 
instead that these ex-post initiatives implemented to involve the affected people have 
replaced and possibly thwarted autonomous forms of participation and articulation of the 
interests, particularly from the weakest sections of the society. These other elements also 
induce to look for alternative explanations to the shift in attitude and strategy observed 
among the affected people.  
The first dissonant element is that at the time of my fieldwork, not even the habitants of 
Devaragundi had moved to their “model” resettlement colony, despite the warning of 
imminent eviction from the government. According to their own account, which I gathered 
during the focus group I held in that village, they had chosen early on to collaborate with 
the government, after a number of visits from the collector and the other government 
officials. For this reason, their resettlement colony had been promoted as the 'model' of 
what was to come for the others. Mr Agarwal had personally invested in this village, often 
visiting the people and trying to establish an on-going dialogue with them. Yet, none of the 
villagers showed up at the first-stone laying ceremony of Devaragundi's “model” colony, at 
which Agarwal was the honoured guest. As the same Agarwal told me, he had personally 
complained with the families for letting him down and ten of them had apologised and 
asked to repeat the celebration together, which eventually they had performed. Yet, not 
even these ten families were enthusiastic enough about the resettlement colony to move to 
it before being forced to do so. As mentioned in chapter 5, at the time of my fieldwork only 
three families were living there. All the others were refusing to leave until the Government 
had paid the promised compensation for cattle sheds, burial places and the village trees. 
So, even the collaborative village of Devaragundi, where theoretically the attempt to 
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establish a dialogue had been the most successful, was using the threat of not moving as a 
leverage to increase its bargaining power. This second element also seems to contrast with 
the picture of a balanced and free negotiation process between the government and the 
affected villages. Indeed, the fact that the real bargaining power of the villages depends 
primarily on the threat of not moving implies that the process of negotiation is un-
structured and un-coordinated and therefore it is liable to result in uneven outcomes across 
different villages and instances of displacement. As a confirmation of this, stands the fact 
that the villages did not seem to be able to negotiate on a more substantial point, that is the 
location of the resettlement colonies and of the land given as compensation. Most of the 
villages which had been shown the land allocated to them (e.g. Sirivaca and Tutigunta) 
were unsatisfied with it and had asked the government a different one. In all cases, they 
were still waiting for the government to consider their request. When I had enquired him on 
this problem, the RDO of West Godavari had given me a contradictory answer. First he had 
said that the villages which did not agree on the location of resettlement, “had to be 
convinced”. On a second though, he had corrected himself, adding that indeed the villages 
have the right to choose the relocation site and if they didn't like it, another one had to be 
found.  
As a third dissonant point, it must be noted that while some of the villages, particularly 
the aforementioned villages in the West Godavari district, did show a certain level of 
awareness and capacity of negotiation, many others that I visited appeared to have a very 
limited  knowledge and control of what was going to happen to them. None of the villages 
in Khammam district knew where they were going to be relocated, and of the 19 villages I 
visited, only seven had received some forms of compensation (see also section 5.5 on this). 
When I asked the participants to the survey whether they knew “about the R&R package”, 
the majority replied that they didn't know or knew only a little. Significantly, this sort of 
answer was obtained also in the West Godavari villages which had been involved in the 
SSC's 'resettlement-awareness' campaign, which supposedly should have given more 
confidence to the people about what they were entitled to.  
Overall, if considered together these different elements depict the initiatives taken by 
Agarwal and Father Moses as part of a top-down and paternalistic attempt to consultation 
and possibly co-optation undertaken to make up for the initial total lack of consultation by 
the Government. While part of the success of these initiatives may depend on the specific 
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personality and the commitment of these two individuals, another factor is likely to have 
played a determinant role. This factor is the caste divisions among the affected population, 
which includes families from STs, SCs and other castes. These groups, as explained in 
chapter 5, have different entitlements to land compensation and as a consequence have 
different stakes from resettlement. As the example of the Kapu landlord mentioned above 
demonstrates, rich peasant castes (non-SC and non-ST) had enough to gain from a good 
resettlement package to be willing to cooperate. It is sensible to hypothesise that the richest 
and most powerful castes have welcomed the spaces of negotiation opened in the way just 
described, imposing this strategy on the other castes. This hypothesis was shared by both 
Uma Maheshwari and Mr Satya Srinivas (the coordinator of SAMATA office in 
Hyderabad), who indicated in the social divisions among the affected population one of the 
reasons of the cooperative attitude by some and the lack of an organised movement.  
Indeed, the lack of an organised resistance movement is another factor which can 
explain the fading away of radical forms of resistance. In their account of the different 
initiatives recorded between 2005 and 2007 in resistance to the Polavaram project, Bondla 
and Rao (ibidem) point out that these were primarily implemented by 'People's 
Organisations', i.e. groups of villagers coordinating common actions against a specific issue. 
They argue that these organisations emerged with specific reference to the Polavaram 
project as a reaction to the failure of statutory bodies to represent the tribals' interests and to 
the little interest demonstrated by political parties in the problem.  These organisations were 
characterised by multiple local leaderships rather than a centralised leadership, and this 
contributed to keep the resistance movement fragmented.   
That divisions exist and run deep in the civil society of AP, particularly among the 
sectors with a stake in the project, was also suggested by Uma Maheshwari and Satya 
Srinivas in the conversations that I had with them. Both were of the opinion that there was 
no social movement around the project, only separated actors protesting or lobbying on 
their own. According to them, NGOs had given up the fight in favour of collaboration with 
the government and lobbying for a better compensation, while political parties (including 
the CPI(M)) were playing a marginal role in the dispute. Of course the evidence reported 
here is insufficient to provide a complete assessment of the state of the civil society in AP, 
even if limited to the actors involved in the Polavaram project. However, I had an indirect 
and involuntary confirmation of these divisions in the very same fact that each person I 
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spoke to was very critical towards all the others. As mentioned, Uma was critical of NGOs 
in general, Mr Savaramakrishna of SAKTI was critical of the work done by Law Agarwal, 
who instead did not appreciate the initiatives of SAMATA. The NGO I worked with on the 
field (i.e. SEEDS) was sympathetic with the work of Father Moses, but had no contacts 
with the other NGOs.   
As a final element, it must be noted that the lack of a strong resistance movement and 
the feeling of resignation seemed in contradiction with the strong presence in the area of 
Naxalite groups, which have officially declared their opposition to the project and regularly 
visit some of the affected villages. Given the increasing influence of Naxalites on local 
politics in AP, especially in tribal areas, one would expect their influence to instigate 
strongest and more manifest expressions of dissent.  
To conclude, a preliminary assessment of the terms in which the political incorporation 
of the Polavaram affected population has taken place so far, in reference to displacement 
and resettlement, would suggest that these have been adverse. First, the decision-making 
process concerning the construction of the dam has been undemocratic and exclusionary. 
Second, the attempts made ex-post by the government to involve the affected people in the 
resettlement operations have been top-down and paternalistic, and seem to have led to the 
co-optation of the social groups (i.e. the non-SC and non-ST castes) more interested in 
getting a higher compensation than avoiding displacement. While these attempts indeed 
have opened some spaces of negotiation between the affected people and the government, 
they also seem to have replaced and possibly thwarted autonomous forms of representation 
of the collective interests. This is reflected in a widespread feeling of resignation and in the 
incapacity of creating an organised movement around the project, with the involvement of 
other actors from the civil society. Significantly, the interests of the affected people are not 
unequivocally represented by any political party. 
As the project and the resettlement operations are far from completion, the terms of 
political incorporation of the Polavaram affected people are liable to evolve in the future in 
unpredictable directions. As things stand now, resettlement as a space of contestation seems 
to be an agent of adverse incorporation, but it cannot be excluded that in the future it will 
prompt political inclusion. 
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6.4. Spatial and socio-cultural dimension of the incorporation of the Polavaram 
affected people 
 
Displacement and resettlement are phenomena in which the spatial dimension 
necessarily dominates. The Polavaram dam is certainly no exception. Indeed, the spatial 
dimension of displacement and resettlement for the Polavaram affected people is 
accentuated by the fact that these processes also imply the uprooting from a peculiar type of 
environment and the relocation in a rather different one. The specific environment includes 
the banks of the river Godavari (flowing from Maharashtra to the Bay of Bengal) from the 
point where it is joined by the river Sabari, in proximity of Badrachalam, to Polavaram 
town, where the barrage will be located. This tract of the river crosses the Eastern Ghats hill 
ranges, and is for large part covered by forest. The local hills are called Papikondalu and 
host a Wildlife Sanctuary. 
The spatial dimension of the process is deeply entrenched with its socio-cultural 
dimension. In fact, the specific environment in which people live not only provides them 
with sources of livelihoods, but it also defines their identity and their social and cultural 
systems. 
This section uses the notion of adverse incorporation to provide an interpretation of the 
spatial and socio-cultural consequences of resettlement in Polavaram. It is based primarily 
on the information that I collected through the visits to three resettlement colonies in West 
Godavari, which at the time of my fieldwork were still under construction (respectively for 
the villages of Devaragundi, Totagundi and Chegundapalli and Mamidigundi together). 
To start with, the Polavaram affected people will be spatially incorporated because they 
will be taken away from a remote and isolated area and relocated closer to the core of 
economic activities and to the mainstream society.  
Many of the affected villages are located in the deep forest and are accessible only by mud 
road, sometimes only by footpath or by river (this is for instance of many of the villages in 
map 5.4). These villages become very difficult to reach during the monsoon season, making 
rescue operations particularly difficult in case of floods. The latter occur with regularity, 
and often force communities to seek refuge on the top of the hills. Isolation also makes 
difficult to go in search of a job, even to achieve areas where agricultural wage labour is 
available. The terrain flattens upstream the river (see map 5.2) and the villages located here 
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are generally more easily accessible. However, the exposition to the flood does not 
necessarily diminish, particularly for those villages locate in proximity of the confluence of 
the Sabari in the Godavari river (as is for instance the case of Sabari Kotha Gudem and 
Aghra Koderu). 
Of the sample of 19 villages which I visited, Kegunduru was accessible only by footpath 
or by boat. Six of the 15 villages in the sample were more than 10 km from the nearest 
town and in all but two (Ramayapeta and Kondamodalu) villagers had to travel at least 5 
km to the nearest market. All the villages but Kondamodalu, Sirivaca, Talluru and 
Kegunduru had a bus stop located within 3 km.  
Isolation and remoteness for most of these villages also imply lack of basic facilities and 
difficult access to health and education services. Many villages rely on the river as the only 
source of drinking water: in the sample of 19 villages, this was true of Kondamodalu, 
Rudramkota and Sirivaca, while for the others the most common sources were tube wells or 
hand pumps. Electricity was, however, available in all the villages.148 All the villages had 
an anganwadi centre,149 and a primary school either in the village or within 2 km. Primary 
health centres were available in Kondamodalu and Rudramkota, while Tutigunta, Pydipaka, 
Totapalli, Devaragundi and Chegondapalli had a sub-centre; the other villages were 
regularly visited by a nurse. Only Chegundapalli and Tutigunta have a secondary school, 
and the habitants of Sirivaca and Kondamodalu have to travel 32 km to find one.   
The resettlement colonies for the Polavaram affected people are planned to be located in 
rural and peri-urban areas, away from the river and the forest. To the extent that it will free 
people of the negative consequences of spatial remoteness, incorporation through 
resettlement will have positive effects on their lives. First, the resettlement colonies will be 
closer to towns and the Mandal headquarters, where services are more easily accessible.  
Besides, vicinity to economic activities also means a better positioning to catch job 
opportunities. Moreover, according to the AP R&R policy, resettlement colonies must be 
provided with all basic amenities and infrastructure facilities, including drinking water, 
internal roads, drainage, primary school building, playground and access road.  These 
                                                           
148   AP is one of the Indian States with the highest rate of villages with electric power (94% in 2005, 
CESS 2008). 
149   Anganwadi centres are part of the Integrated Child Development Services and were established to 
provide children with health, nutrition and pre-school education services from birth to six years and 
nutritional and health services to pregnant and breastfeeding mothers. 
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advantages (i.e. increased accessibility to health and education services and 'freedom' from 
floods) were also acknowledged by the same affected people during some of the focus 
groups that I held with them (especially in Kegunduru and Talluru, indeed two of the most 
isolated villages which I visited). 
Yet, even the spatial incorporation which comes with resettlement presents some 
elements of adversity.  
 First, as discussed in previous section, relocation in a different environment will imply 
the loss of a key source of livelihood. However, the fact that the resettlement colonies are 
less isolated does not guarantee by itself the replacement of the lost source of livelihood. 
We have seen in section 6.2.2. that AP has a poor record of employment creation, and that 
agricultural wage labour has become the main source of livelihood in rural areas. As things 
stand, no significant elements exist to assume that the resettlement areas for the Polavaram 
people constitute an exception. Of the three resettlement colonies which I visited, only the 
colony for Devaragundi seemed to be located in an area relatively economically active, 
almost at the outskirts of Polavaram town. The latter is 13 Km from the resettlement colony 
for Chegundapalli and Mamidigundi, which instead seemed, at least in appearance, to be 
located in a rather desolated and poorly connected area.  In other words, for some of the 
relocated villages, the only job market which indeed will be more accessible after 
relocation might be merely that for agricultural wage labour. To this it must be added that 
the cultivable land given as compensation is often considerably far from the colony, in the 
case of Devaragundi for instance, between 5 and 8 Km. 
A second element of adversity is given by the quality of the resettlement colonies and 
the environmental characteristics of the relocation area. The latter is characterised by very 
hot and dry summers, when the temperature is often above 40º C. Many people were 
worried of not being able to get used to the new climate and of the scarcity of water at the 
relocation site. Indeed, in the original villages the vicinity of the forest and the river at least 
guarantees shadow, breeze and plenty of water. The three families who had already moved 
to Devaragundi's resettlement colony reported that they were already having problems with 
the supply of water and were asking the government to provide the colony with a water 
tank.  
The architecture and the dimensions of the colony's houses were also an element of 
245 
concern to the people. The lot given to each family was considered too small, having to 
contain both the house, the courtyard and the cattle shed. The fact that the house was made 
of concrete was not necessarily deemed an advantage, given that the traditional huts offer a 
better protection from the heat. The model of house that is provided by the government is 
composed of two rooms, and improvements have to be paid by the same family.  
 
This brief account of the spatial dimension of the displacement suggests that relocation 
in a resettlement colony will bring disadvantages but also some improvements to people's 
life. Yet, as will be widely discussed in section 7.2, when inquired on the favourite type of 
compensation and resettlement, the greatest majority of the Polavaram affected people 
indicated that they would have preferred to be relocated close to the forest and to the river, 
and not in plain area. Indeed, it was evident that they considered the loss of their original 
environment the main disadvantage of displacement.  
This attitude is also revelatory of the terms of the socio-cultural incorporation coming 
with resettlement. The value that the Polavaram affected people attributed to their specific 
environment, and in particular to the forest, can be better understood through the categories 
of constitutive incommensurable and inalienable possession introduced respectively in 
section 2.3 and 3.4. Both categories stress the fact that certain entities, including land, 
house and one's own landscape have symbolic meanings and contribute to define individual 
and collective identities. The deprivation of an inalienable possession leads to the 
mutilation of these identities; analogously, the attempt to replace a 'constitutive 
incommensurable' with something of 'equal value' threatens the social and cultural 
arrangements built around it.  
The evidence collected by this research does suggest that the forest is an inalienable 
possession and a constitutive commensurable to the Polavaram affected people, who are in 
their majority tribal and forest dwellers. Overall, resettlement will imply the integration into 
a new environment and the loss of the old one. Incorporation here comes from the greatest 
vicinity to the mainstream society, which can have positive consequence thanks to an easier 
access to means of information and to education. It could also lead to the erosion of 
traditional social arrangements and with it to the disappearance of the most exploitative and 
exclusionary social relations. However, incorporation will also imply the loss of the part of 
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the affected people's culture and tradition which is based on the relationship to the forest. 
To the people I met, this was clearly a painful loss, and they were worried of the 
consequences it could have in disintegrating the ties which kept the community together. 
 
6.5.  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse and interpret the resettlement of the people 
affected of the Polavaram dam through a theoretical framework based on the notion of 
adverse incorporation. The investigation of the political, spatial and socio-cultural 
dimensions emphasised the multiplicity of processes that resettlement will trigger and the 
quantity of factors which will affect its dynamic consequences. The preliminary finding of 
this investigation is that the terms of incorporation of the Polavaram affected people at the 
political, spatial and socio-cultural level will be adverse, despite some positive 
consequences of the process. 
The investigation of the economic dimension of the incorporation engaged in a quest of 
the structural factors which are liable to turn resettlement into a process of adverse 
incorporation. These structural factors were identified in the structures and mechanisms 
which underpin the production of surplus labour in AP. Through a review of the notion of 
surplus labour at the Indian level, and an exploration of the processes of transformation of 
the rural sector in AP, it was found that landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings and 
casualisation of labour are the three mechanisms driving surplus labour, and that social 
structures of accumulation regulate the social relations through which these mechanisms 
take place.  
Then, the analysis moved to an examination of the characteristics of the Polavaram 
affected population. The latter resulted to be poor and to belong to the most disadvantaged 
sectors (i.e. castes) of the Indian society. The affected people are primarily engaged in 
subsistence livelihoods which heavily depend on the access to land and to forest products. 
Landlessness is widespread and the structure of land ownership is affected by centuries of 
land alienation at the expenses of tribal people. As a consequence, most of the landholdings 
are small and marginal and non-tribals own land in an area where they are not entitled to. 
Most of the families rely on agricultural wage labour to diversify their sources of livelihood, 
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however the salary paid barely allows to achieve the poverty line.  
This account of the characteristics and the livelihood strategies of the Polavaram 
affected population is revealing in two senses, First, it highlights that displacement will 
disrupt the affected people’s livelihoods, which are intimately related to and dependent 
upon their specific environment. Second, it shows that the affected people are exposed to 
and indeed embedded into the structures and mechanisms which underpin surplus labour, 
that is landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings and casualisation of labour on one side, 
and the pervasiveness of social structures of accumulation in regulating land relations on 
the other side.  Next chapter will show that these structures and mechanisms interact with 
the shortcomings of the PRRP in turning resettlement into a process of adverse 
incorporation.  
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Chapter 7 
An assessment of Resettlement in Polavaram 
 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
 
The Polavaram dam project, when completed, will constitute one of the major instances 
of displacement by development in Indian history. In order to avoid a human disaster, it is 
therefore imperative that resettlement of the Polavaram displaced people is fair and 
effective in preventing their impoverishment.  
This chapter attempts to assess resettlement in Polavaram, showing that the process is 
likely to lead to the adverse incorporation of the affected population. Given that the dam 
project is still under construction and that the resettlement operations have just started, it 
was not possible to adopt a conventional impact assessment methodology. To address this 
problem, two alternative assessment criteria are adopted. First, the Polavaram Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation package (PRRP) is compared with the preferences concerning 
compensation and resettlement expressed by the Polavaram affected population through 
focus groups and a consultation exercise based on choice experiment methodology (section 
7.2). The focus groups and the consultation exercise lead to the identification of three key 
issues concerning compensation and resettlement from the point of view of the affected 
population. The second assessment criterion is the ability of the resettlement package to 
address these issues and overall its capacity to support the reconstruction of the livelihoods 
disrupted by displacement. Particular attention is given to how forest and land are 
compensated (sections 7.3). 
 This analysis in turn leads to the identification of the main shortcomings of resettlement 
package for the Polavaram affected people. In the conclusion of the chapter it is argued that 
these shortcomings interact with the structures and mechanisms underpinning surplus 
labour in Andhra Pradesh (AP henceforth) in making resettlement a process of adverse 
incorporation.  
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7.2.  Consulting people about their resettlement preferences: focus groups and choice 
experiment 
 
This section explores the possibility of directly questioning the affected people about 
their favoured forms of compensation and resettlement. It does so by looking at the results 
of a consultation exercise based on choice experiment methodology (CE hereafter) and 
focus groups implemented with the Polavaram affected population. The consultation of the 
affected population about the resettlement preferences is relevant for the investigation 
carried out in this thesis for three reasons. First, the findings can be adopted to design more 
effective and fair Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) programmes. Second, it provides 
a criterion against which to assess the Polavaram resettlement programme. Third, it leads to 
the identification of three key issues concerning compensation and resettlement from the 
point of view of the affected people. 
Chapter 2 documented the existence of a literature which calls for the estimation of 
welfare measures of the costs of displacement (such as Willingness to Pay-WTP and 
Willingness to Accept-WTA) as proxy of the amount of monetary compensation which, if 
paid, would make displacement voluntary. The elicitation of WTP and WTA requires the 
adoption of stated preferences methods, such as contingent valuation surveys and choice 
experiments. 
It is not, however, with the purpose of estimating WTA displacement that a CE was 
implemented in Polavaram, but rather, as a consultation tool to explore the preferences of 
the project-affected families with respect to different types of compensation and 
resettlement packages, and how these preferences vary when facing different combinations 
of attributes.150 This allowed us in the first place, to identify what types of compensation 
and modalities of relocation can make resettlement acceptable to the displaced people; for 
instance, it was found that land-for-land compensation is the favoured form of restitution 
and that relocation with one's own community is a priority. The CE also contributed to 
uncovering other sensitive issues linked to displacement, resettlement and compensation 
which, if unaddressed, can lead to the failure of the resettlement programme.  
This use of CE as a consultation tool also enabled us to detect some inconsistencies in 
the respondents' preferences with the assumptions and the predictions of rational choice 
                                                           
150
 “Attributes” mean here the different characteristics of the compensation packages. 
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theory, in particular the existence of lexicographic preferences. It was also tested the 
plausibility of the notion of WTA in reference to the resettlement attribute “relocation 
without community”. 
The CE however was not the only methodology of direct consultation employed. Focus 
groups were also implemented in eight villages with the purpose of investigating with a 
more flexible tool how displacement and resettlement were perceived by the resettled 
population, and whether the 'collective voice' of the village would provide different answers 
from those of the CE. The findings of the two consultation methods were in fact mutually 
consistent and revealed that the loss of the forest, the constraints to land to land 
compensation and the shortcomings of cash compensation are the main issues concerning 
displacement and resettlement in Polavaram.  
The following section describes the main findings of the focus groups, while section 
7.2.2 is dedicated to the CE.  
 
7.2.1  Focus Groups in Polavaram 
 
The main purpose of implementing focus groups in villages affected by the Polavaram 
dam was to hold a collective conversation with the people about their displacement and 
resettlement. This allowed us to collect information on the state of advancement of the 
resettlement and compensation operations, and more generally, of the extent to which the 
affected villages had been consulted. The findings of the focus groups also complemented 
(and confirmed) the evidence collected through the CE on people's preferences. 
As explained in chapter 4, four focus groups (in Devaragondi, Mamidigundi, Koruturu, 
Sirivaca) were implemented before the start of the CE and were used to inform its design, 
in particular to determine the attributes to include in the different resettlement packages 
offered (see section 6.3.1). Additional focus groups were held in four of the villages visited 
for the survey and the CE (Chegondapalli, Tutigunta, Talluru and Kegunduru). 
Two types of questions were put to the participants: the first type asked them what they 
wanted and deemed fair as compensation for being displaced; the second type pursued a 
subjective evaluation of the costs and benefits, asking about the main losses from 
displacement and the advantages and disadvantages of being relocated elsewhere. 
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This second type of questions was answered homogeneously in all the eight villages: the 
life in the forest was considered the main loss, from an emotional and a material point of 
view.  It was clear to the participants that relocation will mean loss of access to the free 
products which they gather from the forest, in particular, firewood, and how this will imply 
a higher cost of living. In the village of Tutigunta, for instance, I had the following 
conversation:  
ME: Which do you think are the advantages of this place and which are the 
advantages of the village where you will be resettled? 
PARTICIPANTS: Here there are more advantages, we have no problems with 
water and there is plenty of firewood. We also lose bamboo. Many things are free for 
us here. Here we can survive with 10 Rs per day, there we need 100 Rs at least. We 
also lose fish, vegetables, green leaves, which we also get for free. We also lose the 
trees, like tamarind and palm tree.  
The specific geographic location of the villages (between the hills and the bank of the 
river Godavari) is considered an 'advantage' which will be lost, as it guarantees a better 
weather and land with a better quality soil. This feeling for example was clearly expressed 
by the people of Koruturu: 
ME:  What do you think of the place where you will be resettled? 
PARTICIPANTS: Here we have black soil and there is sand soil, there are no 
hills, no river, no forest. Maybe the weather is different and we don’t know if we will 
get used to it. 
Few advantages were attributed to the resettlement site (some villages had been shown 
or told where they will be resettled) and more generally to relocation in plain area and they 
mainly concerned the easier access to transport facilities (bus stop) and health and 
education services. The villagers of Talluru, for instance, thought that pregnant women 
would benefit from living closer to a hospital, in case of any related problems. Talluru is in 
fact a particularly isolated village which is located on the riverside of the Godavari and 
which is regularly inundated by the floods caused by the monsoon. As I had heard many of 
the people complaining about the flooding during the survey, I was surprised that they did 
not mention eliminating the flooding as one of the advantages. However, when I directly 
asked them what they thought about it, they did acknowledge that 'freedom from the flood' 
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was indeed an advantage. 
As concerns the questions on the desired type of compensation, they generated some 
contradictory results which are well summarised by the voice of the people of Kegunduru: 
PARTICIPANTS: We're not happy to leave the forest, but we can't do otherwise, 
the government has decided. We don't even know how to fight. So we are happy as 
long as the government keeps its promises. 
What the government is giving us is not fair. Whatever the government will give 
us it will never be enough to compensate what we're leaving behind. We're 
expecting 3 lakhs from the R&R package, free housing and land for land 
compensation. But even if we ask for more money, the government will not give it to 
us. Besides, 3 lakhs are sufficient for us. 
Other villages complained for the low price paid for the land expropriated, too little 
space given to build a new house and claimed that the government should give a job to each 
displaced family. Yet, the general feeling was the same resignation expressed by the 
habitants of Kegunduru: people perceive their displacement as an imposition for which no 
fair compensation exists. However they feel powerless and do not know how to contrast the 
process, therefore they declare that they will be satisfied as long as the government keeps 
its promises about compensation and resettlement.151   
 
7.2.2.  Consulting people with a Choice Experiment Approach 
 
The choice experiment was implemented with 167 families belonging to 15 villages 
which will be submerged following the construction of the Polavaram dam. It was preceded 
by a survey that sought to collect information on the socio-economic characteristics of the 
families interviewed, which might affect the preferences concerning compensation and 
resettlement.  
It is useful to recall here that 56% of the respondents belonged to STs, 25% to SCs and 
the remaining 19% to Other Castes (OCs) or Backward Castes (BCs). In addition, 75% 
claimed to be literate; the majority of the respondents were men (73.5%) and women 
                                                           
151 As explained in chapter 7 and 8, the few action of protests put in action by some villages were 
directed to the improvement of the resettlement package but not to resistance against the construction of the 
dam. 
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constituted only 26.5% of the sample. Further, 46% were landless and 15% when 
questioned about their main source of income, mentioned an activity additional or 
alternative to agriculture (i.e. to both farming than agricultural wage labour). The choices 
made by the respondents through the CE controlled for these characteristics, but different 
socio-economic characteristics were rarely found to be systematically associated with 
different preferences. In fact, one of the key findings of the experiment is that preferences 
were homogeneous across the sample. In the following description of the experiment, 
attention is drawn only to the characteristics of the respondents which were linked with 
having preferences that differed from the  majority. 
The CE consisted in a sequence of exercises, through which the respondent was offered-
and had to make a choice among- 8 different types of compensation packages.152 Whilst the 
real package actually offered by the government of AP to the Polavaram affected people 
was taken as a benchmark to elaborate the alternative packages, it was never offered during 
the CE.153  
In fact the main interest relied in observing the trade-offs in the preferences with respect 
to a package which offered something similar to the maintenance of the status-quo, 
especially in terms of access to the forest and the Godavari river. It was expected that 
people would choose this package, which was the only one to guarantee the perpetuation of 
the access to the forest (called package Forest during the experiment, it's described in 
section 7.2.2.1) with a higher frequency than any other package and irrespective of what 
was offered in exchange. The justification for this expectation was the strong cultural and 
spiritual attachment of tribal people to their territory and the reliance of poor families on 
the resources offered by the river and the forest for their livelihoods. A side objective of the 
experiment was to explore whether this kind of attachment to the original land was in fact 
stronger among ST families or it was also found among SC and OC families. 
It was then decided to compare the “status-quo” package with packages characterised by 
the presence of a specific attribute, chosen because it was either lacking in the original 
government package, or because it was considered an important aspect of the life of the 
affected families.  
                                                           
152  The term 'compensation package' is employed in this chapter referring to packages offering different 
types of restitution  for the losses incurred with displacement (cash, land, housing) and types of resettlement. 
153  The 'real' Polavaram R&R package is described in detail in chapter 7, together with its main 
limitations. 
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During the experiment the families were therefore “forced” to make a choice between 
the maintenance of the status-quo and a change in one aspect of their lives, so revealing 
whether they had lexicographic preferences for the status-quo and the access to forest. It 
was also hoped that the sequence of choice would detect those attributes of the packages 
(and the relative aspects of life) for which it becomes hard for people to make a choice and 
revealed preferences are inconsistent with rational choice theory. 
The CE was composed of four exercises, the first three consisting a sequence of  discrete 
choices and the last a ranking of four different packages. While the former were meant to 
elicit the trade-offs in the preferences, the latter aimed at providing a test for the 
consistency of the preferences.  
The exercises were conducted with the help of visual tools (they are reproduced in 
Appendix IV): each package was represented by a card and each card contained images 
portraying an attribute of the package (e.g., a house to represent housing facilities provided 
by the government).  This expedient made it simpler for the interviewer to explain the 
characteristics of each package and for the respondent to memorise them through the 
different stages of the exercise. 
Some debriefing questions were added at the end of each exercise, to be answered by the 
research assistant conducting the interview and filling the questionnaire. These questions 
concerned on the one hand the conditions upon which the interview took place (presence of 
other members of the community, consultation or disagreement with other members of the 
community, time taken to answer the question), and on the other, any justification adduced 
by the respondent for his or her choice. 
Finally, the CE was implemented in three different rounds, which differed for the 
resettlement packages offered. Three different versions of the packages were employed: a 
'standard', a 'generous' and a 'generous improved' version; in all the rounds the 'standard' 
version was offered to a control group. The different versions are described in the next 
section. The use of different versions of the packages was meant to increase the internal 
validity of the results, albeit at the expenses of external validity. Using different versions in 
fact meant splitting the sample into non-directly comparable sub-samples and therefore 
further reducing their statistical representativeness. However, using different versions of the 
packages also allowed to improve each round of the CE on the grounds of the findings of 
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the previous rounds. In particular, for two times it was decided to increase the amount of 
money offered in the packages (hence the names 'generous' and 'generous improved'). This 
was done in order to exclude (or limit) the possibility that the greatest preference for the 
'status-quo' package observed in each round was due to the fact that the alternative 
packages included too little monetary compensation. 
 
Box 7.1 Details of First, Second and Third Round of the Choice Experiment 
 
 
7.2.2.1.  Description of the compensation packages  
 
As already mentioned, the design of the compensation packages to be used in the 
experiment and the calculation of the different amounts of money to be offered were based 
on the existing R&R package for Polavaram and the market value of land in the relocation 
area. 
This package aimed at replicating the conditions in which the affected people are living 
at present and seeks the minimum level of change in the lives of the affected people. In fact, 
despite relocation it guarantees the perpetuation of the access to the forest and to the river. 
A high frequency of choice for this package when compared to the alternatives would 
indicate a preference for the status-quo and for the access to forest and the river.  
Package Money only offered cash, specifically as compensation for the loss of land, loss 
of housing, loss of access to forest and river, loss of livelihood. It was intended that the 
government was to provide the relocation site and supply it with basic facilities, but would 
not give any land or housing. The amount offered was based initially on the amounts 
envisaged in the actual government package, however it varied in later stages of the 
 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 
Villages 
Kondamadolu, Aghra 
Koderu, Sabari Kotha 
Gudem, Lacchigudem, 
Rudramkota 
Ramayapeta, 
Chegondapalli, 
Tutigunta, Pydipaka 
Vinjaram, Totapalli, 
Gundala, Bovanagiri, 
Talluru, Kegunduru 
Version of 
the package 
used 
Standard (49 
interviews) 
Standard (24 
interviews) 
Generous (22 
interviews) 
Standard (36 interviews) 
Generous  improved(36 
interviews) 
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experiment. As the first interviews revealed that package Money was rarely a preferred 
option, in the second round of interviews the monetary compensation offered was increased 
from 150,000 Rs plus 130,00 Rs per acre of land to 300,000 plus 130,000 Rs per acre 
(called “generous version”, see Box 7.3) and in the third round to 600,000 Rs plus 200,000 
Rs per acre (called “generous improved”). These variations were intended to test whether 
the distaste for package Money depended on the amount offered or on the aversion to cash 
compensation. The standard version of package Money was however still offered to a 
control group in both the second and the third round. 
 
Box 7.2 Package Forest 
-The community will be relocated in a place similar to that of the original village, in 
particular close to the forest and to the river 
-all the community will be relocated together, in the same colony 
-a new house will be provided by the government, similar to the one that you have 
now 
-you will be given land for land compensation 
-there isn't any sort of cash compensation 
 
Box 7.3 Package Money 
-relocation is provided by the government in plain area 
-basic facilities are provided in the resettlement colony, but not housing 
-only cash compensation is provided: 150,000 Rs+130,000 Rs per acre154 
-GENEROUS VERSION: 300,000 Rs+130,000 Rs per acre 
--GENEROUS IMPROVED VERSION: 600,000 Rs+200,000 Rs per acre of land 
owned 
 
Indeed the conversations held with the respondents often revealed that the money 
offered by the real PRRP was not considered enough even to build a new house. Even more 
strongly it was felt that land was undervalued and the price offered not even close to be 
enough to purchase an equal plot of land in the relocation area. However, while the 
“generous” and the “generous improved” versions were accepted more often, there was no 
substantial change in the structure of the preferences. 
 
                                                           
154 130,000 Rs per acre was the compensation offered by the AP government for cultivable land with 
canals and irrigation tanks; 150,000 Rs was obtained summing up the following amounts as offered by the 
government and augmenting the total by 17,500 Rs as compensation for the loss of forest and river : 45,000 
Rs grant for house construction; 5,000 Rs grant for construction of a new cattle shed; 5,000 Rs for 
transportation from the old to the new place, 25,000 Rs for income generating scheme grant; 52,500 Rs 
equivalent to 750 days minimum agricultural wage (equal to 70 Rs per day). 
257 
Box 7.4 Package Land for Land 
-The relocation site is decided by the government and provided in plain area 
-you will be given 35,000 Rs as compensation for the loss of customary rights and 
access to forest and river155 
-housing is provided by the government 
-land for land compensation, subject to ceiling of 5 acres (above 5 acres 
compensation is 130,000 Rs per acre) 
-GENEROUS VERSION: 70,000 Rs for loss of forest and river+130,000 Rs per acre 
of land above the ceiling 
-GENEROUS IMPROVED  VERSION:170,000 Rs for loss of forest and 
river+200,000 Rs per acre per acre of land above the ceiling 
 
Package Land for Land is the one that most resembles the package offered by the 
government. The main difference is that land compensation is provided (subject to a ceiling 
of 5 acres, which however was relevant only for 11% of the interviewed families) to every 
family owning land, irrespective of the social groups (SCs, STs, OCs). As discussed in 
chapter 5, in AP different social groups have different claims over land, at least when it 
comes to Fifth Schedule areas. The Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides (a 
rather generic) protection to the tribal people living in scheduled areas from alienation of 
their lands and natural resources. The AP government (through the Andhra Pradesh 
Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation of 1959) has reinforced this measure forbidding 
the transfer of tribal land to non-tribals. This in turn implies the impossibility to offer land 
compensation to non-tribal families which happen to (illegally) own land in Fifth Schedule 
areas.  
In the present study it was chosen to ignore this constraint in order to observe the 
variation in the preferences for package Land for Land, controlling for the social group and 
the relative claim over land. 
A “generous” and a “generous improved” version were tested also for package Self-
employment: in the former compensation for loss of forest and river was doubled and cash 
compensation for land was kept constant, in the latter forest and river compensation was 
increased of other 100,000 Rs and cash compensation for land was raised to 200,00 Rs per 
acre. A control group in each village was however offered the initial version of the package. 
The rationale of this package was to offer the possibility to abandon the farming activity 
and to move to self-employment. No land compensation was offered in order to isolate the 
                                                           
155 35,000 Rs (equivalent to 500 days of minimum agricultural wage @ 70 Rs per day) is the 
compensation for loss of customary rights and usages of forest produce established by the 2005 AP Policy on 
R&R of Project Affected Families, see chapter 7. 
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effect of the “preference for self-employment”. The package included, apart from housing 
and cash compensation for the loss of forest and river, training and technical and financial 
assistance to implement a self-employment activity (petty shop, carpenter, tailor's shop, 
etc.). Again, a generous and a generous improved version were offered (see Box 7.5).   
 
Box 7.5 Package Self-employment 
-The relocation site is decided by the government and provided in plain area 
-you will be given 35,000 Rs as compensation for the loss of customary rights and 
access to forest and river 
-housing is provided by the government 
-there is no land for land compensation, only cash compensation is provided at the 
rate of 130,000 Rs per acre 
-as compensation for the loss of livelihood and source of income, a self-employment 
package is provided. This includes training, technical assistance, money to purchase 
tools and build a shed 
-GENEROUS VERSION: 70,000 Rs for loss of forest and river+130,000 Rs per acre 
of land owned 
-GENEROUS IMPROVED VERSION:170,000Rs for loss of forest and 
river+200,000 Rs per acre of land owned 
 
Box 7.6 Package Forest no Village 
-The community will be relocated in a place similar to that of the original village, in 
particular close to the forest and to the river 
-housing is provided by the government 
-land for land compensation is provided 
-no cash compensation 
-relocation is without community: households are relocated sparsely, maybe in 
groups or in other villages 
 
Package Forest no Village is identical to Package Forest (the “status-quo” package) 
apart for the fact that the families will not be relocated all together. Its rationale was to test 
whether the preference for a package offering the perpetuation of the access to the forest 
and the river was modified when this privilege came at the cost of losing one's own 
community. The results in section 7.2.2.2 will show that relocation with community could 
not be waved, not even at the cost of losing the forest. 
Package Instalments resembled package Land for Land but offered a higher cash 
compensation for each single item: 50,000 Rs rather than 35,000 Rs for loss of access to 
forest and river and 165,000 Rs rather than 130,000 Rs per acre of land, when land is above 
the ceiling (analogously 100,000Rs for loss of forest and river rather than 70,000 in the 
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generous version and 300,000 Rs rather than 170,000 in the generous improved version. 
The latter also offered 265,000Rs per acre rather than 200,000). 
However this higher compensation was offered in 10 instalments split over 5 years. The  
idea was to check the response towards the offer of a flow of income vis a vis an amount of 
cash in bulk. The motivation was the observed tendency by displaced people to spend most 
of the cash compensation before the actual resettlement takes place, so hampering the 
possibility to invest the money in the development of a new livelihood. 
 
Box 7.7 Package Instalments 
-The relocation site is decided by the government and provided in plain area 
-you will be given 50,000 Rs as compensation for the loss of customary rights and 
access to forest and river 
-housing is provided by the government with all facilities 
-land for land compensation is provided, subject to ceiling of 5 acres (above 5 acres 
compensation is 165,000 Rs per acre) 
-the payment of the cash compensation is split in 5 years: 10 instalments, 1 every 6 
months for 5 years 
-GENEROUS VERSION: 100,000 Rs for loss of forest and river+165,000 Rs per 
acre 
-GENEROUS IMPROVED VERSION: 300,000 Rs for loss of forest and river + 
265,000 Rs per acre 
 
Box 7.8 Package Money no community  
-relocation is provided by the government in plain area 
-only cash compensation is provided-like in package B 
-relocation is without the community, in exchange cash compensation is provided. 
Different amount were tested: 
-STANDARD VERSION: 30,000 Rs; 50,000 Rs; 100,000 Rs. 
-GENEROUS IMPROVED VERSION: cash compensation for loss of community 
was increased to 80,000 Rs; 150,000 Rs; 300,000 Rs. 
 
Package Money no community (MNC for brevity) was used together with package 
Money to attempt the explicit estimation of the willingness to accept relocation without the 
community, using the contingent valuation approach.  
Package Money no community resembled package Money apart from the fact that it 
offered a higher amount of money in exchange for being relocated without the community. 
Each respondent was offered in sequence three different amounts of money: 30,000 Rs; 
50,000 Rs and 100,000 Rs when the 'standard' version of package Money no community 
was adopted; 80,000 Rs, 150,000 Rs, 300,000 Rs when the 'generous improved' version 
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was used (there was no 'generous' version and in the second round the 'standard' version 
was used instead). 
The offer was deemed ridiculous if not outrageous in most of the cases and little 
changed even when the amounts of money offered were tripled. 
 
 
7.2.2.2.   Description of the exercises 
 
The CE was composed of four exercises combining the seven packages described in the 
previous section. In three of the four exercises, the respondent was asked to make a choice 
between two different packages, while in the final exercise she/he was asked to rank them. 
An exercise based on the contingent valuation approach was also implemented, with the 
purpose of attempting the estimation of the willingness to accept relocation without the 
community. 
 
• EXERCISE 1: Resettlement attributes 
Please indicate which package you prefer between: 
 Preferred package 
Package Forest versus 
Package Money 
_______Forest           
_______Money 
Package Forest versus 
Package Land for Land 
_______Forest           
_______Land for Land 
Package Forest versus 
Package Self-employment 
_______Forest            
_______Self-employment 
Package Forest no Village 
versus 
Package Land for Land 
 
_______Forest no Village 
______ Land for Land 
 
This first exercise consisted in four discrete choices. Package Forest constituted the 
benchmark against which the other packages were evaluated. The respondent was asked to 
make en explicit choice between the maintenance of the status quo and a change (possibly 
an improvement) in a particular aspect of their lives (the relevant aspects had been 
identified with the help of the ex-ante focus groups). It was so hoped to identify the 
sensible trade-offs in the preferences, that is those attributes of a compensation package 
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which make relocation acceptable by people, and to test whether the “status-quo” is always 
the preferred option no matter what the alternative is, that is whether the respondents have a 
lexicographic preference for relocation close to the forest and the river. 
The aggregate results of Exercise Resettlement Attributes are summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Aggregate results of exercise Resettlement attributes  
(First, second and third round) 
 Forest VS Money Forest VS Land 
for Land 
Forest VS Self-
employment 
Land for Land VS 
Forest no Village 
1st ROUND 
Forest =36 (73%)  
Money=13 (27%) 
Forest =34 (69%)  
Land for Land=15 
(31%) 
Forest =29 
(59%)   
Self-employment 
=20 (41%) 
Land for Land=47 
(96%)    
Forest no 
Village=2 (4%) 
2nd ROUND 
Forest =46 
(100%)    
Money=0  
Forest =41 (89%)   
Land for Land=5 
(11%) 
Forest =41 
(89%)     
Self-employment 
=5 (11%) 
Land for Land=43 
(93%)     
Forest no 
Village=3 (7%) 
3rd ROUND 
Forest =61 (85%)   
Money=11 (15%) 
Forest =61 (85%)  
Land for Land=11 
(15%) 
Forest =56 
(78%)   
Self-employment 
=16 (22%) 
Land for Land=68 
(94%)    
Forest no 
Village=4 (6%) 
TOTAL 
Forest =143 
(86%)   Money=27 
(14%) 
Forest =136 
(81%) Land for 
Land=31 (19%) 
Forest =126 
(75%) Self-
employment =41 
(25%) 
Land for 
Land=159 (95%)   
Forest no 
Village=9 (5%) 
 
Package Forest versus Package Money 
In Forest versus Money the respondent had to choose between a package which 
guaranteed continued access to the forest and the river and aimed at replicating the existing 
living condition of the affected families without providing any kind of cash compensation, 
and a package which only offered cash compensation but did not envisaged any 
contribution or support to the creation of a new livelihood in the relocation place. Therefore 
the choice between the two packages represented a choice between the “old and known” 
and “the new and unknown”. 
The incontestable preference for package Forest revealed by the exercise (143 out of 
167 of the respondents opted for package Forest, i.e. 86% of them) might therefore indicate 
an aversion to change and to risk and confirm at the same time the essential role played by 
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the relationship with the environment in the life of the people affected by the Polavaram 
dam. Using the language of microeconomics, it means that the affected people value their 
rights and claims over land, forest and river more than the amount offered, that is that their 
WTA loss of these rights and claims is higher than the compensation offered.  
It can be argued however that what drove the choice of the respondents towards package 
Forest was not only aversion to change, the attachment to the environment and the 
undervaluation of the losses implied in the compensation offered, but also a genuine dislike 
or distrust of cash (at least cash versus material assets). A number of respondents, when 
questioned on the reasons for their choice, made clear that they deemed money “not 
important, not reliable and easily lost”. Indeed some of the families interviewed had had 
some kind of direct experience with the volatility of money: the cash compensation 
received for house and land had already been spent at the time of the interview. 
In order to check whether the distaste for package Money was driven by the 
insufficiency of the amount offered or by an intrinsic aversion to cash, three different 
packages encompassing three different amounts of cash compensation were offered. 
In the first round, including 5 villages (Kondamodalu, Aghra Koderu, Sabari 
Kothagudem, Lacchigudem, Rudramkota) for a total of 49 interviews, package Forest was 
preferred 36 times and package Money 13 times (that is Forest was preferred in 73% of the 
cases). 
The “generous” version of package Money was introduced in the second round and 
surprisingly it did not seem to make it more appealing. During the second round, 46 
interviews were realised across 4 villages (Ramayapeta, Chegondapalli, Tutigunta, 
Pydipaka) and within these interviews, the “standard” version of package B was used 24 
times (this version was identical to the one used during the first round), while the “generous” 
version was used 22 times. In 100% of the cases package Forest was preferred to package 
Money, that is there was not any difference in the response rate when using the “standard” 
or the “generous” version. Besides, both scored worse than the “standard” version in the 
first round.  
Finally, in the third round, the “generous improved” version was introduced. In this 
round 6 villages were involved (Vinjaram, Totapalli, Gundala, Bovanagiri, Talluru, 
Kegunduru), for a total of 72 families interviewed. The 'standard” version was used in 36 
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cases, with package Forest chosen 33 times (92%) and package Money 3 times. The 
“generous improved” was used with 36 families, of which 28 (78%) chose package Forest 
and 8 chose package Money. In the third round therefore we can note a small difference in 
the response rate between the “standard” and the “generous improved” version but still the 
attitude to opt for cash compensation is less strong than the one showed in the first round. 
The manifested preference for package Forest cut across social groups and employment 
categories: it was shared by tribals and non-tribals, landless families as well as farmers. 
Some insights however can come from the analysis of the characteristics of those who did 
not chose package Forest, that is whether the preference for cash compensation was driven 
by some specific factors. Of the 24 which opted for package Money, 16 were non-tribal and 
12 were landless. Besides, nine of them were found in the village of Aghra Koderu, which 
is one of the few villages of the sample which is located out of walkable reach from the 
forest and therefore whose inhabitants do not regularly engage in forest-related activities. 
Moreover, six of the 25 respondents belonging to families with a source of income 
alternative or additional to agriculture chose package Money. Having already received some 
compensation did not instead seem to make a difference in the preference for package 
Money. Gender also did not seem to play a role: there was no difference between the 
proportion of women in the sample (26.5%) and the share of women which accepted 
package Money. The results therefore do not suggest a clear socio-economic profile of the 
respondents which expressed a preference for package Money, it seems however that not 
depending on the specific location for one's own livelihood and not having a strong cultural 
bond to the forest (as it's more likely to be the case among non-tribals) were characteristics 
associated with a stronger inclination to prefer cash compensation. 
 
Package Forest versus Package Land for Land 
Package Land for Land resembles the package effectively offered by the government, as 
it includes a relocation site, housing, some cash compensation for the loss of access to 
forest and river and land compensation (subject to a ceiling of 5 acres). The main difference 
is that it provides land compensation to every family irrespective of their social group. In a 
sense package Land for Land did try to replicate the livelihood characteristics of the 
affected people, with the notable exception of the loss of access to the forest and the river. 
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While a varied propensity to opt for this package according to the social group was 
expected, its widespread popularity across all social groups was a surprise. Not only did 
non-tribal families consider it as a guarantee of the perpetuation of a claim over land, but 
most of the families (especially small farmers) saw in it the only opportunity to keep being 
farmers after relocation. The cash compensation provided in exchange for the loss of land is 
in fact insufficient to repurchase an equal (or even smaller) amount of land in the new 
settlement (the cost of new land ranges from 500,000 to 700,000 Rs per acre). The 
implication is that the great majority of the non-tribal families, especially the poorest ones, 
run the risk to become landless. 
It was not however at the stage of the discrete-choice exercise that the generalised 
preference for package Land for Land was clearly shown. When compared with the status-
quo package in fact, most of the families opted for the latter, confirming that access to the 
forest and river is considered a priority. 
Out of the total 167 families which were interviewed, only 31 favoured package Land 
for Land over package Forest, that is 23% of them. Using different versions of package 
Land for Land, with increasing amounts of cash compensation, did not lead to more 
positive responses for package Land for Land. 
In the first round, 34 families out of 49 chose Forest and 15 chose Land for Land (31%). 
In the second round, with a “generous” version of package Land for Land (which 
encompassed an increase in the compensation for loss of forest and river from 35,000 to 
70,000 Rs), the latter was chosen 4 times out of 22 (18%). When the standard version was 
used, Land for Land was chosen only once (4%, across 24 interviews).  
Similarly in the third round, when the “generous improved” version was used (with 
forest and river compensation increased to 170,000 Rs and cash compensation for land over 
the 5 acres ceiling increased from 130,000 Rs to 200,000 Rs), package Forest was chosen 
28 times and package Land for Land 8 times  (22%, for a total of 36 families), while when 
the standard version was used, only 3 families out of 36 (8%) opted for package C. 
So, again the rate of preference for package Land for Land was higher in the first round 
than in the second and the third, when modified versions were used. In the second and third 
round we can, however, notice a significant difference in the percentage of people who 
chose Land for Land when the standard version was used (respectively 4% and 8%) then 
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when the “generous” and “generous improved” versions were adopted (18% and 22%).156  
It is interesting instead to note that those who chose package Land for Land over 
package Forest were found mainly among the non-tribals (20 out of 31) and the landless 
(17 out of 31). Also, in this case eight of the 25 having an alternative or additional source of 
income to agriculture refused package Forest for Land for Land. The fact that landless 
families were attracted by a resettlement package which offers land for land compensation 
appears puzzling at first sight. When the respondents were questioned on the reasons for 
their choice, they provided however a very reasonable explanation: they are attracted by the 
cash compensation element (for the loss of the forest and river) which is present in package 
Land for Land but not in package Forest, and working as wage labourers, they benefit from 
the land for land compensation given to their fellow villagers and potential employers. 
Finally, it is not surprising to find that package Land for Land attracted mainly non-tribals: 
the 'real' PRRP in fact does not grant land for land compensation to non ST families, 
whereas package Land for Land would have granted to them the continuation of their 
entitlement to land.  
 
Package Forest versus Package Self-employment 
Package Self-employment offered the possibility to give up farming activities (no land 
compensation was offered, not even to tribal families) and implement a self-employment 
enterprise, with technical and finance assistance. So again the choice was between the 
status quo and a substantially different livelihood. This package was meant to be appealing 
especially for landless families, which could, more than all the others, take advantage from 
the self-employment opportunity offered. Yet, around half (21 out of 41) of those who 
chose package Self-employment did own some land. This choice is striking as it implied the 
loss of land ownership and therefore the wish to abandon farming but it's consistent with 
the decreasing profitability of agriculture experienced by small and marginal farmers in 
drought-prone areas of India. Indeed, it's consistent with the findings of a survey conducted 
by the NSSO on the conditions of farming in India in 2003, according to which 27% of the 
farmers did not like farming because it was not profitable and overall 40%, if given a 
                                                           
156 The increase was not driven by the increase in the cash compensation for land above ceiling: only 
one of the respondents which accepted package Land for Landin the second and third round was a medium 
farmer which owned more than five acres of land and which therefore wold have benefited from the higher 
price paid. 
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choice, would have liked to give it up for some other activity (NSSO 2005). 
 A “generous” and “generous improved” version were used also for package Self-
employment but in this case the use of modified versions was not expected to generate 
radically different answers, as it did not change the substance of the package. The trend 
shown however is consistent with the previous exercises: in the first round Self-employment 
was chosen 20 times (41% of times) and Forest 29 times (59%), in the second round there 
was a retreat of the preferences for package Self-employment, for both versions: the 
standard version of package Self-employment was chosen only once over 24 families (4%) 
and the generous version was chosen by 4 families (18%) over the 22 interviewed. In the 
third round 6 families out of 36 (17%) chose the standard version of Self-employment and 
10 families out of 36 (28%) chose the 'generous improved' version. 
The results of the discrete-choice exercise seem to indicate that Self-employment was 
considered the “most acceptable” package after Forest. It must be recalled in fact that Self-
employment was chosen (in total across the three rounds) 41 times out of 167, whereas 
package Land for Land was chosen 31 times and Money 27 times. However the comments 
collected during the interviews and the results of the ranking exercise are not entirely 
consistent with these results. Package Self-employment in fact appears only as the third 
most preferred option in the ranking exercise and in many instances the respondents made 
clear that they did not consider a self-employment package as a life-resolving opportunity. 
Employment schemes are often perceived as empty promises by the government, which 
either will not be kept or will not be able to generate a sustainable or sufficient flow of 
income. For instance, we were told: “even if the government provides a job for one person, 
what the rest of the family will do?” (Interview 34). In other cases it was the dimension of 
the local market which was perceived as a constraint: “how many tailors can possibly be 
needed in a single village?” (Interview 100). 
 
Package Forest no Village versus Package Land for Land 
Package Forest no Village is identical to package Forest except for the fact that 
relocation is without community. Given that both Forest no Village than Land for Land 
provide land for land compensation, the trade-off faced by the family in this exercise is 
between relocation in a similar setting without the community versus relocation in plain 
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area with the community. The aim was to explore whether people attribute more importance 
to the location of resettlement or to the presence of the community. The answer provided by 
the exercise is quite clear: package Forest no Village was chosen only 9 times out of 167, 
thus showing a strong tendency to put life with the original community ahead of the access 
to the forest.  
This tendency is confirmed by the exercise attempting to estimate the willingness to 
accept relocation without the community (see later in this section): the greatest majority of 
the families claimed that they were unwilling to accept any money in exchange for being 
relocated without their own community. 
Looking at the results disaggregated in the three rounds, Forest no Village was chosen 
only twice (out of 49) in the first round, 3 times (out of 46) in the second round and 4 times 
in the third (out of 72). All the respondents who accepted it in the second and third round 
had been offered the “generous” or the “generous improved” version. However, given the 
small number of families involved, it seems hazardous to claim that it was the adoption of 
the modified packages which generated the difference in the attitude.  
Rather, it is interesting to note that all the nine respondents but one either belong to 
villages which are heterogeneous in terms of social composition, or belong to a caste 
different from the one prevalent in the village where they live. In particular, three of them 
are OC157 from Ramayapeta, where the majority of the population is OC, with presence of 
SC and ST families; one is BC158from Vinjaram, where the population is mixed; one 
belongs to the ST “Bisidi” and lives in Talluru, where the greatest majority of the people 
are ST “Koya”; two are respectively OC and ST “Konda Reddy” from Kegunduru, where 
most of the people are ST “Koya” or “Konda Kammari”; one is a ST from Sabari Kotha 
Gudem, a village with a majority of SC population. The only exception is an ST “Koya” 
living in Aghra Koderu, where indeed most of the people are ST “Koya”. However, this 
respondent distinguishes himself from the rest of his fellow villagers for being a large 
farmer, as he owns 25 acres of land. Therefore, it seems that not belonging to a very 
homogenous community, or belonging to one but differing from it for at least one 
characteristic, is a feature shared by those who preferred package Forest no Village. 
Comparing this choice with the other preferences expressed in the rest of the 
                                                           
157
  i.e. belonging to Other Castes. 
158
  i.e. belonging to Backward Castes. 
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experiment, it emerges that three159 of the nine respondents preferred Forest no Village not 
because they valued the forest more than the community, but in fact because they were 
attracted by the possibility of being relocated away from their original community. This 
was suggested by the fact that these three accept the package Money no Community at the 
first offer in exercise Willingness to Accept (see below) and when questioned about their 
preferences, they declared that they did not wish to be relocated with the rest of their 
village.160 By contrast, the three respondents from Ramayapeta and the one from Sabari 
Kotha Gudem attributed greatest importance to the place of relocation (without necessarily 
implying a dislike for their community). In fact, these people always chose package Forest 
and ranked it in the first place in the ranking exercise (see below). Instead, it is more 
difficult to interpret the choice of the big farmer from Aghra Koderu, who chose Forest no 
Village, but also preferred Money to Forest and ranked Money in the first place in the 
ranking exercise. A possible explanation is that this person attributed the greatest 
importance to a large amount of cash compensation (hence preference for Money), followed 
by relocation close to the forest, in turn followed  by relocation with his own community.  
To sum up, the results of exercise Resettlement attributes clearly show that the sampled 
families have a strong preference for a compensation package which seeks the maintenance 
of the status-quo, including the perpetuation of the access to the forest and the river, thus 
suggesting the existence of lexicographic preferences.  
The interviews were organised in three rounds, which generated slightly different results, 
as can be seen from Table 6.1.In the first round, when only the “standard” version of the 
packages was used, the number (as well as the percentage) of respondents not choosing 
Forest was higher with respect to the second and third round, across all the discrete choices 
(with the exception of Forest no Village versus Land for Land). In the third round however 
this phenomenon was less strong than in the second, suggesting that offering a much higher 
sum of money might make cash compensation attractive to some. The numbers involved 
are obviously too small to infer any causality, but the non-randomness of the choices made 
by the respondents is confirmed by the fact that those who expressed a preference for cash 
compensation in this exercise, tended to do so across all the other exercises. It is also 
important to stress that the answers obtained with this exercise were all mutually consistent. 
                                                           
159
  The two respondents from Kegunduru and the one from Talluru. 
160
  While sharing this wish with us, these people did not seem to be willing to reveal the reasons for it, 
and it was not felt appropriate to push the conversation any further on the topic.  
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• EXERCISE 2: Willingness to Accept 
Exercise Willingness to Accept explored the possibility of employing CE and contingent 
valuation methodology to estimate the 'right amount' of cash compensation for the losses 
implied with displacement. In particular, it aimed to test the reaction of the respondents to 
the offer of a certain amount of money in exchange for the loss of an important aspect of 
their lives and their degree of acceptability of such an offer. It also wanted to generate more 
evidence on the acceptability of cash compensation by the displaced people as a fair and 
sustainable form of restitution. 
In order to make the test more significant, the most intangible and incommensurable 
aspect of life of the affected people was chosen, i.e. life with the community. The purpose 
of the exercise was therefore to verify the feasibility of the estimation of willingness to 
accept (WTA) relocation without the community.  
 
Please indicate which package you prefer between : 
 Preferred package 
Package Money versus 
Package  Money no community 
with 30.000Rs 
 
________Money                    
________ Money no community  
Package Money versus 
Package Money no community 
with 50.000 Rs 
 
________Money                      
_______ Money no community  
Package Money versus 
Package Money no community 
with 100.000 Rs 
 
________Money                    
________ Money no community 
 
If Money no community is never a preferred option, than ask the respondent the 
following: 
What is the minimum amount of money that you're willing to accept in  exchange 
for being relocated without your community? 
________________________Rs 
 
This was sought through two different types of questions. With the first question the 
respondent was asked to choose between two only-cash-compensation packages, identical 
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apart from the fact that package Money no community offered a higher amount of money in 
exchange for being relocated without the rest of the community. Three different amounts 
were offered in sequence: 30,000 Rs, 50,000 Rs and 100,000 Rs in the first and second 
round, and 80,000Rs, 150,000 Rs and 300,000 Rs in the third round. The amount accepted 
would have indicated his or her WTA. In case none of the amount was accepted, the 
respondent was asked to explicitly state the minimum amount of money that he or she was 
willing to accept in exchange for being relocated without the community.161 
Let's look at the results in the aggregate (first, second and third round together): 
 
Table 7.2 Aggregate results of Exercise Willingness to Accept 
 Money vs MNC30/ 
MNC 80 
Money vs MNC 50/ 
MNC 150 
Money vs MNC 
100/ MNC 300 
Money 159 155 152 
Money no 
community (MNC) 
8 (5%) 12 (7%) 15 (9%) 
 
As Table 6.2 shows, only 5% of the respondents accepted the no-community package 
after the first offer, 7% after the second offer and 9% after the third offer. These results 
therefore show a marked tendency to refuse money in exchange for the community. The 
typical comment, when asked to explain the reason for their choice, was “I don't want the 
money, I want to live with my people”, or “I've known these people since birth, I don't want 
to leave them”, or “The community must live all together, wherever we go”. In some 
comments it also re-emerged the problem of the volatility of money: “money is not 
permanent, it will go away” (interview 73); or “what if I accept 1 lakh and then I lose it, 
who takes care of me, what do I do with no friends?” (Interview 72). 
However one might wonder whether this tendency depended on the fact that too little 
money was offered. The question asking to state the minimum amount of money acceptable 
should have revealed if this was the case, however only three people provided an answer to 
this question (see below). In order to double-check the (in)existence of WTA money in  
exchange for the community, the amounts offered were then tripled. It was so hoped to 
                                                           
161 This 'direct' way of eliciting WTA belongs to contingent valuation methodology and not to choice 
experiments.  
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eliminate the effect due to a potential shyness of people to spell out a “big” amount of 
money. 
The increased amounts (respectively 80,000 Rs; 150,000 Rs; 300,000 Rs) were 
introduced only in the third round and were tested on 36 families (the 36 left were used as 
control group). The results are shown in table 7.3 and in table 7.4. 
They clearly show that offering a higher amount of money in the first place did generate 
a higher rate of acceptance of package Money no community .The difference is particularly 
striking if we compare the results within the third round of interviews: when the original 
version of package Money no community was used, only one respondent accepted it and 
only at the last offer (i.e. 100,000 Rs). When the increased amount was used, 4 respondents 
(11%) accepted Money no community with 80,000 Rs; 2 persons more (that is 6 in total, 
equal to 17% of the sample)  accepted B(i) with 150,000 Rs and the same 6 accepted 
Money no community with 300,000 Rs. 
 
Table 7.3 Results of Exercise Willingness to Accept, First and Second Round 
 Money vs MNC 30 Money vs MNC 50 Money vs MNC 100 
Money 90 88 86 
Money no 
community (MNC) 
4 (4%) 6  (6%) 8 (9%) 
 
Table 7.4 Results of Exercise Willingness to Accept, Third Round 
 
Money vs 
MNC 30 
Money vs 
MNC 80 
Money vs 
MNC 50 
Money vs 
MNC 150 
Money vs 
MNC 100 
Money vs 
MNC 300 
Money 36 (100%) 36 (100%) 35 32 30 30 
MNC  0 0 1 (3%) 4 (11%) 6 (17%) 6 (17%) 
 
In confirmation of the validity of these results, it must be noted how they were obtained 
independently of the presence of other members of the community during the exercise. It 
was in fact my concern that the presence of other people might hinder the respondent's 
inclination to accept package Money no community out of embarrassment to do so in front 
of fellow villagers. However, the same result (i.e. preference for package Money) was 
systematically obtained by interviews conducted in very different conditions: the 
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respondent alone in his or her house, in presence of other members of the family, or of a 
number of neighbours. Vice-versa, the respondents who did accept package Money no 
community , did so even when surrounded by other people commenting the exercise. 
Overall, while the influence of peer pressure on the preferences expressed can't be 
completely ruled out, the findings of this exercise do not seem to have depended on the 
presence of other villagers during it. 
As concerns the characteristics of the 15 respondents who overall accepted Money no 
community, seven were landless and seven also had an additional or alternative source of 
income to agriculture (of these, four were both landless and had an alternative source of 
income). In addition, only four were tribal (that is 26.6%, less than the share of tribals in 
the whole sample) and four were women (in this case the share of female respondents on 
the whole sample was the same). So, not being tied to farming on one's own land for 
subsistence and already engaging in activities outside agriculture were factors shared by 
those who found acceptable to exchange relocation with community with a higher cash 
compensation.  
Regarding the question requiring to state one's own WTA relocation without the 
community, it confirmed the inappropriateness of such concept, at least in those 
circumstances and for that particular package attribute. Except for three people, none of the 
respondents was able or willing to mention any amount of money. In fact everybody more 
or less explicitly stated that they would not accept any amount of money. Respondents of 
either gender, social group, age or income provided the same answer and the presence or 
absence of other members of the community during the interview did not seem to make a 
difference (as it was initially feared). 
The refusal to state a price was usually accompanied by comments which underlined the 
importance of the community in people's life: 
“I want to stay with my community, we've faced many problems together” (Interview 
118); 
“If there are some problems our neighbours can help us. What can we do without the 
community?” (Interview 64); 
 “If you accept package Money no community you run the risk to lose the money and be 
in a place where you don't know anybody. At least if you choose package Money you have 
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friends and family to give support.” (Interview 78). 
The community is therefore considered as a form of insurance against risk and the 
uncertainty of the future, often related to health problems: 
“My husband has health problems, if something happens and we go away, who takes 
care of us?” (Interview 96); 
“What happens if I get sick and I'm without my people?” (Interview 107). 
 The fact that living with one's own community guarantees an informal safety net, which 
is otherwise lost and not replaced by any formal social security system, is in itself a good 
explanation of the impossibility to identify a price for abandoning the community. 
Overall, the results indicate that there was no such a thing as WTA relocation without 
community for the participants to the exercise. This is consistent with at least two non-
mutually exclusive explanations. First, the hypothetical exchange implied in the exercise 
between such an intangible good as the community and a sum of money imposed an 
excessive cognitive burden on the respondent. Second, the community was deemed a 
constitutive incommensurable, in the sense used by Espeland in reference to the Yavapai 
people (see Espeland 2001 and section 2.3 of this thesis). In other words, the respondents 
define themselves and their identity in relation to their community, which therefore is 
considered irreducible to and incomparable with money. The preference for package Money 
no community showed by a minority of the respondents is more indicative of the eagerness 
of certain families for liquidity than of the meaningfulness of WTA in this context.162 This 
hypothesis is supported by the fact that of the 15 respondents which chose Money no 
community, eight had also preferred Money to Forest in the discrete choice exercise and all 
but one also ranked Money at the first place in the ranking exercise (see below). Thus, those 
who were more inclined to accept cash compensation, did so across all the exercises. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
162 For this reason, and also because of  the small number of positive answers obtained, the estimation of 
an average WTA was not pursued. 
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• EXERCISE 3: Compensation in Instalments  
Please indicate which package you prefer between .....? 
 Preferred package 
Package Instalments versus 
Package Land for Land 
_____ Instalments  
     _____Land for Land 
 
One of the main limitations of cash compensation is that it's often exhausted even before 
the actual relocation takes place. In fact, families with binding cash constraints, an injection 
of liquidity can relieve, at least temporarily, some of these constraints. Thus, compensation 
is often used to repay debts, to pay medical expenses, or for the dowry of one or more 
daughters. Sometimes people use it to indulge in a few “luxuries”, such as a TV, a fridge, a 
motorbike or a new fan. 
The implication is that by the time that people move into the relocation colony, they do 
not have enough savings to invest in a new livelihood. The situation is particularly serious 
for landless families, which will not be able to rely on any kind of productive assets.  
It could be argued that in using monetary compensation for consumption goods rather 
than for savings and investment, people are just 'revealing' their preferences and that there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong with these preferences. No value judgement should be made 
about the way people chose to use the money they are given. Indeed, the problem with cash 
compensation is not that it is used to purchase goods, rather that it does not serve the 
purpose for which it is supposedly granted. In fact, it does not help restore the livelihoods 
disrupted by displacement, because it is rarely put to productive uses. 
In consideration of the phenomenon just described, package Instalments offered the 
same kind of compensation than package Land for Land, but with higher amounts of money 
involved (again using a generous and generous improved version). However the payment of 
cash was delayed in time, that is split over ten instalments in five years. The aim was to 
check whether families, when given the possibility, would opt for a (larger) flow of income 
which lasts for a longer period, rather than a payment in bulk. 
The experiment proved however the existence of a strong preference for the present and 
for bulk payments: only nine respondents out of 167 chose package Instalments. Of these 
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nine, six were found in the third round and were offered the “generous improved” version 
of the packages, while two belonged to the first round and only one was found in the 
second round (and was offered the “standard” version of the package). Thus, in this case 
the adoption of an augmented cash compensation (people offered the “improved generous” 
version were facing a choice between 170,000 Rs+ 200,000 Rs per acre and 300,000+ 
265,000 per acre163) did seem to increase the “acceptability” of package Instalments. 
However what is really revealing in this exercise comes from the motivations brought 
forward by the respondents for their choice. 
The main reason for disliking package Instalments was the disbelief that the government 
would in fact pay all the 5 instalments: people feared that the government might “change its 
mind”, especially as a result of the change of the party in power.  
On the other hand, some other respondents made clear that they deemed a payment in 
bulk more useful for productive purposes. For instance, they said that “a little amount is of 
no use, whereas a big one can be used to implement a business” (interview 97), or that “a 
big amount is better to invest in future development” (interview 98). A woman told us “my 
son is starting a business in a new village, the money can be used for that” (interview 96) 
and another that she would “put the money into the bank and get the interest” (interview 
66); a few respondents said that they would use the money to buy land in the resettlement 
area. For others a payment in bulk represented a way to alleviate the cash constraint: “it's 
better to get the money all together, so I can solve all my problems at once” (interview 114), 
meaning the repayment of a debt. 
Finally, those few respondents who preferred package Instalments, claimed that they 
were motivated by the higher amount of money offered and by the fact that “a single 
instalment is a waste, you just drink it and it's gone” (interview 97). 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
163 Only one of the respondents which overall accepted Instalments owned land above the ceiling of 5 
acres, so the preference for Instalments must entirely be imputed to the difference in the cash compensation 
for loss of forest and river.  
276 
• EXERCISE  4: Ranking 
Please rank in order of preference the following packages: Forest, Money, Land for 
Land, Self-employment 
1: (most preferred):  ______ 
2:                              ______ 
3:                              ______ 
4: (least preferred)   ______ 
 
In the final exercise the respondent was asked to rank 4 packages (Forest, Money, Land 
for Land, and Self-employment ) in order of preference. The aim was to double-check the 
preferences expressed in the previous exercises, making the respondents reflect deeper on 
the options faced. The preferences expressed with the ranking exercise were in most of the 
cases consistent with those elicited with the previous exercises, thus confirming their 
findings and in particular the strong preference for the resettlement package which 
replicated the status-quo. However, some cases of inconsistency of the preferences were 
found, and the implications are discussed hereafter. 
 
Table 7.5 Summary of ranking results 
 
Forest Money Land for 
Land 
Self-
employment 
TOT 
1st  133 20 4 9 166 
2nd 9 4 126 27 166 
3rd 2 32 28 104 166 
4th 22 110 8 26 166 
TOT 166 166 166 166  
      
 
On a total of 166 answers164 in fact package Forest appears 133 times at the first place 
                                                           
164 The ranking exercise was done 167 times, but of one of the respondents refused to rank packages 
Land for Land, Self-employment and Money, saying that he was willing to accept only package Forest. This 
interview has therefore been eliminated by the aggregate count. 
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(that is as most preferred option), nine times at the second place, two times at the third 
place and 22 times as least preferred option. 
Package Land for Land appears more often at the second place (126 times), confirming 
its status of “second-best” option. Package Self-employment was chosen by 104 respondents 
as third preferred option and package Money confirmed to be the least favoured choice, 
appearing 110 times in the fourth place. 
A closer look at the results in table 2.5  however reveals some unexpected patterns. 
First, package Forest has been chosen with the second highest frequency not in the 
second but in the fourth place (22 times), that is as the least favoured package. Those who 
ranked package A in the fourth place, did it so consistently with their behaviour in the 
discrete choice exercise: 21 out of 22 never preferred package Forest to the alternative 
package offered in exercise 1 (that is, their sequence of choice in exercise 1 was Money, 
Land for Land, Self-employment, Land for Land or Forest no Village). Moreover, as might 
be expected, the majority of these 22 were landless (13 out of 22) and non-tribal (16 out of 
22). 
Second, package Money is the package which more often, after package Forest, has been 
indicated as the most preferred option. In fact, it appears 20 times in the first place, whereas 
package Land for Land and Self-employment respectively only 4 and 9 times. Also in this 
case, the preference so expressed was consistent with the one revealed in exercise 1: 18 out 
of the 20 respondents which ranked Money in the first place had chosen Money over Forest 
in the discrete choice exercise. In this case, only half of them were landless and 13 were 
non-tribal. As commented above, eight of the 15 respondents who accepted package  
Money no community in the second exercise, also ranked Money in the first place.  
Finally, the distribution of the preferences for package Self-employment somehow 
confirms the mixed opinions expressed by the respondents concerning this package, as it 
was mentioned when describing the exercise “Forest versus Self-employment”. In the latter 
exercise, package Self-employment was chosen 41 times, being so the package that in the 
discrete-choice exercise was more often preferred to package Forest. It was therefore 
expected to find it as the most popular package in the ranking exercise after package Forest, 
appearing with the highest frequency in the second place. Not only did this not happen, but 
in some instances the preferences expressed in the ranking were inconsistent with those 
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expressed in the first exercise. That is, the same respondents which affirmed to prefer Self-
employment to Forest when facing a discrete choice, did not rank Self-employment as the 
most preferred option, but rather claimed to prefer Forest (or Land for Land). Said with 
microeconomic terminology, their preferences did not respect the propriety of 
transitivity.165 
When this happened, the respondent was asked to repeat the ranking exercises and, if the 
results of the latter were confirmed, to repeat the discrete-choice exercise. Usually the 
repetition of the discrete choice eliminated the inconsistencies, with Forest being now the 
favoured option. This “correction strategy” was not however always adopted and the 
ranking was left inconsistent with the rest. The reason is that often it was deemed that 
insisting with the questions might have been felt as an imposition to modify the preferences 
expressed in the first place. In fact in some cases, when asked to repeat the exercise, the 
respondent confirmed his or her choices, and could not even see where the problem with 
the inconsistency was. The typical comment was “ if I have to choose between Forest and 
Self-employment, I choose Self-employment, but in a ranking Forest is obviously the best 
option”. Verifying the existence of this sort of 'irrational behaviour' was indeed one of the 
purposes of the CE. With irrationality it is meant here the fact that people's preferences do 
not necessarily behave as postulated by rational choice theory and in particular they do not 
necessarily have the proprieties assumed by the theory (for instance, transitivity). This 
finding stands in support of the choice made by this study of using CE as a method to elicit 
people’s preferences removing the assumptions required by rational choice theory. 
The total cases of inconsistencies between the choices expressed in exercise 1 and those 
expressed in the ranking exercise were 15, of which 12 involved package Self-employment. 
The existence of these inconsistencies however does not impinge on the validity of the 
exercise and the non-triviality of the results. Overall in fact, the preferences expressed did 
demonstrate consistency within and between exercises.  
 
7.2.2.3 Summary and discussion of the findings  
 
The aim of this section was to investigate what contribution methods of direct 
consultation of people displaced by development projects can give to the design of better 
                                                           
165 If x is preferred to y, and y is preferred to z, then x is preferred to z. 
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R&R programmes. For this purpose focus groups and a consultation exercise based on CE 
were implemented in villages which will be displaced by the Polavaram dam. Both 
methodologies investigated the favoured forms of compensation and resettlement and 
obtained mutually reinforcing results.  
As concerns the preferences for different types of compensation and resettlement 
expressed through the CE, the most evident finding is that the affected population would 
prefer to be relocated in a setting and with modalities which guarantee the perpetuation of 
the status quo, in particular the accessibility of the forest and the river Godavari and the 
ownership of land. Analogously, the main finding of the focus groups was that the forest is 
considered the main loss caused by displacement. 
In particular, exercise Resettlement Attributes revealed that the continuation of the 
status-quo was preferred to relocation elsewhere complemented with different amounts of 
cash compensation. When faced with the choice of losing the forest and the river or the 
community, the greatest majority stated that they could do without the forest but not 
without the community. The importance of the community was also confirmed by the fact 
that the majority was not willing to exchange relocation without the community with any 
sum of money. However, some respondents did express the wish to be relocated without 
the other families. This finding does not invalidate what just stated on the importance of the 
community, rather it suggests the existence of some conflictuality in the villages 
investigated that the experiment was not otherwise able to detect and explore.    
Overall, the behaviour expressed through the systematic choice of package Forest in 
exercise Resettlement Attributes and Ranking and the refusal of package Forest no Village 
suggests the existence of lexicographic preferences for the maintenance of the status-quo 
(i.e. life in the forest) and even more strongly for relocation with one's own community.  
Another clear finding is the importance attributed to land ownership by most of the 
respondents, expressed by their preference for land for land compensation (i.e. package 
Land for Land). When maintenance of the status-quo was not possible, the greatest majority 
preferred resettlement with land for land compensation. This finding is particularly 
significant in consideration of the fact that the non-tribal households will receive cash for 
land compensation instead, in an amount which most likely will not allow them to 
repurchase land in the new location. Issues linked to land compensation emerged during the 
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focus groups only related to the quality of the land provided. The reason is that all but one 
of the focus groups villages were tribal, and all the tribal households displaced by the 
Polavaram dam are granted land for land compensation. As will be discussed later in the 
chapter, one of the main shortcomings of the PRRP indeed is the provision of different 
types of compensation for the land expropriated to families belonging to different social 
groups.  
The mixed evidence generated concerning the attitude towards a resettlement package 
inclusive of a self-employment programme (i.e. package Self-employment) suggested the 
existence of a tension between the willingness to engage in (possibly more profitable) 
activities outside farming and the reluctance to abandon the known mode of livelihood, as 
well as to trust a government programme. From the discussion held within the focus groups, 
however, it clearly emerged how people would be willing to engage in any type of 
employment programme and that a secure job would have constituted an adequate form of 
compensation. 
The untrustworthiness of the government was also found to have a bearing on the 
attitude of the affected people towards cash compensation: the preference for a smaller one-
time payment rather than a larger compensation payment in instalments delayed in time 
was primarily motivated by doubts over whether the government would indeed pay all the 
instalments promised. More generally, both consultation methods suggested a mixed 
attitude towards cash compensation which casts some doubts on its effectiveness and 
fairness as a form of restitution for any type of loss. In fact, the greatest majority of the 
participants to the CE stated that the resettlement package only providing cash 
compensation (i.e. package Money) was the least preferred option. At the same time, 
package Money was the one which attracted the highest proportion of 'deviant behaviour': 
the respondents who preferred it, did so in exercise Resettlement Attributes and Ranking 
and, to an extent, also in exercise Willingness to Accept. The deviant respondents also 
tended to share some characteristics: they belonged more often to non-tribal and landless 
families; moreover the proportion of 'deviant' respondents was higher among those having 
an additional or alternative source of income to agriculture. This seems to suggest that 
monetary compensation tends to attract on the one hand those with no productive assets and 
secure source of income, and on the other, those who already have a regular flow of income 
and do not rely on farming for subsistence.  
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The results of this attempt to directly consult the Polavaram affected people about their 
resettlement are reinforced by the consistency between the two methods employed, but also 
by the fact that the same preferences were expressed by respondents with different 
characteristics in terms of age, gender, social group, land ownership and source of income. 
In particular, it must be noted how the attachment to the forest was shown by all castes and 
not only by the tribals (although of course it must also be noted that those willing to 
abandon it in  exchange for a higher amount of money were found more often among the 
non-tribals). 
To conclude, some methodological considerations need to be made on the validity, 
utility and appropriateness of using CE to explore resettlement preferences. 
This research did not employ CE methodology for the estimation of the 'hidden cost' of 
displacement through the elicitation of the WTA various types of resettlement packages by 
the resettlement people and their marginal rates of substitution between different attributes 
of the packages. The assumptions required for such operation were deemed implausible in 
the context of study. However, it was assumed that preferences did exist and that the 
choices made by the respondents were truthful and non-random.  
The presence of some inconsistent answers by the respondents across the different 
exercises, while not invalidating the experiment, does constitute evidence of the fact that 
the preferences of the affected people do not necessarily behave as predicted by rational 
choice theory. This was also suggested by the adoption of a lexicographic ordering of the 
preferred resettlement packages by the respondents, manifested by the systematic 
preference for the status-quo package independently of what was offered in exchange 
(lexicographic ordering is another violation of the propriety of transitivity of preferences). 
The existence of preferences and their truthfulness and non-randomness seems instead 
confirmed by the homogeneity of the answers across different types of respondents together 
with the consistency of these answers with those obtained by the focus groups. 
The attempt to estimate the WTA for relocation without the community failed, in the 
sense that such exchange was deemed unacceptable by the greatest majority of the 
respondents. Moreover, the use of different versions of the resettlement packages, including 
different amounts of money (in return for loss of land, forest, etc.) did not lead to different 
rates of preferences for the cash compensation packages. So, there seems to be little ground 
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to justify the monetary estimation of the marginal rates of substitution between the different 
packages. The more resettlement packages include attributes which correspond to 
incommensurable aspects of people’s life, the more the use of CEs and statement 
preference methods in general to estimate WTP and WTA seems problematic. 
However, the use of the CE, supplemented by focus groups, did allow the identification 
of a clear pattern in the preferences of the population affected by the Polavaram dam 
concerning their resettlement, and it provided indications on what is deemed as an 
acceptable exchange and what is not. In this sense, it can constitute a useful tool to inform 
the design of R&R packages. As demonstrated by its application to the Polavaram affected 
population, it can reveal what are the aspects of the status-quo which are valued the most 
and which therefore need to be more carefully restituted or compensated (not necessarily 
with money), in order to reduce the unfairness of displacement but also to ensure the 
success of the resettlement operations. 
For instance, in Polavaram it allowed the identification of three key issues concerning 
compensation and resettlement: the loss of the forest, the modalities of land compensation 
(in cash or in kind) and the appropriateness of cash compensation. This finding is important 
because it constitutes the grounds assessing the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
package (PRRP)’s ability to enable the reconstruction of the livelihood disrupted by 
displacement. Finally, it must be underlined that CEs cannot constitute the only source of 
evidence concerning the opinions and desires of the displaced population in guiding the 
design of R&R programmes. Choice experiments in fact are rigid tools which force the 
respondent to express a preference even when all the objects investigated are disliked. 
Furthermore, by themselves they collect no information on the reasons behind the 
preferences. They need to be complemented by other methodologies of direct consultation 
and more generally by other sources of evidence concerning the processes underpinning 
displacement. This holistic methodological approach has the potential to significantly 
improve the design (and performance) of resettlement programmes. 
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7.3.  The main shortcomings of the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
package 
 
This section assesses the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package (PRRP) on 
the basis of the findings of the consultation exercises (focus groups and choice experiment). 
It also relies on the account made of the case study in chapter 5, particularly on the 
information on the state of advancement of the resettlement operations and it draws from 
the description of the characteristics of the Polavaram affected people provided in chapter 6.  
The conformity of the package to the preferences expresses through the choice 
experiment are investigated below, while sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 look at how the 
package deals with the three issues concerning compensation and resettlement for the 
affected people which emerged in the previous section: the loss of the forest, the methods 
of land compensation (in cash or in kind) and the appropriateness of cash compensation. It 
will emerge that the major shortcomings of the Polavaram R&R package concern its 
inability to adequately address these issues, and that they ultimately imply that the package 
lacks the capacity to put the affected people in the conditions to regenerate their disrupted 
livelihoods.  
An important criterion on which the Polavaram R&R package can be assessed is the 
extent to which it responds to the preferences expressed by the affected population during 
the CE. The strongest of these preferences, i.e. relocation close to the forest and the river, is 
not satisfied by the package, and the monetary compensation that tribals are granted for the 
loss of customary rights is unfit for its purpose (see section 7.3.1). The second strongest 
preference, i.e. land-for-land compensation, is only partially satisfied as it is granted only to 
tribal families. As will be discussed in section 7.3.2, one of the major shortcomings of 
resettlement in Polavaram is the inadequate handling of land compensation. The other 
major shortcoming of the package is the exclusive focus on cash compensation, for a start 
because cash compensation was the least preferred form of restitution by the Polavaram 
people (see section 7.3.3). Preferences are also violated by the package because 
compensation is being paid in irregular and unpredictable instalments and because no 
employment opportunities are offered outside agriculture. The only preference which in 
fact is met by the package is the relocation of the community all together, regardless of the 
social group.  
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From this short review, it is possible to claim that resettlement in Polavaram does not 
meet the preferences of the affected people as expressed through the focus groups and the 
CE. However, more significant for an assessment of the package is to explore how the three 
key issues which emerged through the consultation exercises (i.e. loss of the forest, land-
for-land compensation and cash compensation) are dealt with. Considering that land and 
forest have been identified as the main sources of livelihood of the Polavaram affected 
population, an evaluation of how the three key issues have been handled equates to an 
investigation of the extent to which the PRRP addresses the disruption of livelihoods 
caused by displacement. 
 
7.3.1. The Loss of the Forest  
 
The forest plays a key role in the lives of most of the Polavaram affected population. It 
was highlighted in chapter 6 that many of the displaced people are (tribal and non-tribal) 
forest dwellers who rely on forest produce as an important source of livelihood and as a 
means of physical and social reproduction. Forest products are self-consumed as well as 
sold at market, providing a small but secure source of income and consumption, regardless 
of the monsoon or labour market conditions. In this sense, the forest constitutes a 
sustainable and self-regenerating buffer. The forest is also the catalyst of the social life in 
the village. 
The same people, when questioned through focus groups on the main loss induced by 
displacement, all mentioned the forest; similarly they made clear during the CE that their 
favourite form of relocation would have been in a setting which maintains the status-quo, 
that is which guarantees access to the forest and the river. 
The PRRP however, does not satisfy this ‘preference’ of the affected population. The 
resettlement centres arranged by the government for the relocation of the displaced villages 
are all located in plain areas, usually 15-20 km away from the forest. Displacement will 
therefore cause the loss of a key source of livelihood that is able to support both income 
and consumption, particularly during the lean season and in periods of crisis. As mentioned 
in section 5.4.2, the R&R package implicitly acknowledges this loss, providing a monetary 
allowance to tribal families, equivalent to 500 days of minimum agricultural wage @ 80 Rs 
per day as a form of compensation (see also Appendix VII). The inclusion of this allowance 
285 
in the R&R package has an important symbolic value, but it does not replace nor 
adequately compensate for a source of livelihood. In the first place, the amount of money 
paid is not inclusive of the indirect and intangible stream of benefits generated by the forest 
(its spiritual and cultural value, but also the role of buffer stock and informal insurance 
mentioned above). Secondly, the monetary allowance is calculated by estimating the value 
of the forest produce (and the income generated by it) at the price paid at the displacement 
area and not at the resettlement area, where prices are higher. More generally, it ignores the 
fact that products which were free before displacement, will have to be purchased after 
resettlement (or will not be affordable at all), with a significant impact on the size and 
composition of the consumption basket. For example firewood has previously been 
collected for free, but after relocation is likely to absorb a significant share of the household 
budget, reducing the money available for other needs.  
Hence, paying a monetary compensation for the loss of access to the forest, does not 
replace the lost source of livelihood, nor does it account for the fact that resettlement will 
imply a (regressive) alteration in the terms of access to means of reproduction. Furthermore, 
money does not replace the role of sustainable buffer stock and informal insurance played 
by the forest.  
 
7.3.2.  Land Compensation 
 
The area affected by the Polavaram dam has been characterised by almost two centuries 
of tribal land alienation, and land ownership is still beset by conflict and power issues. The 
great majority of the population is still dependent on agriculture, and land is the key source 
of livelihood and means of production. It is not surprising then that land-for-land compen-
sation was considered by the Polavaram affected population as the most favoured form of 
compensation, and arguably the only fair method of compensation. This was clearly indi-
cated by the results of the CE. Indeed, the majority of the participants considered the pack-
age which guaranteed resettlement with land-for-land compensation (i.e. package Land for 
Land) as their second-best option after the status-quo package. Yet, in a context of land 
scarcity, social divisions and deep inequalities, land-for-land compensation can be prob-
lematic, as the case of Polavaram shows.   
There are two kinds of problem in Polavaram: firstly, land-for-land compensation is 
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granted only to tribal families, while non-tribals are paid a (too low) price for their 
expropriated land. Secondly, the compensation provided for the lost land (either in cash or 
in kind) is inadequate, not effective and ultimately unfair.  
The provision of land-for-land compensation exclusively to tribal families is an attempt 
by the AP R&R policy -and therefore by the Polavaram R&R package- to use positive 
discrimination to restore social justice. The package grants land-for-land compensation 
only to tribal families, whereas non-tribals (SCs as well as OCs) are offered cash in 
exchange for the lost land, at the following rates: 115,000 rupees per acre for non-irrigated 
land; 130,000 rupees per acre for cultivable land with canals and irrigation tanks; 145,000 
rupees for land having deep bore wells or small irrigation projects. 
The rationale is that only tribal people are entitled to own land in the displacement area 
and therefore only they are entitled to land-for-land compensation in the resettlement area. 
All the other households own land somehow “illegally”, and therefore are only 
compensated with cash. The assumption is that the cash compensation will be used to re-
purchase land not located in the Fifth Schedule Area (the social composition of the majority 
of the affected villages is mixed, including SC and STs but also OCs and BCs). 
However, there are two major constraints preventing this: firstly, most of the villages 
(especially the villages with the majority of ST populations) will be resettled in colonies 
which are located in the Fifth Schedule Area. The motivation is obviously to safeguard the 
special rights attributed to ST in that area; the implication, however, is that SC and OC 
families will be relocated in an area where they are not supposed to own land. Of course 
they are free to leave the community and move out of the Fifth Schedule Area, but in the 
greatest majority of the cases this option is not even contemplated. Not only is settlement in 
other communities rare because it is risky and costly, but the very idea of leaving the 
community is regarded as the unluckiest eventuality. 
Secondly, even if non-ST families were willing to purchase land outside the Fifth 
Schedule Area, they would not in most cases be able to do it, as the cash compensation 
provided is simply not sufficient. The price for a hectare of land prefigured in the R&R 
package is in fact below the market price of land in the resettlement area, where it ranges 
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from Rs 500,000 to 700,000thousand Rs per acre.166 According to the Land Acquisition Act, 
the price for the expropriated land is established through a negotiation between the owner 
and the state, with the market price as a benchmark. In Polavaram the negotiation took 
place between committees at the state and district level and groups of farmers, and during 
my visits to the field it emerged that the farmers had managed to slightly increase the initial 
price offered by the government. However, I could not locate any official document 
describing the process of negotiation or indicating the prices agreed. The same 
Commissioner for Resettlement and Rehabilitation whom I interviewed in Hyderabad was 
very vague on the topic. Generally, it seems that the Land Acquisition Act leaves a 
substantial element of discretion for the government in directing the process of negotiation, 
and more seriously, it does not impose standards of transparency and principles of fairness. 
The farmers who took part to the survey and the CE were well aware of the gap existing 
between the price for land which they were being paid and the value of land at the 
resettlement area. For instance, respondent No. 26 claimed to have received Rs. 201,250 as 
compensation for the loss of 1.75 acres of land (that is at the rate of Rs. 115,000 per acre). 
With the same amount, assuming that land in the resettlement area costs Rs 500,000 per 
acre, he will be able to purchase only 0.4 acres of land. Similarly respondent No. 107, who 
claimed to have received Rs 618,000 for 6 acres of land, will only be able to purchase 1.2 
acres of land. So from being considered a small farmer (i.e. owning five or more acres of 
land) he will become a marginal farmer (with less than five acres).  
As a result, most non-tribal farmers will only be able to purchase smaller plots of land, 
and many will become landless. Overall, resettlement will be accompanied by an increase 
in landlessness and fragmentation of landholdings, which in turn will lead to an increase in 
tenancy and dependence on agricultural wage labour.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the redistribution of property rights in favour of the STs 
will lead to a more equal landholding structure. In fact, it comes at the expenses of an 
already vulnerable and disadvantaged group of people, the (often SC) small and marginal 
farmers. At the same time, non-tribal big farmers illegally owning land in the area, can be 
seen to gain from this process, as it gives them a chance to dispose of land which they are 
not supposed to own and to even receive some compensation for it. The loss of land will 
                                                           
166  This was the figure repeatedly mentioned by the respondents complaining about cash-for-land  
compensation during the interviews and the focus groups. 
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not significantly affect their livelihood, as in most cases they own land in other locations 
and will be able to purchase more elsewhere. This was the case, for instance, of the big 
farmer owning land in the village of Vinjaram mentioned above: living in Hyderabad, he 
was able to use the compensation money to purchase land elsewhere.  
Finally, even when land-for-land compensation is provided, the restoration of the 
disrupted livelihood is not guaranteed. For instance, the land given as compensation to the 
Polavaram affected people is of poorer quality than that previously owned, with 
consequences for its productivity. 
A number of the families interviewed (from among those who had already received 
compensation or had been shown the resettlement area) reported that the land offered was 
of low quality or far away from the resettlement colony. The quality of the soil was also 
mentioned as one of the main disadvantages of the relocation colonies during the focus 
groups. The villagers of Sirivaca, for instance, reported that after having been shown the 
resettlement area, they complained about the quality of the land (which is sandy) and asked 
to be assigned another site without success. The resettlement colony for the village of 
Devaragundi (called New Devaragundi) is five km away from the agricultural land assigned 
by the government. Low quality land (either infertile or not ready to be put immediately 
into production) results in lower productivity, more intense work, and above all, a delay in 
the collection of the first harvest. The fact that land is far away from the resettlement 
colony entails a significant amount of time and/or money for transport to be spent in 
travelling to the fields. At present many farmers own land in an ideal position: between the 
river and the hills and within walking distance from the village; however this fact does not 
seem to have been taken into account in the estimation of the value of land and land 
compensation. 
To conclude, livelihoods based on land are disrupted by displacement, as the latter 
implies the loss of the main means of production. Compensation and the R&R package in 
Polavaram do replace the expropriated land in cash or in kind, but also lead to an alteration 
in the terms of access to land as a means of production. Thus, they do not adequately 
support the restoration of the disrupted livelihood, and instead lead to an increase in 
landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings, increase in inequality and reliance on 
agricultural wage labour.  
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7.3.3.  Limitations of Cash Compensation: money does not buy a new livelihood 
 
Compensation and R&R packages are ostensibly designed to restitute to the affected 
people the equivalent of the material losses borne as a consequence of displacement. Resti-
tution can take place in kind (as is the case of land or housing) or in cash. Chapter 2 
demonstrated how a microeconomic rationale can be called upon in support of cash com-
pensation, according to which money can be claimed to be the best form of compensation 
as it provides the freedom for the recipients to employ it according to their own prefer-
ences, without any imposition on the side of the project authority. With money, people are 
free to replace what has been lost (whether assets or consumption goods) or not. However a 
number of constraints impinge on this freedom in practice, and in fact, cash compensation 
is the form of restitution which least enables the displaced people to regenerate or recon-
struct their disrupted livelihoods.   
Firstly, money does not necessarily put the affected households in the condition to re-
place the assets which have been expropriated or lost, if the markets for these assets do not 
exist, or if the affected households, for some non-economic reasons, do not have access to 
them. This is particularly the case for land. If land is scarce in the resettlement area, or the 
land market is interlocked with the credit market and both are shaped by power and exploi-
tative relationships, then being given an amount of money to purchase a replacement plot of 
land as large as the one lost might not lead to the expected outcome. Of course the exist-
ence and the accessibility of the land market become irrelevant if the compensation paid is 
unfair and insufficient in the first place. This happens when land compensation is estimated 
at the price for land in the displacement area rather than in the resettlement area, and in the 
latter the land market is more developed and the price for land is higher. It was demonstrat-
ed in the previous section how this is the case for the land compensation paid to the non-
tribal families displaced by the Polavaram dam and how this implies a resulting inability to 
purchase land in the relocation area.  
Constraints can also arise if the affected households are unused to carrying out transac-
tions in significant amounts of money or have a low propensity to save. This effect might 
be enhanced by the existence of binding cash constraints at the family level, so that when 
the money is received, it is immediately used, typically for everyday needs and petty con-
sumption (e.g.: motorbike, fan, fridge or TV) or the repayment of an outstanding debt.  
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Even when saved, its primary purpose is often consumption smoothing or the reproduc-
tion of the household (health and education), rather than productive investment. Social ex-
penses are particularly pervasive, especially those for the dowry of daughters, which are 
often disproportionally higher than the annual income of a household. Some families spend 
the whole amount for health expenses for a member of the family and eventually for his/her 
funeral. 
In Polavaram, of 167 families interviewed, only 46 had already received some cash 
compensation (either for land and house compensation or for the R&R package). Of these, 
31 claimed that they had deposited at least a part of the sum in a bank (the amount ranging 
from Rs 20,000 to Rs 200,000); only one ST family reported that it had invested part of the 
money in agriculture; two non-ST families stated that they had used it to purchase land, and 
two families for the purchase of cattle. At the same time, six families mentioned that they 
used (or intend to use) part of the money for the dowry or the marriage of children, two 
families for health expenses, two for children’s education, eight for house purchase or 
construction, and three to purchase a motorbike; three said that they had redistributed the 
money among the members of the family, one had used it for loan repayment, and 13 for 
general everyday expenses. 
Even when deposited in the bank, the compensation does not seem likely to be used for 
productive purposes (apart from perhaps the education of the children, which, however, 
does not help in regenerating a livelihood in the short term). In the first place, the amounts 
declared by the households which took part to the survey are too small to purchase even an 
acre of land in the resettlement area; therefore they seem insufficient to constitute the basis 
for the generation of a new livelihood. It is to be expected that this money will be used for 
future consumption needs or saved to be used in case of shocks, considering the high level 
of vulnerability of the affected families. 
What this evidence suggests, is that cash transfers to families below the poverty line are 
welcomed but used for consumption rather than productive purposes. This is also consistent 
with the mixed attitude towards cash compensation shown by the participants to the focus 
groups and the CE carried out in the affected villages.  
During the focus groups the participants were asked, among other things, to express their 
opinion on the fairness of the compensation provided by the government and to explain 
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what kind of compensation they would have preferred, as well as how much money would 
have made them satisfied.167  
In all the focus groups some dissatisfaction was expressed towards the amount of money 
granted by the government and in two cases the participants stated that they wanted Rs 
300,000 (plus housing and land-for-land compensation) and Rs 10,000,000.168 Land-for-
land compensation, housing, relocation close to the forest and a secure job were mentioned 
as the fundamental elements of a fair compensation and R&R package. These preferences 
are comparable to those expressed during the CE. As described in section 7.2.2, the 
participants were asked to choose between the “status quo” package (package Forest and an 
“only cash compensation” package (package Money). In only 14% of the 167 cases, 
package Money was indicated as the preferred option. In the exercise Ranking, package 
Money appeared more often as the least preferred option (110 times out of 160). Finally, the 
respondents more inclined to prefer cash compensation were those less reliant on the forest 
or on their own land as sources of livelihood: package Money was in fact preferred more 
often by non-ST, by landless and by respondents with a source of income independent from 
agriculture. 
This is consistent with our previous claim that cash compensation is welcomed by the 
recipients as a support to their consumption, but that it is not perceived as a substitute for 
the lost means of production and physical and social reproduction (land and forest). 
The CE also offered another explanation for the generalised distrust of cash 
compensation and the clear preference for other forms of restitution. The majority of the 
participants preferred a smaller amount of cash compensation paid in a one-time transfer to 
a higher amount paid in instalments delayed in time, because of the scepticism that the 
government would in fact pay all the instalments: people feared that the government might 
“change its mind”, especially as a result of the change of the party in power. Almost two 
centuries of abuse and neglect by the state (the Colonial Rule first, and later, the 
                                                           
167  The exact wording of the questions was (see also Appendix VI): 
-Do you feel the compensation that you received is fair? Or do you feel that the government has somehow 
cheated  you? 
-what would you like to receive in exchange for having to leave your house and your land and be relocated 
somewhere else? What do you think the government should give you as compensation for your losses? 
-How much money do you think the government should pay to you? 
 These questions were put during the focus groups held in Chegondapalli, Tutigunta, Talluru and Kegunduru. 
168
  I interpreted the amount Rs 10,000,000 as meaning that the person wanted much more money than 
what the government was offering, and a marginal increase in the price paid for land would have not been 
sufficient to make him happy. 
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government of Hyderabad), particularly in the form of the Forest Department towards the 
tribal people and more generally the inhabitants of the hills, can easily explain this 
feeling.169 The state has no track record for delivering benefits in due time, and on the 
contrary, it is perceived as the bearer of the disruption of the lives of hundreds of thousands 
of people. It does not come as a surprise that promises of compensation and reward are not 
always taken seriously, or that, at best, they will be temporary expedients attached to the 
party in power. 
Of course this controversial relationship between the affected population and the project 
authority, which in this case is the state, is particular to the local history and political 
situation and does not impinge on the appropriateness of cash compensation in itself. 
However, leaving aside the fact that it is a contingency, the Polavaram case underlines that 
more often than not when it comes to displacement-inducing projects, the methods of 
compensation and resettlement cannot be determined in a vacuum, as their effectiveness is 
also the result of the interplay of the agents involved. If the families are inclined not to 
believe the promises that they are made, there are various significant consequences: they 
are less likely to cooperate and work for the success of the project and the resettlement 
process; they will face losses through the demobilisation of existing assets, rather than 
holding on and waiting for the money transfer; and are likely to adopt short-term coping 
strategies which will accelerate the disruption of livelihoods. 
More generally, it is unlikely that any kind of development path can be pursued by the 
state and the population if a minimum of mutual trust is not guaranteed. 
Further on, some considerations also need to be taken on the methodological implica-
tions of an extensive use of cash compensation. Providing cash compensation entails esti-
mating the value of the losses for which the former is granted. This practice does not come 
without consequences. In the first place, it attributes to the project authority the power to 
decide what kind of losses can and cannot be compensated for. The risk of subjectivity and 
variability of outcomes here is high in the choice of the intangible losses which should be 
compensated. National policies and international guidelines exist to limit this risk, but even 
                                                           
169  Interestingly, comments on the unreliability of the government were  reported by tribal and non-
tribal families alike. Despite the fact that tribals have been the main victims of land alienation and forest 
eviction, SCs and marginal farmers in general have suffered the abuses of the Forest Department and are 
distrustful of the state. 
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in the case that the project authority adheres to them, a significant level of variability and 
randomness remains in the estimation of these losses. 
As illustrated by the case of land, attributing a price to physical losses can be problemat-
ic. Transparency and objectivity in the estimated value are severely undermined when there 
are no markets and no prices at all to refer to. The tribals of Polavaram will be uprooted 
from the forest, which is their traditional environment and the foundation of their spiritual, 
cultural and social life. Attributing a monetary value to this loss is impossible and probably 
not even desirable. However, if the whole idea of compensation is based on monetary esti-
mation and restitution of the losses incurred, the implication is that tribal people (and with 
them all the others in comparable situations) will never be fully compensated and will al-
ways lose from displacement. 
Finally, even in the case that compensation is fair, sufficient to purchase replacement 
land and other productive assets, and that an accessible land market exists, the reconstruc-
tion of new livelihood takes more than just money. Personal skills and institutional support 
are needed to invest in income-generating activities. The Polavaram R&R package, howev-
er, does not envision any type of mechanisms to endow the displaced people with additional 
skills or assets which can help them to invest the money productively. More generally, no 
attempt is being made to link compensation and resettlement with the creation of employ-
ment opportunities outside agriculture and to understand livelihoods in a dynamic way.  
 
7.4.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter assessed the Polavaram Resettlement and Rehabilitation package on the 
grounds of evidence generated through methods of direct consultation of the affected 
population. These methods informed on the modalities of compensation and resettlement 
favoured by the affected people, and suggested three key issues which need to be addressed 
to achieve a fair and effective resettlement. These issues were the loss of the forest, the 
modalities of land compensation (in cash or in kind) and the appropriateness of cash 
compensation.  
The chapter investigated the conformity of the PRRP to the resettlement preferences 
expressed through the consultation methods, finding that these are only marginally met. 
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Moreover, it examined the ability of the package to address the three key issues mentioned 
above and more generally to put the affected people in the conditions to restore the 
disrupted livelihoods or generate new ones. It was found that these conditions are not 
created for the Polavaram displaced people, and that in fact resettlement alters in a 
regressive way the terms with which they can access the means of production and 
reproduction. 
The major shortcomings lie in the exclusive focus on cash compensation, the inadequate 
handling of land compensation and the neglect of the creation of employment opportunities 
outside agriculture. The interaction of these shortcomings with the structural factors 
discussed in chapter 6 makes resettlement have important dynamic consequences, which 
ultimately will lead to the adverse incorporation of the displaced population into economic 
development. Before clarifying this point, it is important to note that these shortcomings are 
derived from the legal and policy framework on which compensation and resettlement in 
Polavaram are based.  
As seen in chapter 5, in the absence of a national R&R Bill, compensation for the 
expropriated land is regulated by the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and resettlement by the 
Andhra Pradesh R&R policy. The Land Acquisition Act allows for land to be estimated at 
the market value in the displacement area and through non-transparent processes of 
negotiation, leading to unfair prices being paid to the displaced people. As concerns 
resettlement, the PRRP reflects the strengths and the limitations of the AP policy. The main 
strength is the acknowledgement of the livelihood disruption which comes with 
displacement and the attribution to the government of the responsibility to compensate the 
affected people for the loss implied. The requirement to conform to the Forest Rights Act 
has substantially contributed to this policy, making compulsory the provision of land-for-
land compensation to tribal families. The issue however is addressed with the mere 
payment of additional monetary allowances to the different categories of families, and 
monetary compensation is intended as a form of restitution, not as a tool to address the 
short, medium and long term effects of these processes. 
Overall, there is no account for the dynamic consequences of displacement and 
resettlement, which are increase in landlessness, in fragmentation of landholdings, and in 
reliance on agricultural wage labour. They are the results of the interaction between the 
shortcomings of the PRRP with the characteristics of the affected population, of the 
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agrarian sector and more broadly of the path of capitalist development at play in the 
affected area. Moreover, they coincide with the mechanisms which chapter 6 identified as 
the factors driving the reproduction of surplus labour in Andhra Pradesh.  
The key argument of this thesis comes now full circle. The resettlement of the people 
displaced by the Polavaram dam is likely to lead to their adverse incorporation because of 
the interaction between shortcomings in its design and context-specific structural factors. 
This interaction results in the alteration of the terms of access to means of production and 
reproduction for the affected people and as a consequence it reinforces the mechanisms 
which underpin surplus labour. As a result, resettlement will further push people into 
surplus labour and will adversely incorporate them into development.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
This thesis has investigated the resettlement of the population displaced by the 
Polavaram dam project in Andhra Pradesh (AP). The construction of the dam will lead to 
the submersion of 177 villages and the displacement of 200,000 people, of whom the 
greatest majority belongs to SCs and STs. It was found that the R&R programme set up by 
the government is likely to fail in preventing the further impoverishment of the population 
displaced and thereby to adversely incorporate them into the local process of development. 
The investigation has consisted in an assessment of the performance of resettlement 
following three strategies of inquiry.  
 
8.1. Summary of the findings 
 
The first strategy of inquiry used focus groups and a consultation exercise based on 
choice experiment approach to assess resettlement in Polavaram through the affected 
population's own opinion and preferences, specifically interrogating them about the 
favourite forms of restitution and relocation.  
The most evident finding was that the respondent considered the loss of access to the 
forest the main cost of displacement and that the majority of the people would have 
preferred to be relocated in a settlement securing the perpetuation of the access to the forest 
and the Godavari river. Another finding was that people had a clear preference for land-for-
land compensation, which confirms that in people's view land remains the main productive 
asset and most secure source of income. 
The thesis further showed that people had mixed attitudes towards a resettlement 
package which included a self-employment programme. This finding suggests the existence 
of a tension between people's willingness to engage in (possibly more profitable) activities 
outside farming and the reluctance to abandon the known livelihood strategy. From the 
discussion held within the focus groups, however, it clearly emerged how people would be 
willing to engage in any type of employment programme and that a secure job would have 
constituted an adequate form of compensation. 
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Cash compensation was found to be the least preferred form of compensation when 
compared to relocation in a settlement securing access to the forest, to land-for-land 
compensation and to resettlement with a self-employment scheme. One reason for this 
result was the fear that the government would not honour its commitments, particularly if 
payments were made in instalments.   
Overall, from the direct consultation of the Polavaram affected population three issues 
emerged as the problematic aspects of their displacement and resettlement: the loss of the 
forest, the modalities of land compensation (in cash or in kind) and the appropriateness of 
cash compensation.  
The second strategy of inquiry described the content of the Polavaram Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation package (PRRP) and provided a description of some aspects of its practical 
implementation. The analysis revealed that the PRRP meets the preferences expressed by 
the affected people only marginally, and it does not address adequately the three issues 
identified above.  
First, the PRRP relocates people far from the forest and the river; meanwhile access to 
the forest, which is a key source of physical and social reproduction, is not restored after 
resettlement, nor is its loss adequately compensated. Second, the PRRP grants land-for-land 
compensation only to ST households. The non-tribal families are paid monetary 
compensation for the loss of land, at a price which is insufficient to repurchase land in the 
resettlement areas. As a result, many non-tribal families will become landless after 
relocation. Third, the PRRP focuses almost exclusively on cash compensation, which is 
provided in insufficient amounts, and paid in irregular and unpredictable instalments.  
Moreover, monetary compensation is not quantitatively and qualitatively adequate by itself 
to enable people to reconstruct a new livelihood.  Finally, in virtue of the fact that the 
package claims to compensate for the loss of livelihood with a lump sum monetary 
compensation, no initiatives are contemplated for the generation of employment 
opportunities outside agriculture. The only preference which in fact is met by the package, 
is the relocation of the whole community in one settlement, regardless of the social group.  
So, the major shortcomings of the PRRP lie in the exclusive focus on cash compensation, 
in the inadequate handling of land compensation and in the neglect of the creation of 
employment opportunities outside agriculture. In reason of these shortcomings, the PRRP 
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will lead to an alteration of the terms of access to the means of production and reproduction 
for the displaced families, while not creating the conditions for the restoration of the 
disrupted livelihoods or the generation of new ones. Moreover, it will have dynamic 
consequences in terms of increase in landlessness, fragmentation of landholdings and 
casualisation of labour. 
The third strategy of inquiry applied the adverse incorporation framework to the case 
study, focusing on the economic dimension of incorporation. First, the structural factors 
which are liable to turn the resettlement of the Polavaram people into a process of adverse 
incorporation were identified in the structures and mechanisms which underpin the 
production of surplus labour in AP.  
Surplus labour in rural AP is composed of small and marginal farmers and agricultural 
wage labourers, primarily belonging to SCs and STs. These groups engage in a variety of 
employed and self-employed activities that can only guarantee subsistence. The production 
and reproduction of this pool of redundant labourers is the outcome of, on the one hand, the 
inability of the AP's growth strategy to create enough remunerative employment which 
could absorb this surplus labour. On the other, it's the result of the processes of 
differentiation underpinning the agrarian sector. These processes have contributed to turn 
small and marginal farming into a risky and unprofitable activity, forcing farmers to seek 
additional sources of income. In absence of employment opportunities outside farming, this 
means resorting almost exclusively to agricultural wage labour. So, surplus labour is 
reproduced through fragmentation of landholdings, which increases the marginality of 
farming, landlessness, which pushes people towards wage labour, and casualisation of 
labour, which makes the labour available precarious and unsecure. Moreover, social 
structures of accumulation such as caste and gender regulate the social relations in which 
surplus labour engages. 
Further, the analysis of the characteristics of the Polavaram affected people revealed that 
the latter are exposed and indeed embedded into the structures and mechanisms which 
underpin surplus labour. It was then highlighted how these structures and mechanisms 
interact with the shortcomings of the Polavaram resettlement package in turning 
resettlement into a process of adverse incorporation.  
First, the exclusive focus on cash compensation is particularly problematic when the 
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affected people are poor because the compensation tends to be used for consumption 
smoothing rather than investment, and therefore is not used for the purpose of livelihoods 
reconstruction. Indeed, this was found to be the case for the Polavaram affected people.  
Second, the inadequate handling of land compensation interacts with the history of tribal 
land alienation that characterises the displacement area. Using positive discrimination to 
amend for the injustice endured by tribals, the PRRP risks to increase the number of 
landless and marginal farmers among the Scheduled Castes. In this way, it will reinforce 
the processes of differentiation and polarisation underpinning the agrarian sector. 
Finally, the lack in the PRRP of provisions for the generation of employment 
opportunities outside farming is particularly harming to the Polavaram people, who are 
used to rely on the forest as key source of livelihood. The latter is lost and not replaced with 
an alternative source of livelihood, in a context where employment creation is limited to 
casual wage labour. As a result, the latter will be the only available livelihood source for 
most of the affected people.  
In other words, the interaction of the PRRP’s shortcomings with structures and 
mechanisms will lead to a reinforcement of these very same structures and mechanisms, 
thus further pushing people into surplus labour and adversely incorporating them into the 
local process of capitalist development.  
 
The results presented above and in particular the findings regarding the appropriateness 
of the PRPP stand in strong support of the research questions and hypotheses posed in this 
dissertation.  
To start with, this thesis showed that issues of management and implementation do affect 
the overall performance of resettlement, but their neglect cannot account as the exclusive 
cause of the failure of resettlement programmes.  
The resettlement of the Polavaram affected population is still at its initial stages and is 
far from completion, therefore it is not yet possible to provide an overall and 
comprehensive assessment of its implementation and management performance. However, 
the preliminary results revealed that even the initial stages of the resettlement operations 
(i.e. payment of compensation and construction of the new settlements) are behind 
schedule, possibly because of lack of funds. Besides, the project records a poor 
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performance in consulting people about their resettlement. In fact, a dialogue has been 
pursued by the government only ex post and with a top-down paternalistic attitude, thus 
limiting its effectiveness. This attitude also contributes to make adverse the terms in which 
the affected population is politically incorporated through resettlement.  
Nonetheless, the inability of the PRRP to restore old or create new livelihoods, so as its 
dynamic consequences, are only marginally the results of the so far unsatisfactory 
implementation of the package. Rather, they reflect shortcomings in the design of the 
package itself and, to the extent that the package complies with the existing legal and policy 
framework, also the limitations of the latter. As outlined above, these shortcomings descend 
from (i) the inadequate consideration of the sources of livelihood of the affected people and 
the fact that access to these resources is altered and made more regressive by resettlement; 
(ii) the fact that the compensation and resettlement programmes do not account for the 
agrarian and labour market conditions in the area to which  people will be relocated; and 
finally (iii) the fact that no account is taken of the lack of employment opportunities  
outside agriculture and outside the rural sector. 
Thus, the analysis demonstrated that the failure of resettlement in preventing 
impoverishment is largely caused by structural factors which depend on the characteristics 
of the affected population, the features of the displacement and relocation areas and the 
development path undertaken by the specific context. The dominant discourse around 
displacement and resettlement, i.e. the 'reformist-managerial' approach, with its almost 
exclusive focus on issues of implementation and management, does not account for these 
structural factors.  
Further, using a political economy approach this thesis achieved a richer and much more 
articulated understanding of the causes of the failure of resettlement, which included 
particularly the identification of the structural factors which in Polavaram will affect the 
outcomes of resettlement. For this purpose, the thesis developed a framework based on the 
notion of adverse incorporation and, focusing on the economic dimension of incorporation, 
it investigated the link between the systematic failure of resettlement and the dynamics of 
capitalism which trigger displacement in the first place. It was found that this link is 
explained by two notions of political economy: accumulation by dispossession and surplus 
labour. Resettlement fails in preventing impoverishment and turns into a process of adverse 
incorporation, because it is required to dispose of people expropriated of their means of 
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production and reproduction and made redundant by accumulation by dispossession. The 
redundancy and the impoverishment are caused by the lack of employment opportunities 
outside the agricultural sector. In addition, the agricultural sector is itself risky and 
unprofitable and does not guarantee sustainability and subsistence. In other words, the 
process of capitalist development which, on the one hand, demands a displacement-
inducing project, is on the other not able to accommodate the displaced population. 
The application of this theoretical argument to the case-study required the use of 
secondary evidence at the state and national level, because the primary evidence available 
at the Polavaram dam level was not sufficient to explore all the categories of analysis. This 
opens a window of opportunity for future research, which should be dedicated to collect 
empirical evidence on what are the current terms of incorporation of the Polavaram affected 
people and how these are likely to be affected by resettlement. In other words, a more 
complete application of the adverse incorporation framework to the case study would 
require an analysis of the processes of differentiation and agrarian change in the 
displacement and in the resettlement area, with particular attention to the evolution of land, 
labour and debt relations.  
 
The results presented above also confirmed this thesis' hypothesis regarding the 
excessive and misplaced emphasis on the potential contribution of welfare economics in 
providing principles and methodologies for the improvement of compensation and 
resettlement. This literature has recommended the use of contingent valuation and choice 
experiment methodologies for the estimation of the costs of displacement through the 
elicitation of WTA money in exchange of displacement of the affected population. The 
argument is that the estimation of the costs of displacement indicates the optimal amount of 
monetary compensation, i.e. the amount which, if paid, would make displacement (and 
resettlement) voluntary. This thesis has criticised the above argument on the grounds of two 
findings. First, the assumptions concerning people's behaviour and preferences required for 
the application of the aforementioned methodologies were too restrictive and possibly 
implausible in the context object of study. The very implementation of the choice 
experiment with the Polavaram affected population provided evidence that the preferences 
of people regarding their resettlement do not behave as predicted by rational choice theory. 
Second, there is no such thing as an optimal amount of money which if paid would make 
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displacement voluntary, at least to the extent that displacement disrupts aspects of people’s 
life which are deemed incommensurable, such as ancestral land, relationship to the forest 
and life with one’s community. This was suggested by the consultation exercises run with 
the Polavaram people and in particular by the failure of the attempt to estimate WTA 
relocation without community.  
In addition, and more significant in terms of policy implications, cash compensation 
resulted to be i) not the favourite form of compensation by the displaced people, and ii) not 
sufficient to turn resettlement into a successful process, being by itself not adequate to 
enable people to reconstruct their disrupted livelihoods or generate new ones.  
Finally, choice experiments proved to be useful tools for the design of better 
resettlement packages if employed for the direct consultation of the affected people. As 
choice experiments ask respondents to choose between different varieties of the same good, 
if applied to resettlement packages, they can suggest the form of compensation and the type 
of relocation preferred. This in turn can help identifying what is deemed as an acceptable 
form of restitution by the affected people and what aspects of their livelihoods need to be 
more carefully restituted or compensated (not necessarily with money), in order to reduce 
the unfairness of displacement and to ensure the success of the resettlement operations. 
 
8.2. Resettlement of people displaced by development: a problem in theory, a problem 
in practice 
 
This research has investigated how the failure of resettlement in preventing the 
impoverishment of the displaced population is determined at, or reflected through, the 
theoretical, methodological and practical level. It found that, indeed, the failure of 
resettlement in practice is matched by a poor understanding of resettlement at the 
theoretical level.  
In this context, this thesis has advocated the use of political economy to research 
resettlement, and in particular a framework based on the notion of adverse incorporation. 
This was based on the assumption that a better theoretical understanding of the problem 
will lead to more efficient solutions and thus to the design of resettlement schemes able to 
prevent impoverishment.  
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The main predicament of a political economy approach to resettlement is that the 
performance of the latter cannot be separated from, and significantly depends on, the 
specific process of development in the relocation area. More importantly, from a political 
economy point of view, resettlement needs to be connected to the mechanisms which 
dysfunctionally link the poor with development. That is to say, a progressive, and more 
likely to be successful, resettlement programme, is one which is connected to initiatives 
directed to shift the balance of power in agrarian and labour relations in favour of the 
displaced people. The latter remark is particularly significant here as it uncovers the main 
limitation of the adverse incorporation framework, that is the magnitude and the complexity 
of its policy recommendations. Indeed, to the extent that what turns resettlement into 
adverse incorporation is the action of inherent structural factors, addressing the problems 
requires tackling these factors at the macro level. However, a resettlement programme by 
itself cannot be invested of the task of making small and marginal farming profitable and 
creating employment opportunities in the rural non-farming sector. What instead can be 
done, is to develop progressive demands in favour of small farmers and wage labourers 
within resettlement policies, and connect the latter with broader political aims of poverty 
reduction and more equitable distribution. 
Adopting a political economy approach also means that the assessment of the 
performance of resettlement must focus on the position that people will occupy into 
capitalist development after resettlement and as a consequence of displacement. This 
assessment has to be made in addition to, and irrespective of, considerations about the 
necessity of the project, the brutality of displacement, and the legitimacy of localised forms 
of resistance (aspects whose importance of course is not denied). According to this 
perspective, resettlement is successful if it avoids adversely incorporating the displaced 
people into capitalist development.  
This perspective also prompts to look for the conditions at which incorporation triggered 
by resettlement can be turned from adverse into beneficial. The existence of positive 
consequences of resettlement emerged in this thesis in the discussion of the political, spatial 
and socio-cultural dimension of the incorporation of the Polavaram affected people. 
Another policy prescription of the adverse incorporation framework then is to foster those 
dynamics triggered by resettlement which are liable to make the incorporation beneficial 
(e.g. promoting participatory processes in the definition of the resettlement packages, which 
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can promote political inclusion). This view is also reflected in this thesis’ conclusions about 
the appropriateness of monetary compensations: a decent cash compensation must be paid, 
not least for fairness reasons, but the way it is actually used by the recipients cannot be 
ignored when assessing its effectiveness. If poor displaced people use the money that they 
receive as compensation to improve their consumption and not to restore their disrupted 
livelihoods, then other devices must be arranged to meet this objective. In addition, it must 
not be forgotten that paying more money does not change the inherent nature of 
displacement, which remains a disruptive, unfair and imposed process. 
These considerations on the relevance and the utility of monetary compensation are not 
contingent to the findings of this research. This is not to say that the preferences of the 
Polavaram people concerning compensation and resettlement which were revealed by the 
choice experiment and the focus groups are representative of the preferences of each and 
every poor tribal person or marginal farmer displaced by development in India, let alone of 
all the displaced population around the world. For instance, a similar exercise run by 
Garikipati (2005) with the people displaced by the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada 
Valley found that the respondents did not intrinsically oppose relocation, even when this 
meant loss of access to common property resources, including grazing land and forest. 
Besides, cash compensation for this loss was, to a certain extent, deemed acceptable by the 
respondents.  
However, what the case of the Polavaram dam is representative of, is the alteration of 
the terms of access to the sources of livelihood caused by displacement, and the inability of 
cash compensation alone to counterbalance this alteration in favour of the displaced people. 
If displacement takes place in a context where few employment opportunities outside 
agriculture exist, and the agricultural sector is itself residual and unprofitable, the fact that 
the displaced people have a preference for monetary compensation and are happy to be 
relocated away from the forest and in plain areas, does not substantially alter the ability of 
the resettlement programme to reconstitute old or generate new livelihoods. To the extent 
that we assess resettlement on the grounds of its ability to prevent impoverishment, and of 
what it entails in terms of incorporation into capitalist development, whether cash 
compensation is liked or not, does not matter for the analysis.  
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8.3. Policy Recommendations for Polavaram and beyond  
 
Resettlement in Polavaram is still at its early stages. This means that there is a window 
of opportunity to improve not only the implementation of the resettlement package, but also 
its substance. Several concrete policy recommendations emanate from the research 
conducted for this thesis.  
First, despite the previous claim that cash compensation alone is not the panacea for a 
successful resettlement, the amount of cash compensation paid to the Polavaram displaced 
people must be increased. The payment of a cash compensation remains important for two 
reasons: i) adequately restitute for the material losses caused by displacement, land above 
all; ii) avoid drops in consumption caused by the disruption of the affected people's 
livelihoods. It is imperative in particular to raise the price paid for the expropriated land, so 
that it approximates the price for land in the relocation area. This would assure that non-ST 
farmers will be able to repurchase land after relocation, and it would mitigate the 
fragmentation of landholdings and the increase in landlessness. More generally, paying a 
higher price for land will reduce the inequalities created by granting land-for-land 
compensation only to ST families, which in turn will improve the fairness of the process. 
Second, given the conditions of the agricultural sector in AP highlighted in this thesis, 
and in particular the obstacles to turning farming into a profitable activity, assistance must 
be given to all small and marginal farmers, regardless of the social groups, even after 
relocation has taken place.  
Third, the loss of access to the forest must be addressed more effectively, not only with 
the payment of a one-off grant, but also with the provision of insurance or buffer schemes, 
to compensate for oscillations in consumption and income in presence of shocks.  
Fourth, employment and self-employment programmes in the rural non-agricultural 
sector which already exist in the relocation areas must be reinforced and clearly targeted at 
the population affected by the Polavaram dam project. 
Fifth, cash compensation can have a dent in people's ability to regenerate their 
livelihoods only if it is paid according to a pre-established schedule and before relocation 
takes place. Thus, the government of AP must make an effort to pay the remaining 
monetary compensation in a predictable and transparent way.  
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Finally, the government is still on time to implement systematic and transparent 
consultations with the affected population concerning all the issues emerging in the future 
stages of relocation and rehabilitation, including the location of the resettlement villages. 
Such consultations could aid to create a climate of mutual trust and cooperation between 
the affected people and the government authorities. This, in turn, could increase the 
programme’s overall  chances of success. 
The recommendations made for improving resettlement in Polavaram also extend to the 
AP Resettlement and Rehabilitation policy and more importantly to the Resettlement & 
Rehabilitation Bill under discussion in the Indian Parliament. However, for both these two 
legislative levels, the baseline recommendation remains the minimisation of displacement. 
Indeed, the latter is also the most effective and possibly less costly way of avoiding the 
failure of resettlement in preventing impoverishment. All this considered, three final 
general considerations can be made with respect to what is needed to improve resettlement 
policies and make resettlement programmes more likely to prevent the impoverishment of 
the displaced population. Firstly, resettlement of people displaced by development can only 
start resembling a fair process if maximum effort is made by the government to make it a 
democratic and participatory one. This is especially so when the decision to implement the 
project itself was neither shared nor democratic.  
Secondly, resettlement programmes must heavily focus on the reconstruction of 
livelihoods after relocation. This implies granting land-for-land compensation whenever 
possible and in a way which mitigates, and not reinforces, the existing inequalities in the 
distribution of land. But more importantly, it means linking resettlement to issues of work 
and employment for the displaced people, namely accompanying resettlement programmes 
with interventions directed at creating employment opportunities in the rural non-farm 
sector, reducing the segmentation of labour markets and the regressivity of certain labour 
relations, and strengthening the position of small and marginal farmers in the agrarian 
sector.  
Thirdly, the more the costs and the benefits of the project are unequally distributed 
among the population, the more there is need to supplement compensation and resettlement 
with some mechanisms of benefit sharing. The most appropriate mechanism should be 
identified in each specific circumstance, however the poorest are the displaced people, the 
more the mechanism should resemble a periodical monetary transfer to each affected family. 
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A periodic monetary transfer, in fact, would effectively support people's consumption also 
in the long term, while re-equilibrating the distribution of the costs and benefits from the 
project. 
In conclusion, the implementation of the three mechanisms just described, that is 
participation in decision making, creation of secure and remunerative employment, and 
periodical cash transfers, would contribute to link resettlement programmes to the broader 
aims of poverty reduction and equitable distribution, thus turning resettlement into a 
progressive process.   
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 VILLAGE QUESTIONNAIRE 
to be completed before/during the visit to the village 
 
[0] descriptive identification of the village 
 
1: DISTRICT  2: MANDAL  
 
 
3:VILLAGE 
NAME 
 4:TYPE OF 
INFORMANT (CODE) 
5: NAME OF 
INFORMANT: 
 6:OTHER 
CHARACTERISTICS 
USEFUL TO IDENTIFY 
THE VILLAGE 
 
 
[2] particulars of field operations 
 
1: DATE  3:any particular 
condition which 
affected the 
subministration of 
the 
questionnaire/the 
collection of data 
 
3:NUMBER AND NAME 
OF RESEARCH 
ASSISTANT(S) 
 
 
 
 [3] availability of some facilities   
 Code 
as from census/ 
official document 
Code 
data collected on 
the field 
Type of approach to the village (paved road-1, 
mud road-2, foot path-3, navigable river-4, 
navigable canal-4) 
  
electricity connection (yes for: street lights – 1, 
household use – 2, agricultural purpose – 3,; no 
–4) 
  
major source of drinking water (tap – 1, tube 
well /hand pump – 2, well – 3, tank / pond 
(reserved for drinking) – 4, other tank /pond –
5, river / canal/lake – 6, spring – 7, others – 9) 
  
main source of irrigation (canal – 1, tube well – 
2, stream/river – 3, tank/pond – 4, well –5, 
others– 9;no irrigation facility– 6) 
  
whether having any co-operative society? 
(yes–1,no–2) 
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whether having any self-help group? (yes – 1, 
no – 2) 
  
whether having any 
government 
development programme / 
scheme relating to: 
drinking water 
(yes – 1, no – 2) 
  
housing (yes – 1, 
no – 2) 
  
sanitation (yes – 
1, no – 2) 
  
approach road 
(yes –1,no–2) 
  
employment 
(yes–1,yes the 
NREGA-2 no–3) 
  
electricity (yes – 
1, no – 2) 
  
watershed/minor 
irrigation (yes – 
1, no – 2) 
  
pension (yes – 1, 
no – 2) 
 
 
 
Children 
education (yes-1, 
no-2) 
  
total literacy 
campaign/adult 
education 
(yes – 1, no – 2) 
  
Is there any NGO working 
in the village? Which is its 
name? 
What kind of activities it 
does? 
 
 
 
 
 
 [4] distance from nearest facility 
 
Distance (info 
from official 
source) 
Distance (code) 
(info collected on the 
field) 
COMMENTS 
NOTES 
panchayat headquarter    
bus stop    
mud road    
all weather/paved road    
post office    
primary school      
secondary school    
college with degree course    
market / weekly market  
 
  
fair price shop    
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primary health centre  
 
  
community health centre/ 
government hospital 
   
Private hospital    
medicine shop    
integrated child 
development centre 
(anganwadi / balwadi) 
   
Bank    
River    
nearest town (which one)    
Resettlement office    
distance code for block 4: within village – 1; outside village: less than 2 km – 2, 2 to 5 km 
– 3,5 to 10 km – 4, 10 km or more – 5 
 
 
[5] Socio-demographic characteristics 
 
  
 INFO 
FROM 
OFFICIA
L 
SOURCE 
INFO 
COLLECTE
D ON THE 
FIELD 
 INFO 
FROM 
OFFICIAL 
SOURCE 
INFO 
COLLECT
ED ON 
THE 
FIELD 
1:No OF 
HHS 
  2:No of people 
(male/female) 
  
3: Presence 
of ST 
(yes/no); in 
which, in 
which %? 
which is the 
main tribe? 
  4:Presence of 
SC (yes –1, no 
– 2).In  which 
percentage ? 
 
  
5: For how 
long has the 
village 
existed? For 
how long has 
the 
community 
lived where it 
is now? 
  6: Is the land 
under the 
5th/6th 
schedule (5th-
1; 6th-2; none-
3) 
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[5] social and economic organization within the village and structure of landholding 
 
 INFO FROM 
OFFICIAL SOURCE 
INFO COLLECTED ON 
THE FIELD 
 
 
 
 
 
1:Is the majority of the families 
landless or small/medium 
farmers? 
 
2:Is there any assigned land 
available in the village? 
How is it managed? 
Is it used for shifting cultivation? 
  
3: How far is the forest? 
 
  
4:Are there any trees in the 
village? How do they share the 
products of the trees? 
  
 
[6] relationship with the dam project 
ONLY INFO COLLECTED ON THE FIELD 
1:Location with respect 
to the dam (1-project 
site, 2-reservoir level) 
distance from the site 
project 
 2:Has 
resettlement 
already 
started? 
(yes–1,no-2)   
 
4: Has the village taken 
part to some kind of 
protest against the dam? 
if yes, what kind of 
protest 
 
6: Have they been told 
when and where they 
will be relocated? 
-when 
-where 
-told by who 
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Appendix II – Household Survey Questionnaire 
QUESTIONNAIRE SERIAL NO. : 
DATE: 
NAME OF RESPONDENT: 
NAME OF COMPILATOR: 
TOTAL TIME TO ADMINISTER THE QUESTIONNAIRE: 
TIME STARTING:                                                     TIME FINISHING: 
 
My name is Chiara Mariotti. I'm a researcher from the University of London, UK. I'm 
studying the Polavaram dam project and its Resettlement &Rehabilitation package. I'm 
interested in particular in understanding the preferences of the affected people regarding the 
kind of compensation provided. In this interview I'll ask you some information regarding 
your family and I'll make you some questions regarding the Polavaram project and the R&R 
package. I'll also ask you to express your preferences regarding different types of 
compensation. Your replies will in no ways affect the compensation that you will receive 
from the Government. My questions are purely hypothetical and they only aim at gaining a 
better understanding of the affected people's opinion regarding displacement and 
compensation. 
I assure you that the information you will provide will be used exclusively for this research 
project and will not be passed to any third party (including the Government or other 
members of your village). 
This interview shall take about  1 hour. 
 
CONSENT FORM (SOAS Ethics Statement) 
I have read, or been informed verbally, about the details of the proposed study. My 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further 
questions at any time. 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and to decline to 
answer any particular question(s). 
I agree to provide information to the researcher(s) on the understanding that my name will 
not be used without my permission (The information will be used only for this research 
project and publications arising from this research project. 
I agree/do not agree to the interview being taped. I understand that I have the right to ask for 
the audio recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview. 
 
I confirm that I'm over the age of 16. 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions initially communicated to me. 
 
 
NAME                                                                                       SIGNED 
 
DATE 
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HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
[0] descriptive identification of sample village 
 
1: DISTRICT  2: MANDAL  
3:VILLAGE 
NAME 
 4:Other characteristics 
useful to identify the village 
or any particular condition 
which affected the 
administration of the 
questionnaire 
 
5:criteria/methods 
used to select the 
household 
 
 
[1] characteristics of the respondent 
1.1:GENDER ----    male 
----     female 
1.2:AGE ----              years 
---- doesn't know/remember 
1.3: 
RELATION 
TO HEAD 
OF THE 
HOUSEHOL
D 
----  self           ---- spouse of married child                 ----  other relatives 
 
---- spouse of head   ----unmarried child      ----  servants/employees/ 
 
---- married child          ----   grandchild        -----      other non-relatives 
 
---- father/mother          ----     brother/sister 
 
---- father-in-law/mother-in-law            ----- brother-in law/sister-in law 
 
[3] household characteristics and household income 
3.1:The household belongs 
to the following social 
group: 
 ---- ST             which tribe?________ 
 
---- SC            ---- BC                      ---- OC 
3.2: primary source of 
energy for cooking 
 
 
3.3: primary source of 
energy for lighting 
 
3.4: How many of the 
following items are owned 
by the members of the 
household all together? 
 
___stools _____sleeping-mats ____watch      
________bicycle 
 
___chairs   ____ __mobile phone      ____fridge          
 
___beds     ____tv    ____radio       ____sewing machine 
        
___matresses    _____motor-bike                   ______ fan 
3.5 Do you own any cattle?  
 
3.6:Which is the household's  
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average monthly income? 
(Rs.0.00) 
 
[4] land ownership 
 
4.1: Does the household  
owns any land? 
 
 
4.2: Extent of land owned  
4.3 Are you cultivating any 
assigned land? If yes, what 
is its extent? 
 
4.4: Are you practising 
irrigation on your land? 
what kind of irrigation? 
 
 
 
 
4.5: Which are the main 
crops produced? Indicate 
whether they are used for 
self-consumption or for 
trade. 
 
4.6: Does the household  
own a document testifying  
the ownership of land? 
 4.7: For how long has the 
household 
(officially/unofficially) 
owned that particular 
piece of land? 
 
4.8: Have you recently 
done any kind of 
improvement/development 
to your land? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9: Are you planning to 
do any kind of 
improvement to your land 
in the near future 
(specify)? 
 
 
 
 
[5] main economic activities 
5.1: Which are the main 
sources of income in your 
family?     
 
5.2: Is the family 
participating in any 
government employment 
scheme/NREGA/food for 
work? 
 
 
5.3: Which are the main 
products that you get from the 
forest? For which of them 
specify: 
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-in which months it is 
available 
-whether you sell it or use for 
self-consumption 
-if you sell it, how much 
money do you get from it 
5.4: Does your family 
practice communal labour 
sharing? 
 
 
 
 
[6] R&R package related questions 
 
6.1: Do you know that you will have to 
leave your house and land and be 
relocated elsewhere because of the 
construction of a dam? 
 
 
 
 
6.2: How did you know about it? Who 
told you? 
 
6.3: Do you discuss what will happen 
with: 
      ____your family                   _____your 
neighbours 
 
      _______the rest of the community 
6.4: Do you know that you're entitled to 
some compensation because of the fact 
that you have to leave your house and 
land? 
 
6.5: Have you heard of the R&R 
package? 
 
 
6.6: Have you already received any form 
of compensation? If yes, what and when? 
 
 
6.7: Have you been contacted by any 
NGO explaining you the R&R package? 
 
 
6.8:Have you or any member of your 
family ever taken part to protest against 
the dam or against the R&R package 
(specify)? 
 
 
6.9: How did you use the compensation 
you received/how do you think you will 
use the compensation you will receive? 
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2 Demographic and other characteristics of household members (for categories of coding see next page) 
2.1 No 
member
s of 
househo
ld 
 
2.2 sex 2.3 age 
(years) 
2.4 
relation 
to head 
(code 1) 
2.5 
Marital 
status 
(code 2) 
2.6 Main occupation  (code 3) 
(INDICATE THE 3 MOST 
IMPORTANT FOR EACH 
MEMBER OF THE 
HOUSEHOLD) 
2.7 General educational 
level (code 4) 
 
 
 
1 
      
2 
 
   
 
   
3 
 
      
4 
 
      
5 
 
      
6 
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Appendix III – Questionnaire for Choice Experiment 
 
335 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHOICE EXPERIMENT   
 
Imagine that the government is making you choose the type of compensation and 
resettlement that you will receive because of displacement, that is you can choose among 
different kinds of R&R packages the one that you prefer. Each kind of package offered has 
different characteristics 
You will be asked to indicate which package/form of compensation you prefer. 
PLEASE REMEMBER THAT: 
-Your preferences will not be revealed to anybody else in the village, unless you wish so. 
-Your answers will in no way affect the compensation that you will actually receive from the 
Government 
-There are no right or wrong answers. Feel free to express your opinion.   
-You can discuss the answer with anybody in  your family and you can change your mind at 
any time during the interview 
 
I will now offer you two different packages. You can choose the package that you prefer to 
receive as form of compensation for being displaced. 
 
EXERCISE 1: Resettleemnt Attributes 
 
Please indicate which package do you prefer between: 
 
 Preferred package Comments 
Package Forest 
versus 
Package Money 
 
________ Forest 
 
________Money 
Indicate tot amount of cash 
compensation offered for package 
Money:_______________ 
Package Forest 
versus 
Package Land for Land 
 
________ Forest 
 
________Land for Land 
 
Package Forest 
versus 
Package Self-
employment 
 
________ Forest 
 
________ Self-employment 
 
Package Forest no 
Village 
versus 
Package Land for Land 
 
________Forest no Village 
 
________Land for Land 
 
 
 
VERSION OF THE PACKAGES USED: ______GENEROUS 
 
______REALISTIC 
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EXERCISE 2: Willingness to Accept 
 
Please indicate which package do you prefer between .....? 
 Preferred package Comments 
Package Instalments 
versus 
Package Land for Land 
_____Instalments 
 
_____Land for Land 
 
Did the respondent express the reason of the preference for F or C? If yes, what is 
this reason? (to be answered by research assistant) 
 
 
EXERCISE 3: Compensation in Installments 
 
Please indicate which package do you prefer between : 
 Preferred package Comments 
Package Money 
versus 
Package Money no community 
with 30.000Rs 
________Money 
 
________ Money no 
community 
 
 
Package Money 
versus 
Package Money no community 
with 50.000 Rs 
 
________Money 
 
________ Money no 
community 
 
 
Package Money 
versus 
Package Money no community 
with 100.000 Rs 
 
_______Money 
 
________ Money no 
community 
 
 
If Money no community is never a preferred option, than ask the respondent the following: 
is there an amount of money that you're willing to accept in order to be relocated without 
your community? How much is it?/Which is the minimum amount of money that you're 
willing to accept in exchange of being relocated without your community? 
 
________________________Rs 
 
 To be answered by research assistant: 
Did the respondent take much time to answer exercise 3? 
Did he consult his family? 
There was any disagreement with members of the family? 
 Did he discuss the answer with other members of the community? 
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EXERCISE  4: Ranking 
 
Please rank in order of preference the following packages: Forest, Money, Land for Land, 
Self-employment 
 
1: (most preferred):  ______ 
 
 
2:                              ______ 
 
 
3:                              ______ 
 
 
4: (least preferred)   ______ 
 
Did the respondent express the reasons for his/her choice? If yes, which are these reasons? 
Did he make any particular comments about the packages? (to be answered by research 
assistant) 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS ON THE CONDITIONS OF THE INTERVIEW (to be answered by the 
research assistant) 
Were other members of the family present during the choice experiment? 
 
 
Did they take part to the discussion and to the final decision? 
 
In particular, was the wife consulted (in case she wasn't the respondent)? 
 
 
Were other members of the community present during the choice experiment? 
 
Did they take part to the discussion? 
 
 
Do you think that their presence influenced the choices of the respondent? 
 
 
RESPONSE CODE (for the whole interview): 
Response code: informant was: co-operative and capable -1, co-operative but not capable -
2,busy -3, reluctant - 4, others –5  
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Appendix IV – Cards used to represent the resettlement packages offered 
in the Choice Experiment 
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340 
 
341 
 
 
342 
 
 
 
343 
 
344 
 
345 
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Appendix V – Questionnaire for Focus Groups (preliminary and ex-post 
focus groups) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VILLAGE FOCUS GROUP 
(PRELIMINARY FOCUS GROUP) 
 
1) OPENING (introduction/ice-breaking) 
 
2) INTRODUCTION OF THE TOPIC 
 
3) DISCUSSION TOPICS AND KEY QUESTIONS 
 
o GENERAL KNOWLEDGE AND FEELING ABOUT THE PROJECT AND 
ABOUT BEING DISPLACED/RELOCATED 
 
-What do you know about the project? Do you know why the dam is built? 
-do you know that you will have to be displaced because of the project? 
-who told you about the project? Who told you about displacement? 
-what do you think of the project? 
-which are your general feelings about being displaced/having to leave your land (HOW 
TO WORD IT?) are you worried/afraid/happy..... 
           -does someone see anything good in this? Do you see any advantages in being 
relocated? 
           -are you discussing what will happen with your family/community? 
    
o ESTIMATION OF THE LOSSES 
I would now make some questions more specifically on the losses that you will have 
because of displacement 
-do you feel that you're going to lose something because you will be displaced? 
-what do you think you will lose because of displacement? 
-can you make a distinction between material and non material losses? 
 
o DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
-do you know when and where you will be displaced? 
-how did you know about this? did someone from the government came to tell you? 
If yes, who? When? What were you told exactly? 
-have you been consulted about the R&R package? 
-is some NGO working in the village? What does it say about the project? 
-during election time were you visited by politicians making promises about R&R 
and compensation? 
 
o COMPENSATION and R&R PACKAGE 
 
We would like to discuss with you what do you think a fair compensation for your losses 
is/what do you think the government should give you to compensate for your losses. We 
would also like to discuss the characteristics of the Resettlement&Rehabilitation package-
how would you like the package to be. 
 
            a) COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
-if you have to make a choice, what would you prefer as compensation: 
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- own piece of land 
-only access to Common Property Resources 
-both (but smaller quantities) 
 
b) HOUSING 
 -if the government were to provide you a new house, how would you like it to be? 
-would you prefer to be relocated in a village/in a small town? 
 
c) CASH 
  -imagine cash compensation is the only kind of compensation that you are given. 
How much do you think a fair cash compensation would be? 
  -how would you use this money? 
 
           d) EMPLOYMENT 
   -when relocated, what kind of job would you like to do? The same you're doing 
now or something else? 
  -would you like the government to teach you a new job when relocated? If yes, 
which one? 
 
           e) RELOCATION WITH TRIBE/CAST/COMMUNITY 
   -how important it is for you to be relocated with your 
tribe/community/caste/whole village? 
 
 
4) ENDING QUESTIONS/CONCLUSIONS/THANKS/REFRESHMENT (all things 
considered, which is the final position of the participants) 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VILLAGE FOCUS GROUP 
(EX-POST FOCUS GROUP) 
 
 
 
Do you know why the dam is built? Do you think you will get any benefit from the project? 
 
Which are your feeling about leaving your land and your house? 
 
How do you imagine your life in the new place? 
 
Which are the advantages and disadvantages of the relocation place? 
 
What do you think you will lose because of displacement? 
 
Do you know when and where you will be displaced? 
 
Did you participate to any kind of protest against the project? Can you tell me what 
happened? 
 
Did you already receive any kind of compensation? What? When? 
 
Do you feel the compensation that you received is fair? 
 
What would you like to receive in exchange of having to leave your house and your land 
and be relocated somewhere else? What do you think the government should give as 
compensation? [It's 
 
Did you receive any compensation for the trees? 
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Appendix VI - Main Sources on the Polavaram dam project   
 
 
- Government of Andhra Pradesh, Project Report of Polavaram major irrigation project, 
Hyderabad 1981-82. 
 
- Government of Andhra Pradesh, Polavaram Project Environmental Impact Appraisal 
Report, Irrigation Department, May 1985 (usually referred to as 1985 EIA). 
 
- Reddy, N. Subba, Polavaram Project: report on resettlement and rehabilitation of the 
displaced, Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad 1996. 
This is considered the most serious and reliable attempt to survey the affected population, 
its main limitation being that it is now outdated. 
 
- Government of India, National Water Development Agency (NWDA), Feasibility Report 
of Polavaram (Godavari)- Krishna (Vijayawada) Link Project, 1995 (circulated in 1999). 
- Government of Andhra Pradesh, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and 
Environmental Management Plan (EMP), in two volumes prepared by Agricultural Finance 
Corporation: 
2. Indira Sagar (Polavaram): a multipurpose major irrigation project, Volume I; 
Irrigation and CAD Department, 2005; 
3. Volume II: Resettlement and rehabilitation project affected persons economic 
rehabilitation plan (PAPERP), September 2005.  
The quality and the comprehensiveness of the 2005 EIA is contested and for instance it 
does not contain any information on the impacts on ecology, wildlife and habitat disruption. 
The resettlement plan has been reported to be  patchy and poorly planned.   
 
The only one of the aforementioned documents to which I had direct access is the NWDA's 
feasibility study. As for the content of the others, I had indirect access through a number of 
independent reports: 
 
- Patrik Osskarsson, Polavaram multi-purpose project. A 25 year old “solution” for all 
water problems in northern Andhra Pradesh returns to haunt tribal communities, June 
2005, a report by SAMATA, Hyderabad, India. 
 
- R. Uma Maheshwari, Godavari. Yet another dam, yet another story, Peace, New Delhi 
2007  
 
- Gujja, B. et al., Perspectives on Polavaram, a major irrigation project on Godavari, New 
Delhi, Academic Foundation in collaboration with WWF-India and Sakti, 2006.  
 
- Stewart, T., R. Rao, India's dam shame : why Polavaram Dam must not be built, 
Secunderabad, Gramya Resource Centre for Women, 2006. 
 
During my fieldwork I had access to a number of internal administrative documents on the 
state of advancement of the resettlement operations; recently, detailed information on 
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resettlement in Polavaram has been made available on the website of the Commissioner of 
Resettlement & Rehabilitation of the Government of Andhra Pradesh 
(http://www.aprr.gov.in/). I have extensively relied on the information from these sources in 
chapter 5. 
For up-to-date information on events concerning the project I have relied on national and 
local newspaper and magazine articles published online. Finally, the only journal to 
regularly publish articles on Polavaram (usually in the form of short commentary or 
reportage) is the Economic and Political Weekly. 
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Appendix VII - Main benefits under the Andhra Pradesh Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation Policy, 2005 
 
 
 
LAND COMPENSATION 
For Scheduled Tribe Project Affected Families: 
-Affected families who become small, marginal or landless farmers after acquisition, in 
lieu of the land acquired from them are given land compensation in the following 
modalities: to the extent of the land acquires from them, or 2.5 ha of dry land or 1.25 ha 
of wet land (whichever is lower). For the land in excess of 2.5 ha or 1.25 ha, cash 
compensation is given. 
For Non-Scheduled Tribe Project Affected Families: 
-Cash compensation is paid to non-tribal families whose land is expropriated by the 
project.  
-Allotment of waste/degraded land in lieu of acquired land can be provided to those (tribal 
and non tribal) families who become landless or small or marginal farmers after 
acquisition, provided that such land is available and the affected families agreed to it. If 
they do, they will also be given financial assistance of Rs 10,000 per hectare for land 
development and Rs 5,000 for agricultural production. 
 
 
HOUSE CONSTRUCTION AND RELOCATION SITE 
-A free house site is provided to each project displaced families, with the following 
characteristics: 202 Sq.mts in Rural areas and 75 Sq. meters in Urban areas, besides the 
payment of compensation for the lost structures. 
-A house construction grant of RS 50,000 (plus Rs 3,000 for sanitary latrines) is paid for 
families below the poverty line including sanitary latrines (families which are not below 
the poverty line are not entitled to this assistance). 
-A resettlement colony is provided with basic amenities and infrastructure: drinking 
water, internal roads, drainage, electricity, primary school, playground, community hall, 
approach road, community centres. 
-Families belonging to the same community are to be resettled in a compact area.  
-Each adult son residing with a project-affected family at the time of notification will be 
treated as a separate family. 
-The tribal affected families which are relocated outside the Fifth Schedule Area will 
receive an increase of the R&R monetary benefits of 25%. 
 
 
WAGE AND ALLOWANCES 
-750 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage for loss of livelihood if after 
the acquisition of land the owner becomes landless if no land is allotted in lieu of the 
acquired land; 
-500 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as one-time financial 
assistance if after the acquisition of land the owner becomes marginal farmer if no land is 
allotted in lieu of the acquired land; 
-375 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as one-time financial 
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assistance if after the acquisition of land the owner becomes small farmer if no land is 
allotted in lieu of the acquired land; 
-625 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as one-time financial 
assistance for labourers; 
     -240 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as one-time financial 
assistance for each displaced family (for the affected families which are also displaced 
families); 
-500 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as compensation for the loss of 
customary rights and usage of forest produce for tribal affected families; 
-500 days @ 85 Rs per day of minimum agricultural wage as one-time financial 
assistance to each non-tribal affected family who is a member of a registered Fishermen 
co operative Society/Fishing license holders in the affected zone as compensation for the 
loss of fishing rights. The tribal and non tribal families which have fishing rights in the 
river/pond/dam and which are members of registered Fishermen co operative 
Society/Fishing license holders will also be given fishing rights in the reservoir area. 
-A pension of 500 Rs per month for life is given to each vulnerable person.170 
-Rs 25,000 Financial Assistance for construction of workshed/shops for the project-
affected families which are self-employed (as rural artisans or small traders). 
OTHER 
Each Project-Affected Family will receive: 
-15,000 Rs financial assistance for construction of a new cattle shed; 
-5,000 Rs for transportation charges (of people/material) from the old to the new place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
170  Vulnerable persons are defined as (Para 5.4): disabled, destitute, orphans, widows, unmarried girls, 
abandoned women or persons above fifty years of age, who are not provided or can not immediately be 
provided with alternative livelihood and who are not otherwise covered as part of a family. The definition has 
been amended in 2009 to make it more inclusive and less discriminatory towards women and elderly people. 
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Appendix VIII -  The failure of Resettlement: empirical evidence 
 
As discussed in section 1.4, the predominance of a discourse around development-induced 
displacement with a reformist-managerial attitude has led to a shift in focus to the process 
of resettlement. Moreover, as a consequence of the World Bank's own admission, there 
exists a common agreement that resettlement practice has failed in preventing the 
impoverishment of the affected population. The failure of resettlement is therefore the point 
of departure for most of the existing literature on the topic, and expedients to make 
resettlement more effective are one of the main objects of research.  
The negative effects of displacement and the impoverishment impact of resettlement had of 
course been noticed - and indeed investigated - before the World Bank acknowledged them. 
The first influential studies to appear mainly concerned projects in Africa. The resettlement 
plan (and failure) of the Akosombo dam on the Volta river in Ghana, for instance, was 
extensively investigated at the end of the 1960s by Robert Chambers among others (1970), 
who had previously published one of the first reviews of resettlement schemes in Africa 
(1969). In 1971 another classic study was published, on the impact of the Kariba 
resettlement scheme on the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia (Colson 1971). Ten years later a 
book appeared on the Aswan High Dam project in Egypt (Fahim 1981). 
Two investigations of the impact of displacement and resettlement worldwide appeared in 
1981 and 1982 respectively, by Thayer Scudder and by Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-
Smith. The work of these authors was seminal in framing resettlement as a separate field of 
study, with theoretical as well as policy relevance. Since the 1990s, major contributions 
have come from Cernea's IRR model and attempts to empirically apply it by a number of 
authors (see for instance Thangaraj 1996, Mahapatra 1999, Muggah 2000). The 
popularization of resettlement as a field of study, as a policy problem and a concern for 
social movements all around the world has also come from the international attention 
dedicated to two major dam projects located in Asia: the Three Gorges Dam in China and 
the Sardar Sarovar project in India. 
The empirical literature on resettlement of people displaced by development projects and its 
shortcomings is therefore extensive; it draws from a number of disciplines and it has a 
considerable geographical and sectoral span. This thesis takes this literature as a point of 
departure, offering a different perspective on the factors determining the failure of 
resettlement. It does not aim therefore at providing an exhaustive review of the empirical 
evidence on the topic. Suggesting an alternative perspective does however require specific 
definitions of concepts and practices when we talk of the failure of resettlement. For this 
purpose, the eight risks of impoverishment identified by the IRR model have been chosen 
as an organising principle. For each risk, an example of a resettlement programme which 
has failed to prevent or mitigate that risk is described below, drawing on the existing 
literature. In this way, a sample of case-studies of the failure of resettlement is provided, 
which also serves to clarify the meaning of the risks identified by the IRR model. 
 
Risk of Landlessness 
When displacement involves the expropriation of land used for productive purposes, the 
economic base and the source of livelihood of the affected population is disrupted. Unless 
the affected population is put in the condition to recover the lost assets and use them to 
rebuild a new livelihood, expropriation of land means de-capitalization and pauperisation. 
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This is in fact the most common – as well as probably the most serious – form of 
resettlement failure. 
In the volume Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees (Cernea 
and McDowell 2000), Ranjit Nayak reports the experiences of the Kisan tribe of Orissa and 
the consequences of land deprivation. Around 100,000 people belonging to the Kisan 
Scheduled Tribe were affected by the construction of the Mandira Dam at Rourkela in the 
Indian state of Orissa, which started in 1957 and was designed to provide water for the 
Rourkela Steel Plant. Land belonging to 15 tribal villages was acquired by the government 
and three different forms of compensation (cash, land, and employment) were provided in 
exchange for the lost land.171 The fieldwork study conducted by the author 40 years after 
displacement, found that all three types of compensation had failed;  many families had 
become landless and impoverished, and other aspects of their life had also deteriorated. 
For instance, wasteland had been allotted for the land compensation scheme, so that even 
the few families which did receive land, were not able to engage in profitable farming after 
relocation. The additional subsidy of 100 rupees per acre promised by the government was 
never  paid. As for the cash-for-land compensation scheme, this might have been fairer (as 
the  estimated figures were reported to be in line with the market price of land), if the 
money had actually been paid. However, more than 80% of the population did not receive 
the money promised, and those who did, exhausted it in a short period of time on petty 
consumption. Finally, the policy of preferential reservation in government services for each 
displaced family (employment for land compensation) promised by the government turned 
out to be impossible to implement, firstly for administrative reasons, and secondly, due to 
the inadequate skill levels of the affected population. 
 
Risk of Joblessness 
When displacement occurs, the affected people can find themselves unemployed and 
unable to engage in a sustainable income-earning activity, either because their land has 
been expropriated and not properly compensated, or simply due to their moving to another 
location,. In some cases the displaced people are employed in project-related activities, but 
this is rarely a sustainable solution. Creating new jobs for the displaced people- who are 
often low-skilled and with an agricultural background, is indeed one of the main challenges 
of resettlement. 
This is the problem faced by Coal India Limited (CIL) in Orissa, for instance, as described 
by Hari Mohan Mathur in a number of studies (2008 and 2011). Since coal extraction from 
underground mines is a very labour intensive activity, CIL mining projects were able in the 
past to absorb a large share of the work force made available by displacement. However, 
when coal extraction shifted to open caste mines (which are capital intensive) CIL has been 
increasingly less able to offer jobs in lieu of lost land. Moreover, the CIL policy on 
resettlement (adopted in 1994 under the World Bank's supervision) releases the company 
from the obligation of providing a job to each displaced family. While this helped the 
company to reduce the weight of overstaffing, it made implementation and management of 
resettlement more difficult. The policy in fact did require the company to provide 
compensation for the loss of all economic assets to all families (including landless families) 
in a situation of decreasing availability of agricultural land. The new resettlement strategy 
focused therefore on self-employment. 
                                                           
171  Unfortunately the author does not provide information on the criteria according to which the different 
forms of compensation were allocated (or were supposed to be allocated, as he finds that in most cases actual 
compensation was not delivered at all) and whether in some cases they overlapped. 
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With the support of the World Bank, from 1994 to 1999 the new policy was applied to 25 
open caste mines in 5 different states, with a total of 2129 project-affected families and 
6,532 targeted for self-employment. However, the self-employment programme that was 
implemented failed in attracting the interest of the affected families (at the end of 1999 
barely 25% of the entitled affected population had taken part in the programme, and those 
attending the training course were more interested in the monetary incentive attached to the 
course's participation than by the real service provided). Nor did the programme create real 
employment opportunities. By mid 2002, when the project closed, 1724 project-affected 
persons had completed training. The feedback that they provided suggested that the self-
employment scheme had not been able to provide income on a sustainable basis, especially 
for people with a traditional agriculture background. 
 
Risk of Homelessness 
House compensation might appear to be the easiest and the least controversial resettlement 
activity, nonetheless being relocates in  an adequate shelter is an eventuality often faced by 
the displaced people. For instance, problems can arise if house compensation is paid at 
assessed value rather than at replacement value, or the conditions of the resettlement site 
are poor. If the housing  at the resettlement site is deemed unsatisfactory by the people, they 
might devote a substantial part of the compensation received for other purposes to improve 
them. While this can increase their sense of ownership of the new home, it also reduces the 
capital available to be invested in creating a new livelihood. 
When displacement concerns forced evictions from slums, lack of space, real estate 
speculation and urban policies may further contribute to homelessness. The plan set up in 
2003 to convert Mumbai into a World Class City172 constitutes a clear example of this. 
According to Birkinshaw and Harris (2009), the urban transformations encompassed by the 
plan have been negatively affecting the poorest inhabitants of the city, especially through 
displacement. Between 2004 and 2005, for instance, the Mumbai authorities have 
demolished 90,000 homes, affecting approximately 350,000 people, including pavement 
dwellers (COHRE 2006). For 80,000 of the houses which were demolished, no provision 
for rehabilitation was given (IPTEHR 2005:45). According to the Indian People's Tribunal, 
there simply is no affordable housing for the poor available in the city (ibidem). Indeed, 
while the plan foresees a 90%reduction of slums, the rate of housing construction for 
relocation purposes of 3,000 units per year is far from being sufficient to accommodate the 
people already displaced and the two million  or more people still facing eviction (COHRE 
2006).   
 
Risk of Increased morbidity and mortality and food insecurity 
Resettlement, in conjunction with the other types of impoverishment risks, often implies a 
combination of decrease in food production and a substantial change in dietary patterns, 
which often lead to increase in malnutrition and general worsening of the health status of 
the resettled community. Displacement and resettlement can also induce an increase in 
morbidity and mortality because of the social and psychological stress that they cause, and 
the enhanced exposure to parasitic and vector-borne diseases at the relocation site, where 
unsafe water supply and poor sewage systems are often the norm. 
These effects were found by Kedia (2008) in his study of the Garwhali population in 
                                                           
172  See Vision Mumbai: Transforming Mumbai into a World Class City, a plan created by the 
international corporate consultants McKinsey & Company (linked to the IMF) in association with the 
Government of Maharashtra. See also The right to the “World Class City'? City visions and evictions in 
Mumbai (Birkinshaw and Harris 2009). 
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Uttaranchal (India), displaced by the Tehri dam between 1978 and 2004, which affected 
100,000 people belonging to 125 villages.. Through extensive fieldwork, the author found 
that the health and nutrition conditions of the resettled population had considerably 
deteriorated (together with a generalised worsening of their living conditions). Multiple 
mechanisms were responsible for this. In the first place the resettlers' dietary intake had 
changed, shifting from a locally produced, diversified and protein-rich diet to a market-
purchased, nutrient-poor and high carbohydrate diet. The shift had been mainly due to the 
decreased access to freely available products (fish, wild plants, fruits, roots, and herbs) and 
the reduction in crops for self-consumption (replaced by cash crops). Moreover, the 
resettlement site was already contaminated with various disease-causing micro-organisms, 
against which the displaced population had no immunity. Disease vulnerability was 
aggravated by the new climate, poor hygiene practices, and the absence of a sewage and 
garbage collection system. Finally displacement had caused stress, depression and anxiety 
in many people. 
 
Risk of Social disarticulation  
Displacement and resettlement can break or weaken the ties which bond families and 
communities, and disrupt the traditional patterns of social articulation, on the basis of 
which family and community life reproduces itself. The informal networks which maintain 
social life are put at risk by displacement, and the result is the disarticulation of 
communities and the loss of reciprocity networks. 
To show how this can happen, Behura and Nayak (1993) report the experience of the 
village of Khemala in Orissa, displaced by the construction of the Rengali Dam. 
Resettlement started in 1982 and involved 260 families, of which 146 were resettled 
together in a new village of the same name. Resettlement seriously altered the traditional 
mechanisms of production, reproduction and interaction of family and community life, 
which were based on kinship and caste relationships. 
Inadequate compensation and resettlement in fact led to the breakdown of the extended 
family. The hardship of displacement had put the affected families in the conditions of 
needing and relying more on support from kinsmen, while their capacity to reciprocate this 
support had declined, putting at stake the ties on which kinship was based. Besides this, no 
additional resettlement package (homestead and cultivable land) had been planned for 
unmarried sons, who, since the start of resettlement, had married and formed separate 
families. The latter had to resettle with the original family and share a plot of land 
insufficient to provide support for everybody. A similar, but even more dysfunctional 
dynamic occurred for the families which were only given cash compensation. 
Caste association in the resettlement village also changed. As many low castes among the 
displaced population preferred to accept cash compensation and relocate away from the rest 
of the community, inter-caste services (like washing clothes, disposing of dead-animals, 
cutting hair and fingernails, considered as polluting activities) were no longer available, and 
the upper castes had to perform these services themselves.173 As a result they were not able 
to form social and economic alliances with other upper castes of the region, which 
exacerbated their economic decline. This change in social roles also contributed to a change 
in the patterns of marriages, with a disappearance of the exogamy rule. As a result of  
impoverishment and/or caste pollution, many sons and daughters of the displaced families 
                                                           
173  Despite the end of this type of subordinate relationship with the upper castes, the lower castes did 
not benefit from the situation, as they lost their jobs and struggled to find agricultural wage employment in the 
new settlement.  
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were not considered desirable marriage matches and were forced to marry within the 
displaced village. This further limited the possibility of creating alliances with other 
families, which could have helped with the economic recovery of the village. As a result of 
all these dynamics, village unity eroded and the community found itself unable to maintain 
social obligations and generally unable to perpetuate political, economic and ritual 
coordination.174 
 
Risk of Loss of Access to Common Property Resources  
When people's livelihoods are heavily dependent upon Common Property Resources 
(CPRs), they may face a deterioration of their living conditions following resettlement. The 
right to common property is in fact rarely recognized by governments, and few legal 
systems guarantee compensation for loss of common property (especially for resources 
other than land and for uses other than farming, such as grazing, fishing, and the use of 
forest products). As suggested by Koenig and Diarra (2000), access to CPRs also has a 
political dimension which is rarely acknowledged and accounted for. The two authors 
explore the effects of resettlement on access to common property resources with reference 
to the Manantali dam in Mali, and the ensuing displacement of 10,000 people. They find 
that access to CPRs declined considerably after resettlement, despite significant attention 
during the design of the resettlement plan. 
They point out that one of the problems often encountered by planners is the incorrect 
evaluation of the quantity, quality and variety of the resources used at the original site and 
of those needed at the resettlement location. Authorities also often underestimate changes in 
natural resources exploitation patterns likely to occur because of resettlement. In Manantali 
for instance, the usual path followed by nomadic pastoralists was modified by the increase 
in water levels in the Bafing river. As a consequence most of the herders started using the 
Manantali bridge, crowding into the neighbouring villages and fomenting conflicts with the 
local farmers.  
Another common failure concerns the management of CPRs after resettlement, especially 
of newly introduced collective resources. The Manantali resettlement project failed to 
adequately prepare villagers for the management of village water pumps. Years after 
resettlement several pumps had ceased to work  because the population considered the 
pumps to be the property of the resettlement authority and deemed it responsible for their 
maintenance. 
 
Resettlement and Gender Issues  
The IRR model has been criticised for its lack of specific attention to gender issues linked 
to the impoverishment process (Scudder 2005). An increasing number of studies however 
are concerned with how resettlement can fail to address and in fact worsen the gender bias 
in its multiple dimensions (see for instance Mehta 2009). It therefore seems appropriate to 
include an example of this dynamic in this review. 
A study of resettlement in the Three Gorges Project in China (Tan 2008) found that as a 
result of resettlement, women are left worse off than men, and face a higher risk of 
impoverishment. The main reason is the inability of women to achieve occupational 
mobility at the resettlement site, so that they are forced to stay at home or be employed in 
agriculture, where pay is low. The generalised inability to create non-farm employment in 
                                                           
174 Social disarticulation then implies the breakdown of  traditional community ties, but not necessarily 
the end of exploitative relationships based on caste, which instead might be reinforced by the increased 
economic insecurity (see also Chapter 8). 
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rural areas, along with the segmented labour market, the lower education level of women, 
and social prejudice all contribute to make resettlement more challenging for women. 
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Appendix IX – Maps of Polavaram 
 
Figures 5.2-5.5 in chapter 5 contain different maps of the Polavaram project, the affected 
area and the submergence villages. 
In particular, map 5.2 shows the tract of the river along which submersion will take place, 
as well as the two types of terrain present in this area (hilly forest closer to Polavaram, plain 
north-west of the Sabari river). Map 5.3 comes from one of the internal government 
documents I had access to. It is of poor quality, yet it clearly shows the submergence area 
(the shaded area in the map) and how this is distributed in the three districts (West 
Godavari, East Godavari, Khammam). The area shaded in green is reproduced in map 5.4. 
The latter is an extract of a much larger map I was given by the RDO of the West Godavari 
district, showing the submergence villages and the rehabilitation colonies for the West 
Godavari and partially for the East Godavari districts. The extract reported in the thesis 
shows the West and East Godavari affected villages which are located in the Papikondalu 
hills, where the forest is denser and the villages are more isolated. The seven immediately 
affected villages are also represented in the map, these are all located in close proximity to 
the dam barriage. The villages that I visited during fieldwork are underlined in red. Finally, 
map 5.5 depicts the Polavaram project after completion, showing the Right and the Left 
canal and their command area.  
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Appendix	X	–	Pictures	of	Polavaram	
 
Picture 1. Works for the construction of the Right Main Canal of the Polavaram Project 
 
 
Picture 2. Israel watching the construction works of the barriage of the Polavaram dam 
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Picture 3. The location of the barriage of the dam  across the Godavari river 
 
 
Picture 4. Land to be submerged in the proximity of the village of Devaragondi 
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